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Abstract 
Rates of unconscious plagiarism were investigated using Brown and Murphy's 3-stage 
paradigm. Initially, participants completed the creative Alternate Uses Test (generation 
phase) and then at test, recalled their original ideas (recall-own phase) and generated 
new ideas (generate-new phase). In both of the testing phases, participants plagiarised 
by reporting someone else's ideas as either their own idea or a new idea. Plagiarism rates 
increased over a one week retention interval (Experiment 2) and both active and passive 
participants were equally likely to plagiarise someone else's idea as a new idea 
(Experiment 1). When an elaboration phase was incorporated into the paradigm, 
following idea generation, different types of elaboration had clear and consistent effects 
on participant performance. Elaboration by rating ideas positively and negatively 
improved correct recall (Experiment 3) and rating the imaginability of ideas (Imagery-
elaboration IE) and improving the ideas in three ways (generative-elaboration GE) also 
increased correct recall to a comparable degree (Experiment 4). In the generate-new 
phase, these different types of elaboration either reduced plagiarism (Experiment 4) or did 
not affect the level of plagiarism relative to control (Experiment 3, 5, 6, 7 & 8). However, 
in the recall-own phase, the GE alone consistently led to the highest levels of unconscious 
plagiarism (relative to IE or control, Experiment 4, 5, 6, 8). This pattern prevailed when 
participants were encouraged not to plagiarise by means of a financial incentive 
(Experiment 5) or when their memory was assessed more stringently by a source 
monitoring task (Experiment 9). IE did not result in such recalled intrusions, even when it 
was matched in terms of content to the GE (Experiment 6) or when IE was repeated (3 
days after generation) and thus strengthened (Experiment 7). Also, strengthening IE did 
not affect plagiarism levels in a source monitoring task (Experiment 11). Strengthening 
GE, on the other hand served to dramatically inflate the observable intrusions in both a 
recall-own task (Experiment 8) and in a source monitoring task (Experiment 10). 
Therefore, contrary to a strength account, the probability of plagiarising another's ideas as 
one's own is linked to the generative nature of the elaboration performed on that idea, 
rather than its familiarity. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings will 
be discussed. 
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1. Introduction and Review of Previous Literature 
1.1 Introduction to thesis 
The need to correctly attribute a memory, a thought, or an idea to its origin is 
important for normal human interaction and is inherent in most facets of everyday life 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Inevitably, mistakes in this attribution process 
may occur in life where two information sources become confused. Memories are not 
objective snapshots of the past but rather subjective reconstructions of events that are 
vulnerable to post-event information (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Misinformation provided 
after an event may be integrated into a person's memory, modifying an Individual's belief 
of what was personally experienced. While these modifications may be relatively minor 
(e.g. a stop sign becoming a yield sign; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978) or more acute (e.g. 
fictional memories of a wounded animal at a tragic bomb scene; Nourkova, Bernstein & 
Loftus, 2004), distinguishing the sources of these facts without corroboration can be 
extremely difficult (Loftus, 2002). Moreover, post-event suggestion is used in a range of 
techniques and has been demonstrated to plant and create entirely false memories (see 
Loftus & Bernstein, 2005). For example, these distortions have occurred where children, 
through 'strong suggestion', have been convinced that they were 'lost In the mall' when 
they were a child (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). More pertinently, similar studies have shown 
that these powerful false beliefs can also be induced for traumatic events (e.g. being 
attacked by an animal; Porter. Yuille & Lehman, 1999), seemingly unlikely events (e.g. 
that they had witnessed a person being demonically possessed when they were a child; 
Mazzoni, Loftus & Kirsch, 2001) and even impossible events (e.g. meeting Bugs Bunny, 
who is a Warner brother character, at Disney Land; Braun, Ellis & Loftus, 2002). 
Remari<ably for these events, participants have also confidently provided details and 
expressed emotion about these false memories of fabricated events (e.g. they remember 
hugging/shaking hands with Bugs Bunny Grinley, 2002 as cited by Loftus & Bernstein, 
2005). 
Recently, similar false memories have been observed in monozygotic and 
dizygotic twins, but without any experimental intervention. For example, such memory 
errors occurred where one twin was involved in an event but where both twins claimed 
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ownership of the event memory (Sheen, Kemp & Rubin, 2001). The nature of the events 
in question varied from mundane events (Kunlay, Gulgoz & Tekcan, 2004) lo quite 
significant events such as running away from home (Sheen et al. 2001). What may have 
caused one of the twins to possess a false belief? Unconscious plagiarism is a 
conceptually related type of source confusion that occurs when an individual assumes 
ownership of an idea that is not their own. Indeed one could argue here that one of the 
twins has plagiarised (stolen) the other's memories. In both real life and in the laboratory, 
people unconsciously plagiarise experienced information by reproducing it under the 
illusion that it is new, or that they originally produced it. This phenomenon has particular 
implications for those who work in a creative discipline and strive to produce something 
high-quality and novel. When someone presents an idea as an original creation, can they 
be sure that the idea is really new and not a copy or mild alteration of something they 
have previously encountered? 
There have been many documented cases of unconscious plagiarism over the 
years that include high profile cases where public claims have been made about the 
originality of the work. These cases are not restricted by time or discipline. For example, 
cases have emerged from Freud's theory of bisexuality (1901/1960), to more recent cases 
of music copyright infringement (Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, 2000)\ This thesis 
intends to explore the conceptions of unconscious plagiarism with regard to the legal 
system (copyright infringement) and academic institutions (unconscious plagiarism), in 
terms of definition, accusation and punishment. Prior experimental research will be 
reviewed and discussed in the context of two theoretical perspectives that seek to explain 
this important phenomenon. 
1.2 Legal I s s u e s 
Plagiarism is derived from the Latin word 'plagiarius' meaning 'kidnapper' and has been 
loosely and variously defined as cheating, stealing, dishonesty, deception (Carroll, 1992) 
and uncritically making an idea one's own (Saalbach, 1970). Although definitions of 
plagiarism vary from one era and one culture to the next (Martin, 1971), unequivocally 
Three Boys Music v. Michael Bohon, 212 F.3d. 477 (9th Cir. 2000) 
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plagiarism is regarded as theft or the expropriation of someone else's work without 
permission or appropriate referencing of the original source (Bournemouth University, 
2005). A high profile area where plagiarism is apparent is in music copyright infringement. 
A general guide to copyright infringement is that there are three conditions that need to be 
met before a defendant may be charged with 'plagiarism' in this domain (McCready, 
2005):^ 
1) Does the plaintiff own a valid copyright in the material allegedly copied? 
In both the UK and the USA an instant copyright infringement/violation is sought when a 
song is sampled without permission. The use of samples without appropriate 
authorisation can result in heavy penalties as the sound recording copyright (that is 
usually owned by an artist or their record company) and the copyright in the song itself 
(that is usually owned by the songwriter or their music publishing company) is violated. If 
a plaintiff owns a valid copyright on the material allegedly copied, then this condition is 
satisfied and the next two conditions are investigated before one's liability is determined. 
2) Has the plagiariser had access to the works? 
This is where the accused must have had a reasonable opportunity to view the plaintiffs 
work (Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods.. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp, 1977)^. A 
copyrighted song that had received vast media attention nationwide (i.e. via radio, 
television etc) would be deemed popular and accordingly, the likelihood that the accused 
would have been exposed to the song would be high. In this instance, one's potential 
access to the song is easy to establish and difficult to oppose. On the other hand, 
demonstrating and establishing access to a song that was only advertised on a demo 
record with an isolated distribution is more difficult (although not impossible); access must 
not be based on speculation. Fundamentally at this stage, the stronger the demonstration 
of access, the more easily copyright infringement is to accuse (McCready, 2005). 
3) Is the copied work substantially similar? 
If the conditions for access are not met then a case of infringement may still be made on 
the basis of the 'substantial similarity* between two musical pieces (Smith vs. MCA. Inc.. 
^ The highlighted condiiions for copj^ight infringement are proposed as an elementary guide because 
discussing absolute (complex) copyright law is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
^ Sid and Marty JCrofft Television Prods.. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977) 
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1987)"*. This legal definition of substantial similarity in the USA and UK is deliberately 
vague, so it resides with the judge or jury to use their discretion to evaluate the extent of 
the similarity of each individual case, based on the context particulars. Verdicts of 
substantial similarity greatly differ for example, in the case of Hawkes & Sons v. 
Paramount Film Services (1934 as cited by Challis, 2003) twenty seconds (of 4 minutes) 
of a musical work used without permission, was deemed infringement. However, currently 
rulings appear more stringent and infringement may be regarded, if a listener can easily 
identify a similar sounding piece of music from one musical bar. Hence, any 
"recognisable" use may infringe even if the overall similarity of the pieces is questionable 
(Challis, 2003). Under this condition, a possible defence argument would be to advocate 
that the song was an independent creation. This is conceivable as there are limited note 
combinations. However, it is difficult to prove if the above 2 premises have been met. 
Intentional plagiarism is morally and professionally unacceptable and deserves 
punishment. At a cursory level (or single act of infringement) a copyright infringer is liable 
for "statutory damages" that may range from a few hundred to a few thousand pounds. 
The infringed may receive 'actual damages' of harm endured if the value of their original 
work has suffered as a result of the infringement. However, irrespective of this, they are 
entitled to a (complex and variable) proportion of the profits that have been reaped from 
the plagiarised works (McCready, 2005). When a wilful infringement is passed, damages 
may reach hundreds of thousands of pounds or percentage of the artist's royalties (up to 
100% of single or album sales). For example, The Verve were forced to pay the Rolling 
Stone's one hundred percent of the royalties from their song "Bittersweet Symphony" as 
the melody was claimed to be 'borrowed* without consent from the Stones song "The Last 
Time". Similarly, US rapper Vanilla Ice was found guilty of plagiarising the bass line from 
'Under pressure" by Queen and David Bowie and he equally had to renounce one 
hundred percent of the album royalties (as cited by Challis, 2003). In addition, copyright 
owners can also obtain a court injunction forcing the infringer to cease their violation and 
even recall the infringing albums for destruction (Challis, 2003) 
•* Smith, 84 F.3d at 1220; Baxter v. M C A , Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423, 424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987). 
4 
However, there are many cases of plagiarism where the accused is adamant that 
they did not maliciously plagiarise others' work and that the plagiarism was entirely 
unintentional, not because they did not realise that the borrowing constituted plagiarism, 
but rather as they believed that their work was a novel creation and not based on anyone 
else's work. The first such case (to our knowledge) was Fred Fisher Inc vs. Dillingham 
(1924)^ who was found guilty of plagiarism in 1934 but the infringement was reported to 
have been most likely 'unconscious'. Here no material damage was perceived to have 
been inflicted on the plaintiff as a result of the infringement (as the song was not popular 
at the time) so the accused was charged with 'the minimum statutory damages' ($250 and 
associated legal costs). However, the most renowned example of alleged unconscious 
plagiarism was the lawsuit of Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music. Ltd (1976)^ 
where George Harrison was accused of plagiarising the previously popular Chiffons' hit 
"He's so fine", with his song "My Sweet Lord". Although. Hamson admitted in court that 
he had heard the Chiffons' hit, he refuted the claim that he had copied their work 
intentionally. The court found him guilty as a result of demonstrated 'access' to the 
Chiffons song and that his song bore 'substantial similarity' to theirs. He was found guilty 
of plagiarising the harmonies and musical essence of 'He's so fine'. The court agreed that 
he had not deliberately plagiarised the song and described his infringement as an 
unintentional copying of what was in his subconscious memory (Self, 1993). While 
Harrison was composing the song, he was not consciously aware of the previous hit and 
hence its' influence on his work (Self, 1993). Nevertheless, despite the acknowledged 
lack of intent this lesser verdict did not favourably affect his punishment or relieve any 
liability. 
Perhaps an even more striking case was more recently, in 2001, when Michael 
Bolton was found guilt of plagiarising the Isley Brothers song "Love is a Wonderful Thing". 
The Isiey Brother's song was not released on an album and the single only reached the 
top 100 in the music charts twenty-five years before Bolton's song was released. Michael 
Bolton denied ever hearing the song, but as he had previously demonstrated admiration of 
^ Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
* Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music. 420 F. Supp. 177 (SDiSTY 1976) 
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the Isley Brothers' music (i.e. attended concerts) this undemiined his claim of independent 
creation. The condition of access was met and the two songs were also deemed 
substantially similar. Michael Bolton and his record company Sony were fined $5.4 million 
which was the largest damages award ever made in connection with a music plagiarism 
case. Moreover, this heavy punishment followed even though the court accepted that the 
plagiarism was not intentional (Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, 2000). 
Consequently, three conditions guide plagiarism njlings but intent does not need to 
feature in such rulings. Moreover, over time, verdicts of plagiarism that implicate 
unintentional plagiarism appear to be having less of an impact on the courts decisions. 
When a song is in production usually many people are involved throughout the 
different developmental stages. Therefore, it is probable that stringent checks will be 
made to evaluate the authenticity of the material prior to release and in light of a genuine 
concern the song may be changed or withheld. If a potential instance of plagiarism is not 
detected prior to release but detected after, the plagiariser may often opt for a 'quiet' out 
of court settlement (i.e. 6 figure sum paid from Mike Batt to John Cage, 2002 for 
plagiarising his prior song; CNN, 2002). This may follow (for both parties) as a plagiarism 
case is not desirable publicly or financially. For the accused, each potential case of 
plagiarism is unique with its own complexities and ambiguities so the incentive to avoid 
lengthy and expensive high-profile legal disputes with the associated personal anguish 
and negative publicity that they bring, is high. Further, following the Michael Bolton case, 
artists may be more apprehensive about a possible unconscious copying lawsuit. The 
plaintiff may also have a motivation to avoid a legal battle and opt for an out of court 
settlement, particulariy if the infringed material was not, in the first instance, highly 
successful. The former artists may be flattered by their songs resurrection and eager to 
avoid an Inconvenient legal dispute if a suitable financial arrangement can be made with 
the infringers. Hence, the number of reported cases may not reflect the true prevalence of 
such cases as these may be difficult to trace. Indeed cases of plagiarism may simply be 
dismissed for a number of reasons. For example, the case of Harold Lloyd Corp. v. 
Witwer (1933)^ was unusually dismissed on the grounds of unconscious plagiarism 
although unintentional copying was actionable. The plaintiffs complaint had only alleged 
deliberate copying so no further action was taken. Consequently, as a result of out of 
court settlements, case dismissals or withdrawal of the accused material, accurately 
calculating the total numbers of plagiarism cases is difficult, and evaluating the numbers 
of these cases (both reported and non-reported) where genuine unconscious plagiarism 
was to blame for the infringement is even more elusive as intent to plagiarise is easy to 
deny and difficult to detect or prove. 
Moreover, this problem is not anticipated to subside as the laws governing 
plagiarism/intellectual property are currently 'loose' and were not written with knowledge 
of the current technological advancements and particularly the internet (Cauchi, 2005). 
Harrison's plagiarism may have been a low-tech precursor to what is currently a highly 
technical problem on the internet. The legal and ethical problems are not exclusive to 
music copyright, but relevant to many different walks of life. For example Academia, 
Entertainment, History, Journalism, Literature, Politics (e.g. Iraq Dossier allegedly 
plagiarised from a student thesis), Pop-Fiction, Science and Medicine, Theology and 
Religion (as cited by Lesko, 2003). Moreover, the widespread introduction of old films, 
music, pictures and advertising, via the internet suggests that that future plagiarism (and 
unconscious plagiarism) cases are perhaps all the more likely. While cases of plagiarism 
are quietly settled with the infringing works compensating the originals or being withdrawn 
from sale - although this may relieve the issues of legality - it does not recognise, 
understand or begin to tackle the problem of unconscious plagiarism. Is work created 
independently of one's consciousness really "copying" and fundamentally, can copyright 
law extend to the unconscious? Should unconscious plagiarism be dealt with on a par with 
deliberate plagiarism? This is point that we will return to later. 
1.3 Plagiarism within Universities 
The problem of plagiarism is also very pertinent within higher education. Academic 
plagiarism is widely viewed as the act of copying or including the work of someone else in 
' Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, cert., 296 U.S. 669.65 F.2d 1, 17 (9th Cirl933.) 
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one's own for personal benefit, without adequate acknowledgement. At a basic level, 
plagiarising the work of another is a form of academic dishonesty and is not acceptable in 
academic circles. There are a number of reasons why an individual may deliberately 
plagiarise. Some of the reported reasons include a belief that one's own work is 
inadequate and so a motivation may be to copy to obtain higher marks. Similar 
motivations may stem from a belief that 'everyone' does It or one may plagiarise as a 
result of time constraints, lack of preparation or simply laziness (Leight, 1999). A lack of 
understanding about what constitutes plagiarism and a poor writing, research, referencing 
practice may also underlie plagiarism. University guidelines are fairly consistent in their 
treatment of undergraduate students that are found guilty of plagiarism. Generally 
speaking plagiarism is heavily discouraged and is viewed as unacceptable, with the 
students found guilty of such a 'crime' facing very serious penalties. The University of 
Newcastle states that plagiarism 'degrades academic standards, degrees and institutions' 
and puts 'honest students at a disadvantage'. Moreover, if students fail to learn correctly 
this 'negatively impacts upon professional standards and qualifications' 
(http;//www.infm.ulst.ac.uk/-'projects/com560/8). Typically students found guilty can fail 
the course and often the entire semester. However, some institutions do have a degree of 
punishment depending on the severity and/or extent of copying that was detected and the 
punishment may be vary and (e.g. Birmingham University 
http://www.studserv.bham.ac.uk/sca/exam/plag.htm) be contingent upon the academic 
year of the student (i.e. more lenient in the earlier years). However, as with copyright 
infringement, not all students who have plagiarised may have done so intentionally. 
Institutions' guidelines on unconscious plagiarism are incredibly variable. The University 
of Edinburgh (2005) quotes that 'plagiarism is the act of copying or including in one's own 
work, without adequate acknowledgement, intentionally or unintentionally, the work of 
another, for one's own benefit' (http://www.aaps.ed.ac.uk/regulations/plagiarism/intro.htm). 
Students from the very beginning of their course are made aware that ANY plagiarism 
(including incorrect referencing) regardless of intent will not be tolerated. This stance 
avoids the problem of students who are caught and accused of plagiarism claiming 
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ignorance in a plea for a lesser punishment and equally those counting on a second 
chance If their plagiarism was detected. 
However, in some cases students really believe that their work is original and 
profusely deny plagiarising, as in the music copyright cases discussed above (i.e. George 
Harrison). Is it justified that these students be treated the same as those individuals who 
deliberately copied work from elsewhere? The University of Canberra feel that it is not, 
and take a different approach to punishing this type of unintentional plagiarism. Generally 
the guidelines for dealing with such cases are more flexible and punishments are decided 
on a case to case basis during discussions with the plagiarising student and their 
assessor. There are three possible outcomes; the first, is that the student's mari< may be 
reduced. This may follow only if the standard of the work is lower than required and is not 
regarded as a penalty as the plagiarism was void of intent. Second, the student may be 
permitted to resubmit the assignment or third, the tutors may choose to take no action. 
Importantly though unlike deliberate plagiarism, in cases of unintentional plagiarism no 
permanent records are kept 
(http://www.canberra.edu.au/secretariat/plagiarism_proc.html). 
Institutions both nationally and internationally, vary considerably in terms of their 
stance on plagiarism and specifically, whether unconscious plagiarism is regarded as 
punishable at the same or lesser level as deliberate plagiarism (the University of 
Canberra's lenient treatment of unconscious plagiarism is not the norm). This is a very 
controversial point as a plagiariser's intent is very difficult to determine and prove (as in 
copyright infringement cases). The problem with plagiarism in general is steadily 
increasing in terms of the number of incidents occurring (although this is also confounded 
by the increasing ability to detect such plagiarism). This has been likely fuelled by an 
increasing number of students being recruited into higher education and the vast an-ay of 
information that is so readily available and accessible on the internet. The increasing 
numbers of cases has also spurred the need for sophisticated software to be developed to 
highlight plagiarised material and help alleviate this problem. However, there are no 
governing rules or measurement tools that may be used to help detect such cases of 
unconscious plagiarism. Moreover, if cases are detected there are no consistent 
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procedures for dealing with such Individuals. Depending on the institution, lack of intent 
may or may not be used as a defence against plagiarism but nevertheless, unintentional 
plagiarism is still highly undesirable and morally unacceptable. Unconscious infringement 
is still infringement. Currently little is understood about unconscious plagiarism and the 
measures that may be taken to prevent such intrusions from occurring. This thesis 
intends to investigate the mechanisms by which an individual may incorrectly come to 
believe that something that originated elsewhere, was their uniquely their own. 
1.4 Unconscious Plagiarism Research 
1.4.1 Initial paradigm 
In 1989, Brown and Murphy were the first researchers to examine unconscious plagiarism 
within a controlled generation context. Using a three-stage paradigm, they empirically 
demonstrated that participants can be induced to plagiarise In the laboratory: 
Phase 1- Generation Phase: In an initial generation phase, groups of 4 
participants took turns to generate category exemplars (e.g. fruits. See also Brown & 
Halliday, 1991; Macrae, Bodenhausen & Calvini, 1999). There were 4 categories and in 
total 16 generated exemplars for each, to a total of 64 exemplars. 
Phase 2- Recall-Own Phase: Following the encoding session, participants were 
instructed to recall their initial responses without recalling any of the other participants' 
prior suggestions. 
Phase 3- Generate-New Phase: Following the recall-own phase participants were 
instructed to generate an equal number of new responses that had not been previously 
been given (by anyone including themselves) in the prior generation phase. 
Unconscious plagiarism was scored slightly differently in each of the phases. In 
the generation phase, participants plagiarised if they repeated an exemplar (i.e. type of 
fruit) that someone else had previously given eariier in the experimental sequence. In the 
recall-own phase, plagiarism was counted whenever a participant recalled an exemplar as 
their own, that had originally been generated by someone else. In the generate-new 
phase, plagiarism was counted when participants reproduced any previously given 
exemplars as their own, new exemplars. This followed for other participants' exemplars or 
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their own eariier exemplars. Although stealing from oneself may not be morally akin (or 
have the same legal or moral connotations) with 'plagiarising' from another individual; in 
the conventional sense, it is nonetheless unacceptable in certain domains. For example, 
in academic writing, publishing research/ideas in more than one place (intentionally or 
unintentionally) breaches copyright and it not permitted. Moreover, stealing from oneself 
in other ways may in fact be viewed as embezzlement or fraud. Therefore in such cases 
self-plagiarism can be a very undesirable and punishable offence hence these self-
plagiarism rates are also of theoretical interest. 
Brown and Murphy (1989) found that unconscious plagiarism (from other 
participants) occurred in each of the three phases. The rate obtained in the initial 
generation phase was 4 %, but higher rate of 7% was obtained in the recall-own phase, 
when participants recalled their own exemplars and 9% in the generate-new phase, when 
participants generated new exemplars. The information participants were plagiarising 
here were category exemplars e.g. banana, orange etc. In such straightforward category 
generation tasks there is a danger that the 'exemplars' that were given in each of the 
phases may not have been plagiarised perse but may have been spontaneously 
generated, regardless of their prior exposure in the initial generation session. To account 
for this possibility, Brown and Murphy (1989) statistically compared the rate of solution 
generation against Klee and Gardiner (1976) 1.6% base rate likelihood of those 
generations being made in the absence of prior experience (see chapter 2). 
Fundamentally, in all phases, the obtained rates (4%. 7% and 9% respectively) 
statistically exceeded this baseline and hence plagiarism was not solely accountable in 
chance terms of spontaneous generations. Furthermore, in the recall-own phase, 
participants were more likely to plagiarise someone else's idea that they previously 
experienced (7.3%) as one of their own ideas, than a random new idea (2.3%) and in the 
generate-new phase, participants were more likely to plagiarise others' ideas as their own 
new ideas (8.6%) than one of their own prior ideas (inadvertent self-duplications) (only 2 
instances in the experiment). This finding is consistent with generation effect, which 
occurs when people are better are remembering information that they had to produce (as 
it is more highly differentiated in memory; Macrae et al. 1999) than information that was 
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given to them (Raye & Johnson, 1980; see also Linna & Gulgoz, 1994; Slamecka & Graf, 
1978; Voss, Vesonder, Post & Ney, 1987) and also suggests that self-generated and 
other-generated information is monitored in different ways (Brown & Murphy, 1989). 
Brown and Murphy, (1989) conducted two further experiments to investigate the 
veracity and generalisability of their findings. In Experiment 2, task difficulty was 
increased in two ways; by first increasing the number of semantic categories and second, 
introducing more difficult orthographic categories. Orthographic categories were deemed 
to be more difficult as conversations are usually processed on a semantic (as opposed to 
orthographic) level. Participants were required to generate from both these categories 
simultaneously. This hampered their ability to effectively monitor the origins of the initial 
information and hence, increased the observable plagiarism. The highest level of 
plagiarism was observed in the difficult orthographic categories. In their third experiment, 
rather than being tested in groups participants were tested individually, in a 'visual mode'. 
This dynamic removed the social interaction and accordingly, the social (memory) cues 
that may have been exhibited by the other participants in the previous experiments. 
However, this individual testing did not affect the plagiarism rates. Moreover, in each of 
these studies, the high rates of obtained plagiarism were accompanied by high confidence 
ratings. Higher participant confidence was exhibited for those ideas that that were 
incorrectly recalled as their own (recall-own) rather than new ideas (generate-new), 
although both sets of ratings were slightly lower than those ratings given for correct ideas. 
These findings cumulatively indicated the robust nature of unconscious plagiarism and 
that participants were not simply guessing but were exhibiting plagiansed errors under the 
confident illusion that other participants' ideas were their own or genuinely new ideas. 
1.4.2 Factors that affect unconscious plagiarism 
1.4.2.1 Delay: 
Brown and Halliday (1991) replicated and extended the work of Brown and Murphy. 
(1989) by incorporating a retention interval of one day and one week between the initial 
item generation and testing. This delay separated the testing session with a view to 
investigating the magnitude of the observed effect while enhancing the generalisability of 
12 
the paradigm. Essentially Brown and Murphy's (1989) methodology was maintained but a 
minor change at generation was that participants were tested in groups of 3 and 
generated 6 exemplars to each category. Brown and Halliday (1991) found that, in each 
task, over 80% of the participants exhibited unconsciously plagiarised en-ors. In the 
recall-own phase, the errors over the delay increased from 4.3% to13.1% and in the 
generate-new phase from 6.7% to13.3%. Although the levels obtained by Brown and 
Halliday (1991) during immediate testing were slightly lower than those obtained by Brown 
and Murphy (1989), following the delay rates nonetheless tripled in the recall-own phase 
and doubled in the generate-new phase (see also Marsh & Bower, 1993). The lower rate 
of initial plagiarism may however be accounted for, as Brown and Halliday, (1991) only 
instructed participants to recall two thirds of their initial exemplars and not all of their 
eariier exemplars as in Brown and Murphy (1989). 
In the *real worid' there is almost inevitably an extended time period between the 
moment an individual is initially exposed to information (i.e. a song, movie plot) and the 
time that that information is later plagiarised. Brown and Halliday (1991 see also Marsh & 
Bower, 1993) essentially observed that laboratory plagiarism rates did significantly 
increase over a 1 week delay. Subsequent studies have mirrored this inflated plagiarism 
rate following a one week retention interval (see Bredart. Lampinen & Defeldre, 2003; 
Landau & Marsh, 1997; Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995; Marsh, Landau & 
Hicks, 1996,1997; Marsh, Ward & Landau, 1999). Moreover, as a result of the more 'real 
worid' scenario that a delay creates, combined with the inflated rates of plagiarism that are 
obtained, implementing a one week delay between generation and testing has become 
more common in investigating unconscious plagiarism. However, to date, during these 
retention intervals, the cognitive processes that participants engage in have not been 
subject to experimental investigation. This is important as Veal life' plagiarists inevitably 
think about appropriated information and accordingly invest considerable time and effort 
into development between the time that the information is initially encoded and later 
plagiarised. We return to this topic in chapter 3. 
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1.4.2.2 Alternate generation tasks: 
A series of research studies have been conducted using adaptations of Brown and 
Murphy's original paradigm. One of the main changes across studies is the type of task 
implemented at generation. Consistently high levels of plagiarism have been obtained 
using the traditional category generation tasks (Bredart et al. 2003; Brown & Halliday, 
1991; Linna & Gulgoz, 1994; Landau & Marsh. 1997; Macrae et al. 1999; Marsh & 
Landau, 1995) but. Marsh & Bower, (1993) were the first to investigate the generalisability 
of these prior findings using a more creative task at generation. Their motivation was to 
create a setting that they believed would more accurately reflect scenarios that would be 
more conducive to unconscious plagiarism in the 'real worid'. Brown and Murphy's (1989) 
three stages were maintained with a more creative puzzle task (the word game 'boggle') 
at generation that required the participants to search for creative word solutions. The 
plagiarism levels obtained using this task were found to be between 2 and 9 times greater 
than in the previous experiments (depending upon the individual task and condition) with 
associated high confidence attributions. They found that increasing task difficulty, by 
increasing the number of words in a puzzle increased (but not significantly) overall 
plagiarism (as Brown & Murphy, 1989) as fewer combinations of words were available. 
Specifically, in the recall-own phase plagiarism rates for difficult puzzles increased the 
most over the delay from 8 .1% to 35.2% while easy puzzles increased from 6.9% to 
28.4%. The generate-new phase however, produced higher levels of plagiarism, following 
a similar pattern to the recall-own phase. Plagiarism for difficult puzzles increased over 
the delay from 29.4% to 44.9% and for the easy puzzles from 10.6% to 26.1%. Moreover, 
40% of plagiarised errors received a high confidence rating. Therefore, this substantial 
raise in plagiarism was attributed to the creative nature of the initial task and closer 
analogy to real worid cases of unconscious plagiarism. 
Since Marsh and Bower's study (1993; see also Marsh & Landau. 1995), 
additional creative tasks have been incorporated into the paradigm (see chapter 2 for a 
comprehensive review). More social tasks have been implemented where participants 
have been required to work together and brainstorm information. For example, 
participants were required to respond and generate ideas to questions, such as ways 'to 
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improve their universities' and 'to reduce traffic problems' (Marsh et al. 1997, see also 
Bink, Marsh, Hicks & Howard, 1999). Despite responses to such questions being 
relatively constrained, later when participants generated new ideas other participants' 
ideas were plagiarised at a high rate of 2 1 % . In addition, unconscious plagiarism has 
been investigated in a different paradigm where the participants' generation task is to 
produce creative drawings (non-oral paradigm). In these studies, participants design and 
draw space creatures (Ward. 1994; Smith. Ward & Schumacher, 1993; or their faces 
Bredart, Ward & Marczewski, 1998) that could inhabit a distant planet. Here, participants 
plagiarised by drawing creatures with 'novel' entities that were consistent with emergent 
properties of the examples that they were shown (and explicitly instructed to avoid) 
(Landau & Leynes 2004; Landau, Thomas, Thelen & Chang, 2002; Marsh et al. 1996; 
Marsh, Bink & Hicks, 1999). This followed when creatures were encouraged to reflect 
those from their wildest imagination (Ward, 1994). 
To our knowledge, the only study where plagiarism was not observed following a 
creative task was specifically, when participants were required to devise a non-word 
language for use on an alien planet (Tenpenny, Keriazakos. Lew & Phelan, 1998). 
Following their study. Tenpenny et al. (1999) contested that plagiarism was observed 
when truly creative tasks were utilised. However, Marsh, Ward and Landau's study 
(1999). used a similar creative task that required participants to generate novel non-words 
for English categories, but they found that during both immediate and delayed testing, 
participants' words tended to conform to the orthographic structures embedded in the 
shown examples (both with arbitrary features and naturally occurring orthographic 
regularities), despite admonitions to avoid existing features. Participants had difficulty 
avoiding the use of this prior knowledge, despite being able to list the features they were 
asked to avoid. Therefore, Tenpenny et al's lack of plagiarism was subsequently 
attributed to the substantially increased difficulty of the task containing no inherent 
regularities (Marsh et al. 1999). Cumulatively, these varied creative studies (both verbal 
and non-verbal) have resulted high levels of unconscious plagiarism (or conformity to 
presented exemplars) that exceed those obtained when semantic category tasks were 
utilised (e.g. Brown & Murphy, 1989). This thesis intends explore unconscious plagiarism 
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using a verbal creative task that is comparable to the widely used category generation 
task but that is concurrently more real and creative (than non-word generation) without 
being easily categorically constrained. 
1.4.2.3 Testing characteristics: 
Brown and Murphy (1989) found that there was little difference in the ultimate rate of 
plagiarism when participants were tested in groups of four or individually and this did not 
change when participants were tested in groups of 3 (e.g. Brown & Halliday, 1991). 
Brown and Murphy (1989, Experiment 1 and 2 and Brown & Halliday, 1991) observed that 
the plagiarised items were most likely to have been a word given in the generation phase 
by the person who spoke immediately before the plagiariser. This was attributed to a 
diminished attention just prior to the when the participant was due to speak (Brown & 
Murphy, 1989; Brown & Halliday, 1991) and was labelled the 'next in line' phenomenon 
(Brenner, 1973; Brown & Oxman, 1978). However, Linna and Gulgoz (1993) randomised 
the order that participants generated ideas and their study demonstrated that one's serial 
position does not influence the likelihood of the ideas being plagiarised by another 
participant. Moreover, subsequent research has tested participants in pairs (e.g. Macrae 
et al. 1999) or with a computer partner (e.g. Marsh & Bower, 1993) and the plagiarism 
intrusion rates obtained have been largely consistent. Although paired testing appears to 
produce higher rates of plagiarism (Macrae et al. 1999; Marsh & Bower, 1993) the 
definitive impact of paired testing on rates has been somewhat confounded by other 
simultaneous manipulations. However, when participants were tested individually rates 
did not differ from when participants were tested in groups (Brown & Murphy, 1989). 
Hence, obtaining high rates of unconscious plagiarism does not appear to be contingent 
upon the testing dynamics regarding the size of the group. 
Bink et al. (1999) have demonstrated that when participants are presented with 
information from two sources they are more likely to plagiarise information from the 
'alleged' more credible and most prestigious source (this was the case even thought there 
was no actual difference in source -a point we will return to Chapter 2) and Macrae et al. 
(1999) indicated that when participants were tested in pairs they were more likely to 
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plagiarise from someone of the same gender as themselves. This finding complements 
the observations from the reality monitoring literature (the processes by which people 
discriminate between memories derived from perception and those that were reflectively 
generated via thought, imagination, dreams, and fantasy; Johnson & Raye, 1981) that 
when the perceptual similarity of two sources is increased, perceivers typically experience 
difficulty recollecting who said what (Ferguson, Hashtroudi & Johnson, 1991) and 
specifically, that participants are more likely to confuse the source of infonnation when the 
information is given by two women than when information is given by one woman and one 
man (Johnson, Nolde & DeLeonardis, 1996). In the real worid. people plagiarise from a 
variety of media, for example, infonnation they have heard on the radio, television or read 
in a book, article or computer. Thus, this research programme intends to implement 
group testing as a means of creating an element of diversity with a more social and less 
experimental environment. 
1.5 Theory 
Two main theoretical accounts of Unconscious plagiarism; the Activation Strength Model 
(Marsh & Bower, 1993) and the Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson et al. 1993) have 
been used to illustrate why and how individuals may exhibit unconsciously plagiarised 
errors. 
1.5.1 Activation Strength Model account of Unconscious Plagiarism 
In 1993, Marsh and Bower used a simple model of the usual strength (or familiarity) theory 
of recognition memory to account for why individuals plagiarise (e.g. Norman & 
Wickelgren, 1969). They developed Johnson and Raye's (1981) model for reality 
monitoring. The rationale for this approach focused on the notion that items from the 
experiment would each differ in their levels of associated activation strength. Initially there 
are three classes of items, ideas that were externally generated (i.e. computer or partner 
ideas that were either heard or seen), ideas that the participant generated themselves (i.e. 
participants own ideas) and new ideas that the participant had not been previously 
exposed to (new ideas). Items that participants generated themselves would be the 
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strongest ideas as a result of the effort that they exerted during the self-generation (the 
generation effect; Slamecka & Graf. 1978 a point that we return to). In contrast, the new 
or distracter items would be the weakest ideas as participants had had no prior exposure 
to such ideas. The strength of items from an external source (computer partner/other 
participant) would fall in between the two, as they would be stronger than the distracter 
items, as a direct result of their prior exposure to the ideas in the generation phase, but 
would not be as strong as their self-generated ideas as participants were not directly 
engaged with those ideas to the same degree. Marsh and Bower (1993) indicated that 
participants utilise a decision criteria to establish the information's source, based on a 
level of strength. Hence, if an item is below this level then an item will be regarded as a 
new idea, if it falls above this level it may be regarded as self-generated and if it is in 
between the two it would be regarded as an externally generated idea (see figure 1.5.1.1 
for a pictorial demonstration). Moreover, the 'farther the items strength is from the 
relevant criteria the more confident subjects judgements should be' (Marsh & Bower 1993. 
p685). 
N= new word s= self-generate word 
C=other generate idea 
. _ » hypothetical distribution for new ideas 
hypothetical distribution for others' ideas 
hypothetical distribution for self-generated words 
fi= generate-new criterion - any item falling below will be considered as a new candidate. 
0 - recall-own- item whose strength exceeds would be considered self, 
n = will be labelled new idea 
c = will be labelled computer (externally) generated idea 
s = will be labelled self-generated ideas 
Figure 1.5.1.1 Pictorial demonstration of Marsh and Bower's (1993) Activation Strength 
Model (p686). 
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Marsh and Bower (1993) used the model to account for manipulations that affect 
forgetting such as retention interval between encoding and testing and participant 
interference. The marked reduction in the number of ideas that are correctly recalled 
during delayed testing (relative to immediate testing), suggests that traces of item strength 
(both self and other generated infonnation) weaken over time. The activation strength of 
such items may deplete (shift below p see figure 1,5.1.1) to a level that is more 
comparable to non-presented or genuinely new items. Consequently, such ideas may 
have a greater probability of incorrectly being presented as new and thus plagiarised. 
This explanation is consistent with the pattern of results observed across studies that 
have investigated participant delay within an unconscious plagiarism paradigm (Brown & 
Halliday, 1991; Bredart et al. 2003. Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995; Marsh 
& Landau, 1997; Marsh et al. 1996,1997; Marsh et al. 1999). Moreover, additional 
support for this idea may be derived from the incremental increasing rates of plagiarism 
observed within an experiment. Marsh and Bower (1993) speculated that the observable 
increase in plagiarism across the three tasks, from the lowest rates during generation to 
the highest rates in the generate-new phase, was a function of the memory traces of the 
respective ideas weakening over time (see also Brown & Halliday, 1991). 
Marsh and Bower, (1993) conducted a series of experiments to evaluate their 
activation strength model's ability to explain unconscious plagiarism. They used Brown 
and Murphy's (1989) three stage paradigm but implemented a creative puzzle task at 
generation, where participants generated their own words in response to the puzzles but 
were also exposed additional words that a computer partner produced. Their intention in 
Experiment 2a was to raise the strength of the others' (computer partners') ideas with a 
view to reducing plagiarised errors. To do this, participants were encouraged to learn 
their computer partner's words better, at encoding by processing the words at a deeper, 
semantic level. Specifically, they evaluated whether the given words were represented or 
associated with something 'good'. This manipulation increased the activation strength of 
'others' (the computers) words and so resulted in better participant discrimination between 
these words and new words. This reduced the likelihood that these old (semantically 
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processed ideas) words were incorrectly considered as new, and so reduced the 
plagiarism in the generate-new phase. 
Experiment 2b intended to replicate this pattern (of strengthening others' words), 
but also to decrease participants' ability to distinguish whether words were initially partner 
or self-generated. This was achieved using their 'orienting manipulation', where as well as 
producing their own words participants were instnjcted to find and complete computers 
words hidden in the puzzle. This was anticipated to further increase the strength of 'other' 
(computer) ideas. With respect to their model, the anticipated affects of this manipulation 
were two fold: First, for those items in the generate-new phase, increasing the strength of 
computers items towards the level of self generated ideas would result in better participant 
discrimination between old and new, and reduced generate-new plagiarism (as in 
Experiment 2a). Second, for those items in the recall-own phase, further increasing the 
strength of the computers items towards the status of self generated ideas, should 
increase confusion between others' and self-generated ideas. Hence, the 2 distributions 
should overiap and accordingly recall-own plagiarism should increase (see Figure 1.5.1.2 
for a hypothetical pictorial demonstration). The results supported the model and 
demonstrated that this orienting manipulation, as anticipated, significantly reduced 
plagiarism in the generate-new phase and increased plagiarism in the recall-own phase, 
but not significantly. Their model could also account for measures of reaction time and 
thinking time that participants used to complete the tasks. Participants were found to be 
quicker in the generate-new phase than in the recall-own phase. This followed as new 
distributions are better distinguished from old once they have been strengthened (right 
hand figure 1.5.1.2), hence speeding responding, whereas, others' ideas and self 
generated become more similar, hence slowing responding. Fundamentally, this model fit 
extremely well with Marsh and Bower's (1993) data and accounted for 92% of the 
variance in participants' responses. 
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< > 
N= new word 8= self-generate 
C=other generate idea 
N= new idea 8= self-generated 
C=other generate idea 
hypothetical distribution for new ideas 
hypothetical distribution for others' ideas 
hypothetical distribution for self-generated words 
P = generate-new criterion - any item falling below will be considered as a new candidate, 
e = recall-own- item whose strength exceeds would be considered self, 
n = will be labelled new idea 
c = will be labelled computer (externally) generated idea 
s = will be labelled self-generated ideas 
Figure 1.5.1.2 Hypothetical pictorial demonstration of Marsh and Bower's (1993) 
Activation Strength Model following orienting manipulation in Experiment 2b to strengthen 
others' ideas. 
Marsh and Landau (1995) subsequently more rigorously tested the assumptions of 
the relative strength model and assessed its ability to account for laboratory induced 
unconscious plagiarism. They compared Brown and Murphy's (1989) paradigm (using a 
category generation task) with Marsh and Bower's (1993) paradigm (using a puzzle task), 
but introduced a lexical decision measure of activation between the initial generation and 
testing phase of each study. Lexical decision tasks test participants' reaction time to the 
ideas, with the faster reaction times indicating a greater item strength (e.g. Johnson & 
Hasher. 1987). Hence, they investigated whether other-generated items that were later 
plagiarised demonstrated any evidence of greater strength (as demonstrated by a faster 
reaction time) than those ideas that were not later plagiarised. They found, first and 
importantly, that the rates of unconscious plagiarism obtained in these studies were in line 
with the initial studies that they replicated and second, that items appeared to retain 
different levels of activation from prior exposure. Specifically, plagiarised items were 
those that were more readily available in the lexical decision task. 
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More stringent tests of the model followed where the strength of different classes 
of ideas were independently manipulated. To do this, Marsh and Landau (1995, 
Experiment 3) developed Hoffman's, (1992 as cited by Marsh & Landau, 1995) 
methodology of manipulating the strength of self and other-generated information. 
Hoffman, manipulated the strength of pictures or words by implementing a two day 
retention interval between initial encoding and test. On day 1, a sub-set of participants 
were shown photos of objects and returned on day 3 to imagine other objects. At test, 
participants tended to incorrectly attribute a new idea to the external source (as an old 
seen idea), rather than the internal source, (a more recently imagined idea -false 
positives). This tendency when one is unsure of the source, to attribute an item to an 
external source (rather than an internal one) was termed the 'it had to be you effect' 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981). Marsh and Landau (1995) investigated this phenomenon by 
specifically manipulating the relative positions of the strength distributions of different 
classes of information, by alternating the sequence of tasks that participants completed. 
They used Marsh and Bower's (1993) boggle paradigm, but assigned participants to either 
a 'computer first', or a 'participant first' condition. In the participant first condition, 
participants generated their own words, waited 20 minutes and then heard the computers 
words, while in the computer first condition, participants listened to the computer words, 
waited 20 minutes and then generated their own words. The results demonstrated that in 
the recall-own phase, plagiarism was higher in the participant first condition (27.5%) than 
the computer first condition (16.7%). This followed as the retention inten/al had weakened 
the strength of participants words compared to the more recently experienced computer-
generated words. Similariy, in the generate-new phase, in the computer first condition, 
computer plagiarisms were much higher (21.7%) than those in the participant first 
condition (15.0%) and this was due to the weakened strength of the computer words. 
Therefore, here it appeared that rather than the weak ideas being attributed to an external 
source (as Hoffman, 1992 found) the weaker Ideas were attributed to the weaker source. 
As such, Marsh and Bower's (1993) activation strength model can neatly account for 
these findings. Moreover, in 1997, Hoffman reversed his initial study and found that 
when imagining pictures preceded seeing pictures, participants tended to attribute new 
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items (to which they were unsure of the sources) to an imagined, weaker (internal) source 
rather than a seen (extemal) source. This finding was consistent with the strength 
account and consequently termed 'it had to be me effect'. Accordingly, Marsh and 
Landau (1995) subsequently maintained that availability underlies what information comes 
to mind and that failure to engage in appropriate source monitoring that ultimately leads to 
unconscious plagiarism. 
1.5.1.1 Related Explanations: Processing Fluency and the Familiarity Attribution 
Model 
Activation strength or variations on strength have been used to account for other 
phenomena. According to the 2-process theory, processing of a stimulus can be 
enhanced or made more fluent by recent exposures to it. Fluency may be a useful cue in 
a memory test, to help determine whether the information has been experienced before. 
In this sense, something that feels familiar and is processed fluently may be attributed to a 
previous encounter, but this fluent processing may also be incorrectly attributed to other 
sources. An example of such a cognitive misattribution was demonstrated by Jacoby. 
Allan, Collins and Larwill (1988). Jacoby et al. (1988) initially presented participants with a 
list of oral sentences. Following this, participants were represented with some of these 
sentences together with some new sentences that were both presented against 
background noise which occurred at 1 of 3 intensity levels. Participants' task was dual; 
they were required to repeat back the sentences and to judge the intensity of the noise. 
Jacoby et al. (1988) found that for very low-level perceptual judgments, participants' 'old' 
sentences were attributed with a lower noise level than new sentences. Hence, it 
appeared that participants misattributed fluent processing incorrectly to the intensity of the 
masking noise rather than the influence of the past sentence exposure. This 
misattribution pattern has been observed for those with reduced attentional capacity that 
may be caused by aging (Dywan & Jacoby. 1990; Dywan, Segalowltz, & Williamson, 
1994) or traumatic brain injury (Dywan, Segalowitz, Henderson, & Jacoby, 1993). 
Moreover, participants who have been subject to dual task conditions (reduced attentional 
capacity) may subsequently mistake the familiarity of previously read non-famous names 
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for real-world fame (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989). Hence, this memory illusion was 
accordingly dubbed the false fame effect (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown & Jasechko, 1989). 
Processing fluency has also been implicated in a host of judgements that may be 
influenced by prior exposure. These include judgements of perceptual duration 
(Witherspoon & Allan, 1985), perceptual clarity (Whittlesea. Jacoby & Girard, 1990), 
recognition and tmth (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993) and imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, 
Loftus & Sherman. 1996). In the imagination inflation paradigm, participants are initially 
given a long list of possible childhood events and are asked to indicate whether or not 
these events have happened to them as children. A couple of weeks later, participants 
are asked to imagine a few of these events that had not happened to them, such as 
'breaking a window with their hands*. During this imagination, participants are instructed 
to think about relevant event details (of breaking the window), such as 'how they tripped 
and fell', 'who else was there' and 'how they felt' when they broke the window. Then at 
test, participants receive a list of events for a second time and indicate which events had 
happened. Garry et al. (1996) demonstrated that imagining these counterfactual events 
actually increased one's confidence that the events occurred. Subsequently, this powerful 
and robust effect has been replicated on numerous occasions (e.g. Goff & Roediger, 
1998; Heaps & Nash, 1999; Paddock, Terranova, Kwok & Halpern, 2000; Thomas & 
Loftus, 2002). 
The processes by which false memories occur is unclear, however, Mazzoni, 
Loftus and Kirsch, (2001) proposed a 3 stage model to account for the formulation of such 
memory intrusions. 1) An individual must believe the event is plausible, 2) An individual 
must believe that the event occurred 3) An individual must expehence the event as if it 
were a real memory. Bernstein, Godfrey, Davidson and Loftus (2004) maintain that 
fluency (rather than imagination) may account for stages one and two of the model. For 
example, in their study initially, participants were given actual sentences to read or were 
given a sentence in which an anagram was included about a particular event. For each 
sentence participants either rated the likelihood that the event occun-ed in their lives or in 
the lives of an average North Americans child before the age of 10. Those who had 
unscrambled the sentences had an increased confidence that the event occurred to them. 
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This followed for those participants who had completed either type of rating. Bernstein et 
al. (2004) suggested that this may have occun-ed as when the anagram was initially 
experienced, it was difficult and slow to solve. However, as a result of the effort invested 
into the anagram throughout the problem solving process, when the solution is uncovered, 
participants may experience a 'rush of meaning that may be akin with an 'ahah' moment' 
(Schooler & Dougal, 2003 as cited by Bernstein et al. 2004 p455). Subsequently, this 
'rush of meaning' may be experienced as 'surprising fluency' that may encourage the 
experience to feel familiar (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001). If the event feels plausible and 
the familiarity is incorrectly attributed to a fictional experience happening to them, instead 
of the anagram from which it correctly originated, a false memory may occur. A similar 
familiarity misattribution model may be used to explain how false memories or fictitious 
imagined events may be recalled as real with accompanied sensory detail and emotion 
(Loftus & Bernstein, 2005). In studies reviewed by Lindsay, Hagen. Read, Wade & Garry 
(2004) 3 1 % of participants' false memories had accompanying sensory details. 
However, while a familiarity misattribution model may sufficiently explain these 
findings, Bernstein et al. (2004) maintain that fluency per se (excluding familiarity) is 
insufficient to exclusively explain the participants' increase in confidence. This follows as 
prior exposure alone does not cause a later increase in childhood autobiographical 
confidence, despite the increased fluency that likely accompanies words that have been 
seen before. False memories were not created when prior exposure was relatively 
uninvolved i.e. when participants were engaged in simple vowel counting tasks but only 
when prior exposure was relatively elaborate i.e. anagram solving (Bernstein et al. 2004). 
False memories have also been created as a result of other types of elaborate 
processing, such as providing vividness ratings performing sentence generation, 
paraphrasing information (Sharman, Garry & Beuke, 2004) or explaining fictional event 
(Sharman, Manning & Garry, 2005). However, if this prior elaborate exposure is seen as 
being directly relevant to the experimental task (i.e. generating a sentence about a child) 
participants are likely to discount the associated misplaced familiarity (Loftus & Bernstein, 
2005). 
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Activation strength distributions are conceptually similar to those proposed by 
Jacoby (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, Kelley & Dywan, 1989) 'as strength distributions 
could be interpreted as distributions of relative fluency of processing" (Marsh & Landau. 
1995, p808). Subjective experiences of remembering may reflect the operation of 
decision processes that attribute mental events to respective sources. Fluency or 
familiarity that results from processing items may be used to make source attributions 
about those items. In the plagiarism studies (i.e. Landau & Marsh, 1995) ideas that 
participants self-generated may be more easily processed and hence feel more familiar 
than computers responses during test. Consequently, the computer items that may be 
later plagiarised, may be those ideas that are processed more easily/fluently than those 
not plagiarised (Marsh & Landau, 1995). Kelley, Jacoby and Hollingshead (1989) have 
argued that fluency may drive source judgements but Marsh and Landau (1995) maintain 
that although fluency may provide a useful heuristic for making source decisions (i.e. 
distinguishing old/new Ideas) it cannot solely explain unconscious plagiarism. While 
fluency may be able to account for plagiarised intrusions in the recall-own phase it would 
struggle to account for why people plagiarise in the generate-new phase. For example, if 
an idea was fluent/familiar, this feeling should help participants avoid using such 
information as new and not promote such intrusions (Marsh & Landau, 1995). 
Additionally, perceptual fluency declines very slowly over short delays (i.e. 15 minutes) 
whereas; the rates of unconscious plagiarism may be high over equivalent short delays. It 
is more intuitive that an activated (but not explicitly familiar) idea may be incorrectly 
attributed as a new generation (Marsh & Landau, 1995). 
Although the reviewed data may be accounted for by Marsh and Bowers' (1993) 
activation strength model it may also be difficult to exclusively explain unconscious 
plagiarism in terms of strength. This conclusion may be drawn as the model was primarily 
based on recognition memory and is simplistic, as it may ignore the complexities of recall, 
cognition and the possibility that participants may be determining source (own/other) in 
alternative ways. For example, participants have their own subjective lexicons in which 
certain words are either unknown or rarely occur, so during testing participants may 
remember one of the words being previously given and hence conclude that the item was 
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not their own but originated elsewhere (Marsh & Bower, 1993). This thesis will explore 
the ability of the activation strength model to account for unconsciously plagiarised errors 
that arise under alternate conditions. 
1.5.2 Source Monitoring 
Source refers to characteristics that together collectively represent the conditions under 
which a memory was acquired (i.e. in terms of the modality a source could be perceptual 
or reflect the thought processes utilised during imagination). Source monitoring is 
exhibited when an individual discriminates the origin of different memories. Monitoring 
decisions are based on the qualities of the retrieved memories that are bound to 
memories during encoding and the judgment processes that are utilised to evaluate this 
information (Johnson et al. 1993). 
1.5.2.1 Memory encoding 
The source monitoring framework suggests that when 'information' is experienced (i.e. 
generated/heard) memory characteristic features (that include source information) may be 
bound to the memories (Johnson et al. 1993). Johnson et al. (1993) defines five types of 
characteristics 1) sensory/perceptual information (e.g. sound and colour). 2) contextual 
information (e.g. both spatial and temporal), 3) semantic detail. 4) affective information 
(e.g., incorporating emotional reactions), and 5) cognitive operations (e.g. records of 
generating infonnation, organizing information or imagining). Hence, the associated 
memorial representations that accompany a memory may differ as a result of the different 
encoding processes that led to that memory. Actual experienced events are typically 
associated with sensory, perceptual and contextual information (Johnson. Raye, Foley. & 
Foley, 1981; Finke, Johnson & Shyi, 1988; Suengas & Johnson, 1988). Specifically, 
these memories of real events tend to be rich in cues to their external perceptual origin; 
colours, perceptual clarity and vividness (sensory properties), and contextual information 
such as relative spatial location and temporal order (Johnson, Foley, & Leach. 1988; 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson, Ray. Foley, & 
Kim, 1982; Suengas & Johnson, 1988). They are also more likely to give rise to 
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supporting memories (Johnson, 1988). On the other hand, internally-generated memories 
may posses few perceptual memory cues but generally be more schematic (i.e. formed by 
expectations of familiarity with the source) and reflect the cognitive operations that were 
attained during creation (i.e. reasoning, inferring, imagining) (Cohen, 1981). Evidence of 
such cognitive operations are more difficult to contextualise than for example perceptual 
information. In contrast, since imagining an event requires mental effort evidence 
(including details) of this effort may in this case be preserved in memory. 
The quality and quantity of these varied characteristics may be used by an 
individual to infer the original source of their memories (Johnson et al. 1993). Anything 
that prevents a person from fully contextualizing information at acquisition will reduce 
encoding of potentially relevant source information. Source monitoring assumes that 
unconscious plagiarism may arise 'from the same processes as do accurate 
classifications of memories; from processes of attribution based on the subjective qualities 
of experience' (Johnson, 1988 p. 390). Consequently, confusions between two sources 
may indicate a similarity between the qualities associated with the memories from each 
source (or an insufficient monitoring of the memory characteristics at test). 
Moreover, general knowledge, category knowledge, beliefs and plausibility that 
may be external to a candidate memory trace may also aid source decisions (Hicks & 
Cockman, 2003). For example, if a joke was heard in a particular context, one may 
conclude from general knowledge that the source of the joke was an individual associated 
with that particular context. Experimentally this has been demonstrated where 
participants have been more likely to attribute Information to a schema consistent source 
than a non-consistent source. Specifically, with regards to object schemas (e.g. a soap 
dish to a bathroom Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis & Yang, 2000; Spanlol & Bayen, 2002) and 
professional schemas (i.e. doctor items more likely attributed to the doctor source than 
lawyer and vice versa). Bayen et al. (2000) explained these findings in terms of a 
'guessing hypothesis' where such schemas are used by individuals who cannot remember 
the source. Hicks and Cockman (2003) found that schema related response bias was not 
random but most likely to occur during retrieval and particulariy for items that were 
semantlcally related to the schemas. Moreover, in conditions where source memory is not 
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optimal i.e. for older adults and those with a self-focus (Mather, Johnson & DeLeonardis, 
1999) stereotyped infonnation may also influence source memory (Shenman & Bessenoff. 
1999). 
1.5.2.2 Decision processes 
Source monitoring depends on the quality encoded information but also on the quality of 
the decision processes employed to evaluate those sources (Johnson et al. 1993). 
Monitoring decisions are based on discriminating the qualitative differences between 
memory characteristics. When a memory is retrieved activated memory records are 
evaluated to determine source, but there is no explicit 'tag* that provides source specific 
information (Johnson et al. 1993). Fundamentally, there are two types of decision 
processes that may be employed by individuals to address and evaluate their memories 
and assign source (see Johnson et al. 1993). First, are heuristic processes that inspect 
the 'amount' of qualitative aspects of activated information (cognitive operations, 
perceptual detail) rapidly and without deliberation (Johnson & Raye, 2000), If a particular 
sort of detail (e.g. semantic, perceptual, and temporal) is prominent, then that detail has a 
high probability of driving the decision process (Cook, Marsh & Hicks, 2002). Source is 
inferred using heuristic judgements, by matching the qualities of a memory with the 
activated schemas that represent particular sources. For example, if a memory contains 
rich perceptual information the person may conclude that the 'event' was seen. The 
extent to which the qualities match the criteria set by a particular schema influences the 
likelihood that the memory is attributed to a source, (whether it is the con-ect source or 
not). These decisions are not comprehensive and are relatively automatic, so decisions 
can be made without conscious knowledge of the process (Chaiken. Lieberman & Eagly, 
1989). As a result, errors may arise when there is reduced variability over memories from 
different sources and the distributions of the given features that may overlap. This may 
occur for memories that are atypical of their class such as a very vivid and plausible 
dream. 
The second decision process is a more systematic process that is slower, more 
controlled (Chaiken et al. 1989; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shallice, 1988) more effortful 
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(Hasher & Zacks. 1993) and more deliberate than the heuristic processes. Such 
processes may involve the retrieval of additional information, supporting memories and 
extended reasoning. Such decisions draw upon a person's prior knowledge, metamemory 
assumptions and plausibility (Cohen, 1981). For example, a person may remember an 
extremely vivid dream but evaluate whether *it seems plausible given the other things they 
know' (Johnson et al.1993 p. 4 e.g. that money doesn't grow on trees, Johnson & Raye, 
1981). Or alternatively, that the veracity of a source may be questioned on the basis of a 
reaction that should or should not have occurred, if the event did in reality occur. Hence, 
systematic processes are more thorough and believed to carefully scrutinise the available 
Information (Johnson & Hirst, 1993) but these processes are typically, engaged in less 
often than the more heuristic processes (Johnson et al. 1993). 
Heuristic and systematic processes can be utilised to guide and monitor one 
another, but the extent to which each may be utilised is contingent upon the demands of 
the task and the person's goals (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Marsh et al, 1997). a point we will 
return to in Chapter 5. Source monitoring accuracy depends on the participant's adopted 
criteria. One will tend to engage in relatively automatic heuristic processes for everyday 
remembering, but in more systematic source monitoring processes where the cost of 
making a mistake is high (Dodson & Johnson, 1993) or where source ascription is a 
primary objective (Johnson et al. 1993). 
1.5.3 Factors that affect source monitoring 
In 1995, Marsh and Landau claimed that in an unconscious plagiarism paradigm, item 
activation underiies the information that comes to mind and is subsequently plagiarised. 
Moreover, they claimed that there was 'little evidence that factors that influence source 
monitoring may alter the incidence of unconscious plagiarism' (p. 1580). This conclusion 
was based on three factors. The first resided in Brown and Murphy's (1989 Experiment 3) 
data, where no difference in plagiarism were detected when participants worked in social 
setting compared to solitary working with index cards. Their argument maintained that 
working in social settings should have contributed to richer perceptual traces that should 
have in turn aided source memory and reduced plagiarised errors. The second reason, 
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was related to the findings from Marsh and Bowers, (1993 Experiment 2b) orienting 
manipulation study, where participants ability to discriminate own versus partner 
generated information was manipulated. Using a creative puzzle task, participants here 
were required to find and complete their computer opponent's words in the puzzle. They 
claimed that that if source monitoring was important, then this manipulation should have 
encouraged the memory characteristics of the completed-computer words to resemble 
their own self-generated words, as similar processes were utilise to produce both sets of 
words (and hence encourage source confusion). However, this manipulation did not 
significantly alter source confusion or accordingly, unconscious plagiarism in the recall-
own phase. The third reason was directly related to their own data. In their study, they 
compared two unconscious plagiarism paradigms (Brown & Murphy's 1989 category 
generation task and Marsh & Bower's 1993 puzzle task) and evaluated the activation 
strength model. They anticipated that if cognitive operations influenced unconscious 
plagiarism then word frequency should play a role in determining which ideas get 
plagiarised. This follows as high frequency words are associated with fewer cognitive 
operations and less source information (Johnson et al. 1993) and consequently, high 
frequency words should be plagiarised more often. However, using a lexical decision task 
they found that the items with the highest activation strength constituted those ideas that 
were later plagiarised and word frequency did not affect this pattern. They accepted that 
source judgements were made heuristically in 5 out of their 6 studies but nonetheless 
claimed that the 'attributes of traces such as the cognitive operations proposed by 
Johnson et at. (1993) are not a primary detenminant of cryptomnesia' (Marsh & Landau, 
1995 pg 1577). 
In 1997, their viewpoint concerning the importance of source monitoring on 
unconsciously plagiarised errors changed as a result of recognising the different memorial 
processes utilised in both the recall-own task and generate-new tasks (Landau & Marsh, 
1997; Marsh & Bower, 1993). In the generate-new phase, participants need to make a 
judgement that resembles an old new judgement as they must refrain from presenting an 
old idea as new. Therefore, when generating new ideas, less differentiated infonnation is 
required as participants can rely on judgements of item familiarity (Dodson & Johnson, 
31 
1996; Johnson et al. 1993) Therefore, in this phase, activation strength may guide 
performance as an Increase In strength would lead to greater discrimination between old 
and new ideas and hence better performance/ reduced plagiarism (Macrae et aL 1999; 
Marsh & Bower, 1993; Landau & Marsh, 1997). However, the recall-own task is more 
complex as participants need to determine whether an Idea was 'old' but also to determine 
whether the idea was originally given by themselves or another participant. Conceivably 
to make this decision a cursory source evaluation is required to verify an idea's origin. 
Therefore, while performance in the generate-new phase may not be influenced by source 
confusion but driven by strength, perfomiance in the recall-own phase may be more 
reliant on source monitoring. Consequently, as a result of source monitoring during the 
recall-own phase, levels of unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own phase alone may be 
sensitive to factors related to the attributes of the memory representations. 
Landau and Marsh (1997) suggested that the orienting condition in Marsh and 
Bower's (1999) experiment (finding and completing the computers' words) may not have 
been strong enough to induce a source confusion effect. Although the observed 
plagiarism in the recall-own phase following this manipulation was not significant the 
plagiarism trend was increased in the anticipated direction. Consequently, Landau and 
Marsh (1997) with the same intention as Marsh and Bower (1993) manipulated the 
representations of self-generated and computer-generated information. Initially, in 
Experiment 1. (rather than completing words) participants were required to guess the 
computer's responses in addition to generating their own ideas; this was anticipated to 
result in the two sources of ideas becoming highly confusable. They found that as similar 
search processes and cognitive operations were required to derive each of the ideas, 
information from both the sources proved difficult to differentiate and the rates of 
unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own phase were increased. Conversely, using the 
reverse logic in Experiment 2, the sources were manipulated to be highly perceptually 
differentiated by participants either reading the computer responses directly from the 
computer screen or listening to the experimenter read the computers responses. More 
perceptual and contextual details are associated with representations when another 
person reads an idea. Hence, this time, due to the increase in source differentiation and 
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decrease in source confusion, unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own phase was 
reduced. Rates of plagiarism in the generate-new phase however, remained unchanged. 
This finding, highlighting the potential importance of source monitoring in the 
recall-own phase has since been replicated and extended by Macrae et al. (1999). 
Macrae et al employed experimental manipulations that obstructed encoding and post 
encoding operations that underiie successful source monitoring. Research has 
demonstrated source monitoring depends on the quality of stored memorial representation 
and any factors that prevent or disrupt perceivers from binding memory detail together 
and memory traces increase source confusion and impairs source monitoring ability 
(Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996) (i.e. divided attention, focusing on one's own emotion rather 
than event detail, diagnosticity of available source information is reduced, more lax 
decision criteria, attention is diverted at test, or limited source judgement time). Macrae et 
al. (1999) varied the basis of source confusion for 3 reasons; first to investigate the 
generality that source confusion increases unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own 
phase, second to investigate the type of processing used that may increase unconscious 
plagiarism in the real worid and third, to investigate the extent that the source monitoring 
framework may characterise unconscious plagiarism (Macrae et al. 1999). In the first two 
studies, they specifically manipulated and obstructed participant encoding. Experiment 1, 
investigated the affects of perceptual similarity on source confusions. Increasing the 
semantic similarity of two sources decreases one's ability to correctly assign source (i.e. 
Ferguson et al. 1992) this follows for two speakers who describe the same event (relative 
to different events Lindsay, Johnson & Kwon. 1991) or two speakers of the same gender 
(relative to another gender Johnson et al. 1996). This study explored this dynamic in the 
conventional three stage unconscious plagiarism paradigm. An initial category generation 
task was used, but here participants were either tested in perceptually similar pairs, (with 
someone of the same gender as themselves) or in perceptually diverse pairs (with 
someone of a different gender). When participants recalled their own ideas, they were 
much more likely to plagiarise from similar targets (same gender as themselves 24.4%) 
than dissimilar targets (different gender 14.5%). Experiment 2, was similar although initial 
encoding was obstructed by a radio playing during idea generation. Distraction was 
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anticipated to further promote source confusion and hence increase likelihood that 
participants would erroneously believe others ideas were incorrectly their own. This 
distraction did result in significantly more recall-own plagiarism (23.5%) than when no 
such distraction was experienced (12.7%). Therefore, in two experiments, the results 
supported Landau and Marsh (1997) as source confusion negatively Influenced recall-own 
plagiarism. However, in neither study did the experimental manipulations affect 
plagiarism rates In the generate-new phase (range 3.5-6.2%). 
In their third Experiment Macrae et al. (1999 Experiment 3) were the first to 
explore the affects that manipulations imposed at retrieval would have on later recall-own 
unconscious plagiarism. Their rational for this was that as well as the quality of the initial 
encoding, the quality of the decision processes utilised or post-encoding operations can 
also disrupt an individuals' ability to source monitor effectively (Johnson et al. 1993; 
Johnson & Raye, 1981). Hence, in their last experiment participants were either tested 
with their initial partner (partner present) and their associated source related cues or on 
their own (partner absent) where no such clues were available. The rate of recall-own 
unconscious plagiarism in their study was significantly higher when participants were 
tested alone (partner absent 21.4%), relative to when their partner was present (9.7%) 
(c.f. Brown & Murphy, 1989). This finding appears to be at odds with Brown and Murphy's 
finding of no affects of individual versus group testing. However, Macrae et al. (1999) 
indicated that the extent that one's partner may aid source memory (by providing source 
cues) may be contingent upon the number of ideas associated with that source. 
Specifically, the more ideas that are associated with a source, the stronger the source 
links may be, and the more memory cues that may be available to aid recall and help to 
avoid plagiarised errors. This may account for the differential finding between the two 
studies. In Macrae et al. (1999) participants were required to generate 24 ideas each, but 
only 16 in Brown and Murphy (1989). Therefore, in Macrae et al's (1999) study as each 
participant was responsible for more ideas, the associated memory links may have been 
stronger (between the source and their ideas) and so withdrawing such cues (the partner) 
may have constituted a bigger recall deficit than in Brown and Murphy (1989) where fewer 
ideas were associated with each participant. However, cumulatively. Macrae et al. (1999) 
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found that source confusion manipulations at encoding and retrieval increased 
unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own phase but did not increase unconscious 
plagiarism in the generate-new phase. Hence, they concluded that unconscious 
plagiarism derives from failure of basic memory operations and more specifically, is a 
variant of source forgetting as hindering source monitoring increases (recall-own) 
unconscious plagiarism. 
Bredart et al. (2003) explicitly tested the memory characteristics or con-ectly 
recalled and plagiarised ideas in the recall-own phase. They found that errors of source 
attribution may occur when representations lacks sufficient discriminating information. 
They compared the phenomenal characteristics for produced and unconsciously 
plagiarised ideas. The traditional plagiarism domain was utilised with a category name 
generation task, during generation, and a recall-own task followed by an adapted version 
of the memory characteristic questionnaire (Johnson et al. 1988). In this test, for each of 
the names that participants recalled they were asked to respond to 6 questions 
concerning the specific circumstances of the names production. (1. 'Do you remember 
what the word sounded like when you produced it?' 2. 'Do you remember whether the 
word was one of the first (last or intermediate) items that you produced'? 3. 'Do you 
remember whether the word was one of the last items that you produced'? 4. 'Do you 
remember having a mental image while producing that word'? 5. 'Do you remember 
having a specific thought relating to that word while producing it'? 6. 'Do you remember 
using a retrieval strategy for finding the name'? (cognitive operations) (p. 6)). They found 
that actual experienced information included significantly more information about 
qualitative features at study than plagiarised information (or new information). 
Specifically, correctly recalled ideas, when compared to plagiarised ideas, were reported 
to possess more auditory and contextual detail, more associations with a mental image, 
feeling or specific thought about the idea and more associations with information that 
related to a particular retrieval strategy. Unconsciously plagiarised ideas were purported 
to have poor memory of source-specifying experiential content (i.e. auditory details, list 
position, and cognitive operations). However, there was a high number of plagiarised 
names and for each of these plagiarisms participants were very confident in a minimum of 
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one of the qualitative characteristics. Moreover, the differences between these types of 
memories remained for one week. Hence, Bredart et al. (2003) essentially demonstrated 
that plagiarised ideas and participants' own ideas differed and supported the source 
monitoring account of unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own phase. 
1.5.4 Role of Strength 
Hoffman, (1997) previously found that participants tended to make source decisions on 
the basis of judgements of item strength. For example, in Hoffman's (1997) study 
participants initially complete two separate tasks; they were either shown picture on day 1 
and imagined information on day 3 (PI group) or imagined information on day 1 and were 
then shown pictures on day 3 (IP group). Then, at test, participants were presented with 
information that was completely new together with the previously imagined (internally 
generated) or seen (externally generated) information and were instructed to recall the 
source. Participants were more likely to attribute new infonnation to the weakest class of 
item, the task that they had completed during the first session. This was demonstrated in 
terms of an 'it had to be you effect' (when external source was weaker. PI condition) and 
an 'it had to be me' effect' (when internal source was weaker, IP condition). Bink et al. 
(1999) however, investigated whether the data could be alternatively accounted for from a 
source monitoring perspective. They specifically, questioned whether the biases that 
Hoffman obtained were a result of willingness to ascribe a new item to the source that 
posses the least diagnostic qualitative characteristics (rather than strength). For example, 
in the IP condition where imagination preceded picture viewing, the new ideas may be 
attributed to the 'imagined' source ('it had to be me') - not because 'imagined' was the 
weaker source - but because the imagined ideas were lacking in perceptual details, 
relative to the more recently, 'seen' information. A similar justification may be used for the 
PI condition, where the new items may be attributed to the seen (external) source ('it had 
to be you') on the basis of a lack of cognitive operations that would have conceivably been 
stronger for the imagined ideas. To investigate this possibility, the strength of the two old 
sources were equated by giving day 1 items a stronger trace strength. This was achieved 
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by repeating the activity performed on day 1 (either imagined or seen) three times but by 
only performing the respective activity on day 3 once. 
This manipulation did equalise the strength of the sources, as the recognition hit 
rates were the same for both. However, at test the 'it had to be you' effect (in the PI 
group) and the 'it had to be me' effect (in the IP group) were still observed. As such, 
explaining these findings in terms of strength is problematic. The findings may be more 
easily accounted for by Bink et al's explanation that participants make decisions on the 
basis of the different diagnosticity of particular qualitative characteristics (as specified by 
source monitoring framework; Johnson et al. 1993). For example, for old ideas, 
participants in the IP condition may rely more on pictorial details to make a source 
decision as this was the most recent class of information. If this perceptual information is 
lacking participants may ascribe the item to the 'Imagined' source. A similar technique 
may have carried over for new items (reverse in PI cognitive operations). However, the 
pattern of data is complex as pictures called pictures had a higher accuracy than imagined 
called imagined. 
Bink et al. (1999) also suggested alternative explanations for the prevailing effects 
that may be due to participant sensitivity to the (potentially higher) variability in information 
from day 1 (Johnson et al. 1993), or the metacognitive factors that may influence their 
judgements i.e. an implicit theory (that participants may hold) that older items are weaker 
in memory (not that they are in actuality). Fundamentally, Bink et al. (1999) Indicated that 
"decision criteria may either be changed heuristically by different weightings of 
characteristics or more systematically by plausibility of inference and that these changes 
in criteria give rise to the misattributions" (p. 807). Although, these findings do not 
necessarily need to oppose strength they simply demonstrate that decision criteria can 
differ depending on the particulars of the source monitoring situation (Marsh & Hicks, 
1998) and specifically, the weighting of different decision criteria based on the relative 
diagnosticity of different qualitative characteristics. However, although Bink et al. (1999) 
argued that reality monitoring was not based on strength they did maintain that strength is 
nonetheless a useful heuristic in unconscious plagiarism studies when someone is 
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generating a new idea. This assertion is not at odds with the source monitoring 
framework. 
1.5.5 Tasks used to measure retrieval 
In addition to decision criteria, demands of the task have also been demonstrated to be 
important in guiding source monitoring by evoking different decision processes that lead to 
asymmetries in people's claims about the origin of their memories (Marsh & Hicks, 1998). 
Marsh et al. (1998) induced participants to examine their memories for evidence of the 
qualitative characteristics associated with the given source. In their experiment, 
participants were initially presented with some words (seen words) and were asked to 
generate the remainder of the words from anagrams (generated words). Following this, 
they were presented with one of the prior words (either generated/seen) and were 
specifically asked whether the item was originally generated or seen. Their motivation 
here was that if manipulations do not change the decision process used to arrive at a 
source judgement, then performance for ideas from different sources (seen and generated 
ideas) would be equivalent irrespective of how the question was asked (questioned about 
seen or generated items). The results demonstrated that focusing participants on one 
aspect of a source judgement changed one's ability to recognise a word as having been 
generated at study. For example, when participants were asked if a generated word was 
previously generated, participants were more accurate than when they were asked 
whether it was seen. Asking if the word was generated encouraged participants to focus 
on evaluating their memory characteristics for cognitive operations, but asking If it was 
seen encouraged participants to examine memory characteristics for perceptual 
information and less diligently for cognitive operations that might help source attributions 
(and vice versa). Hence, when participants were queried about whether items came from 
a particular source they weighed more heavily on the qualitative characteristics associated 
with the source specified in the question and were more accurate when source and test 
were matched. Similariy, Leynes, Bink, Marsh, Allen & May (2003) illustrated that source 
memory was better when the source and test modalities (auditory or visual) were 
congruent. However, here this source matching benefit was only evident for sources that 
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differed in diagnosticity (i.e. external (seen) & internal (generated) source) and not for 
those that were more similar in diagnosticity (i.e. 2 external sources (heard or seen). This 
followed as the attributes were more equivalent the source monitoring was relatively 
unchanged. Source monitoring accuracy therefore may depend on the cognitive agenda 
when a judgement is made and the presence or absence of information may provide 
diagnostic information that may discern origin (Marsh & Hicks, 1998) but importantly these 
findings indicate that different tasks can have different implications for perfonnance. 
In unconscious plagiarism studies the recall-own and generate-new tasks have 
been dominantly used to investigate levels of plagiarism. Although these tasks invariably 
involves a source monitoring component that had been derived from task instruction, 
source monitoring (even in the recall-own task) is a secondary task as it is not the 
participants' primary objective. In contrast, source monitoring is conducted under 'best 
case' circumstances and is a primary objective In source monitoring tasks (Johnson et at. 
1993). These source monitoring tests are usually conducted in two parts. In the initial 
task, information is provided by different sources (i.e. the participant (generate) or the 
computer (read)). This Is followed by a modified recognition test where all the previously 
generated information is re-presented, together with new information. Participants are 
instructed to indicate in which of the sources (i.e. computer, themselves or new) the 
information initially originated (see Johnson et al. 1993 for a review). Hence, such tests 
directly measure source memory when participants' full attention is assigned to 
completing this task goal. As such, in modified recognition tests (source monitoring tests) 
systematic decision processes are more consciously and exclusively utilised (Marsh et al. 
1997). 
Marsh et al. (1997) specifically investigated source monitoring on levels of 
unconscious plagiarism when participants primary objective was to correctly ascribe 
source. In the generation phase, participants brainstormed ways to improve their 
universities or to reduce traffic accidents. Then, after one week, participants either 
completed the conventional generate-new task (generated 4 new solutions for each task) 
or were given a source monitoring test and were explicitly asked to state the source of the 
previous solutions. The plagiarism rates obtained in these two groups were compared. In 
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the generate-new group, of the newly generated items, 2 1 % were plagiarised from the 
earlier session (a rate that was in line with prior findings). However, in the source 
monitoring group, only 0.8% of the prior ideas were plagiarised from the eariier session 
(Experiment 1). Therefore, it appears that unconscious plagiarism resulted from inefficient 
source monitoring as participants failed to engage in systematic decision processes 
detailed by the source monitoring framewori^ during retrieval (Marsh et al. 1997), Marsh 
et al claimed that when people devised new solutions, they utilised more resources and 
were thus less able to effectively monitor their information sources. Conversely, when 
participants made source judgements, they were motivated to use their processes 
efficiently and therefore the rate of unconscious plagiarism significantly decreased (Marsh 
et al. 1997). This conclusion was supported by data demonstrating that when participants 
completed testing under time pressure plagiarism rates increased and when strict 
instructions warned participants to avoid plagiarism (Landau, Thomas, Thelen & Chang, 
2002; see also Marsh et al. 1999) or indicated that their responses would be carefully 
scrutinised at test, the number of intrusions decreased (see chapter 5). 
The aforementioned findings illustrate the important impact that source monitoring 
has on unconscious plagiarism. It would appear that factors that inhibit encoding (Landau 
& Marsh, 1997; Macrae et al. 1999) or retrieval (Macrae et al. 1999) affects one's ability to 
correctly assign source and as a consequence an individual may come to believe that 
something that originated elsewhere was incorrectly one's own. Moreover, the findings 
from Marsh et al. (1997) indicate that participants may unconsciously plagiarise when 
utilising their cognitive resources to develop something new and creative, however this 
effective generation may come at the expense of effectively monitoring (or neglecting to 
monitor) their information sources. In contrast, individuals In the real worid who are 
engaged in product generation (i.e. song writing, or academic writing) are highly motivated 
to make correct source judgements to prevent themselves from blatantly copying. 
However, the extent to which they are able to engage in such monitoring processes may 
vary and be dependent upon their current task. In plagiarism cases where unconscious 
plagiarism has been implicated, a common theme connecting the cases is that the artists 
(i.e. George Harrison) were so convinced that their composition was original that they 
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were determined to profess their innocence and the originality of their work in court. Is it 
possible that these artists presented their product following a lengthy process of idea 
development and plagiarised as a result of failing to monitor the sources of their 
information? Real world plagiarists really believe in the authenticity of their work and have 
motivation to prevent undesirable infringement and the lawsuits that they bring. 
1.6 Issues to be explored in this thesis 
This thesis will investigate the effects of source monitoring on unconscious plagiarism and 
explore the relationship between item and source memory when participants are engaged 
in novel creation and evaluation. Specifically, Chapter 1 focuses on task creativity and 
manipulations at encoding that may affect unconscious plagiarism. To dale, experimental 
research has investigated the effects of incorporating a retention interval between initial 
idea encoding and later testing. Such delays have without exception, increased the levels 
of plagiarism obtained (i.e. Brown & Halliday, 1991; Marsh & Bower, 1993). However, the 
type of cognitive effort that participants may be investing in during this period has been 
largely neglected. Therefore, Chapter 3 explores the effects of participant elaboration 
following initial idea encoding but before testing. Elaboration will be considered in different 
ways; that involve thinking about, evaluating or developing the Idea after the Initial 
generation phase, but before test. A number of findings suggest that elaboration should 
have an impact upon rates of unconscious plagiarism (e.g. Garry et al. 1996; Shaw, 
1996). Moreover, it Is plausible that real worid plagiarists Invest considerable time and 
effort developing their novel products (song, story, article) and hence, Chapter 5 explores 
the effects of repeating this idea elaboration over multiple experimental sessions. Chapter 
6 focuses on manipulations at retrieval. The majority of unconscious plagiarism studies 
have utilised the recall-own task and the generate-new tasks In the testing phase. Few 
studies have Implemented a source monitoring test without out the conventional recall-
own and generate-new tasks preceding it. Moreover, in such studies, levels of plagiarism 
have been vastly reduced when participants have been encouraged to think carefully 
about their Information sources (source monitoring tests, Marsh et al, 1997). Hence, 
Chapter 6 will explore the veracity of the prior findings within a elaborative paradigm 
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where participants consider their information and are focused on avoiding plagiarised 
intrusions in the first instance. Moreover, these findings will be thoroughly discussed in 
terms of the activation strength model (Marsh & Bower, 1993) and the source monitoring 
framework (Johnson et al. 1993). 
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Chapter 2: Manipulations at Encoding 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Previously Used Tasks 
In 1989, Brown and Murphy developed a three stage experimental paradigm (generation. 
recall-own and generate-new task) that has since been consistently and successfully used 
to Investigate Unconscious Plagiarism. Their pioneering experiment implemented a 
category generation task in the initial generation phase that involved participants 
generating exemplars to various semantic or orthographic category cues. The selected 
semantic categories (i.e. sports, musical instruments, clothing, four-legged animals) were 
sufficiently large and did not include temporal or spatial cues that could potentially aid 
retrieval (i.e. prime ministers or counties respectively) and the more taxing orthographic 
categories (words starting with BE, FO, MA and T) were selected from the Mayzner and 
Tresselt norms (1965 as cited by Brown & Murphy, 1989) as they were the most 
frequently occurring letter combinations at the start of written words. Participants were 
separated into groups of 4 and were each required to generate 4 exemplars to each of the 
conceptual categories in Experiment 1 (e.g. football in response to *sport') or conceptual 
and orthographic categories in Experiment 2 (e.g. bed in response to 'BE'). In each 
experiment, there were a total of 64 exemplars generated. 
Following this initial task, participants completed a short unrelated distracter task 
followed by the two testing phases. First, was the recall-own phase, where participants 
were represented with the category names that they initially generated to and were 
required to remember the exemplars that they had initially said in the generation phase, 
without repeating anyone else's generated word. Second, was the generate-new phase, 
where participants were represented with the categories for a second time and were 
required to produce new exemplars that had not been previously given by themselves or 
any of the other participants. Plagiarism occurred when a participant reproduced 
someone else's word as either their own (recall-own plagiarism) or as a new idea 
(generate-new plagiarism). Brown and Murphy observed plagiarism levels across both of 
these tests, ranging from 7-14%, with the highest levels in the orthographic task. They 
argued that this occurred because the orthographic task was more difficult to complete 
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than the semantic task (as conversations are usually processed at a semantic level). As 
task difficulty is increased task monitoring ability to track and remember responses 
generated by others is simultaneously decreased (Brown & Murphy, 1989; Marsh & 
Bower, 1993). This has been demonstrated when task difficulty has been Increase at 
encoding, by participants simultaneously following task instructions and hearing white 
noise (Gardiner, Passmore, Herriot & Klee, 1977) or listening to the radio playing (Macrae 
e ta l . 1999). 
More recently, studies have been conducted that have supported and replicated 
Brown and Murphy's (1989) initial study. When studies have used the same semantic 
generative materials as Brown and Murphy (i.e. Brown & Halliday, 1991; Linna & Gulgoz, 
1994; Macrae et al. 1999; Marsh & Landau, 1995; Tenpenny et al. 1998;) or very similar 
generative materials (that were based on name generation i.e. female first names 
beginning with M and foreign city names including the letter O; Bredart et al. 2003) 
comparable levels of plagiarism between 10 and 19% have been obtained. Across these 
experiments, while the fundamental methodology has been largely consistent, the number 
of participants tested in one session has varied. Initially, Brown and Murphy (1989, 
Experiment 3) demonstrated that when participants worked in a group of 4 or alone with a 
booklet or computer partner the plagiarism rates in the generate-new phase did not 
substantially differ (14% Vs 10% respectively). Hence, the social group generation did not 
appear to Impact the ultimate plagiarism levels. However, when participants were 
engaged in group generation Brown and Murphy (1989 Experiment 1 & 2) observed that a 
plagiarised item was most likely to have been a word given in the generation phase by the 
person who spoke immediately before them. This was attributed to a diminished attention 
just prior to the when the participant was due to speak (Brown & Murphy, 1989) and 
labelled the *next in line' phenomenon (Brenner, 1973; Brown & Oxman, 1978). For this 
reason, subsequent studies have used pairs of participants a l generation to potentially 
maximise the obtainable levels of plagiarism (Macrae et al. 1999) because each 
participant is always next in line. However, this has made little difference to the observed 
rates of category exemplar plagiarism. Participants tested in pairs have resulted in 
comparable rates of plagiarism of approximately 12% (Bredart et aL 2003) and inflated 
plagiarism 14.5% (Macrae et al. 1999), while rates of approximately 1 1 % have been 
observed with groups of 4 participants (e.g. Linna & Gulgoz, 1994), 10% with groups of 3 
participants (Brown & Halliday, 1991) and 19% when participants have wori<ed alone with 
a booklet (Tenpenny et al. 1998). Thus, cumulatively, the highest levels of plagiarism were 
observed when participants were in small (or no) groups but the differences were 
relatively small and not consistent across tasks (recall-own & generate-new). Moreover, 
the methodologies used in the studies varied in terms of number of ideas that participants 
were required to produce and the particular manipulations that were employed (Macrae et 
al.1999; found levels of plagiarism as high as 24.5%). Thus, inferences about group size 
and according plagiarism levels are somewhat speculative. 
Despite these small differences, the findings highlight the consistent nature of the 
task in producing unconsciously plagiarised errors when utilising this three stage 
paradigm. Plagiarising in a category generation task however, differs fundamentally from 
instances of plagiarism that appear In the court room (e.g. musical essence of a song). 
Although word retrieval from semantic memory is sufficient here to complete the task goal, 
creative thought is absent and it is this creativity that is ultimately required when 
developing something 'new' (a point we will return to later). Hence, control for 
unconscious plagiarism in these tasks is ambiguous and problematic. Should all 
repetitions be classified as 'plagiarism'? Or, could some of these semantic repetitions be 
genuine spontaneous generations arising through (for example) an Initial lack of idea 
processing (in tenms of experiencing a brief lapse in attention at encoding or simply 
hearing the word incorrectly) such that the generation is genuinely new? Various control 
measures have been proposed and evaluated to address this possibility (see Brown & 
Murphy. 1989). One method focused on statistical comparisons of obtained plagiarism 
rates against participants' incidental self-repetition rates. Previously, in 1970 Bousfield 
and Rosner conducted a simple free recall task consisting of 20 pre-generated, unrelated 
words and observed a repetition rate of 2.6%. Later, this figure was subsequently 
increased to 5.7% when instruction encouraged latter list ideas to be reported first 
(Gardiner & Klee. 1976) but was reduced to 1.6 when the recency effect was reduced 
through retrieval requests in serial order (Klee & Gardiner, 1976). However, in these 
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tasks, episodic categories were implemented that were more restricted In size than those 
utilised in plagiarism studies (e.g. fruits). Also, in the incidental tasks participants had 
fewer items to remember, less time to recall them, and more pertinently, were explicitly 
instructed not to reproduce any previously given Ideas. Therefore, these obtained 
repetition rates may potentially over-estimate repetition in plagiarism tasks and although 
these findings constituted a good guide to incidental repetition rates they must be 
extrapolated to the plagiarism domain with caution. Consequently, Brown and Murphy 
(1989) used Klee and Gardiner's (1976 see also Grunewald & Lockhead, 1980) reduced 
rate of repetition of 1.6% as an appropriate reference point (for generated plagiarism) for 
the purposes of their research. Levels of plagiarism attained by Brown and Murphy and 
subsequent research (e.g. Linna & Gulgoz, 1994) have consistently surpassed this 
baseline (7% recall-own 14% generate-new), and so it is unlikely that all these plagiarisms 
are accountable simply in terms of chance or spontaneous generations. 
Moreover, Brown and Halliday (1991 see also Marsh & Bower. 1993) observed 
that these laboratory plagiarism rates increased over a 1 week delay, with generate-new 
plagiarism doubling and recall-own plagiarism trebling (see also Bredart et al. 2003; 
Marsh & Bower. 1993; Marsh et al. 1996; Marsh et al. 1999). Their motivation for 
incorporating such a delay was drawn from real worid cases of plagiarism in which several 
years may separate Initial information encoding and later plagiarism of that Information. 
Various documented time periods over which real worid plagiarism develops have varied 
enormously, spanning a couple of years (e.g. Freud, 1901/1960) to a couple of decades 
(e.g. Jung, 1905/1957). 
However, despite these high levels of plagiarism, completing the category 
generation task and subsequently plagiarising those generated words, still constitutes an 
Instance of semantic word repetition. So moving away from category generation as an 
initial task. Marsh and Bower (1993) developed the three stage paradigm and assessed 
the Impact of standard learning variables on unconscious plagiarism. This move was 
made as the most significant cases of unconscious plagiarism arise when participants are 
engaged in a creative pursuit, such as writing or composing, rather than producing an Item 
from semantic memory. Hence, rather than category generation, participants were 
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administered with creative puzzle tasks that they had to solve by searching for appropriate 
'creative' solutions (see also Marsh & Landau. 1995). Puzzle Tasks consisted of 16 letters 
arranged in a 4 x 4 matrix, in a similar style to the word game 'boggle'. Each valid solution 
had to contain at least 3 'touching' letters that could be adjoined in any direction. Rules 
prevented noun generation, letters in the matrix being used twice in the same word and 
word roots being duplicated with the addition of a prefix or a suffix. Participants 
completed this task with virtual participants (computer players) who generated 12 words 
while the participants each generated 4 solutions to each of the 4 puzzles. 
The rates of plagiarism obtained during immediate testing did not differ from those 
obtained by Brown and Murphy's (1989). However, following the retention interval, rates 
far surpassed those that they obtained in their semantic categories (i.e. nine times in 
recall-own & neariy three times in generate-new) and in their orthographic categories; (i.e. 
twice as high in recall-own & nearly twice as high in generate-new). Plagiarism rates were 
different in the two tasks, showing an increase from the recall-own task to the statistically 
highest rates seen in the generate-new task. Moreover, confidence values indicated that 
participants strongly believed that the ideas they had plagiarised were initially their own in 
the recall-own phase or were genuinely new in the generate-new phase. Therefore, it 
appeared that implementing a perhaps more creative task, which is arguably more 
ecologically valid task than category generation, inflated levels of plagiarism. 
However, in this study, although participants at test were engaged in a more 
generative, creative task than category generation, they were still ultimately plagiarising a 
word from semantic memory. Therefore, the absolute complexities that may be involved 
in real worid plagiarism were still perhaps not appropriately considered. Tenpenny et al. 
(1998) contested that unconscious plagiarism occurs when truly novel information is 
created and denied that previous work in unconscious plagiarism was creative but rather 
only novel within the context of the experiment. Furthermore, they stipulated that 
distinctions between these two types of creativity are crucial for useful real life 
generalisations to be made. They argued that implicit memory from a previously 
generated word may cause someone to repeat it inadvertently, but were sceptical that this 
constituted a true instance of plagiarism. Tenpenny et al. (1998) therefore implemented a 
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completely novel task that encouraged participants to devise non-words for potential use 
in an alien language (fictitious category) to investigate whether implicit memory could be a 
source of unconscious plagiarism. 
While they replicated previous findings in their replication semantic condition, no 
plagiarism was observed for fictitious categories. This finding was not explainable in 
terms of strong explicit memory for the previous suggestions, as participants were only 
able to recall 1/6^ of their initial suggestions. Conversely, low level encoding would also 
not suffice as an explanation as when participants learned definitions for the fictitious 
suggestions at generation, despite recalling twice as many non words as the control 
group, there was still no plagiarism. A perceptual identification test revealed that non-
word repetition priming had occurred and participants were shown to be influenced by the 
unintentional correlation between spelling and category membership but the experimental 
participants did not repeat the key letter combination more than baseline. Consequently, 
as plagiarism and partial plagiarism was absent in this condition it appeared that implicit 
memory, in this case, was not a source of unconscious plagiarism when people tried to 
produce novel information. This absence of plagiarism throughout their research 
programme indicated that although plagiarism prevailed in real categories, it did not when 
a creative stimulus was used, despite demonstrations of implicit memory for the words. 
They deduced that previous studies had overestimated the prevalence of unconscious 
plagiarism and conceded that it does not occur when people are trying to be original. This 
is a statement that is in stark contrast to documentation of real worid cases of plagiarism. 
This result was surprising as previous demonstrations of unconscious plagiarism 
appeared quite robust. A potential reason for Tenpenny et al's (1998) finding Is that 
although producing non-words requires creativity, it is cognitlvely demanding to generate 
novel words that have no semantic associations in memory and is not a pragmatic task. 
Marsh et al. (1999) demonstrated that over a series of 4 experiments when participants 
were shown example non-words from English categories, they tended to generate novel 
words that conformed to regularities inherent in the examples, by including 
arbitrary/mismatched features, or naturally occurring orthographic regularities. Therefore, 
participants expressed eariier learning in their novel products when easier non-word 
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generation tasks were implemented. This was inherent even when participants were 
made aware of the rules and the exemplars to avoid were actively available (participants 
could list this Information when requested) or cleariy displayed. They concluded that prior 
knowledge plays an ovenwhelming role in structuring otherwise 'novel' ideas (see also 
Peri<ins 1988). Marsh et ars.(1999) findings therefore, do not oppose those of Tenpenny 
et al. (1998) as their materials did not systematically Incorporate rules that could be 
learned by participants. When Marsh, et al (1999 Experiment 1 and 2) used 'inconsistent 
groups' where the given non-words did not conform to any specific orthographic rules, 
they like Tenpenny et al. (1998) observed little plagiarism. Therefore, although complete 
non-words are not plagiarised (Tenpenny et al, 1998) consistent aspects of the given 
examples (if they are there to be learned) tend to be difficult to avoid and thus, 
subsequently included in generated novel products (Marsh et al. 1999). 
This idea that people have difficulty avoiding features from the given examples is 
not new but complements the findings that people rely on longstanding categorical 
information when generating novel entities. For instance, in related studies when 
participants were required to draw space creatures to inhabit a distant planet (Ward, 
1994) or the creature's faces (Bredart et al. 1998). human attributes were incorporated 
into their designs (such as appendages and eyes, nose, mouth etc respectively). This 
was the case even when they had to use their 'wildest imagination' (Ward. 1994) and 
when they were informed that their space creatures should be Vi ldly different' to earth 
creatures (Ward & Sifonis, 1997). Similar results were also obtained when participants 
designed new fruits and their tendency to incorporate the typical features such as stems, 
pips and skin (Ward. Saunders & Dodds, 1999). 
Ward, (1994) investigated the universal cognitive mechanisms that underiie 
creative novel idea production and theoretically explained these findings in terms of 
'Structured Imagination'. This is where Individuals who are solving a creative problem 
may use the 'path of least resistance' to formulate their solution. For instance, when 
presented with a novel task, the highly accessible, domain specific information (or an 
existing solution) may be retrieved and then modified in an acceptably novel way (Ward 
1994 for a similar argument see Pertains, 1981, 1988). This would account for the 
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regularities in creative thought and explain why reported solutions are rarely novel but 
contain relics of prior solutions (Jansson & Smith 1991; Smith et al 1993; Ward, 1995) and 
even non-optimal prior solutions (Jansson, Condoor and Brock. 1993). This idea of the 
'path of least resistance' was empirically substantiated by Ward, Patterson, Sifonis. Dodds 
& Saunders (2002) who demonstrated that across different domains (animals, tool and 
fruits), two thirds of participants who were instructed to imagine novel instances reported 
that they relied on examples from that domain. 
Marsh et al. (1996) adopted the Smith et al (1993) and Ward (1994), paradigm to 
assess the degree to which incorporating features of old solutions would in fact constrain 
people's creativity. When participants were shown 3 examples that all contained 3 
common features (e.g. tail, antennae and 4 legs) these features were far more evident in 
those participants' subsequent designs than those who had not been given such 
examples. Hence, they found that (in creative activities) providing examples may 
ultimately alter the nature of the creative product and increase conformity (see also Smith 
et al. 1993). Moreover, when space creature examples were related to the concept of 
hostility the participants subsequent creations contained hostile features that were not part 
of the given examples (Marsh. Bink & Hicks. 1999). Hence, participants designed novel 
entities that were consistent with emergent properties of shown examples and this 
conformity was not affected by explicit instructions to avoid using these features. This is a 
finding that is also pertinent within the unconscious plagiarism studies. 
The reviewed studies tend to indicate that plagiarism does emerge when tasks are 
completed that demand creativity. Drawing space creatures strongly indicates that this Is 
the case but at the same time it does not easily lend itself to attaining a verbal 
(written/spoken) measure of unconscious plagiarism. The intent of the present research 
was to develop a straightforward creative task that could be experimentally substituted for 
the more traditional tasks with easy incorporation Into the 3-stage paradigm. A task that is 
more applicable to this end and has been used in unconscious plagiarism studies is a 
participant brainstonning task (Landau & Marsh 1997 see also; Marsh et al. 1997). During 
the initial generation phase Marsh et al. (1997) provided participants with questions to 
which they had to generate solutions. These questions included; 'what are some ways in 
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which the university may be improved?' (Paulus, Dzlndolet, Poletes & Camacho, 1993) 
and 'how can the number of traffic accidents be reduced?' (DIehl & Stroebe,1991). (see 
also Bink et al. 1999). In groups of varying sizes participants were required to offer 
solutions to these given problems. Participants offered between 3 and 8 suggestions. 
each to a total of 15/16 Ideas, When generating the new Ideas. 2 1 % of the previous ideas 
were re-presented and hence, plagiarised. This Is a high rate of obtained plagiarism that 
is comparable to eariier studies of semantic plagiarism (e.g. Macrae et al. 1999). This is 
also more analogous to real world scenarios where plagiarism may later emerge, such as, 
in a creative office or academic environment. However, when participants were shown 
the Ideas from the generation phase and were asked to indicate which Ideas were initially 
theirs or someone else's, the level of plagiarism fell to about 1%. Consequently, It 
appeared participants had information that could prevent these Intrusions but they did not 
use that information when they were generating new ideas (generate-new phase) (see 
also Marsh et al. 1999). Landau, Thomas, Thelen and Chang. (2002) suggested that 
when creativity is the goal participants may 'bypass many of the prototypical features and 
reiy on activated features unless there is some compelling reason to avoid them' (p. 196). 
Therefore. In this case, did plagiarism either occurred as a result of participants falling to 
evaluate whether accessible Infonnation was relevant or applicable to the given task, or 
because participants were unable to avoid the influence of this Information. These 
possibilities will be thoroughly reviewed and considered In chapter 5) 
Aside from this, the brainstorming tasks were creative and effective at inducing 
plagiarism when participants completed the generate-new tasks. However, Marsh et al. 
(1997) found that during generation some participants did not provide their own solutions. 
This may have been for various reasons but could have been due to the difficulty of the 
task in producing a large number of solutions (to questions such as how can traffic 
accidents be reduced?) or abstaining responses due to social pressures In producing 
'good' and quite complex Ideas in front of the other group members. Thus, In the present 
research, a creative task was required that could easily be completed (like category 
generation), without being too specific or easily constrained in terms of the given 
responses (as the brainstorming type task was). 
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The chosen task was the Alternate Uses Test (Christensen, Guilford. Merrifield & 
Wilson, 1960). In this test participants were given the name of an object (i.e. a brick) and 
were told that they had to generate novel uses for that object (e.g. a brick as a heat-proof 
mat). This task was designed to represent an expected factor of flexibility of thinking' in 
an investigation of creative thinking and is advertised as a means of measuring ability to 
spontaneously produce ideas in response to object names (Buros Institute of Mental 
Measurements, 2005). This task is comparable to category generation and can easily be 
administered and completed within the 3-stage paradigm and hence enables comparison 
to previous studies. 
The limitations of using this task to investigate creative thinking are however 
recognised. The Alternate Uses Task provides a measure of divergent thinking and tasks 
such as these have been criticised in their approach, as they may 'underemphasise the 
existence of common cognitive processes and representations that support creative 
thinking' (Marsh et al. 1996. p. 669). However, we are not advocating that this task can be 
used to measure creativity (and are aware of its restrictions) but rather that it can be used 
to easily evoke creative thought that can then be subsequently manipulated throughout 
this research programme. The Alternate Uses Test is a quick and structured task that is 
relatively simple to administer, complete and score the given output. Moreover, the 
potential generated uses for each given object (I.e. brick, paperclip etc) are not 
constrained and may be very diverse. 
2.2 Experiment 1 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The main intention of this exploratory study was to investigate whether the Alternate Uses 
Test would produce levels of plagiarism that are congruent with prior findings. The 
generate-new task was utilised during the testing phase as previous studies have 
consistently demonstrated that this phase led to numerically the highest rates of 
plagiarism (see Brown & Halliday, 1991; Brown and Murphy, 1989; Linna & Gulgoz. 1994; 
Tenpenny et al. 1998). 
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In this study a further sub issue was explored that investigated different types of 
participation. Predominantly, previous studies have only investigated unconscious 
plagiarism for participants who are actively engaged in the generative task and to date, 
only Brown & Halliday (1991) have explored plagiarism exhibited by participants who 
exclusively observe the generation phase (and did not actively participate in generation, at 
any point). They found plagiarism in the generate-new task was 'considerably higher" for 
observers than generators but suggested the outcomes of observers tested in other 
(similar) types of generative tasks were often inconsistent. 
This follows, as in related studies, results have indicated that participants who 
actively contribute to the initial task have subsequently suppressed recall levels (Brown & 
Oxman, 1978) or improved recall levels (Slamecka & Graf, 1978) relative to those who 
merely observe the generative process. Suppressed recall has been explained in terms 
of an arousal framewori< (Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1963). This is where attention to the 
experimental procedure and uncertainty of participation resulted in high arousal during 
learning and thus a reduced level of initial processing (Brown & Oxman, 1978). On the 
other hand, enhanced recall was explained in terms of the 'generation effect'. This is 
where items generated by 'self possess additional information in terms of the cognitive 
operations that were acquired during idea production. Consequently, this information may 
act as a retrieval cue and thus elicit a memory advantage during recall (for these 
generated ideas) (Slamecka & Graf, 1978). However, this benefit would not prevail for 
those who simply listened to or observed the word production. 
This act of self-generation (active participation) has also been reported to improve 
recognition memory (Raye & Johnson, 1980; Slamecka & Graf. 1978; Voss et al. 1987). 
In 1980. Raye & Johnson had pairs of participants who alternately generated free or 
constrained responses to various cues (generators) or participants who only listened to 
(observers) or recorded the spoken responses (recorders). On a later source 
identification test, generators were found to perform better than the listeners or recorders 
(who did not differ). Hence, they found that it was easier for individuals to discriminate 
between an observed/ externally generated idea, (that may be associated with perceptual, 
contextual and sensory detail) and a self/ internally generated Idea (that may be 
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cognitively rich), than to discriminate between two externally generated memories (Raye & 
Johnson. 1980). Altogether, these studies demonstrate that although active participation 
appears to differentially affect recall it more consistently appears to enhance source 
monitoring ability (Raye & Johnson. 1980; Voss et al. 1987). These findings are 
interesting in light of those found in the plagiarism literature (see Brown & Murphy, 1989) 
where generators of category exemplars later exhibited unconsciously plagiarised errors 
across tasks, despite their initial active participation. This study investigated the roles of 
active and passive participation simultaneously (within-subjects) within the plagiarism 
paradigm. In this study, participants were required to generate-new ideas that were not 
previously experienced (generate-new phase) and although recall was not explicitly tested 
here, participants needed Indirect memory of the initial ideas to prevent themselves from 
incorrectly re-producing those ideas as new. Previous findings indicate that exclusive 
passive participation, relative to active participation at generation results in higher levels of 
later plagiarism (Brown & Halliday, 1991). Hence, more errors may be expected within 
the passively observed categories than the categories that received active generation. 
However, similar predictions cannot be deduced from previous related recall or source 
memory studies as the findings are somewhat less clear. Findings from source 
monitoring studies Indicate that passive participation may lead to poor source memory 
(Johnson & Raye. 1980; Slamecka & Graf. 1978; Voss et al. 1987) and as such potentially 
enhanced plagiarism. Findings from recall studies may serve to support this assertion 
through findings that demonstrated decreased recall (Brown & Oxman. 1980) or 
contravene it through findings that have demonstrated increased recall (Slamecka & Graf, 
1978). Consequently, predictions regarding generative errors with regards to active and 
passive participation are elusive. 
Fundamentally, there 2 were questions of interest in this study. First, if the 
Alternate Uses test was implemented In the generation phase would plagiarism be later 
observed in the generate-new phase? Second, to what extent would passive participants 
(who do not actively participate to particular categories in the generation phase) later 
exhibit unconsciously plagiarised errors? 
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Active (generating ideas) versus more passive participation was investigated. Two 
types of passive participation ensued; participants either listened to the generated ideas 
(observed) or they processed the ideas more deeply at encoding by rating how easy to 
imagine and how effective they thought the ideas were (rated). Rating here was 
anticipated to further strengthen item memory at encoding. In total six categories were 
used of which 2 were generated to, 2 were listened to and 2 were rated and so, 
participants were tested in groups of 6. Additionally, retention interval was investigated. 
Participants either completed the testing phase immediately after the generation phase or 
following a 1 week delay. In line with past research, this extended retention interval was 
anticipated to generally inflate the rates of plagiarism (see Brown and Halliday, 1991; 
Marsh & Bower, 1993). 
2.2.2 Method 
2.2.2.1 Participants 
Eighteen final-year A level students volunteered to participate in this study. In addition, 
forty seven undergraduates from the University of Plymouth volunteered and received 
partial course credit for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to each 
group and a position within each group. Ail the participants were tested in groups of six. 
The session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
2.2.2.2 Design and materials 
A mixed design was employed. The wilhin-subjects variable corresponded to the level of 
participant involvement for each idea (generate, listen or rate). The between subjects 
factor was the delay between the encoding and testing phase (immediate Vs. 1 week) 
2.2.2.3 Procedure 
The participants were randomly assigned to each group of six. The participants were 
briefed and informed that would hear a list of items (e.g. a newspaper) and for each they 
would be required to do one of three tasks to generate novel, non-conventional uses for a 
given object (e.g. to swat flies or make a paper hat) to listen to ideas generated by other 
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participants or to rate the quality of the other participant's ideas. This required rating the 
ideas using two. 5 point Likert scale, one in terms of Idea effectiveness (1=not effective -
5=very effective) and one in terms of imaginability (1=difficult to imagine - 5=easy to 
imagine). The order the tasks were conducted was fully counterbalanced. Participants 
were given a booklet instructing them which task to complete first. 
After the experimenter read the first item (e.g. brick, paperclip, button, shoe, key or 
car tyre), the 2 participants who were required to generate the responses were given 
approximately 30 seconds and then asked to share their answer with the group (the 
generation phase). They were given explicit instaictions to listen to each other's ideas to 
prevent themselves from re-producing the same or similar suggestions. The two raters 
recorded and rated the ideas while the other two participants listened to the ideas. 
Meanwhile, the experimenter also kept a record of the ideas produced. For each of the 2 
different objects, the generating pair of participants would alternately generate a total of 
10 uses. Hence, in total 60 ideas were generated (10 to each object) across all the 
categories. 
Participants in the immediate condition initially completed a 5 minute unrelated 
distracter task (puzzle task) before testing, while those in the delayed condition were 
dismissed and asked to return the following week to complete the testing phase. In the 
testing phase (generate-new phase), participants were given the 6 object names for a 
second time and were required to generate 3 completely new novel uses that neither 
themselves, nor any of the other participants had previously generated. Although 
participants here had fewer items to generate at test per object (3), than in prior studies 
(i.e. 4, Brown & Murphy, 1989) there were more categories included in the design. Hence 
in total, participants generated 18 ideas which is in line with past research (i.e. 16, Brown 
& Murphy, 1989). 
2.2.3 Results 
In the initial generation phase, no previously generated ideas were re-produced by any of 
the other participants so no plagiarism was observed. In the generate-new phase where 
participants generated three new ideas per category cue unconscious plagiarism was 
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evident, and was classified in two ways. First, a 'self-plagiarism, that occurred through an 
inadvertent reproduction of the participant's own, previously given ideas, and second, an 
'other'-plagiarism that occurred through a reproduction of an idea initially generated by 
another participant. 
2.2.3.1 Immediate Testing 
In total, 637 ideas were generated and of these 567 were new ideas (89%). There were 
62 (9.7%) plagiarised ideas that had previously been generated by someone else but only 
8 (1.3%) instances of self plagiarism. Across participants, 86 .1% (31 of 36) plagiarised at 
least one idea and 52.8% (19 of 36) plagiarised more than one idea. The effects of type 
of task on plagiarism rates during the immediate testing can be seen in Table 2.2.3.1.1. A 
within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of task F(2,70)= 3.47. p<.05. 
Numerically, observing by listening to others' suggestions resulted in the highest levels of 
plagiarism while there was little difference between the raters and generators. However, 
after Sidak adjustments for multiple comparisons, these differences were not significant. 
Encoding Task 
Generate Rate Listen 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Immediate Test ing .50 .70 .39 .60 .83 .97 
Delayed Test ing .97 1.09 1.17 .97 1.21 .94 
Table 2.2.3,1,1 Experiment 1: Study: A graph showing levels of generate-new plagiarism 
for each task in the immediate and delayed testing conditions 
2.2.3.2 Delayed Testing 
Following a 1 week delay 516 ideas were generated of which only 398 were new 
ideas (77.1%) a much lower number than in the immediate testing group. This was due to 
the substantial increase in plagiarism. Following the delay there were 97 plagiarised 
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intrusions (18.8%), this almost doubled the rate that was obtained following immediate 
testing. There were also slightly more Instances of self plagiarism, 21 (4%) however, the 
rate of these intrusions was still low and they were not significantly effected by type of task 
or retention interval, F<1. Implementing a retention interval also increased the overall 
numbers of participants that exhibited plagiarised errors. All but 2 participants, 93 .1% of 
participants (27 of 29) reproduced an old idea that had been previously generated by 
another group member, and 89% (26 of 29) made two or more of these intrusions. The 
effects of task and retention interval on rates of these errors can be seen in Table 
2.2.3.1.1 however, a within-subjects ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of task 
F(2,56)=.459, p=.634. 
2.2.3.3 Immediate and Delayed Testing combined 
The listeners performed worst overall (as in the immediate testing) but the largest 
deterioration across the delay was exhibited by the raters. In immediate testing the raters 
made fewest errors but after the delay they equalised with the listeners. Crucially, 
however after the delay there was little difference in plagiarism levels across all three 
tasks and a repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of task 
F(2,126)=1.94; p<.149 or significant interaction of task and delay F(2, 126)=.94; p=.392. 
Importantly however, plagiarism rates significantly increased over the 1 week retention 
interval F(1,63)=18.79; p<.001 
2.2.4 Discussion 
The main finding in this study was that when the Alternate Uses Task (Christensen, et al 
1960) was implemented in the initial phase of Brown and Murphy's, (1989) 3-stage 
paradigm, plagiarism was observed at a rate that was consistent with previous studies. 
Overall, in the immediate testing condition participants reproduced on average, 10% of the 
initial ideas (originally other participants ideas) from the generation phase as their own 
'new' ideas. However, in the delayed condition where testing was administered after a 
retention interval of 1 week the rate almost doubled to 19%. This is a rate that is 
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equivalent to or higher than previous studies (Bredarl et al. 2003; Brown & Halliday, 1991; 
Brown & Murphy, 1989; Linna & Gulgbz, 1994; Tenpenny et al.1998) 
Before the delay, it appeared that passively 'observing' ideas resulted in the 
highest rate of plagiarism, with generating and rating providing the lowest levels of 
plagiarism (and thus the best performance). The trend of these findings supported Brown 
and Halliday (1991) who found the same pattern with participants who exclusively 
observed the generation phase (see also Johnson & Raye. 1980, Slamecka & Graf, 1978; 
Voss et al. 1987). However, following a 1 week delay, this active (or rate) advantage did 
not help participants to avoid plagiarised intrusions and rates of plagiarism were increased 
and comparable to those obtained from the passive participants. Thus, although enduring 
a one week retention interval between generation (generation phase) and testing 
(generate-new phase) increased plagiarised intrusions relative to immediate testing, the 
type of task performed during generation had no subsequent effect on these absolute 
levels. Therefore, active or passive encoding did not affect participants' later propensity to 
plagiarise, following a one week retention interval. 
Essentially in this study, the Alternate Uses Test was easily administered, 
completed and importantly, generated high levels of score-able plagiarism. Consequently, 
the Alternate Uses Task is a suitable, creative task that can be utilised to further 
investigate unconscious plagiarism within the forthcoming research programme. Here we 
observed plagiarism levels of 19% when participants generated new ideas. The next step 
was to investigate levels of recalled plagiarism that would be obtained when the recall-
own phase was implemented. This was explored in Experiment 2. 
2.3 Experiment 2 
2.3.1 Introduct ion 
Experiment 1 indicated that when the Alternate Uses Test was used in a 2-stage 
paradigm (generation and generate-new phase) unconscious plagiarism occurred at a 
rate of 19%. Therefore, when participants were generating new ideas, one fifth of the time 
they reported another participant's initial idea as their own novel idea. In previous studies, 
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higher levels of plagiarism has been observed in this generate-new phase, than in the 
recall-own phase, when participants try to recall their original ideas. 
Marsh and Bower (1989) indicated that the elevated *theft' of others ideas as new, relative 
to one's own was a function of a weakening in idea strength across the sequential task 
completions. Nonetheless, using this alternate measure of plagiarism has yielded 
significant levels of self-appropriation of others' ideas (e.g. Brown & Halliday, 1991; Brown 
& Murphy, 1989; Linna & Gulgoz, 1994). Hence, this study will incorporate the recall-own 
phase into the design to determine what degree participants' believe others' creative ideas 
were originally their own (this issue will be further investigated in Chapter 3). 
In this study, the 3-stage paradigm will be employed (generation, recall-own and 
generate-new phases) with the Alternate Uses Test administered at generation (creative 
task). This will replicate and further the findings from Experiment 1. Additionally, a 
second condition will be included that constitutes a replication of Brown and Murphy's 
(1989) study, with the traditional category generation task implemented at generation. 
Consequently, it would be possible to make a direct comparison across the three stages 
between the traditional and creative tasks. This task was chosen for comparison as it 
was the original task used within this paradigm and although not creative, has since 
featured and been manipulated in a large proportion of the studies investigating 
unconscious plagiarism (see e.g. Brown & Halliday, 1991; Brown & Murphy. 1989). Our 
goal was to further investigate the Alternate Uses Test as a suitable task for subsequent 
studies. 
In this study, methodological factors were consistent with Brown and Murphy's 
initial study. First, four participants were tested in a group. Although they found that 
individual testing did not substantially reduce the measurable intrusions (14% vs. 10% 
Experiment 3), group testing was employed here to create an element of group dynamics 
that would accordingly increase the external validity of the study. This follows as initial 
group interaction may promote a scenario more analogous to real life interactions that 
may potentially lead to unconscious plagiarism. Second, consistency was maintained 
during generation by presenting four categories at generation to which each participant 
generated four exemplars. However, participants generated in a random order, to 
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reduced the likelihood of the 'next in line' phenomenon'. In addition to these, there were a 
further four objects presented at generation to which each participant generated four novel 
uses. The specific categories (taken from Battig & Montague, 1969 category norms) and 
the novel uses were randomly selected. Moreover, two sets of materials were used for 
control purposes and to investigate the generalisability of the task. Third, consistency was 
maintained during testing by instructing participants to recall the 4 exemplar (and 4 novel 
uses) that they initially generated (in the recall-own phase) and then to generate 4 new 
exemplars (and novel uses) that had not been previously generated (in the generate-new 
phase). Finally, in this study, immediate and delayed testing (following a 1 week retention 
interval) was also investigated and compared. 
In the Generate-New phase (GN), plagiarism levels obtained in Experiment 1 for 
the creative ideas were in accordance with levels obtained in other semantic studies that 
included a retention interval (Bredart et al. 2003; Brown & Halliday, 1991; Linna & Gulgoz, 
1994; Macrae et al. 1999; Tenpenny et al. 1998). The methodology used here was very 
similar to Experiment 1 and so, similar levels of intrusions were expected. There were 
however, two fundamental differences at generation and testing in the current 
methodology. First, at generation, although the total number of ideas generated here and 
in Experiment 1 were almost equivalent, in this study each participant generated a quarter 
of the total produced ideas (as there were 4 participants in a group-16 ideas each of the 
total 64) whereas, in Experiment 1 they only generated a sixth of the total ideas (as there 
were 6 participants in a group-10 ideas each of the total 60). Therefore, here the 
proportion of others' ideas that could potentially be plagiarised was lower than it had been 
in Experiment 1. In addition, Macrae et al. (1999) suggested that the more ideas that are 
associated with a single source, the stronger the links may become between ideas and 
their source, and hence the more distinctive the source may become. Together this 
suggests that the levels of plagiarism obtained in this study may be slightly lower than in 
Experiment 1. However, this difference may be mediated by the second difference, the 
number of ideas produced at testing. During testing, in this study, participants generated 
ideas to a total of 4 object names (and 4 category titles) and were obliged to generate 4 
novel uses (and exemplars) to each. In Experiment 1 participants generated to 6 object 
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names but were only required to generate 3 new novel uses to each. Consequently, 
although the ultimate number of ideas generated were comparable; in this study the 
testing phase was slightly more taxing as more ideas were required for each object. 
Therefore, this difference may compensate somewhat for the overall reduction in potential 
candidates for plagiarism and not affect the overall number of plagiarised intrusions. 
In the generate-new phase, rates of plagiarism in the semantic task at immediate 
testing are expected to be comparable to those obtained by Brown and Murphy, (1989) as 
this task constitutes an exact replication. Similarly, further to the findings of Experiment 1 
and those of Brown and Halliday (1991 see also Marsh & Bower, 1993) retention interval 
is anticipated to globally enhance the observed rates of plagiarism. 
With regard to the plagiarism rates expected in the Recall-Own phase (RO), 
plagiarism is anticipated but at a lower rate than in the generate-new phase (see Brown & 
Halliday, 1991; Brown & Murphy 1989; Linna & Gulgoz, 1994; Tenpenny et al. 1998), this 
follows as a result of the weakening in idea strength across the sequential task 
completions (Marsh & Bower 1993: This issue will be explored in Chapter 3). Moreover, 
somewhat lower rates of plagiarism are expected than those initially found by Brown and 
Murphy (1989). As in their study, during the recall-own phase, recall was forced and 
participants were required to remember all of their own initial contributions. This may 
have been problematic if participant could not remember all of their previously given 
exemplars (novel uses) as they may be inclined to report others initial ideas to 'fill in the 
blanks*. Therefore, despite participants not believing the ideas were their own, the 
obtained levels of plagiarism would be incorrectly inflated and hence misleading 
(Tenpenny et al. 1998). Consequently, to avoid this possibility participants were only 
instructed to report the ideas that they could remember and were permitted to leave 'blank 
spaces'. Levels of plagiarism with respect to the novel uses in this phase are less clear 
but are anticipated to be in line with those obtained in the semantic task (as this was the 
case in the generate-new task). 
Consequently the predictions were as follows, first, little difference in plagiarism 
rates is expected between the category generation task and the creative Alternate Uses 
Test. Second, the statistically highest rates of plagiarism are anticipated in the generate-
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new phase and third, delayed testing is expected to simultaneously inflate the observable 
intrusion levels in each task across conditions. 
2.3.2 Method 
2.3.2.1 Participants 
Forty-eight undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth participated in this 
study. Twenty-four were paid £5 and twenty-four received partial course credit for their 
participation. The participants were randomly assigned to the immediate or delayed-recall 
test conditions. 
2.3.2.2 Design and materials 
A factorial mixed between (immediate Vs delayed testing)-within (category generation task 
Vs Alternate Uses task) design was employed. Four of the category generation questions 
were taken from Brown and Murphy's (1989) experiment and the other 4 were selected 
from Battig and Montague's (1969) category nonns. The categories were chosen as they 
were large with no obvious spatial or temporal strategy in the retrieval process that could 
potentially aid retrieval (i.e. prime ministers or counties respectively; Brown & Murphy, 
1989). The 8 creative *novel uses' questions were selected from the Alternate Uses Test 
(Christensen eta l . 1960). 
2.3.2.3 Procedure 
Four participants were randomly assigned to a group and given a seat around a central 
table. Participants completed two tasks. In one task, they heard a list of object' names 
(e.g. a newspaper) and were instructed to generate novel, non-conventional uses for each 
object (e.g. to make a paper hat). In the other, they heard a list of category names (e.g. 
vegetables) and were required to generate members of that category (e.g. potato, carrot 
etc). The experimenter read the object or category name and instructed the participants 
one at a time to share their idea with the group. The order these tasks were conducted 
was randomised and the order that participants were asked to give their ideas was 
denoted by a Latin square design. This decreased the likelihood that the participant would 
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plagiarise the person who spoke directly before them, as they could not anticipate when 
they were going to speak (Marsh & Bower, 1993). Moreover, explicit instructions stated 
that they must listen to all the others' contributions to prevent themselves from generating 
the same ideas as another person. The experimenter recorded all the generated ideas. 
There were 4 groups of participants: immediate testing A and B and delayed 
testing A and B. Groups A and B were essentially the same, the only difference was the 
materials used (specific categories and Alternate Uses questions chosen). Participants in 
group A generated four category exemplars to each of the 4 categories (sport, musical 
instruments, clothing, four-legged animals) and four novel uses to each of the 4 objects 
(brick, shoe, eyeglass, key) while participants in group B generated 4 category exemplars 
to 4 different categories (part of the body, kitchen utensils, vegetables and furniture) and 
objects (wooden pencil, paperclip, car tyre and button). Accordingly, in both groups there 
was a total of 16 generated responses for each item/object. 
The second-phase constituted the recall-own and generate-new phases. 
Participants in the immediate testing condition completed a 3-minute distracter task, in 
which participants were required to answer a selection of puzzle tasks that did not 
interfere with the information that they had just provided. Immediately after, in the recall-
own phase, participants were shown the 4 category headings (e.g. brick) and 4 object 
names (e.g. animals) that they had previously generated to in the first session, with four 
blank spaces under each. Each category was displayed one-by-one in a random order for 
each participant. Participants were instructed to write down all of their own ideas from the 
first session (16 ideas). Recall was not timed or forced. If participants could not remember 
all of their ideas, then they were permitted to leave blank spaces. Once this had been 
completed, the same category headings were repeated in a random order. However, 
participants were asked to generate four completely new uses for each category that had 
not been previously generated (in any of the categories). Participants in the delay 
condition returned after 1 week to complete the same recall-own and generate-new 
sessions. This session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
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2.3.3 Results 
For the category generation items, unconscious plagiarism was scored if a given exemplar 
was the same as one that was previously generated in the initial phase. For the Alternate 
Uses items, an intrusion was scored if the idea was identical or very similar to a novel use 
previously generated by another participant (e.g. use brick as a door stop or use a brick to 
wedge a door open). Furthermore, if a recalled / generated novel idea was identical or 
very similar to a previous idea from a different category, the idea was scored as an 
instance of unconscious plagiarism. Inclusion of these ideas did not alter the pattern or 
significance of the results. Forty-seven participants (94%) exhibited an unconsciously 
plagiarised error in at least one of the phases (recall-own or generate-new). The overall 
numbers of ideas correctly recalled and unconsciously plagiarised in each of the tasks are 
summarised in Table 2.3.3.1. 
Elaboration Status 
Immediate Testing 
Task Category Alternate Uses Category Alternate Uses 
Generation Test Generation Test 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Recall 13.85 2.11 12.28 2.71 8.38 2.30 8.71 2.42 
UP (RO) .38 .70 .38 .75 3.04 2.66 .96 1.33 
UP (GN) 1.77 1.68 1.50 1.50 3.92 2.50 2.75 1.48 
UP (RO) = Unconscious Plagiarism in the recall-own task 
UP (GN) = Unconscious Plagiarism in the generate-new task 
Table 2.3.3.1: Experiment 2: Mean rates of correct recall and plagiarism within the recall-
own (RO) & generate-new (GN) phases for ideas plagiarised in the category generation 
and alternate uses tasks over the two retention intervals. 
2.3.3.1 Correct Recall 
During immediate testing 370 Category Exemplars were reported in total, of which 
360 (97.3%) were correctly recalled, and 328 Novel Uses were reported in total of which 
318 (97%) were correctly recalled. Thus, fewer novel used were reported but of those 
ideas a similar proportion of the ideas were correctly remembered. On average, 
participants correctly recalled slightly more category exemplars (13.8/16) than novel uses 
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(12.2/16). Following a 1 week retention interval the total number of reported ideas was 
reduced. Participants reported 274 category exemplars, of which 201 (73.4%) were 
correctly recalled and 232 novel uses were reported of which 209 (90%) were correctly 
recalled. Consequently, although participants reported fewer novel uses, more of these 
reported ideas were correctly recalled. Therefore, on average each participant correctly 
recalled a comparable number of category exemplars (8.4/16) and novel uses (8.7/16). 
A mixed ANOVA revealed there was no main effect of task (category generation V 
Alternate Uses Test) F(1, 48)= 2.49; p=.121. Consequently, overall participants were 
equally good at remembering the category exemplars and the novel uses that they had 
previously generated. However, as expected, there was a main effect of retention 
interval; implementing a one week delay significantly reduced correct recall F(1, 48)= 
60.44; p<.001. There was also a significant interaction between the type of task 
(category/novel) and retention interval (immediate V delay) F(1,48)= 5.75; p<.05. During 
immediate testing recall performance on both tests was similar but more category 
exemplars were recalled than novel uses. This difference was mediated following a 1 
week retention interval, where there was little difference in recall between the two tasks. 
These findings were consistent over both sets of materials (A and B) thus 
indicating that the testing materials were robust. There was no significant main effect of 
testing materials F<1, participant's position in the group F<1 or the order that the Ideas 
were presented F<1. 
2.3.3.2 Unconscious Plagiarism 
Recall-own task: In this task, participants were required to remember as many of 
their own initial ideas as possible. Unconscious plagiarism occurred when participants 
recalled someone else's category member or novel use as their own, initial contribution. A 
plagiarised idea was only counted once. During immediate testing 370 Category 
Exemplars were reported in total, of which 10 (2.7%) were unconsciously plagiarised and 
328 Novel Uses were reported in total of which the same number, 10 (3%) were 
plagiarised. However, following a 1 week retention interval although the total number of 
plagiarised ideas increased there was a much higher proportion plagiarised in the 
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category generation task. Participants reported 274 category exemplars, of which 73 
(26.7%), were plagiarised and 232 novel uses were reported of which only 23 (10%) were 
plagiarised. Consequently, when testing immediately followed generation participants 
were just as likely to incorrectly believe that someone else's category exemplar or novel 
use was originally their own. However, following a retention interval, participants were 
more likely to believe a category exemplar was initially their own. 
Overall, in the recall-own phase, 70% of participants (35 of 50) unconsciously 
plagiarised at least one idea that another group member had originally generated in the 
encoding session. The percentages of participants that plagiarised ideas are shown in 
Figure 2.3.3.2.1 Participants in each task appeared to make a similar number of errors 
during immediate testing. As expected, the subsequent number of intrusions that 
participants made increased following the retention interval. Moreover, participants who 
plagiarised 1 idea and more than 2 ideas doubled across both tasks. Although overall, 
there were more errors made when participants recalled category exemplars. 
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Figure 2.3.3.2.1 Percentages of participants to make 1 or more plagiarised error in the 
recall-own phase. 
The means (displayed in the second row of Table 2.3.3.1) indicate that during 
immediate testing levels of plagiarism in both of the tasks was identical. After the delay, 
plagiarism levels increased but there was a larger increase for the category exemplars 
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than the novel uses. A mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of task 
(category/novel) F(1, 48)= 17.83; p<.001 with category exemplars showing statistically the 
most plagiarism. Therefore, despite similar numbers being recalled, participants were 
more likely to attribute someone else's category exemplars, than novel uses to 
themselves. There was also a significant main effect of retention interval (immediate Vs 
delay) F(1,48)= 19.88; p<.001 and more ideas were plagiarised following a one week 
delay. Additionally there was a significant interaction between task and retention interval 
F(1,48) 17.83; p<001. Performance during immediate testing was comparable across both 
tasks but the number of plagiarised responses following the delay differentially increased. 
While the intrusions of novel uses increased by a factor of 2.5 over the delay, the number 
of category exemplars plagiarised increased by a factor of nearty 8. 
These findings were also consistent over both sets of materials (A and B); there 
was no significant main effect of testing materials F<1. Moreover, the results were 
unaffected by a participant's position in the group F<1 or the order that the ideas were 
presented F<1. 
2.3.3.3 Generate-new task: Participants' were required to generate four new category 
members or novel use ideas per cue. Often participants unconsciously plagiarised 
another persons' exemplar/idea (other plagiarism) or inadvertently duplicated one of their 
own previous ideas (self plagiarism). However, there was a very small number of these 
types of self intrusions and there was no significant main effect of task or delay on self-
plagiarism rates, F<1. 
In total, 1560 ideas were generated and of these, 798 in the category generation 
task and 762 in the novel uses task. During immediate testing, performance in both tasks 
was very similar. During Immediate Testing, in total more category exemplars (415) were 
given than novel uses (392). Of these category exemplars 367 (88.4%) were new and 46 
(11.1%) had previously been generated by someone else. Only 2 (0.5%) were 
participants own ideas that were inadvertently reproduced as new. Overall fewer novel 
uses were given in this phase but the proportion (as in the category task) of ideas that 
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were new (346 ideas, 88.3%), other plagiarised ideas (39 ideas 10%) and self plagiarised 
(7 ideas 1.8%) were similar. 
Following delayed testing 383 category generation and 370 alternate uses were 
generated in total. Of these category exemplars 267 (70.2%) were new and 94 (24.5%) 
had previously been generated by someone else. This time 20 (5.2%) were participants' 
own ideas that were inadvertently reproduced as new. Overall fewer novel uses were 
given in this phase. A larger proportion of these ideas were new (289 ideas 78.1%) while 
a smaller proportion were other plagiarised (66 ideas 17.8%) or self plagiarised ideas (15 
ideas 4.0%). Consequently, as in the generate-new task, imposing a one week delay 
increase the rates of plagiarism in both of the tasks but numerically the highest rates of 
plagiarism were seen in the category generation task. 
In the generate-new phase 94% of participants (47 out of 50) exhibited a 
plagiarised error by reproducing an old idea that had been previously generated by 
another group member. The percentages of participants that plagiarised ideas are shown 
in Figure 2.3.3.3.1 During immediate testing performance on both tasks was comparable. 
As expected, following a 1 week delay, performance in each task deteriorated equivalently 
and hence an increase in plagiarism was observed. Following the delay on average a 
striking 80% of participants across both tasks made 2 or more plagiarised errors. 
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Figure 2.3.3.3.1: Percentages of participants to make 1 or more plagiarised error in the 
generate-new phase. 
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The effects of task and retention interval on rates of these plagiarised errors can 
be seen in Table 2.3.3.1. There was a significant main effect of task F(1,48)=4.71; p<.05. 
At immediate testing, the number of ideas plagiarised in both of the tasks was 
comparable. Over the delay, plagiarism increased although the statistically highest rate 
was observed in the category generation task. Implementing a one week delay resulted in 
a significant increase in the number of ideas that were plagiarised F(1,48)=18.17; p<.001 
as in the recall-own phase, but there was no interaction between type of task and 
retention interval F(1, 48)=1.84; p=.18. Additionally, in the generate-new phase, there 
was no significant main effect of testing materials F<1, participant's position in the group 
F<1 or the order that the ideas were presented F<1. 
2.3.4 Discussion 
This experiment demonstrated that when a creative generative task was implemented in 
the generafion phase of Brown and Murphy's (1989) 3-stage paradigm high levels of 
plagiarism were obtained. Moreover, the obtained rates were in line with those found in 
the more traditional category generation task. This was the case on two different tasks; 
the generate-new task and the recall-own task. Essentially, not only did participants 
incorrectly introduce old ideas as new but they also mistakenly reported old ideas that 
were previously generated by other participants as their own ideas. Specifically, in this 
study, when participants generated new category exemplars immediately after generation, 
1 1 % of the given ideas were plagiarised ideas from the eariier generation phase. This 
level replicated those obtained in prior studies (e.g. Brown & Murphy, 1989; Linna & 
Gulgoz, 1994) and more pertinently, was comparable to the 10% of ideas that were 
plagiarised in the Alternate Uses Test. Both of these figures were significantly inflated 
following the retention interval, and although the category generation task resulted in the 
numerically highest amount of plagiarism following this delay, the Alternate Uses Test still 
resulted in a level of 17% intrusions. This is a large amount of plagiarism that is 
comparable to or exceeds the levels found in the literature for semantic tasks (Bredart et 
al, 2003; Brown & Halliday, 1991; Brown & Murphy. 1989; Linna & Gulgoz, 1994; 
Tenpenny et al. 1998) and those found in more creative tasks following a retention 
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interval. Moreover, these errors were exhibited by nearly all of the participants (94%) and 
interestingly, 80% of participants made 2 or more of these plagiarised errors across each 
task. 
In both of the tasks in the recallHDwn phase (when participants were recalling their 
initial Ideas/exemplars), there was a slight recall advantage for category exemplars at 
immediate testing but this benefit dissipated after the delay. Participants recalled a similar 
number of correct category exemplars and novel uses (8.4 and 8.7 respectively). This 
indicated that participants were able to appropriately complete the task and that 
importantly, that they did not find it significantly more difficult to recall their initial novel 
uses (than category exemplars). Consequently, the Alternate Uses Test appeared to meet 
its objectives and constitutes a suitable creative task in which general levels of participant 
performance is (mostly) matched to the category generation task 
As expected, the higher rates of plagiarism were observed in the generate-new 
phase than in the recall-own phase. This supports the pattern found in previous research 
(e.g. Brown & Murphy, 1989; Marsh & Bower. 1993) and the notion that perhaps this 
difference, results from a decline in memory strength, across the tasks. In addition, this 
differential plagiarism rate may reflect a categorical difference between the types of errors 
exhibited in each task (this point will be discussed in chapter 3). However, in the recall-
own task, the plagiarism rates that were obtained for category exemplars, were lower than 
those obtained by Brown and Murphy (1989). This likely ensued because in this study 
recall not was forced; participants were only asked to report the ideas that they could 
remember. For example, if for a given category a participant could not recall any of their 
initial responses they were permitted to leave the section blank and to move on to the next 
category. This was not the case in Brown and Murphy's (1989) study as participants were 
required to remember and report all 4 exemplars. Hence, while they obtained a level of 
7% recalled Intrusions here, we obtained 3%. Importantly however, the same percentage 
of novel ideas were also plagiarised in this phase (3%). 
As expected, the retention interval increased these recall-own intrusions, but while 
the number of category exemplars increased enormously the number of novel uses 
increased more steadily. This difference in recall-own plagiarism, between the two tasks 
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was large, as 3.04 words were plagiarised in the category generation task but only 0.96 
ideas were plagiarised in the novel uses task. This difference may partly be due to 
differential guessing rates across the two tasks. The word frequency effect suggests 
while frequent (or common) words may be easier to recall than more unusual word, 
recalling their source is more difficult (Johnson et al. 1993). This follows as common 
words are more familiar but are associated with fewer memory characteristics (including 
perceptual information concerning the generator's voice e.g. pitch, tone, volume and 
aspects of their appearance e.g. distinctive features; Johnson et al. 1993) than more 
unusual words. Thus, it is conceivable to expect that following a retention interval, the 
novel uses would be more distinctive in memory (e.g. paperclip to stir tea) than the 
frequently used category members (e.g. orange). This distinctiveness may be particularly 
pronounced for some of the more atypical novel uses, as it is possible that certain idea 
may evoke an emotion within the participant (e.g. amusement or a reminder of something 
else) thereby providing more retrieval cues that would serve to help differentiate source 
and improve item (correct recall) and source memory (reducing plagiarism). Hence, at 
recall, participants may have been less likely to confuse someone else's novel use with 
their own than someone else's category members. Moreover, participants may have 
found it easier to report familiar category exemplars than unfamiliar novel uses (more 
responses withheld). However, a rate of 10% recall-own plagiarism was obtained in the 
Alternate Uses Test and this rate is nonetheless comparable with previous semantic tasks 
that are completed following a 1 week retention interval. 
The materials that were used in this study appeared to be consistent. There were 
no significant differences found in either task, or in any of the phases, between the 2 sets 
of testing materials (groups A or B). Additionally, in the Alternate Uses Test the 
responses given to these materials in terms of the particular ideas that were plagiarised 
were not constituted from repetitions of a particular sub-set of ideas and thus plagiarised 
ideas varied considerably. Moreover, in the category generation task there was no 
evidence of a normative frequency bias in the plagiarised responses (see also Brown & 
Halliday, 1991). Consequently, the high rates of plagiarism that were attained in this 
study are unlikely to be explained in terms of the specific materials that were used. Also 
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these intrusions cannot be explained by chance as the rates observed in the recall-own 
phase and generate-new phase far exceeded the base rate levels of (1.6%) semantic 
repetitions (Klee & Gardiner. 1976). This was particularly pertinent across both tasks 
following the 1 week retention interval (Brown & Halliday, 1991; Marsh & Bower, 1993) 
In this Experiment, participants were able to complete the Alternate Uses Test by 
engaging in creative thought, and generating appropriate uses for given objects. 
Moreover, they actively recalled these ideas (correct recall), generated new ideas 
(generate-new phase) and plagiarised earlier ideas to a degree that was consistent with 
the category generation test. Importantly, although the highest levels of plagiarism were 
obtained in the generate-new task high levels were also seen in the recall-own task. 
Furthermore, implementing a one week retention interval between generation and testing 
significantly inflated the exhibited errors, 
2.4 General Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Alternate Uses Test produced generate-new 
plagiarism at a comparable rate to the previous studies of category generation. This 
finding was supported and replicated in Experiment 2. Moreover, Experiment 2 
additionally demonstrated that the Alternate Uses Test leads to plagiarised errors in the 
recall-own phase. Essentially, not only did participants incorrectly introduce old ideas that 
were previously generated by other participants as new ideas they also mistakenly 
reported them as their own old ideas. This held even when allowing participants to 
withhold their responses. 
Substantial rates of plagiarism were observed in both Experiments when the 
creative Alternate Uses Task was utilised. Following a 1 week retention interval, when 
participants were generating new ideas (generate-new phase) the observed levels of 
plagiarism were as high as 19% in Experiment 1 and 18% in Experiment 2. High rates 
(10%) were also obtained when participants were recalling their own ideas (recall-own 
phase) in Experiment 2. Moreover, these errors occurred in this creative task despite 
participants being given strong admonitions to avoid such reproductions. This finding 
follows those obtained in prior plagiarism studies (e.g. Brown & Murphy, 1989) and those 
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observed in the cx)nformity literature; where participants completing a creative drawing 
task, conform to features shown in the initial examples that they are explicitly warned to 
avoid (e.g. Marsh. Bink & Hicks, 1999). 
Overall, the inclusion of a larger retention interval resulted In high rate of 
plagiarism in Experiment 1 and inflated the intrusion rates in Experiment 2 (relative to 
when no delay was incorporated). This followed across both tasks and in both testing 
phases thus supporting Brown and Halliday, (1991; Marsh & Bower, 1993) who observed 
similar effects. In real world cases of plagiarism large time periods inevitably elapse 
between an individual's initial introduction to an idea (information/song etc) and their 
subsequent inadvertent use of that infomiation. Time lapses of various lengths have been 
previously documented from relatively short (i.e. Freud, 1901/1960) to extremely long (i.e. 
Jung, 1905/1957). Recently, Michael Bolton was found guilty of plagiarising a song that 
was a 'hit' 25 years before his song was released. Thus, although, the interval included 
here was short and cleariy not as extensive as this, it nevertheless more closely mimicked 
real life findings and importantly and significantly increased the observable plagiarism. 
This forced time lapse served to increase the external validity of the experiments and 
consequently, only a 1 week retention interval will be used in the forthcoming research 
programme. No immediate testing was administered in any study reported later in this 
thesis. 
Experiment 1 indicated that for generate-new plagiarism intrusions to occur 
participants do not need to be actively engaged in the initial generative process. Simply 
observing this process can lead to numerically more intrusions when testing immediately 
follows this generation period (Brown & Halliday. 1991; Johnson & Raye, 1980). 
However, implementing a one week delay resulted in inflated plagiarism, particulariy 
generator plagiarisms. Hence, after 1 week there was little difference in the perfomnance 
of the raters, listeners or generators and so regardless of whether participation and 
subsequent encoding in the generation phase was active or passive rates of plagiarism 
were high and did not differ. 
In these studies, when groups of 6 (Experiment 1) or 4 participants (Experiment 2) 
were involved in generation this element of group dynamics did not significantly impact the 
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results. In the generate-new phase comparable rates of plagiarism were observed in 
both Experiments. The obtained rates of 19% and 18% were in accordance with previous 
studies that had employed comparable sized groups and comparable materials, following 
the retention interval. Testing participants in larger groups and hence maintaining the 
social interaction has been reported to lead to fewer intrusions than when participants are 
tested in pairs (Macrae et al. 1999). This followed as Brown and Murphy, (1989) initially 
reported that participants were most likely to plagiarise information that was heard just 
before they were about to speak. This was due to a diminished attention toward the 
exemplars given by the participant who immediately preceded them. Hence, Macrae et al. 
(1999) only tested pairs of participants with a view to inflating the observable level. In 
these studies, we maintained group testing but changed participant generation order, so 
they were unsure when they would be called upon to give their response. Therefore, we 
may have expected to find low rates of plagiarism but this was not the case. Moreover it 
has been demonstrated that participants are less likely to plagiarise during testing if the 
context is the same at generation and retrieval, for example, if the original source (partner) 
is present at test (Macrae et al.1999). This is due to the additional retrieval cues that the 
environment and the other participants provide. Here, the physical and social context was 
maintained between generation and testing as participants completed all phases in the 
same laboratory. In their initial generative groups. Consequently, the consistently high 
rates of plagiarism obtained in these 2 experiments are particulariy striking 
The results obtained In each of these studies indicate that when the Alternate 
Uses Test Is utilised in the generation phase of the 3-stage paradigm participants are able 
to easily produce appropriate and varied creative ideas. Participants can later recall these 
ideas (in the recall-own phase) and equally, produce an appropriate number of new ideas 
(in the generate-new phase). Fundamentally, participants also exhibited high levels of 
plagiarised errors In both of these phases. Numerically the highest rates observed were 
found in the generate-new phase. This Interesting and consistent finding will be examined 
in Chapter 3. The Alternate Uses Test is also a desirable task as the novel ideas that are 
produced in response to the objects (e.g. paperclips to make a picture frame) are tangible 
ideas that potentially lend themselves to evaluation or alteration. This is important as in 
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the real worid experienced information that is later plagiarised has at some point invariably 
been worked upon and potentially evolved. In Experiment 1 participants rated the given 
ideas at encoding, while this did not affect the observed levels of generated plagiarism 
potentially rating or evaluating these ideas after encoding may conceivably affect the 
subsequent probability of the ideas being plagiarised. These issues of idea development 
will be also be explored in Chapter 3. 
Consequently, within this forthcoming research programme, the 3 stage paradigm 
will be maintained and the creative Alternate Uses Test will be administered during 
generation with a 1 week retention interval incorporated between generation and testing. 
This test will be utilised and manipulated in the proceeding studies to further investigate 
the conditions under which unconscious plagiarism is manifest. 
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Chapter 3: Manipulations after Encoding 
3.1 Introduction 
Using variations in Brown and Murphy's (1989) original paradigm, research has 
demonstrated that imposing a 1 week retention interval between initial Idea or category 
member generation and later testing of novel responses significantly increases rates of 
unconscious plagiarism relative to immediate testing (Bredart et al. 2003; Brown & 
Halliday, 1991; Macrae eta l . 1999; Marsh e ta l . 1996;). Experiment 1 and 2 supported 
these findings and found comparable rates of plagiarism when the Alternate Uses Test 
replaced the category generation task in the generation phase. To date however, 
although the effects of a delay on rates of plagiarism has been investigated, the effects of 
different mental processes that participants may be engaged in during the delay has been 
largely neglected. This is problematic as real life plagiarists are likely to think about 
appropriated ideas and accordingly invest considerable time and effort into these ideas 
before the idea is presented as their own novel creation. Hence the aim of the present 
work is to explore the possibility that it is an elaborative process that might involve thinking 
about, evaluating or developing the idea after initial exposure, but before test, that is 
responsible for a plagiarist maintaining belief in the originality of their work. Specifically, 
the effects of different types of elaboration on rates of recall-own and generate-new 
plagiarism will be investigated. 
3.1.1 Plagiarism Measure 
Appropriation has previously been demonstrated to manifest itself in different forms 
(Wicklund, 1989; Wicklund, Reuter & Schiffmann, 1988. For example, when a person is 
exposed to an idea, this information can be internally integrated and stored. Initially the 
individual's association with the idea may be weak although it can be strengthened 
through idea alteration or development. Wicklund (1989) maintained that different forms 
of appropriation can arise and be operationalised in at least 2 different ways. First, a 
weaker association can lead to a subjective feeling that an idea has been known for 
longer (feeling of knowing), whereas a stronger association can result in an incorrect 
belief that a pre-experienced idea was unique and self-generated (authorship attribution), 
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or, stated differently, generate-new plagiarism (Wicklund. 1989; Wicklund, Reuter & 
Schiffmann, 1988). 
Both of these measures require different decision processes, but constitute a 
similar type of error. Both are a form of misappropriation of another's idea to themselves. 
Marsh, Landau and Parsons (2000) explored these errors in a single experiment and 
demonstrated that engaging in elaborate encoding resulted in participants believing that 
they had known an idea for longer (length-of knowing errors) (see also Wicklund, 1989) 
but simultaneously this led to fewer of these ideas being reproduced as new (generate-
new plagiarism). They suggested that since both memory tasks were completed in short 
succession after encoding, there was very little time for changes in the stored memorial 
information. Intuitively it was more likely that different decision processes that interpreted 
the memorial information were responsible for the different results. These findings were 
explained in terms of the source monitoring framework. For a length of knowing 
judgement, participants could asses the ideas in terms of strength or familiarity (Jacoby, 
1991) and hence, an increase in strength (through elaborate encoding) resulted in 
participants assuming that they have known the idea for longer. In contrast, when 
generating new ideas, these available ideas were recognised from the encoding session 
and not believed to be new. 
In the unconscious plagiarism literature intrusions have also been measured in two 
different ways; using the recall-own task and the generate-new task as previously 
discussed. In Experiment 1, only one test was implemented during retrieval, the 
generate-new task and thus, only one measure of plagiarism was obtained but in 
Experiment 2 two measures were used. In Experiment 2 and generally in the literature 
unconscious plagiarism tends to be higher when participants generate new ideas than 
when they recall their own ideas (e.g. Marsh & Bower, 1993). This difference in 
unconscious plagiarism rates between the tasks is an issue of central interest as 
unconscious plagiarised errors appear to manifest in different ways. This is also believed 
to be due to the operation of different decision processes being utilised in the two phases 
(Marsh & Bower, 1993). In the generate-new phase participants need to make a decision 
that resembles a recognition judgement. For example, participants need to decide 
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whether the idea occurred in the generation phase. To answer a question like this, 
participants can rely on information such as item familiarity (Dodson & Johnson, 1996; 
Johnson et al. 1993). However, in the recall-own phase, although an initial recognition 
judgement is required to asses the old/new status of the idea, an additional decision 
process that determines who initially generated the idea is also required. This demands 
an extended reasoning judgement that is more typical of source monitoring. 
Consequently, due to the extended use of source monitoring during the recall-own phase, 
levels of unconscious plagiarism are sensitive to factors related to the attributes of the 
memory representations. Landau and Marsh (1997) first demonstrated this, using Brown 
and Murphy's (1989) 3 stage paradigm, by manipulating the representations of self-
generated and computer-generated information. During generation, participants 
completed a puzzle task (a boggle game). Initially, memory representations were made 
highly confusable by requiring participants to guess the computer's responses as well as 
generating their own ideas. Similar search processes and cognitive operations were 
utilised to derive each of the ideas and so information from both sources (i.e. memory 
characteristic information) was more difficult to differentiate. Consequently, rates of 
unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own phase increased but rates of plagiarism in the 
generate-new phase remained unchanged. This followed as at recall, the ideas were 
familiar and could easily be attributed to the generation phase and be rejected as new 
ideas. Furthermore, Macrae et al. (1999) investigated factors that detrimentally affect the 
quality of the stored memorial representations and demonstrated that increasing 
perceptual source similarity (same gender generating partner) or exposing participants to 
a cognitive distraction at encoding (topical radio reports) also promoted source confusion 
and increased plagiarism in the recall-own task alone. Such findings highlighted the 
potential importance of source monitoring in the recall-own phase (Landau & Marsh. 1997; 
Macrae e ta l . 1999). 
Interestingly Macrae et al. (1999) also demonstrated that source confusion 
introduced at retrieval can also cause plagiarism here. Retrieval context was manipulated 
by removing source-related cues (i.e. their generating partner). This raised subsequent 
levels of source confusion and accordingly, recall-own unconscious plagiarism. In this 
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case, infonmation representations were unchanged but rather the decision processes that 
guide source monitoring were interfered with and affected. However, in all of these 
studies plagiarism in the generate-new phase was either unaffected or reduced as 
extended source monitoring decision processes were not necessary. 
In essence, this previous research has demonstrated 2 things; 
1) That the recall-own and the generate-new tasks are different with regards to the cause 
of plagiarism. Therefore, In Experiment 3 both measures of plagiarism are incorporated 
into the experimental design. 
2) Manipulations that are imposed at the time of both encoding and retrieval affect 
subsequent levels of plagiarism and may differentially affect recall-own and generate-new 
plagiarism. Specifically, manipulations that promote source confusion can inflate the 
likelihood that participants will claim someone else's idea incorrectly as their own. Our 
interest here focused on introducing manipulations after encoding but during the interval 
between initial idea generation and later testing, to evaluate the subsequent affects on the 
two measure of plagiarism. 
3.2 Experiment 3 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In the real worid when a person hears an idea they may evaluate it and think about why 
the idea is good or bad or even whether they like the idea. The potential effect that these 
types of evaluative processes may have upon rates of plagiarism has been subject to little 
empirical investigation. Marsh and Bower (1993) contrasted the effects of thinking about 
how pleasant an idea was following initial idea generation, with a more passive letter 
counting task. Introducing pleasantness rating reduced the amount of plagiarism that was 
later observed in the generate-new phase. It was concluded that performing these ratings 
resulted in the ideas becoming more available or familiar. Hence, at recall if these ideas 
came to mind more easily participants may have presumed that they were old words and 
so avoided presenting them as new. Marsh and Bower (1993) explained these findings in 
terms of the activation strength model. 
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As discussed in the introduction, activation strength is cun-ently one of the 
dominant models used to explain unconscious plagiarism (Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & 
Landau, 1995). Marsh and Bower (1993) suggested that as the activation strength of an 
externally-generated idea is increased its activation level becomes closer and more 
comparable to self-generated ideas. Consequently, the ideas' representations may 
'overiap' and this may lead to confusion and result in participants believing that someone 
else's idea was initially their own. This view also predicts that more elaborate encoding 
should concurrently reduce plagiarism, relative to baseline, in the generate-new tasks. 
This follows because any increase in strength would lead to greater discrimination 
between new and old items, and thus reduce intnjsions from previously elaborated ideas. 
However, as described in Chapter 1. a source monitoring account has also been 
used to explain unconscious plagiarism (Johnson et al. 1993; Landau & Marsh, 1997; 
Macrae et al. 1999). This is the case specifically in the recall-own phase where levels of 
unconscious plagiarism are sensitive to the attributes of the memory representations. 
Manipulations that result in source confusion, such as, perceptual source similarity 
(Landau & Marsh. 1997; Macrae et al. 1999) or cognitive distraction (Macrae et al. 1999) 
can result in an individual claiming someone else's idea as their own. This follows 
because these types of source confusion can affect the quality of the stored memorial 
information, so when source decisions are made on the basis of these qualitative aspects 
of the ideas (rather than familiarity), mistakes can occur and hence plagiarism (e.g. Marsh 
& Landau, 1997). In a different vein this source monitoring view was advocated more 
recently by Bink et al. (1999) regarding plagiarism in the generate-new phase. They have 
suggested that information from a credible source may be processed differently to other 
information and specifically, that more detailed characteristics are stored at encoding. In 
their study, participants were given lists of ideas on how to reduce traffic accidents, some 
of the ideas were presented as if they were from *town planners' and hence comprised the 
credible ideas while the remaining ideas were presented as if they were from 
undergraduate students. Both sets of ideas were equated in terms of quality and 
effectiveness and importantly, ratings given by the participants indicated that credible 
sources were not viewed as objectively better. In addition, explicit memory measures 
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Indicated that both sets of ideas were equally learned and recalled (as shown by a free 
recall test) and even idea origin judgements did not differ. However, when participants 
were asked to generate new ideas they tended to plagiarise more credible Ideas, thus 
suggesting a sensitivity to the sources credibility. Hence, there was a dissociation 
between implicit and explicit memory. 
BInk et al. (1999) suggested that this unconscious plagiarism may have been 
caused by participants spontaneously generating implications for the credible Ideas at 
encoding. This suggestion was supported In Experiment 3 where rates of unconscious 
plagiarism were equated when participants were explicitly Instructed to provide implication 
for the students' ideas (but not credible ideas) at generation. These findings are difficult to 
explain exclusively in temns of activation strength, as according to this model generating 
implications should have resulted in improved recall (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and a 
reduction in plagiarism (Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995). However, 
absolute recall was not improved so it was unlikely that this manipulation was explicitly 
affecting memory. Rather, the source monitoring framewori< would imply that implication 
generation resulted In extra cognitive operations being stored at encoding (Johnson et al. 
1993) and although these were not sufficient to significantly enhance recall they may have 
heightened the idea's availability. Consequently, at test when the ideas came to mind, the 
idea's availability may have been attributed to spontaneously generating a new idea rather 
than remembering the associated source. If participants utilised a heuristic editing 
process, while engaging In the taxing generate-new task they may have focused on this 
task and so failed to consult all their available memorial details associated with the ideas 
and consequently plagiarised (Bink et al. 1999; Landau et al. 1997). 
In BInk et al's (1999) experiment, participants did not actively participate In the 
initial generation session so accordingly only one measure of plagiarism could be 
obtained (generate-new plagiarism). In Experiment 3 we were interested in further 
exploring idea processing on later rates of plagiarism but in the 3 stage paradigm (Brown 
& Murphy, 1989). However, instead of generating idea implications participants were 
required to Invest more time in each idea by considering the ideas In a positive or negative 
way. This task had parallels with Bink et al's implication generation, but increased the 
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mental processing that was invested in each idea (providing 3 suggestions as opposed to 
1) and also investigated elaboration on 2 dimensions (positive and negative). In addition, 
two different measures of plagiarism were used; 1) the recall-own task and 2) the 
generate-new task. We were interested in the rates of plagiarism obtained in the recall-
own phase as a different decision process, a more extended reasoning judgement must 
be utilised when completing this task (see Marsh & Bower, 1993). 
Therefore, in Experiment 3, two types of elaboration were investigated. These 
were implemented following the initial idea generation session thus creating a 4 stage 
paradigm. During elaboration participants either generated 3 positive things about the 
idea, 3 negative things about that idea or heard the idea for a second time but did not 
elaborate. The goal was to determine what effect these manipulations would have on 
plagiarism and moreover, whether these different types of elaboration had differential 
impacts on plagiarism rates across the two plagiarism measures. As conceivably, ideas 
perceived to be 'bad' are less likely to constitute those ideas that are appropriated in the 
real worid. However, both forms of elaboration require deeper processing of the original 
ideas and so would be expected to increase the idea's strength in memory relative to 
control. Thus the simple strength account of unconscious plagiarism predicts that 
elaboration should show a dissociation across the two measures of plagiarism but makes 
no predictions regarding the two forms of elaboration beyond that predicted by strength. 
That is, if either positive or negative elaboration leads to stronger memory traces, as 
indexed by higher recall, one might consequentially expect to see higher rates of 
plagiarism in the recall-own task, and lower rates of plagiarism in the generate-new task in 
that condition. 
However, alternative predictions can be derived from the source monitoring 
framework. If generating 'positive things' (or negative things) about an idea effects 
encoding in a comparable way to implication generation this may result in a higher level of 
plagiarism in the generate-new phase, relative to the control. At test, these Ideas may be 
more available due to increased cognitive operations associated with the ideas. Rather 
than improving source memory (as activation would suggest), the ease with which the 
ideas are retrieved may incorrectly cause the participants to believe the idea was a 
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spontaneously generated new idea and not an old idea, hence increasing plagiarism. 
Alternatively, the increased cognitive processing and associated cognitive operations may 
result in the ideas being more easily remembered and thus appearing more distinctive 
from new ideas and instead reducing plagiarism in this phase. 
3.2.2 Method 
3.2.2.1 Participants 
A total of twenty-four undergraduates from the University of Plymouth received £5 for their 
participation in this study. Only twenty-one of these participants returned to complete the 
second half of the experiment. 
3.2.2.2 Design and Procedure 
A within-subjects design was implemented that explored participant idea involvement 
(control, positive elaboration, negative elaboration). Four participants were randomly 
assigned to each group of four and were given a seat around a central table. The 
participants were informed that they would hear a list of object names (e.g. a newspaper) 
and they would have to think of novel, non-conventional uses for the item (e.g. to make a 
paper hat). After the experimenter read the first category (either; brick, shoe, paperclip or 
button) participants were instructed one at a time to share their ideas with the group. The 
order that participants were asked their ideas was denoted by a Latin square design. This 
decreased the likelihood that the participant would plagiarise the person who spoke 
directly before them, as they could not anticipate when they were going to speak (Marsh & 
Bower, 1993). Moreover, explicit instructions stated that they must listen to the other's 
examples to prevent themselves from generating the same ideas as another person. The 
experimenter recorded all the generated ideas. For each of the 4 objects, each participant 
generated 3 novel uses, one idea that would be amenable to the three elaboration 
conditions (control, positive elaboration & negative elaboration). Accordingly, for each 
category there were 12 generated exemplars. The elaboration phase immediately 
followed the idea generation. Of the previously generated ideas, a third (one idea from 
each participant per object) was then subject to the following treatment conditions. In the 
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control condition participants simply wrote down the idea. In the positive elaboration 
condition participants wrote down 3 positive things about the idea and in the negative 
elaboration condition participants wrote down 3 negative things about the idea. 
The order that participants peri'ormed these tasks was counterbalanced across the 
groups. The experimenter read these ideas in a pre-determlned random order, instructing 
participant to write down the idea and positively or negatively rate the Idea as appropriate. 
This task complete the first session and lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
One week later participants returned to complete the testing phase comprising of a 
recall-own and generate-new phase. In the recall-own phase, participants were given a 
booklet which displayed the 4 object names (e.g. brick) that they had previously generated 
to in the first session, with 3 blank spaces under each. Each object name was displayed 
one-by-one in a random order for each participant. Participants were Instructed to recall 
and record all of their own ideas from the first session (12 ideas). Recall was not forced 
or timed. If participants could not remember then they were permitted to leave blank 
spaces. Once this had been completed the same category headings were repeated again 
In a random order. However, participants were asked to generate four completely new 
uses for each category that had not been previously generated. This session lasted 
approximately 20 minutes. 
3.2.3 Results 
Unconscious plagiarism was scored if an idea was Identical or very similar to an Idea 
previously generated by another participant (e.g. use brick as a door stop or use a brick to 
wedge a door open). Furthermore, if a recalled / generated idea was Identical or very 
similar to a previous idea from a different category, the idea was scored as an instance of 
unconscious plagiarism. Inclusion of these Ideas did not alter the pattern or significance of 
the results. Responses were categorised independently by two raters. In the recall-own 
phase the raters indicated whether the Ideas were correctly recalled, plagiarised or a new 
ideas (that were not generated In the initial phase). In the generate-new phase, raters 
determined whether the ideas were new, plagiarised or duplicated ideas (I.e. ideas that 
appeared in the generate-new phase more then once). The Inter-rater agreement across 
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all the ideas was 98.7%. Discrepancies occurred when ideas from the generation phase 
were similar to ideas produced as new ideas for example 'to use button as eyes on a 
teddy bear' and 'to use buttons as eyes on a snowman'. In instances such as these the 
ideas was not classified as being plagiarised. However, there were very few examples 
like these and all were resolved by discussion. 
All of the participants exhibited an unconsciously plagiarised error in at least one of 
the phases (recall-own or generate-new). The overall numbers of ideas correctly recalled 
and unconsciously plagiarised in each of the tasks are summarised in Table 3.2.3.1. 
Elaboration Status 
Task Control Positive Elaboration Negative Elaboration 
Mean (of 4) SD Mean (of 4) SD Mean (of 4) SD 
Recall 2.24 1.14 2.67 1.20 2.48 1.21 
UP (RO) .43 .68 .67 .86 .52 .60 
UP (GN) .67 1.02 .43 .51 .43 .60 
f?eca// = Correctly recalled ideas in the recall-own task 
UP (RO) = Unconscious Plagiarism in the recall-own task 
UP (GN) = Unconscious Plagiarism in the generate-new task 
Table 3.2.3,1: Experiment 3: Mean rates of correct recall and plagiarism within the recall-
own (RO) & generate-new (GN) phases for control ideas and those that were positively 
and negatively elaborated. 
3,2.3.1 Correct Recall 
In total, 189 ideas were reported. Of these, 155 ideas (82.0%) were correctly 
recalled, where each participant on average correctly recalled (i.e. did not plagiarise) 9 
(SD = 2.3) of their initial ideas. The top row of Table 3.2.3.1 shows the effects of 
elaboration on correct recall. Numerically, there was a slight recall advantage following 
elaboration but both positive and negative elaboration affected recall equivalently. 
However, a within-subjects ANOVA revealed there was no main effect of elaboration 
status on participants' performance, F(2,40)= .78; p=.463. 
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3.2.3.2 Unconscious Plagiarism 
Recall-own task: In this task, participants were required to remember as many of their own 
initial ideas as possible. Unconscious plagiarism occurred when participants recalled 
someone else's idea as their own. A plagiarised idea was only counted once. Of the 189 
ideas that were reported, 34 ideas (18%) were unconsciously plagiarised (SD= 1.5). In the 
recall-own phase. 76.2% of participants (16 of 21) unconsciously plagiarised at least one 
idea that another group member had originally generated in the encoding session. 
Additionally, 42.9% (9 of 21) of participants made two or more plagiarised intrusions. 
The means (displayed in the second row of Table 3.2.3.1) suggest that rating the 
ideas increased the later rate of recalled plagiarism and positively rating the ideas resulted 
in the highest levels of plagiarism. However, this difference was not statistically significant 
F(2,40)=.721. p=.49. 
3.2.3.3 Generate-new task: Participants' were required to generate four new ideas per 
category cue, but often participants unconsciously plagiarised another persons' ideas or 
inadvertently duplicated one of their own previous ideas (self plagiarism). In total, 327 
ideas were generated and of these. 286 (87.5%) were new ideas, 32 (11.2%) had 
previously been generated by someone else, and 9 (2.8%) were participants own ideas 
that they had inadvertently re-presented as new. The small remainder were duplicated 
ideas at test that were excluded from the analysis. 
Self-plagidrism\ There was a very small number of these types of intnjsions and 
there was no significant main effect of elaboration status on self-plagiarism rates. F<1. 
Unconscious plagiarism; In the generate-new phase, 76.2% of participants (16 of 
21) plagiarised by reproducing an old idea that had been previously generated by another 
group member. Moreover, 57 .1% (12 of 21) made two or more of these intmsions. The 
effects of elaboration on rates of these errors can be seen in Table 3.2.3.1. Both positive 
and negative elaboration had a comparable effect on subsequent levels of plagiarism. 
Elaboration reduced the number of plagiarised errors relative to control however, a within-
subjects ANOVA revealed that this reduction in plagiarism did not reach statistical 
significance F(2,40)=.726; p<.490. 
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3.2.4 Discussion 
There were two measures of plagiarism in this study; plagiarism in the recall-own phase 
and plagiarism in the generate-new phase but there were no significant differences 
observed in either task. Therefore, it appears that neither, positive nor negative 
elaboration influences one's propensity to plagiarise another persons' idea as their own 
idea, or as a new idea. The trends of the data however, suggested that elaboration of 
either kind increased the number of ideas that were correctly recalled and reduced the 
number of ideas that were plagiarised in the generate-new phase. This pattern reflects 
the trend that the activation strength model (Marsh & Bower, 1993) would support, in 
terms of elaboration increasing item discrimination between old and new items and 
therefore aiding correct recall and simultaneously preventing old ideas presentation as 
new. However, the rates of plagiarism in the recall-own phase were high. The rates 
obtained following positive elaboration (16.7%) exceeded those obtained following 
negative elaboration (13.0%), control (10.7%) and those obtained in Experiment 2. 
Therefore elaboration inflated rates of recall-own plagiarism in this study and although 
positive elaboration resulted in numerically the highest rate of plagiarism (more supporting 
the source monitoring framework) the differences between conditions were small so must 
be interpreted with caution. 
There are a number of possible reasons for the lack of lack of significance in this 
study. First, as there were fewer ideas generated in total, the generation phase may have 
been easier to complete. Participants here were only required to generate a total of 12 
ideas rather than 16 in previous experiments thus, recalling their own ideas and the 
source of others' may have been easier than in the previous study. Moreover, having 
fewer ideas generated in the initial task concun-ently reduced the absolute number of old 
ideas that could be potentially reproduced as new, in the generate-new phase. Therefore, 
increasing the number of ideas produced in the initial generative phase may have 
mediated these potential problems and made the measures of plagiarism more sensitive. 
Additionally, in this study, although participants were generating fewer ideas in 
total (relative to Experiment 2) they were elaborating a large proportion of those ideas 
(two thirds). Hence, a second reason for the lack of significant effects in this study may 
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reside in the actual elaboration that was performed. For example, it is difficult to establish 
exactly what mental processes participants were engaging in when they were completing 
the elaborative task. When they were thinking positively (or negatively) about the ideas, 
were they considering the provided use for the object or evaluating the use of the object 
per se7 In other words, did they evaluate the positives of using a brick as a flower pot (i.e. 
weather proof, will not blow over etc) or focus on the positives of generally using a brick 
as a flowerpot (i,e. cheap, easily abundant etc). If participants were focusing on the object 
rather than the individual uses, as would be conceivable due to the number of Ideas 
elaborated here, then neither elaboration nor idea processing was performed In the 
desired or instructed manner. Consequently, the idea's subsequent strength and 
associated memory characteristics may have been contingent upon how participants 
approached the task and the way the task was approached may have lacked consistency 
within and or between subjects. When participants were rating the ideas positively and 
negatively, what kind or memorial techniques were they engaging in to aid them complete 
the task? Were they using their imagination or pictorial based strategy or a more 
reasoning based process where idea implications were considered or developed? Using 
more specific task instructions, Experiment 4 explores these possibilities. 
3.3 Experiment 4 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Real world plagiarists inevitably think about appropriated information/ideas and 
accordingly invest considerable time and effort into these ideas. This effort or elaboration 
involves idea consideration but also may include some form of idea evaluation or 
development that may be achieved in a number of different ways. In Experiment 3 
participants were required to elaborate ideas by generating positive things (and negative 
things) about the idea. However, in retrospect it was unclear what kind of mental 
processes participants were engaging and moreover whether this processing was 
consistent across participants or individual ideas. This type of idea elaboration could 
potentially involve a visual element, a more reasoning based evaluation based on idea 
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implications, or an incorporation of the 2 components. To investigate these possibilities 
the next experiment focused more closely on types of elaboration perfonned. 
Two specific forms of elaboration were examined. The first was elaboration based 
on the idea itself. In this condition, participants were required to rate how easily the idea 
could be visualised and how effective an idea it was. In depth of processing terms (Craik 
& Lockhart. 1972), this would be regarded as deep processing since it requires both the 
formation of an image and the consideration of the meaning of the idea. However, 
crucially, it does not involve the participant developing the idea in any way. The second 
form of elaboration did just that. In this condition, participants were required to think of 
three ways of improving the idea. Because this second form of elaboration involves a 
degree of generation, it will be referred to as generative-elaboration, to contrast with the 
previously described imagery-elaboration condition. Given that these forms of elaboration 
also involve being repeatedly exposed to the ideas that were previously generated, two 
control conditions were used. In addition to the standard baseline condition of single 
exposure to the generated ideas, there was a condition in which ideas were re-presented, 
without any accompanying instructions to elaborate. This enabled us to rule out simple 
repetition as the basis of any effects observed in these conditions. Also, this pemnitted a 
comparison to be made between ideas heard once and twice. 
It was intended to determine whether these different types of elaboration affected 
plagiarism rates in different ways. As in Experiment 3 both types of elaboration require 
deeper processing of the original ideas and so accordingly this should increase the idea's 
strength in memory (Marsh & Landau, 1995). Consequently, greater correct recall is 
anticipated following either form of elaboration. Moreover, higher rates of plagiarism are 
anticipated when participants recall their own ideas, as items with greater strength are 
more likely to be plagiarised (Marsh & Landau, 1995). Increasing the activation strength of 
externally-generated ideas results in the activation level of this information reaching a 
similar level to self-generated ideas, and so intrusions of plagiarised ideas occur (Marsh & 
Bower, 1993). Simultaneously, this act of elaboration should serve to reduce plagiarism. 
relative to baseline, in the generate-new task. This follows because any increase in 
strength would lead to greater discrimination between new and old items, and thus reduce 
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intrusions from previously elaborated ideas. Thus, as In Experiment 3, the simple strength 
account of unconscious plagiarism predicts that elaboration should show a dissociation 
across the two measures of plagiarism, but makes no predictions regarding the two forms 
of elaboration beyond that predicted by strength. Therefore, if one form of elaboration 
leads to stronger memory traces, as indexed by higher recall, one might expect to see 
higher rates of plagiarism in the recall-own task, and lower rates of plagiarism in the 
generate-new task in that condition. 
An alternative viewpoint leads to a different set of expectations, however. In line 
with the source-monitoring framework (Johnson et al. 1993), one might expect participants 
to make an attribution about an idea that is cun-ently in mind on the basis of the qualitative 
aspects of that idea. That is, a person might conclude that a particular idea is new 
because of the cognitive operations that led to it, or they may conclude the idea is a 
memory because of its perceptual qualities, or because they also can access other ideas 
associated with the event at encoding. In this view, the different forms of elaboration might 
have differential effects on unconscious plagiarism because they lead to different kinds of 
traces being laid down, and so different attributions. This difference is likely to emerge in 
the recall-own task where there is likely to be greater overiap between the processes of 
originally generating an idea, and thinking of ways of improving that idea, than there is 
between originally generating that idea and imagining it and rating its quality. This follows 
because generating an idea and thinking of ways of improving an idea both involve 
generative processes, and participants may erroneously attribute the generation of the 
ways of improving the idea to the generation of the original idea. 
There may also be scope in such a view for an effect due to personal-style, or 
personal semantics to emerge. That is, participants may think of ways of improving an 
idea that makes it "their kind of idea". For example. Person A might generate the idea of 
using a brick as a door-stop. However, Person B might think of improving this by 
decorating the brick using floral-design wallpaper. Later, Person B might recall the 
elaborated idea, and focusing on the floral attribute believe that the idea must have been 
their own, since they particulariy like flowers. This would be a use of personal style. An 
example of personal semantics would be if a participant had thought of decorating the 
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brick so as to match their wallpaper at home. Recalling the brick as being decorated in 
the style of one's own home-decor might later be taken, erroneously, as evidence that the 
Idea must have been one's own. 
Thus, this view anticipates that elaborative encoding instructions that allow 
participants to generate ways of improving an Idea will lead to substantially more 
plagiarism in the recall-own task than instructions that merely require participants to 
imagine an idea and judge It. Even though both may lead to memories of the same 
strength, as Indexed by correct recall, it is the qualitative nature of the traces that will lead 
to these differential levels of unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own task. However, in 
the generate-new phase, either form of elaboration should lead to greater discrimination 
from new ideas than control items, and so exhibit less unconscious plagiarism. However, 
it is also possible that during this generative task if an old idea is retrieved easily and the 
associated cognitive operations that include the source information are neglected, then 
participants may misattribute the idea's source to their own spontaneous generation and 
hence, plagiarise (see Bink et al. 1999). 
The procedure utilised was very similar to the previous study. Brown and 
Murphy's (1989) paradigm was utilised with the Alternate Uses Test (Christensen et al. 
1960) completed at generation. Hence, this creative task maintained consistency with the 
previous studies but also provided ideas that could be improved upon, unlike simple 
category membership. However, participants were required to generate 4 ideas per object 
as opposed to 3 in Experiment 3. This number of ideas was increased to achieve a larger 
pool of ideas thus increasing the sensitivity of the two plagiarism measures. In the 
elaboration phase, there were 4 conditions as opposed to 3 in Experiment 3. Participants 
were required to complete 2 different elaborative tasks (imagery and generative). The 
testing session followed one week after the Initial generation and elaboration stages that 
involved involving recall of old Ideas and generation of new ideas. The expectation was 
that any form of elaboration would lead to a reduction of unconscious plagiarism in the 
generate-new task. However, the issue of particular interest was the rate of plagiarism in 
the recall-own task. Here, the strength account would predict that both forms of 
elaboration would lead to increases in unconscious plagiarism, whilst the source 
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monitoring account would predict that unconscious plagiarism would be particularly 
inflated by elaboration that involves thinking of idea improvements. 
3.3.2 Method 
3.3.2.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students participated in the generation phase. However. 2 
participants failed to attend the second testing session and so only 38 participants 
completed the experiment. Participants were undergraduates from the University of 
Plymouth and received partial fulfilment of a course requirement for their participation in 
this study. 
3.3.2.2 Design and Procedure 
A within-subjects design was implemented that explored types of participant elaboration 
(control, re-presentation, imagery elaboration, generative elaboration). 
Four participants were randomly assigned to a group and given a seat around a central 
table. The methodology was the same as in Experiment 3 except for the following 
differences. 
Generation Phase In the generation phase for each of the 4 object names, each 
participant generated 4 novel uses rather than 3 as in Experiment 3. Accordingly, for 
each category there were a total 16 generated exemplars and hence 64 ideas in total. 
Examples, of generated ideas included 'to use buttons to play tiddlywinks', *to use a shoe 
as a flower pot' and 'to use a paperclip to decorate a picture frame' (see Appendix A for 
examples). 
Elaboration Phase; The elaboration phase immediately followed the generation 
phase. Of the previously generated ideas, a quarter (one idea from each participant, from 
each category) was then subject to the following condition treatments. For the imagery-
elaboration ideas participants rated the ideas on five point rating scales for how easy they 
were to imagine {1 = difficult to imagine, 5 = easy to imagine) and how effective (1 - not 
effective, 5 = very effective) they thought the ideas would be. For the generaf/Ve-
elaboration ideas participants wrote down three ways to improve the given idea (see 
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Appendix B for examples). For the re-presented items participants heard the ideas a 
second time but were not instructed to elaborate them in any way. Control ideas were not 
re-presented at this stage. The order that participants performed these tasks was 
counterbalanced across the groups. The experimenter read these ideas aloud in a pre-
determined random-order, instructing the participants to rate, elaborate or listen to the 
idea, as appropriate. This task completed the first session, which lasted approximately 40 
minutes. 
Recall-Own and Generate-New Phases: One week later, participants retumed to 
complete the recall-own and generate-new phases individually on computer. In the recall-
own phase, participants were shown the 4 category headings (e.g. bricl<) that they had 
previously generated to in the first session, with four blank spaces under each. Each 
category was displayed one-by-one in a random order for each participant. Participants 
were instructed to type in all of their own ideas from the first session (16 ideas). Recall 
was not timed or forced. If participants could not remember all of their ideas, then they 
were permitted to leave blank spaces. Once this had been completed, the same category 
headings were repeated in a random order. However, participants were asked to generate 
four completely new uses for each category that had not been previously generated (in 
any of the categories). If participants failed to enter four ideas a message was displayed 
alerting them that they had not provided four Ideas and could not proceed until all the 
ideas had been typed in. This session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
3.3.3 Results 
Unconscious plagiarism was scored in the same way as in the previous experiments and 
the same two raters were used. The inter-rater agreement across all the ideas was 
98.7%. All of the participants exhibited an unconsciously plagiarised error in at least one 
of the phases (recall-own or generate-new). The overall numbers of ideas correctly 
recalled and unconsciously plagiarised in each of the tasks are summarised in Table 
3.3.3.1. 
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Elaboration Status 
Task Control Re-presented Imagery elaboration 
Generative-
elaboration 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
(of 4) (of 4) (of 4) (of 4) 
Recall 1.42' 1.13 2.24'' 1.24 2.63^ .97 2.42'* .98 
UP (RO) .53' .73 .63' 1.05 .55' .76 1.7^ * 1.8 
UP(GN) .95' 1.01 1.03' .88 .39^^  .72 g-jab .89 
Notes: Means within a row that share the same superschpt letter do not significantly differ from one 
another (p<05 after Sidak adjustment). 
Table 3,3.3.1: Experiment 4: Mean rates of correct recall and plagiarism within the recall-
own (RO) & generate-new (GN) phases for control ideas, ideas that were repeated, ideas 
that were rated and ideas the were subject to imagery-elaboration and generative-
elaboration. 
3.3.3.7 Correct Recall 
In total, 460 ideas were reported. Of these ideas 331 ideas (72%) were correctly 
recalled, where each participant on average correctly recalled (i.e. did not plagiarise) 8.7 
(SD = 2.5) of their initial ideas. The top row of Table 3.3.3.1 shows the effects of 
elaboration on correct recall. A within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
elaboration status on participants' performance. F(3,111)= 10.26; p<0.01. Multiple pair-
wise comparisons between means were conducted, with a Sidak-adjusted alpha level of 
.05. These revealed that the baseline condition was significantly lower than all the 
remaining conditions, which did not differ. This lack of difference suggests that imagery-
elaboration and generative-elaboration produced memories of equivalent strength. 
3.3.3.2 Unconscious Plagiarism 
Recall-own task: In this task, participants were required to remember as many of their own 
initial ideas as possible. Unconscious plagiarism occurred when participants recalled 
someone else's idea as their own. A plagiarised idea was only counted once. Of the 460 
ideas that were reported, 129 ideas (28%) were unconsciously plagiarised. In the recall-
own phase, 79% of participants (30 of 38) unconsciously plagiarised at least one idea that 
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another group member had originally generated in the encoding session. Additionally, 
57.9% (22 of 38) of participants made two or more intrusions. 
A within subject ANOVA revealed that the elaboration manipulation reliably 
affected rates of unconscious plagiarism F(3,111)=11.01, p<.001. The means are 
displayed in the second row of Table 3.3.3.1 and were compared by Sidak adjusted 
multiple comparisons as before. These revealed that generative-elaborated ideas were 
plagiarised more often than any of the other ideas. Therefore, conducting generative-
elaboration during idea encoding significantly increased the later plagiarism of those 
ideas. The remaining means did not differ significantly. 
3.3.3.3 Generate-new task: Participants' were required to generate four new ideas per 
category cue, but often participants unconsciously plagiarised another persons' ideas or 
inadvertently duplicated one of their own previous ideas (self plagiarism). In total, 602 
ideas were generated and of these, 474 (78.7%) were new ideas, 113 (18.8%) had 
previously been generated by someone else, and 15 (2.5%) were participants own ideas 
that they had inadvertently re-presented as new. The small remainder were duplicated 
ideas at test that were excluded from the analysis. 
Self-plagiarism; There was a very small number of these types of intrusions and 
there was no significant main effect of elaboration status on self-plagiarism rates, F<1. 
Unconscious plagiarism; In the generate-new phase, 97.4% of participants (37 of 
38) plagiarised by reproducing an old idea that had been previously generated by another 
group member. Moreover, 68.4% (26 of 38) made two or more of these intmsions. The 
effects of elaboration on rates of these errors can be seen in Table 3.3.3.1. A within-
subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of elaboration status on the rate of 
unconscious plagiarism for others' ideas F(3,111)=4.51; p<0.05. Follow up tests were 
conducted as before, and revealed that the mean for the imagery-elaborated ideas was 
significantly lower than both control and re-presented ideas, but that no other comparison 
was significant. 
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3.3.4 Discussion 
There were three measures of interest in this study. On two of them, recall and plagiarism 
in the generate-new task, there were equivalent levels of performance in the two 
elaboration conditions relative to the two control conditions. The only difference observed 
between the two fonns of elaboration occurred in the rate of unconscious plagiarism seen 
in the recall-own task. In this task, generative-elaboration led to considerably higher rates 
of plagiarism than imagery-elaboration, which did not differ from the two control 
conditions. 
This pattern is interesting for a number of reasons. First, unlike in Experiment 3 the 
results strongly refute a simple strength account. There are two measures of memory 
strength available. The most direct is correct recall and on this measure neither form of 
elaboration exceeds the re-presented control. More pertinently, the two forms of 
elaboration did not differ, with in fact numerically higher recall for imagery-elaboration. 
Thus, this measure refutes the idea that generative-elaboration produces the strongest 
memories. Exactly the same conclusion can be drawn from the indirect measure of 
strength, the ability to avoid generate-new plagiarisms. Here again the two forms of 
elaboration are not statistically different though they do reduce plagiarism on the 
generate-new task relative to either control or re-presented Ideas. Further, it is the 
imagery condition that is numerically the lowest suggesting stronger memories than 
generative-elaboration. Thus both measures are consistent with imagery-elaboration 
producing memories that are as strong, if not stronger than the generative-elaboration. 
Additionally, the generate-new plagiarism data, though not the recall data, suggest that 
both forms of elaboration produce stronger memories than re-presentation. Finally, both 
recall and generate-new plagiarism data indicate that re-presentation creates stronger 
memories than single presentation. 
Using these measures of strength to predict plagiarism in the recall-own data 
produces a series of predictions that are not met. Strength would predict more recall-own 
plagiarism of represented ideas than control data; this was not found. Nor was there the 
expected increase in plagiarism following imagery compared to either represented or 
control. Conversely, in recall-own plagiarism whilst strength would predict no difference in 
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recall-own plagiarism (or perhaps a difference favouring Imagery-elaboration) a large 
difference favouring generative-elaboration was found. Thus, a strength account is wrong 
on almost all accounts. 
Whereas a memory strength account cannot explain the elevated levels of 
unconscious plagiarism seen In the generative-elaboration condition, a source-monitoring 
account readily explains this pattern. These data are in line with the idea that participants 
make attributions about the qualitative aspects of ideas that come to mind in the recall 
task. Ideas that were originally generated by someone else, but have been added to by 
the participant, were more than three times as likely to be plagiarised than control ideas or 
imagined ideas, and more than twice as likely to be plagiarised as repeatedly presented 
ideas. In fact, the magnitude of the effect was particulariy surprising. On average, in the 
generative-elaboration condition, participants recalled an average of 2.4 items, and 
plagiarised a further 1.7 items. Thus, plagiarised items constitute 4 1 % of all responses in 
that condition. Previous studies have shown much lower rates of plagiarism, more in line 
with the levels seen in the control condition here. The highest rates of plagiarism reported 
previously were those in the recall-own phase in Macrae et al. (1999). They reported 
plagiarism levels of between 14% and 24%, which are still well below the rate in this 
study. 
There are a number of potential factors that may contribute to the high levels of 
plagiarism seen in the present study. One may be de to the Alternate Uses task being 
implemented at generation. Although it is not an overiy demanding task, there may be 
certain task-specific factors operating that make it difficult for participants to complete. 
For example, the ideas may be less discriminable from each other than on some of the 
previously used tasks. However, this explanation is unlikely as such high levels of recall 
and low levels of plagiarism were observed in Experiment 3. Similariy, the use of an 
extended delay is not typical of the literature, but is consistent with previous work showing 
that delays increase rates of plagiarism (Bredart et al. 2003; Brown & Halliday, 1991; 
Macrae et al. 1999; Marsh et al. 1996). Also, the fact that, in three out of four conditions. 
participants encountered the Ideas twice may also contribute to the higher rates of 
plagiarism. Nevertheless, while these factors might account for a general increase in 
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plagiarism errors, they cannot account for the particular increase seen only in the 
generative-elaboration condition. However, because the general levels of plagiarism 
observed in this study were high, there was a concern that the levels were elevated as a 
result of participants not using a strict enough decision criterion to monitor their responses 
given in the recall-own and generate-new phases. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a 
replication of the study with an additional manipulation that encouraged participants to 
think more carefully about their answers before making a response. 
3.4 Experiment 5 
3.4.1 Introduction 
This study replicated Experiment 4 except for one detail. Participants were offered a 
financial incentive for not plagiarising any previously generated ideas, in order to 
encourage them to monitor their decision processes more carefully. Participants were told 
that a prize of £50 would be shared between all participants who avoided plagiarised 
errors. They were told that in the previous study, this would have resulted in two or three 
participants sharing the money. The expectation was that this manipulation would 
encourage participants to monitor the source of their ideas carefully, and so reduce the 
overall plagiarism rates from Experiment 4. There was no strong expectation that this 
would affect the pattern of effects seen previously, although it did allow the testing of the 
possibility that the particularly high rates for the generative-elaboration items were due to 
this factor. As a manipulation check, participants were also asked to rate how hard they 
tried to not plagiarise any of the previously given ideas at the end of the study. 
3.4.2 Method 
3.4.2.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students participated in the idea generation stage of the 
study. However, four participants did not attend the second test session and so only thirty-
six participants completed the experiment. Participants were undergraduates from the 
University of Plymouth and received partial fulfilment of a course requirement for their 
participation in this study. None had taken part in Experiment 2. 
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3.4.2.2 Design and Procedure 
A within-subjects design was implemented that explored types of participant elaboration 
(control, re-presentation, imagery elaboration, generative elaboration). The procedure was 
identical to the Experiment 4, except for an additional participant incentive not to 
plagiarise. Before they began, participants were instructed that there was a reward 
available for all the participants who did not plagiarise any of the previously generated 
ideas. They were infonmed that a £50 cash prize would be equally split between the 
participants who did not re-produce any ideas from the initial session (previously given by 
themselves or any of the other participants). It was made dear that in previous studies 
only 5 - 10% of participants have been able to successfully do this. Consequently, their 
share in the money should be sizeable. At the end of the study, participants were asked to 
indicate how hard they tried to not plagiarise any of the previously given ideas using a 5-
point rating scale from 1 = no^ hard at all to 5 = very hard. 
3.4.3 Results 
Unconscious plagiarism was scored in the same way as in Experiment 4. The same two 
raters were used and the inter-rater agreement was 99.3%, again with discrepancies 
resolved through discussion. When participants were asked how hard they tried to not 
plagiarise any of the previous ideas 86.7% of participants responded with a 4 or higher. 
The mean rating on the 5 point rating scale was 4.4 (SD = 0.9)®. Excluding those who had 
given a lower rating than 4 did not alter the results and so all the data were retained. The 
number of correctly recalled ideas and the number of plagiarised ideas in the generate-
new and recall-own tasks are given in Table 3.4.3.1. 
Due to an administration error 7 participants did not receive this rating scale to complete 
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Elaboration Status 
Task Control Re-presented l-E G-E 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Recall 1.75^ 1.25 2.80** 1.16 2.47'' 1.18 2.58'' 1.0 
UP (RO) .25^ .50 .31" .82 .47" .81 .92^ 1.0 
UP (GN) .58" .60 AT .77 .28" .57 .58^ .69 
Notes: Means within a row that share the same superscript letter do not significantly differ from one 
another (p<05 after Sidak adjustment). 
Table 3.4.3.1: Experiment 5; Mean rates of correct recall and plagiarism within the recall-
own (RO) & generate-new (GN) phases for control ideas, ideas that were repeated, ideas 
that were rated and ideas the were subject to imagery-elaboration and generative-
elaboration. 
3.4.3.1 Correct recall: 
In total, 417 ideas were reported. 347 (83.2%) of which were correctly recalled (i.e. 
not plagiarised). Each participant on average correctly remembered 9.6 (SD = 2.9) ideas. 
A within-subjects ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main effect of elaboration 
status on rates of recall, F(3,105)= 7.31, p<0.05. Differences between the means were 
examined by Sidak multiple comparisons with an adjusted alpha level of .05. These 
revealed that the ideas that had received generative-elaboration, imagery-elaboration or 
had been re-presented were recalled more often than control ideas. As in Experiment 4 
there were no other significant differences, thus providing no evidence for differential 
memory strength as a result of elaboration type. 
3.4.3.2 Unconscious Plagiarism 
Recall-own task: Unconscious plagiarism was scored in the same way as in Experiment 4. 
In the recall-own phase, of the 417 ideas that were produced, 70 (16,8%) were 
unconsciously plagiarised. During this task, 75% of participants (27 of 35) unconsciously 
plagiarised at least one idea that another group member had originally generated. 
Additionally, 44.7% of participants (17 of 35) made 2 or more intrusions. As shown in 
Table 3.4.3.1, the elaboration manipulation reliably affected rates of unconscious 
plagiarism F(3,105)=6.32. p<0.05. Follow up tests revealed that the generative-
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elaboration ideas were plagiarised at a higher rate than baseline ideas, re-presented 
Ideas and the imagery-elaborated ideas. The remaining comparisons between cell means 
were not significant. Therefore, as in Experiment 1, generative-elaboration alone 
increased the later plagiarism of ideas. 
3.4.3.3 Generate-new task: In total, 563 ideas were generated and of these, 481 (85.4%) 
were new ideas, 69 (12.3%) were unconsciously plagiarised ideas and 13 (2.3%) were 
participants' own ideas that they had inadvertently re-presented as new. 
Self-plagiarism: There were a very small number of these types of intrusions, only 
27.8% (10 of 36) of participants plagiarised one of their eariier ideas. Only two participants 
made more than 1 intrusion. Moreover, there was no significant main effect of elaboration 
status on self-plagiarism rates F<1. 
Unconscious Plagiarism: In the generate-new phase, 91.7% of participants (33 of 
36) plagiarised by reproducing an old idea that had been previously generated by another 
group member. Moreover, 55.6% (20 of 36) made 2 or more of these types of intrusions. 
A within-subjects ANOVA revealed that there was no significant main effect of elaboration 
status on the rate of unconscious plagiarism F(3,105) =1.65 p=0.182. As in Experiment 4, 
the lowest level of unconsciously plagiarised ideas was in the imagery condition. 
3.4.4 Discussion Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 largely achieved its aims. Rates of plagiarism were reduced from the 
previous study, although the magnitude of the reduction was larger in the recall-own task. 
Overall, in the recall-own task, mean number of plagiarised ideas per person dropped 
from 3.4 (Experiment 4) to 1.9 (Experiment 5). The equivalent figures for the generate-
new task were 3.0 and 1.9. Thus, It appears that our incentive did result in participants 
making fewer intrusions on average. However, Interestingly, this effect did not translate to 
the number of participants making any kind of plagiarised response. In Experiment 4, 79% 
of participants made a plagiarised response on the recall-own task, and 97.4% of 
participants did so on the generate-new task. In Experiment 5, 75% of participants made a 
plagiarised response in the recall-own task, compared to 91.7% in the generate-new task. 
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In fact, in Experiment 5, there was no-one who met the criterion of totally avoiding 
plagiarised responses. 
Against the background of reduced rates of plagiarism, the basic pattern of 
findings seen in Experiment 4 was replicated. In the recall-own task, there was a 
significant effect of elaboration type, which was entirely due to the generative-elaboration 
condition. Although the mean number of plagiarised Ideas per person dropped from 1.7 in 
Experiment 4, to 0.9 in Experiment 5, this remained around double the rate seen in the 
other conditions. In contrast, the mean number of plagiarised responses in the imagery-
elaboration condition was only 0.4, which was in line with the rates seen for re-presented 
items (0.3) and control items (0.3). 
The effects seen in the generate-new task were less clear cut, though still in line 
with the previous results. In Experiment 4 the ideas that were subjected to both the 
baseline measures (control and repeated ideas) were plagiarised significantly more than 
the imagery-elaborated ideas and numerically more than the generative-elaborated ideas. 
However, in Experiment 5, there was a significant reduction in the plagiarism in the control 
and re-presented condition compared to Experiment 4 and consequently there was little 
difference between the plagiarism levels across the manipulation of elaboration. However, 
once again the lowest rate of plagiarism was seen in the imagery-elaboration condition, 
again suggesting imagery produces strong memories. 
As before, a strength account cannot account for these data. The recall data 
suggests that control items are weaker that the other 3 kinds of item, which do not differ. 
Numerically, the highest recall is seen for re-presented items. The plagiarism data in the 
generate-new phase suggest no differences in strength but numerically it is imagery-
elaboration that minimises plagiarism to the greatest degree. Thus, neither measure 
suggests that generative-elaboration produces 'strong* memories but it is this condition 
that shows double the rate of plagiarism in the recall-own task, compared to the other 
conditions. 
One pattern that is hard to explain is why the incentive manipulation only reduces 
plagiarism in the control and re-presented conditions. Clearly a simple threshold shift that 
might be utilised in a strength model such as a signal detection theory cannot explain this 
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finding as all ideas should have equally been reduced. However, while strength may 
ultimately guide performance in the generate-new task there is also scope here for 
additional influencing components. For example, as a result of inflated item strength the 
elaborated ideas may come to mind quickly, this ease of recall may then fool participants 
into believing the idea was, at that time, spontaneously generated. This idea is similar to 
the familiarity misattribution model (Mazzoni et al. 2001) that has been used to explain the 
imagination inflation effect. In this imagination inflation domain, performing an elaborate 
task e.g. imagining an event (Garry et al. 1996; or solving anagrams in a sentence; 
Bernstein et al. 2004) may result in the event feeling familiar. Then later, if the event feels 
plausible, the familiarity may be incorrectly attributed to a fictional experience rather than 
the prior elaborative task (e.g. imagination) from which It con-ectly originated. In these 
studies, elaborating may in some cases have increased the familiarity of the ideas to a 
level at which they were not clearly remembered as old ideas but incorrectly attributed to a 
spontaneous generation. This may have been the case particularly if the previously 
elaborated idea was an idea that felt 'plausible' or 'natural' as one of their own ideas. 
Moreover, the ideas may feel 'plausible' as a result of the memory characteristics that 
were associated with the ideas during the elaboration period (in a similar way to those 
explained above for the recall-own ideas). Hence there may be scope for a small source 
monitoring component here too. Although the stricter decisions criteria utilised in 
Experiment 5 would have encouraged participants to more carefully monitor their 
information sources Marsh et al. (1997) demonstrated that when participant are 
completing the 'cognitively taxing' generate-new task, their cognitive recourses may have 
been monopolised by completing the task and hence despite intent for careful monitoring, 
in certain circumstances this may not have been sufficient to prevent all potential 
instances of plagiarism (particularly for those ideas following G-E). 
What is pertinent is the replication of the pattern of reduced generate-new 
plagiarism for imagery compared to generative-elaboration in Experiment 5. Whilst 
neither study showed a significant difference, overall generate-new plagiarism following 
imagery was about half that seen for generative-elaboration. As we argued above if the 
ability to reject ideas as being old on a measure of strength then this pattern would be 
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consistent with imagery-elaboration producing stronger memories. This pattern therefore 
serves only to strengthen the claim that the increased plagiarism for recall-own following 
generative-elaboration could not be due to strength. This pattem serves to support our 
above speculation that plagiarism in the generate-new task may not stem from strength 
alone. There may also be a metacognitive component such that participants apply a 
'memory criterion' (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002) to generated ideas. Thus, in the reverse 
manner, when an l-E idea comes to mind, any associated Imagery that is produced might 
lead to the conclusion that the idea is old and should be rejected. On the assumption that 
the imagery-elaboration condition creates more visual traces this might explain why fewer 
generate-new Ideas are plagiarised following imagery. This is a point that will be returned 
to in chapter 4. 
3.5 General Discussion 
In Experiment 4 and 5, elaboration improved correct recall relative to control where no 
elaboration was performed and the different types of elaboration did not affect these rates. 
The same trend was seen in Experiment 3 although the obtained differences did not reach 
statistical significance. Moreover, elaboration of all kinds reduced plagiarised en-ors in the 
generate-new phase relative to control (although this difference did not reach significance 
in Experiment 3). Therefore, elaboration of all kinds appeared to affect correct recall 
performance and generate-new errors to a similar degree. However, these three 
experiments revealed that different elaboration tasks affected rates of plagiarism in the 
recall-own phase in different ways. While the level of control ideas that were plagiarised 
in this phase were consistent (10.7% in Experiment 3. 10.8% in Experiment 4 and 9.8% in 
Experiment 5) the levels of elaborated ideas that were plagiarised were not. Specifically, 
one's propensity to plagiarise others' ideas as one's own was not increased by idea 
ratings that were positive or negative (Experiment 3), or based on idea imagery or 
effectiveness (Experiment 4 & 5) but was influenced by idea development. Hence, the 
only task that affected recall-own plagiarism was improving the ideas using generative-
elaboration (Experiment 4), Moreover, these robust errors prevailed when participants 
utilised a more stringent decision criteria to monitor their responses. This was 
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encouraged by participant warning against plagiarised errors and their offering of a 
financial reward for successfully avoiding such intrusions (Experiment 5). 
Marsh and Bower, (1993 see also Brown & Murphy, 1989; Marsh & Landau, 1995) 
originally suggested that in the recall-own task participants plagiarise ideas that have a 
high activation strength. They maintained that increasing the activation level of externally 
generated Ideas makes these ideas more comparable to self-generated ideas. Therefore, 
the 'overlap' between the ideas increases and accordingly, so does the rate of 
unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own phase. Conversely, increasing activation 
strength allows ideas to be rejected as old in a generate-new task, and so would be 
expected to lower plagiarism when new responses are required. Our strategy in 
interpretation of our data to test these ideas has been to take the recall performance as an 
indicator of memory strength, and use this to make predictions about plagiarism rates in 
the two tasks. Clearly, given that there were no significant differences between the forms 
of elaboration in Experiment 4 and 5, a simple strength model fails to account for our data 
because recall did not differ between either of the elaboration methods but plagiarism in 
the recall-own tasks did. The same arguments apply to comparisons involving the re-
presented ideas. A strength hypothesis would also have predicted that re-presentation, 
which improved recall, would also have increased plagiarism in the recall-own task 
relative to baseline, but it did not. 
If one adopts a similar strategy, and takes plagiarism in the generate-new 
condition as a proxy measure of strength, one runs into similar difficulties. Assuming that 
stronger memories are easier to reject as old in the generate-new task, but harder to 
distinguish from old in the recall-own, leads to the prediction that the two forms of 
plagiarism should be negatively correlated across conditions. This is clearly not the case. 
For instance, in Experiment 5, generative-elaboration leads to numerically the highest 
rates of plagiarism in both tasks. Thus, however memory strength is operationalised these 
data do not seem to conform to the predictions from the strength hypothesis. 
One surprising aspect of the data in these studies was performance in the re-
presented ideas condition in Experiment 4 and 5. Merely re-presenting ideas, without 
instructions to elaborate in any way, had a substantial impact on rates of correct recall. In 
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fact, in both experiments recall rates for this condition did not differ from the elaboration 
conditions, and were significantly higher than control ideas. However, given the Increased 
recall seen in this condition. It is important to note that this was not reflected in higher 
rates of unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own task. Clearly our re-presentation control 
condition involves presenting participants with ideas to hear again, in the context of other 
ideas that they are being asked to imagine/elaborate. It would be naive to assume that 
participants do not cany over some of the processing from the elaboration conditions to 
the re-presented ideas. What impact is this likely to have had? Foremost it can only serve 
to reduce differences in processing between the re-presented and the other conditions. If 
we were able to demonstrate robust effects, this would suggest that that perhaps the 
effect we obtained are underestimates of the true effects. 
We were able to explore this Issue by comparing those ideas that were re-heard 
before any elaboration instructions were given, with those that followed either the imagery 
or generative-elaboration. For con-ect recall and generate-new plagiarism there were no 
significant effects of presentation order in either experiment. However, for unconscious 
plagiarism in the recall-own phase order was significant F(2,35)= 4.73. p<.02, with re-
heard ideas presented first producing .36 plagiarisms, ideas following imagery rating .27 
and those following generative-elaboration 1.33. Thus, these data mimic exactly the 
pattern seen in the full data set, suggesting that those who do generative-elaboration first 
carry this over to listening and hence produce more plagiarisms. Those who begin with 
imagery-elaboration show no such effect. The same broad pattern was observed in 
Experiment 5 (listen first .07, image first, .25 generative-elaboration first. .70), but this did 
not reach statistical significance, F(1,35)=1.83, p<.18. Thus together the data suggest 
that listening a second time does not increase plagiarism, compared to baseline, except 
when preceded by the generative-elaboration instruction. 
There are a number of potential reasons why generative-elaboration increased 
plagiarism in the recall-own task while ratings (positive and negative; Experiment 3 and I-
E Experiment 4 & 5) did not. One, in line with the source-monitoring framework, is that the 
different forms of elaboration resulted in qualitatively different kinds of traces being laid 
down at encoding. When participants generated their ways of improving an original idea. 
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they will have stored a record of the associated cognitive operations (Johnson et al. 1993; 
Johnson & Raye, 1981) that went into generating those improvements. It is this additional 
information (including the quality and detail) at recall that assists the participant in 
distinguishing between internally and externally generated ideas and inferring their origin 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981; see also Jacoby, 1987; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). During 
generative-elaboration, participants may have earned out processes similar to those 
involved in generation of ideas in the first instance. Consequently, the memory 
representations would resemble the representations of their own ideas. Thus, at recall 
when source-monitoring judgements are made, if the perceptual detail for an externally 
generated idea is lacking but there is an abundance of associated cognitive operations, 
then the sources of the two types of ideas may be confused (Marsh & Bower, 1993; 
Landau & Marsh, 1997). Such a process would result in the original sources of the idea 
being misplaced and others' ideas incorrectly claimed to have been self-generated. 
Conversely, processes used in constructing images, and rating the quality of those ideas 
(Experiment 4 & 5, or positively or negatively Experiment 3) do not resemble those utilised 
in generation and so the representations will not be confused at test. This idea is 
consistent with past research (Marsh & Landau, 1995; Landau & Marsh, 1997; Macrae et 
al. 1999). 
These additional cognitive operations seen in the generative-elaboration condition 
may also involve some element of personal style or personal semantics that serve as a 
semantic cue. In reality monitoring literature, it is well documented that internal and 
external events differ (see Raye & Johnson, 1981) and internal memories provide 
additional cues that allow the origins of the ideas to be distinguished. Johnson and Raye 
(2000) maintain that the source of information is not stored with a memory but is inferred 
through an automatic heuristic process that is based on an evaluation of various 
information features. Therefore this additional, personal information may incorrectly 
influence participants' source monitoring judgements. While participants were performing 
generative-elaboration by devising novel uses for ideas, they may have associated 
personally relevant information to the idea. Other participants* ideas may have cued 
memories of times when they have seen or used the item in that way (e.g. to use a shoe 
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to hide money in). As a result of thinking about and improving the idea, the source may be 
confused and the idea may feel more personally relevant. What Is personally relevant 
might consist of personal semantics (e.g. remembering using their shoe to hide money) or 
personal style (e.g. that they are the kind of person who hides money). This familiar style 
of the idea may be achieved through participants re-working the idea throughout the 
elaboration period. The effort exerted may serve to change the expression of that idea to 
fit the person's own style. Consequently, when the participant later recalls the idea, they 
may remember the personally relevant information, or recall the idea in a way that is 
familiar, natural and in their own style. This Idiosyncratic information may then serve as a 
misleading discriminative cue and hence, participants may en-oneously decide that the 
idea was something that they had originally generated. Such effects would not occur with 
ideas that were merely rated or imagined because they are not so closely tied to self, or 
self-style. Therefore it is not the strength or effort per se that is responsible for the 
increase in recalled Intrusions but rather the nature and kind of elaboration 
Overall rates of plagiarism obtained in these three studies were high. Levels of 
control plagiarism obtained in this chapter in the recall-own phase did not differ (10.7% in 
Experiment 3,10.8% in Experiment 4 and 9.8% in Experiment 5) but the obtained rates 
were inflated to a high level of 36% following generative-elaboration in Experiment 4 and 
2 1 % in Experiment 5, when participants were trying to avoid such errors. However, in 
neither study did rating tasks result in comparable levels of recall-own plagiarism thus, 
these findings were used to support the source monitoring account of unconscious 
plagiarism (Johnson et al. 1993). These high rates of plagiarism (37% and 21%) 
exceeded (or were comparable to) the rates found in this research programme and those 
found by Landau and Marsh, (1997) Macrae et al. (1999) when participants' source 
monitoring ability was impeded. Elaboration here was only conducted on one occasion. 
whereas in the real worid plagiarism more likely involves prolonged and repeated idea 
attention. Unintentional plagiarists such as George Harrison had inevitably spent time 
working on and developing his song prior to release. Therefore, it is conceivable that 
plagiarists really believed the 'work' to be their own as a result of the developmental 
process that led to the plagiarised works. Consequently, in Chapter 4 we are interested in 
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exploring and strengthening this robust elaboration and investigating the subsequent 
effects on source memory. 
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Chapter 4 - Development of elaborated Ideas 
4.1 Introduction 
The rationale for the previous studies stemmed from the fact that in the real-world 
plagiarism invariably involves prolonged idea attention rather than just one idea exposure. 
In chapter 3. the studies required participants to initially generate novel-uses for objects 
such as, a button (use as a counter). They then either devised ways to improve other 
people's ideas (e.g. to colour code them), which was labelled generative-elaboration (G-
E), or rated how easy they were to imagine, which was called imagery-elaboration (l-E). 
An increase in recall-own plagiarism was only observed following G-E. That is, 
participants only claimed others' ideas as their own after devising idea-improvements and 
not after forming a mental image. It was argued that a strength-based account cannot 
explain this finding since l-E actually produced as strong memories as G-E, as measured 
by correct recall and reduction in generate-new plagiarism. Instead a source-monitoring 
account was favoured (Johnson et al. 1993) maintaining that processes employed in G-E 
may resemble those used in the original generation phase and consequently 
representations of improved ideas may reflect those of internally generated ideas, by for 
instance, containing similar cognitive operations. In contrast, l-E does not require similar 
cognitive operations to generation and thus plagiarism rates were not comparably 
affected. 
However, findings from a similar domain have indicated that imagining can later 
result in source confusions. In a reality monitoring paradigm, Johnson, Raye, Wang and 
Taylor (1979) initially showed participants objects 2, 5 or 8 times and then asked them to 
imagine a selection of the objects or entirely new objects 2, 5 or 8 times. At test, when 
participants were presented with an object (either previously seen or not seen) and were 
asked how many times they had seen the picture, the highest estimates were reported for 
those that had received the most imaginings, regardless of whether they had actually 
previously seen the object. This methodology has since been applied and developed by 
Garry et al. (1996) in their imagination inflation paradigm. Initially, participants were given 
a long list of possible childhood events and were asked to indicate whether or not these 
events had happened to them as children. A couple of weeks later, they were asked to 
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imagine a few of these events that had not happened to them such as 'breaking a window 
with their hands'. During this imagination, participants were instructed to think about 
relevant event details (of breaking the window), such as 'how they tripped and fell', V h o 
else was there' and 'how they felt' when they broke the window. Then at test, participants 
were given a list of events for a second time and were required to indicate which events 
had happened. Garry et al. (1996) demonstrated that Imagining these counterfactual 
events actually increased confidence that the events had occurred. Subsequently, this 
powerful and robust effect has been replicated on numerous occasions {Garry et al. 1996; 
Goff & Roediger, 1998; Heaps & Nash, 1999; Paddock et al. 2000; Thomas & Loftus, 
2002). Moreover, it has been observed for complex events that have included imagining 
false details from a crime scene, (Wright. Loftus & Hall, 2001) and also for actual non-
performed actions (Goff & Roediger, 1998) both common (rolling a dice) and bizarre 
(kissing a plastic frog) (Thomas & Loftus. 2002 see also Thomas, Bulevich & Loftus, 
2004). These links between imagery and false remembering have been amplified by 
Gonsalves. Reber, Gitelman, Parrish, Mesulam and Paller (2004). They presented 
participants with a series of photos, and Instructed them to visually imagine objects for 
other presented words. Representations produced when a vivid visual image of an object 
is generated may compare to those produced when that object is actually seen and they 
found that later, participants claimed to have seen photos of objects that had only been 
imagined. More pertinently, these imagery-based false memories occurred in conjunction 
with activation in brain regions known to be involved in imagery (precuneus, right parietal 
and anterior cingulated activation (i.e. imagery regions; Ishai, Ungerleider& Haxby, 2000). 
Activations In response to words were greater when people claimed to have seen the 
corresponding object than when a false memory for that object was not produced. Hence, 
neural events at encoding can be predictive of later false memories of something that was 
simply imagined. 
However, the precise cognitive mechanisms responsible for this imagination 
inflation are unclear but Garry and Polaschek (2000) suggested that the act of imagination 
evokes detailed mental images (Thomas et al. 2003) or increased familiarity (Jacoby, 
Kelley & Dywan. 1989; Loftus & Bernstein. 2005) that later result in source confusion and 
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increased certainty that an event was real. In terms of evoked mental images causing this 
effect, research has suggested that people erroneously claim that actions were performed 
as a result of discrete memory characteristic misattributions. Thomas et al. (2003) 
propose that when participants elaborately imagine actions, they accordingly form detailed 
and elaborate representations that are subsequently mistaken as real and are held 
responsible for creating false memories. They ascertain that the nature of processing is 
important as these types of representations can only be formed through imagination and 
not information presentation alone. However, they do acknowledge that a misattribution 
of more global characteristics, such as familiarity, can lead to modest distortions in 
memory. 
Garry et al. (1996) on the other hand, argued that global familiarity induced by 
imagination of a fictitious event may be the primary cause of imagination inflation (see 
also Bernstein et al. 2004; Garry et al. 1996) claimed that as participants rate their 
confidence that an event occun-ed, they may take their feelings of familiarity derived 
through prior imagination as evidence that the event happened (see also Jacoby et al, 
1989; Loftus & Bernstein, 2005). This argument for familiarity has been supported by 
studies that have demonstrated that participant confidence in this fictitious event is not 
contingent on specific imagery details (Garry, Frame. & Loftus, 1999) or whether oneself 
or another person provided the imagination focus (Manning, Garry, Assefi & Loftus. 1999 
as cited by Libby, 2003). Moreover, recently simple exposure to an event by solving 
anagrams (Bernstein et al. 2004; Bernstein, Whittlesea & Loftus, 2002), paraphrasing 
(Sharman et al. 2004) or even explaining event information without specific imagination 
has also been demonstrated to induce this 'imagination' inflation effect (Sharman et al. 
2005). Hence, these findings can be more effectively explained using a processing 
fluency account that is associated with the target events rather than the nature of 
processing employed. If the familiarity induced by either imagination or exposure is 
incorrectly attributed to a prior experience rather than the experimental manipulation, then 
a misattribution is made. Consequently, if familiarity perse can cause these types of 
source-monitoring errors, then the lack of an imagery effect in our previous studies 
(Experiment 4 & 5) is surprising. This follows, as an increase in unconscious plagiarism 
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was only observed following idea improvements but not following ratings of imaginability 
and effectiveness. 
This experiment is interested In whether the prior dissociation effect on rates of 
plagiarism in the recall-own phase between imagination (l-E) and improvement (G-E) was 
a consequence of the l-E condition not constituting a strong enough Imagination' 
manipulation to drive processing fluency. This question was raised on the basis of 
Bernstein et al. (2004) who found that although anagram solving induced the imagination 
affect, a simple vowel counting task did not. Consequently, this chapter explores the 
effects of strengthening the performed Idea elaborations on participants' subsequent self 
appropriation rates. Strengthening the imagery-elaboration performed would not however 
affect rates of recall-own unconscious plagiarism if rather generation was responsible for 
the increased intrusions that we observed in Experiment 4 and 5. It is possible that the 
imagination inflation effect is not caused by imagery or familiarity but generation, as much 
of the imagination inflation literature involves an element of generation (for example, 
generating anagram solutions, paraphrasing or event explanations). 
4.2 Experiment 6 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This study explored whether the absence of unconscious plagiarism following l-E in the 
previous studies, relative to G-E, was a consequence of differential levels of idea 
familiarity following these two elaboration manipulations. Previously, in the G-E 
participants were required to generate 3 idea improvements, whereas, in l-E only 2 
judgements were required. We investigated whether experimentally increasing the 
familiarity of the l-E ideas would result in raised levels of plagiarism that were more 
comparable to those obtained following G-E. To this end, the two types of elaboration 
used in Experiment 4 & 5, l-E, (ratings of imaginability and effectiveness) and G-E (idea 
improvements) were retained but a third, stronger imagery-elaboration condition was 
included. This condition was called rich imagery-elaboration (Rl-E). Essentially the aim of 
this Rl-E was to equate Imagery-elaboration and generative-elaboration more effectively 
in terms of the idea detail that was considered. This was achieved by participants 
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imagining and rating original ideas together with those idea improvements that were 
provided by another participant. Consequently, participants would construct a more 
detailed mental image of the Rl-E ideas (relative to l-E). These detailed images in turn 
would be more analogous to the types of images constructed in imagination inflation 
studies (e.g. Garry et al. 1996) where richer, more perceptual, images increase false 
memory likelihood. Moreover, since the ideas here that one participant generates are 
later imagined by another participant, any differences in plagiarism cannot be due to idea 
content. A baseline condition was also included where ideas received no elaboration. 
Methodologically, this study was consistent with Experiment 4 except for two 
differences. The first difference was that the new rich imagery-elaboration condition 
replaced the prior re-presentation condition and consequently, in Experiment 6, there was 
no measure of mere idea exposure. Experiment 4 and 5 indicated that although idea re-
presentation significantly enhanced correct recall and reduced generate-new plagiarism 
relative to control, it did not affect the absolute difference in recall-own plagiarism relative 
to control. Consequently, using only one baseline measure (control) in this study was 
deemed sufficient as the comparison ability within the measure of primary interest 
(plagiarism in the recall-own phase) would not change. The second difference was that 
participants were tested in a groups of two rather than groups of four as before. Despite 
this difference, ultimately the same number of ideas were produced in total. This was 
achieved by the 2 participants (as opposed to 4 participants) producing half the total 
number of ideas while the experimenter provided the remainder of the ideas (posed as 2 
virtual participants). This methodological change was made for logistical reasons in so far 
as, in the elaboration phase, generative-elaboration always preceded the rich imagery-
elaboration. This was the case as G-E needed to be completed by one participant before 
a second participant could perform the Rl-E on those same ideas (and accordingly the 
given idea improvements). Therefore, as one participant was required to rich imagery-
elaborate a second participant's ideas (and improvement), testing sessions of two 
participants was considered most appropriate. Paired testing was not anticipated to be 
problematic, as prior findings have suggested that smaller testing groups increase rather 
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than reduce the total observable levels of plagiarism (see Macrae et al. 1999). No other 
factors differed and the testing phase was identical to the prior studies. 
Our expectation was to replicate the findings of Experiment 4 (and 5) regarding 
Inflated levels of plagiarism in the recall-own phase with the G-E but not l-E alone. 
However, the imagination of ideas elaborated by others provides an interesting test case. 
On the one hand, these ideas are elaborated In more depth and are likely to result in 
richer images than either l-E or unelaborated ideas. Consequently, this additional 
processing (of improved ideas) may be sufficient to strengthen familiarity and processing 
fluency and induce source confusion. In this view, both G-E and Rl-E should show higher 
plagiarism than l-E and control. On the other hand. In line with our prior findings, forming 
images of others' idea improvements involves no generation. Consequently, while the 
memory characteristics of improved ideas (G-E Ideas) may resemble the cognitive 
operations of self-generated ideas, the memory characteristic of imagined ideas (Rl-E 
Ideas) would instead contain enhanced perceptual information. Thus at recall, 
irrespective of idea familiarity, this difference in distinctive information may aid source 
identification and specifically reduce the likelihood of those imagined ideas being 
confused as the participants own ideas. In this source-monitoring view, only G-E should 
produce elevated rates of plagiarism relative to simple l-E and the more detailed Rl-E. 
Following this line of thought, Rl-E may in fact reduce plagiarism levels relative to l-E, as a 
result of the associated and enhanced perceptual information. As in Chapter 3, 
(Experiment 4 and 5), elaboration of any kind is expected to strengthen memories and so 
increase correct recall (Craik & Lockhart, 1976) and decrease plagiarisms In the G-N 
phase, relative to control items (Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1997). 
4.2.2 Method 
4.2.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-two undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth participated in 
return for partial fulfilment of a course requirement. 
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4.2.2.2 Design and Procedure 
A within-subjects design was implemented that explored types of participant elaboration 
(control, imagery-elaboration, generative-elaboration, rich imagery-elaboration). 
Participants were tested in pairs. The experimenter individually read aloud, a list of 
category names (e.g. brick, shoe, paper-clip and button) and participants generated 4 
novel, non-conventional uses for each item (e.g. brick as a door stop). Additionally, the 
experimenter contributed 8 novel uses for each category that were randomly selected 
from a pool of ideas given in Experiment 4 and 5. Participants were explicitly instructed to 
listen to all the ideas to prevent them from re-production. Ideas were given in a pre-
determined random order and the experimenter recorded all the ideas. 
Following this generation phase, participants completed a picture puzzle distracter 
task for 5 minutes, while the experimenter wrote down the to-be-elaborated ideas (from 
the generation phase) in each participant's booklet. A quarter of the ideas (one idea from 
each participant, from each category) were subject to each of the following conditions. For 
the imagery-elaboration (l-E) ideas, participants rated the ideas on five-point rating scales 
for imaginability {1 = difficult to imagine, 5 = easy to imagine) and effectiveness (1 = not 
effective, 5 = very effective). For the generative-elaboration (G-E) ideas, participants 
wrote down three ways to improve a different sub-set of ideas. For the rict) imagery-
elaboration (Rl-E) ideas, participants imagined the ideas (in a pre-determined random 
order) that their partner had just improved (G-E). To ensure participants read each idea 
and the improvements they were also required to rate the imaginability and effectiveness. 
The baseline ideas were not re-presented at this stage. This task completed the first 
session, which lasted approximately 55 minutes. 
One week later, participants completed the recall-own phase. The four category 
headings (e.g. brick) from the first session were shown in a random order with four blank 
spaces under each. Participants wrote down the ideas that frtey generated in the first 
session leaving blank spaces if they could not remember all 16 ideas. The generate-new 
phase followed, using the same category headings in a random order, and participants 
generated 4 new uses for each that had not been previously given. This session lasted 
approximately 20 minutes. 
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4.2.3 Results 
4.2.3.1 Recall-own task 
Correct Recall: In total, 403 ideas were reported of which 286 ideas (71.0%) were 
correctly recalled. Each participant correctly recalled (i.e. did not plagiarise) a mean of 9.0 
(SD = 2.61) of their Initial ideas. A within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
elaboration status on recall perfomnance, F(3,93)= 7.54; p<0.01, as illustrated in Table 
4.2.3.1. Multiple pair-wise comparisons were conducted, with a Sidak adjusted alpha level 
of .05. These revealed significantly fewer baseline ideas were recalled compared to 
elaborated ideas. However, there was no difference in recall performance between the 
different kinds of elaboration. 
Elaboration Status 
Task Control l-E G-E Rl-E 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Recall 1.56^ .98 2.44^* 1.05 2.63" 1.11 2.31^* 1.02 
UP (RO) .19^ .47 .84' .95 1.67'' 1.61 .97' 1.17 
UP (GN) 1.03' 1.10 .59' .84 .84' .92 .63' .83 
Notes: Means within a row that share the same superscript letter do not significantly differ from one 
another (p<.05 after Sidak adjustment). 
Table 4,2.3.1: Experiment 6: Mean rates of correct recall and unconscious plagiarism 
(UP) within the recall-own (RO) & generate-new (GN) phases for control, l-E, G-E and Rl-
E ideas. 
4.2.3.2 Unconscious Plagiarism: If participants incorrectly reported an idea that was the 
same or similar to one from the initial phase (partner/experimenter given) the idea was 
classed as a plagiarised intrusion (e.g. paperclip as a halrclip or paperclip as a hair slide). 
The scoring agreement between two independent-raters was 98.7% (on both tasks) and 
the discrepancies were resolved by discussion. Of the 403 reported ideas, 116 ideas 
(28.8%) were plagiarised (53% initially experimenter ideas and 47% were other 
participants* ideas). Additionally, 75.0% of participants (24 of 32) unconsciously 
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plagiarised at least one idea from the generation phase while 71.9% (23 of 32) made two 
or more intrusions. 
A within-subject ANOVA revealed that the elaboration manipulation reliably 
affected rates of unconscious plagiarism F(3,93)=12.61, p<.001. The means are 
displayed in the second row of Table 4.2.3.1, and were compared by Sidak adjusted 
multiple comparisons as before. These revealed that all of the elaborated ideas (G-E, l-E 
& Rl-E) were plagiarised more often than the control, but G-E Ideas were plagiarised 
significantly more than any of the other ideas. Crucially, there was no difference between 
the two forms of imagery-elaborated ideas. Therefore, conducting generative-elaboration 
during idea encoding significantly increased the later plagiarism of those ideas, but 
imagining already elaborated ideas did not. 
4.2.3.3 Generate-new task 
When participants generated new ideas, plagiarism ensued if they mistakenly reproduced 
a previous idea. In total, 495 ideas were given, 379 (76.6%) were new ideas, 99 (20%) 
had previously been generated by someone else (63.6% experimenter ideas and 36.4% 
other participant ideas) and 17 (3.4%) were participant's own ideas that they had 
inadvertently re-presented as new. The small remainder were duplicated ideas at test that 
were excluded from the analysis. 
Unconscious plagiarism; 90.6% of participants (29 of 32) re-presented and idea from the 
generation phase and 84.4% (27 of 32) presented two or more of these old ideas. The 
effects of elaboration on rates of these errors can be seen in the third row of Table 
4.2.3.1. The baseline ideas were plagiarised numerically more than any of the elaborated 
ideas but, a within-subjects ANOVA revealed that this difference was not significant 
F(3.93)=1.68. p=.177. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
With regards to generative and imagery-elaboration these results replicated our previous 
findings. In this 4-stage experiment we found that performing both l-E and G-E during the 
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retention interval increased the rate of correctly recalled ideas and simultaneously 
reduced the rate of generate-new plagiarisms to a similar degree. The only observed 
difference was In the plagiarism rates in the recall-own task, with G-E resulting in elevated 
levels of plagiarism. Therefore, after performing G-E participants were much more likely 
to claim other's ideas as their own. 
The key measure of interest in this study was the rich imagery-elaboration, where 
participants rated and imagined already improved ideas. Crucially, these ideas were 
matched in content with the G-E condition, unlike in Experiment 4 and 5. As expected this 
Rl-E resulted in a comparable increase in correct recall and decrease in generate-new 
plagiarism relative to the G-E and l-E. However, in the recall-own task the observed level 
of plagiarism did not differ from the l-E condition. So, although constructing a rich mental 
image increased activation strength (see Marsh & Bower, 1993) and familiarity (Loftus & 
Bernstein, 2005; see also Sharman et al. 2004) of the Rl-E ideas, it did not increase the 
likelihood of participants appropriating another's idea. Rather, it was the generation of 
idea improvements that led to increased plagiarism, even compared to a group who 
imagined those same ideas. Consequently, while familiarity misattribution may explain 
how fictional events may be regarded as 'personally experienced as real memories' 
(Loftus & Bernstein, 2005, p. 110), here, in a plagiarism domain, familiarity misattribution 
cannot sufficiently explain how an individual may come to believe that an idea originating 
elsewhere was 'incorrectly' their own, as imagined ideas did not appear to differ in 
familiarity to G-E ideas. 
These data may be explained in terms of the source monitoring framewori< 
(Johnson et al.1993) and therefore, adhere to our previous source-monitoring account of 
unconscious plagiarism. This account was explained in terms of how generating 
improvements to an idea shares cognitive operations with the process whereby the idea 
was originally generated. Thus at recall, if participants use cognitive operations to decide 
an idea's source (Johnson et al. 1993), then G-E will lead to error and hence appropriation 
of another's idea as their own. Conversely, such errors would not be observed with the 
imagined Ideas, despite idea familiarity as these ideas would lack the generative cognitive 
operations (that G-E ideas would have) but rather may possess rich perceptual 
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information that is acquired through the imagination (that the G-E would lack). 
Consequently, at recall, these memory characteristics may have aided performance and 
simultaneously helped to prevent l-E and Rl-E ideas from being incorrectly presented as 
self generated ideas. Conversely, in an imagination inflation paradigm, the 
accompaniment of such idea perceptual characteristics with imagined ideas would result 
in imagined ideas resembling real events (that would be highly perceptual in nature), and 
hence promote confusion here. However, the imagination inflation effect has been 
demonstrated following tasks that are not perceptually based, such as anagram 
completion (e.g. Bernstein et al. 2004), event paraphrasing (Sharman et al. 2004) or 
explaining event information (Shanman et al. 2005). Thus, the imagination inflation effect 
here may be explained by the familiarity derived from such generative activities, (in the 
absence of perceptual cues) being misattributed to a real memory in a similar way to the 
unconsciously plagiarised errors we have described following G-E. 
Surprisingly, in the recall-own phase, Rl-E ideas were plagiarised slightly (but not 
significantly) more than the l-E ideas. In a source monitoring view (Johnson et al. 1993) 
rich perceptual information may have been expected to not affect or reduce such errors. 
This pattern may however, be accounted for in terms of a degree of crossover of the Rl-E 
ideas with the G-E, as Rl-E was always performed after G-E (due to design constraints). 
It is reasonable to expect (in a small number of cases) that when a 'vague' idea 
improvement was given by one participant the next rich imagery-elaborating participant 
may have spontaneously elaborated the improvement to allow for effective imagination. 
For example, if the idea was to 'paint a brick as a booksheir the imagining participant 
would have to decide how the brick was to be 'painted' as this detail would be necessary 
before the brick could be properiy imagined. This information detail may have 
corresponded to the particular colour or pattern used and furthermore, the details may 
have been evoked in some personally relevant way. Consequently, the memory 
characteristics for some of these Rl-E ideas may be associated with cognitive operations 
that at recall may interfere with the source monitoring processes and result in incorrect 
self-misattributions in the recall-own phase. Hence, in a similar vein to the G-E, this may 
account for the small rise in plagiarism for Rl-E ideas here however; this speculation 
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should be viewed with caution as this difference between the Rl-E and l-E ideas that were 
plagiarised was not significant. 
In this study, participants in the recall-own phase appeared to plagiarise ideas 
from their partner and the experimenter at a similar frequency (total ideas plagiarised: 
47% Vs 53% respectively) but in the generate-new phase, participants appeared to be 
more likely to plagiarise the experimenters' ideas than the other participants' idea as new 
(63% Vs 36%). However, unlike the prior experiments, participants here were tested in 
pairs, with the experimenter generating twice as many ideas as one of the participants. 
Therefore, in the recall-own phase, participants are actually more likely to plagiarise ideas 
from other participants at a higher rate than the experimenter. Macrae et al. (1999) 
suggested that the more Ideas that are associated with a source, the lower one's 
propensity to source monitor and avoid unconsciously plagiarised errors may be. They 
speculated that this followed as a result of the strong associative links that the participant 
would have formed between the source and their ideas; hence, the fewer ideas that were 
generated from a source, the weaker the links would be. When participants were 
associated with 24 ideas each, they were less likely to plagiarise their partners' ideas 
when the partner was present at testing than when the partner was absent. Here, the 
experimenter generated 32 ideas while their partner generated 16 ideas but both were 
present at testing, thus re-instating the experimental contest (and associated cues). 
Therefore, this line of argument - in tenns of the links between the experimenter and their 
ideas being stronger - may account for the lower levels of experimenter plagiarism 
obtained in the recall-own phase. 
Further, in the recall-own phase participants have previously been demonstrated 
to be more likely to plagiarise from a participant who is perceptually similar to themselves 
(e.g. the same gender; Macrae et al. 1999). Hence, here there may be a bias away from 
the (female) experimenter with two male participants, but the frequency of this was likely 
low since most participants were female. As the majority of participants here were female 
between the ages of 18 and 2 1 , it may be speculated that participants may be more likely 
to plagiarise their partner if their partner was more similar to themselves than the 
experimenter, except in cases when their partner was male (but there were very few such 
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cases). Such gender data was not collected so this possibility could not be statistically 
explored. 
In the generate-new phase, when the larger pool of ideas that participants can 
potentially plagiarised from is accounted for participants were seen to be equally likely to 
plagiarise ideas from the experimenter and other participants. This finding also 
complements Macrae et al. (1999) as perceptions of source similarity did not affect levels 
of generate-new plagiarism. One's reduced propensity to plagiarise other participants in 
the generate-new phase, relative to the recall-own phase may be additionally influenced 
by participant's perceptions of source distinctiveness' or credibility of the ideas. This latter 
assertion would follow Bink et al. (1999) who demonstrated that favourable perceptions of 
credibility increased the rates of participants subsequently re-producing such 'superior' 
ideas as new. In their study, participants were given a series of ideas that could 
potentially reduce traffic accidents, together with arbitrary indications of the idea's origins; 
either traffic planners or undergraduate students. Later, participants were engaged in a 
similar idea generative task and plagiarised significantly more of the ideas thai initially 
originated from the town planners. Bink et al. (1999) suggested that this was because 
these ideas were perceived to be more credible (despite independent raters declaring no 
objective difference between the two sets of ideas). Such perceptions of credibility 
however did not, explicitly affect their rates of recall-own plagiarism. Thus, this 
explanation would fit with the results from Experiment 6, as there was no difference in the 
credibility of participant and experimenter ideas, because, the ideas given by the 
experimenter were randomly selected from a pool of ideas provided by participants in 
Experiment 4 and experimenter ideas were not plagiarised more than experimenter ideas 
in the recall-own phase. In the recall-own phase, the number of ideas plagiarised was 
confounded by elaboration type, but fundamentally there was more unconscious 
plagiarism following G-E for both sets of ideas. It is not entirely clear what factors are 
responsible for the differences observed here so it would be interesting to determine 
whether the same pattern of findings would prevail if the number of ideas generated by 
each source were matched 
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In sum, this study indicated that increasing the strength/fluency of the imagery 
manipulation did not concurrently increase the plagiarism observed in the recall-own 
phase. Therefore, we have consistently found the same effect that it is only G-E that 
results in participants incorrectly believing that someone else's idea was their own. 
4.3 Experiment 7 
4.3.1. Introduction 
So far in this research programme, l-E has not resulted in inflated unconscious 
plagiarism in the recall-own phase (Experiment 4, 5 & 6). This followed even when the 
imagery-elaboration was strengthened and equated In content to the generative-
elaboration (Experiment 6). Hence, in tine with predictions drawn from the source 
monitoring framewori< it would be conceivable to expect that strengthening l-E by 
repeating this elaboration would not result in an increase of these types of errors. This 
follows as the associated memory characteristics of the repeated l-E ideas would contain 
rich perceptual information derived through imagination (Johnson et al. 1993). Therefore, 
this information should increase the distinctiveness of the imagined Ideas, relative to other 
non-imagined ideas or ideas that were only imagined once. This repetition manipulation 
is anticipated to increase the idea's strength and accordingly participants' correct recall 
performance. However, it should not increase memory intrusions in the recall-own phase 
as these ideas would not resemble their own. Here unlike in the G-E participants are not 
engaged in generative processes and so accordingly should lack the cognitive operations 
that would accompany self-generated ideas. Consequently, the lack of cognitive 
operations but presence of rich perceptual information should help prevent plagiarised 
intrusions of recalling these repeatedly imagined ideas as their own. 
In contrast, according to predictions based in processing fluency (see Jacoby et al. 
1989) or activation strength (see Marsh & Bower, 1993) there is also a possibility that 
repeating this imagery-elaboration may be sufficient to induce these intrusions. The 
concept of repeating imagination has not been explicitly explored within the domain of 
unconscious plagiarism but it has been investigated within Imagination inflation. 
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Imagination inflation occurs when imagining counterfactual childhood events can lead to 
increased certainty that those events did occur (Garry et al. 1996). This effect has been 
observed in reality monitoring situations where sources that are fundamentally internal 
(e.g. imagining a picture) have been claimed as being external (seeing a picture) (e.g. 
Johnson et al. 1979), but it has also been more prominently observed in internal source 
monitoring paradigms when both sources are internally initiated (see Johnson et al. 1993). 
This follows as when the sources are both internally initiated they are more easily 
confused, for example, when 'imagining actions' result in belief that those 'actions were 
performed' (Goff and Roediger, 1998). However, in both of these cases, increasing the 
number of imaginations served to increase the likelihood that a false memory was made 
(Goff & Roediger, 1998; Lampinen, Odegard, Bullington, 2003; Thomas etal . 2003; 
Thomas & Loftus, 2002). Consistently, in these studies idea familiarity Is held responsible 
for this robust imagination inflation effect that is induced through imagination and 
strengthened through repeated imagination (c.f. Sherman et al. 2004). Thus, in the 
present study although 'generating* ideas and 'imagining' ideas involves fundamentally 
different processes, they are both internally initiated and so there may be some scope for 
confusion here too. In a related way, it is also possible that doing something (anything) 
twice could increase unconscious plagiarism; this experiment will test this idea. 
It is conceivable that real wortd plagiarists throughout the process of novel idea 
generation such as writing a story continuously think about, develop and improve the plot 
over time. If this is the case, is it not also conceivable that during this process they may 
have also repeatedly imagined 'their' story plot? Hence, it may be possible that repeated 
imagery experiences also contribute to real worid plagiarist's appropriation of another's 
idea in a similar way to those false memory constructions within imagination inflation. In 
Experiment 6, increasing idea familiarity did not appear to affect subsequent plagiarism 
errors and this indicated that in a plagiarism domain, familiarity may not be sufficient to 
explain how the ideas can be misappropriated to self. However, although strengthening 
the imagery manipulation did not result in significantly more plagiarised en-ors. slightly 
more errors were evident following rich imagery-elaboration than imagery-elaboration 
alone. This may have been due to some element of spontaneous idea improvement on 
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the part of the imager (see Experiment 6 discussion), but it may have instead resulted 
from the increase in idea familiarity and processing fluency induced by this stronger 
imagery manipulation. This interpretation is made with caution as this difference (between 
l-E and Rl-E) did not reach statistical significance. However, investigating repeated l-E 
would further raise idea familiarity and thus address this important theoretical possibility. 
This study therefore explores repeated idea elaboration within our 4-stage 
paradigm. The generation and testing phase were the same as Experiment 6 except that 
participants were tested in groups of 4 (identical to Experiment 4 & 5). This reintroduced 
the desirable group testing dynamic and also eliminated the likelihood that participants 
would be compelled to plagiarise the experimenters' ideas. The two main changes here 
were made in the elaboration phase(s). The first change was that participants were 
required to perform the l-E on one or two occasions. The ideas that were elaborated 
twice were elaborated for the first time during the generation phase and for a second time 
3 days after generation. The ideas that were elaborated once were either elaborated 
during the initial generation phase on day 1 (conventional l-E), or in a separate elaborative 
session on day 3. Consequently, the ideas that were only elaborated once, on day 3, 
constituted an extended replication and comparison for Ideas that were only elaborated on 
day 1 (the conventional l-E condition). Additionally, these ideas acted as a control for the 
repeated elaboration ideas to rule out the possibility that any increase in plagiarism could 
have been a function of participants completing the elaboration in a session separate from 
initial idea encoding that is closer In time to testing. The second change was that in total, 
three quarters of the generated ideas were subject to the l-E manipulation (% day 1, % 
day 3 and % day 1 & day 3), relative to the one quarter unelaborated as before. Thus, at 
any one time during the sessions on day 1 and day 3, half of the Ideas were subject to l-E. 
This was double the number of ideas that were elaborated in this way in the previous 
studies (Experiment 4, 5 or 6). However, as participants here were not required to 
perform any other elaborative tasks (such as G-E) the l-E was not expected to take much 
longer to complete than previous elaborative tasks and assuming participants complete 
the task in the intended way no associated problems should prevail. 
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4.3.2 Method 
4.3.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-two students participated in the generation phase. However, 4 participants 
failed to attend the second testing session and so only 28 participants completed the 
experiment. Participants were undergraduates from the University of Plymouth and 
received either partial fulfilment of a course requirement or £8 for their participation in this 
study. 
4.3.2.2 Design and Procedure 
A within-subjects design was implemented and the within subjects variable con'esponded 
to the day on which imagery-elaboration was performed (control, once on day 1, once on 
day 3, twice- on day 1 & 3). Four participants were randomly assigned to a group and 
given a seat around a central table. The generation phase was identical to Experiments 4 
and 5. Participants were given 4 object names, and were required to generate 4 novel 
uses for each idea. Accordingly, for each category there were a total of 16 generated 
exemplars and hence 64 Ideas in total. 
As in Experiment 4, the elaboration phase immediately followed the generation 
phase but an additional elaboration phase was conducted 3 days later. In the first 
elaboration session (day 1), participants were required to imagery-elaborate ((rate ideas 
on five point rating scales for how easy they were to imagine {1 = difficult to imagine, 5 = 
easy to imagine) and how effective {1 = not effective, 5 = very effective) they thought the 
ideas would be) half of the generated Ideas (32 ideas). The remaining ideas were not re-
presented at this point. In the second elaboration phase 3 days later (day 3), participants 
were required to imagery-elaborate a further 32 ideas. Half of these ideas (16) had been 
elaborated once In stage 1 (repeated elaboration) and the other half had not. Thus, there 
were 4 conditions of elaborated Ideas: % of the ideas were elaborated on days 1 & 3, % of 
the ideas were elaborated once on day l , a % were elaborated once on day 3, and the 
remaining % were not elaborated and hence served as control ideas. 
For the ideas elaborated twice, during session 2 participants were asked to try to 
remember the ratings that they had given in the first session, but if they could not, they 
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were instructed to re-rate the ideas. The order that participants performed these tasks 
was counterbalanced across the groups. The experimenter read the to-be elaborated 
ideas aloud in a pre-determined random-order. This task completed the first session, 
which lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
The Recall-Own and Generate-New Phases were completed on day 7, one week 
after the initial generation phase (4 days after the second elaboration phase). Participants 
returned to complete the recall-own and generate-new phases in there original groups. In 
the recall-own phase, participants were shown the 4 category headings (e.g. brick) that 
they had previously generated to in the first session, with four blank spaces under each. 
Each category was displayed in a random order for each participant. Participants were 
instructed to record all of their own ideas from the first session, 4 ideas per object. 
Although the number of ideas correctly reported for each object may not exceed 4 (1 
control idea. 2 ideas elaborated once; 1 on day 1 and 1 on day 3 and 1 Idea that was 
elaborated twice; on day 1 and 3), it is possible that the number of ideas reported for a 
particular elaboration status may exceed 4 (i.e. correctly recalled & plagiarised ideas). 
This follows, as for a particular class of ideas (e.g. Ideas elaborated twice), participants 
may exhibit good recall, by correctly recalling their original 4 ideas (i.e. one novel idea for 
each object) but also by plagiarising others' ideas from that same class (e.g. ideas 
elaborated twice). This would only be possible at the expense of failing to recall ideas 
from another elaboration status (e.g. control ideas), as participants may report a maximum 
of 4 ideas per object (e.g. 1 control idea, 1 G-E idea on day 1,1 G-E on day 3 and 1 G-E 
on day 1 & 3). and 16 ideas In total. Hence, although only 4 ideas may be reported for a 
given object the numbers recalled for a class of ideas may exceed 4. Again, recall was 
not timed or forced. Once this had been completed, the same category headings were 
randomly repeated and participants generated four new uses for each. This session lasted 
approximately 20 minutes. 
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4.3.3 Results 
Unconscious plagiarism was scored in the same way as in the previous experiments. The 
overall numbers of Ideas correctly recalled and unconsciously plagiarised in each of the 
tasks are summarised in Table 4.3.3.1 
Elaboration Status 
Task Control Elaboration on Elaboration on Elaboration on 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
(of 4) (of 4) (of 4) (of 4) 
Recall 1.80' .86 2.86" .92 2.83'' 1.07 3.10'' .86 
UP (RO) . 2 1 ' .41 . 4 1 ' .68 . 5 5 ' .83 .59 ' .98 
UP (GN) . 4 1 ' .68 .55" .95 . 59 ' .73 .28 ' .59 
Notes: Means within a row that share the same superschpt letter do not significantly differ from one 
another (p<05 after Sidak adjustment). 
Table 4,3.3,1: Experiment 7: Mean rates of correct recall and plagiarism within the recall-
own (RO) & generate-new (GN) phases for control Ideas and ideas that were subject to 
Imagery-Elaboration once, (on day 1 or day 3) or twice (on day 1 & 2). 
4.3.3.1 Correct Recall 
In total, 356 ideas were reported. Of these ideas 295 ideas (82.9%) were correctly 
recalled, where each participant on average correctly recalled (i.e. did not plagiarise) 10.5 
(SD =2.3) of their initial ideas. The top row of Table 4.3.3.1 shows the effects of 
elaboration on correct recall. A within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
elaboration status on participants' performance, F(3,84)= 12.45; p<0.01. Multiple pair-wise 
comparisons between means were conducted, with a Sidak-adjusted alpha level of .05. 
These revealed that the ideas that were elaborated (once or twice) were better recalled 
than control ideas. Moreover, elaborating ideas twice did not improve recall relative to 
idea that were only elaborated once. 
4.3.3.2 Uriconscious Plagiarism 
Recall'Own task: In this task, participants were required to remember as many of their own 
initial ideas as possible. Unconscious plagiarism occurred when participants recalled 
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someone else's idea as their own. As in the previous experiments a plagiarised idea was 
only counted once. Of the 356 ideas that were reported, 61 ideas (17.1%) were 
unconsciously plagiarised. In the recall-own phase. 71.4% of participants (20 of 28) 
unconsciously plagiarised at least one idea that another group member had originally 
generated in the encoding session. Additionally, 57 .1% (16 of 28) of participants made 
two or more intrusions. 
A within subject ANOVA revealed that the elaboration manipulation did not reliably 
affect the observed rates of unconscious plagiarism F>1. The means are displayed in the 
second row of Table 4.3.3.1 and indicate that relative to control, elaborating ideas did not 
increase the idea's probability of self-appropriation. Nor was their evidence that imagining 
twice had a greater effect than imagining once. 
4.3.3.3 Generate-new task: Participants' were required to generate four new ideas per 
category cue, but often participants unconsciously plagiarised another persons' ideas or 
inadvertently duplicated one of their own previous ideas (self plagiarism). In total, 458 
ideas were generated and of these, 383 (83.6%) were new ideas. 55 (12%) had 
previously been generated by someone else, and 20 (4.4%) were participants own ideas 
that they had inadvertently re-presented as new. The small remainder were duplicated 
ideas at test that were excluded from the analysis. 
Self-plagiarism\ There was a very small number of these types of intrusions and 
there was no significant main effect of elaboration status on self-plagiarism rates, F<1. 
Unconscious plagiarism: In the generate-new phase, 79.3% of participants (23 of 
29) plagiarised by reproducing an old idea that had been previously generated by another 
group member and 44.83% (13 of 28) made two or more of these intrusions. The effects 
of elaboration on rates of these errors can be seen in Table 4.3.3.1. A within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of elaboration status on the rate of 
unconscious plagiarism for others' ideas, F<1. Numerically, the highest amounts of 
plagiarism were obtained after one session of elaboration on day 1 and 3. Following two 
sessions of elaboration the strength of the ideas increased and accordingly the plagiarism 
level was numerically reduced. 
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4.3.5 Discussion 
The pattern of results obtained in this study supported the main previous findings that 
performing l-E during one experimental session improved correct recall and but did not 
increase plagiarism in the recall-own phase relative to control. This pattem followed 
whether the elaboration was conducted on day 1 during the generation session, or day 3 
when elaboration was conducted three days after generafion. Following repeated 
elaboration where the l-E was performed twice, correct recall was also inflated but recall-
own plagiarism did not differ from control. Although repeated elaboration increased the 
strength/familiarity of the ideas, it did not result in an increase in intrusions relative to the 
ideas that were elaborated only once or those ideas that received no elaboration. Hence, 
increasing the number of 'imaginations' performed does not increase a participants 
propensity to plagiarise and as anticipated Idea familiarity does not result in unconscious 
plagiarism with regards to participants assuming someone else's Ideas as their own. This 
suggests that unconscious plagiarism is not tike imagination inflation or that the 
manipulation differs from imagination inflation manipulations in critical ways. 
Consequently, the findings from this study further support the source monitoring 
explanation for unconscious plagiarism and indicate that in a plagiarism paradigm, 
processing fluency cannot account for the prevalence of unconscious plagiarism obtained 
in the recall-own phase. In this study, repeated l-E raised idea familiarity and produced 
an extremely high level of correct recall and numerically reduced plagiarism level in the 
generate-new phase. However, whether the l-E was completed once or twice did not 
affect the number of subsequent intrusions obtained in the recall-own phase. 
4.4 Experiments 
4.4.1 Introduction 
In the real worid, when an individual creates a novel entity that may take the form of a 
song, a novel or an academic paper, a great deal of time and effort is Invested until these 
feats are completed. Such processes may reflect the G-E (and not the l-E) that we have 
utilised here. However, during these creative procedures the finished product is rarely 
completed during one working session but is rather developed In an ongoing process 
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where repeated efforts are invested into the 'products' formulation. George Harrison had 
inevitably spent time repeatedly working on and developing his song *My Sweet Lord' and 
as a consequence of this, he really believed that the song was his own. This real life 
notion of exposing participants to infonnation on multiple or repeated occasions has 
previously not been explored experimentally in an unconscious plagiarism framewori<, 
despite the interesting applications to practical cases of plagiarism. Consequently, within 
this research programme, the next step was to investigate the effects of repeating G-E, as 
real worid plagiarism undoubtedly involves repeated and prolonged Idea attention rather 
than just one idea exposure. 
Support for this idea that repetition may be important for source memory can be 
derived from twin research. These studies have exposed twins that have both claimed 
ownership of an event memory that only one of the twins was actually involved in. This 
was first empirically demonstrated by Sheen et al. (2001) who found that 65-70% of their 
twins produced a disputed event memory in response to given cues. These disputes 
occurred when the twins agreed that the chosen event had occurred but both believed the 
event concerned them. The prevalence of these disputes is higher in monozygotic twins 
than siblings, and this is believed to be symptomatic of their stronger similarities in 
appearance and behaviour (Ikier, Tekcan, Gulgoz & Kuntay. 2003). However, the nature 
of the events in question vary from mundane events (Kuntay et al. 2004) to quite 
significant events (i.e. running away from home) (Sheen et al. 2001). Essentially 
however, these individuals have been demonstrated to possess a false belief something 
happened to them when it did not without any experimental intervention. This type of 
source monitoring error is akin to recall-own plagiarism, where someone else's Idea is 
claimed as one's own. Hence it may be deduced here that the twins had 'unconsciously 
plagiarised' each others' memories. 
Although speculative, one potential explanation for these disputes is that they 
evolve as a consequence of repetition and elaboration. It is well documented that verbal 
rehearsal during conversations about the past results in event reinstatement and error 
introduction into the original account (see Howe, 2000). Also repeatedly interviewing a 
witness may increase their confidence in their testimony, even for erroneous events 
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(Shaw, 1996). Moreover, repeated attempts to remember have been demonstrated to 
produce source confusions and erroneous memories that are intensified following 
repeated reflections on such memories over time (in the absence of source reflections) 
(Henkel, 2004). It is likely that during the twins' lives, the plagiarising twin had previously 
thought about and discussed these memories on a number of occasions. Although, there 
has been some evidence that the disputed memories were not reported to be often 
rehearsed (Sheen, et al 2001) or talked about with other twin (Ikier et al. 2003) it is 
possible that the events were often thought about or discussed with others. Specifically, 
Ikier et al. (2003) suggested that re-exposure to information may arise through parent 
Interaction particulariy. For a given event, parents (or grandparents) may have been 
uncertain or confused about which of the two children was involved. In such cases, the 
information may then be incorrectly relayed and reflected in conversations between the 
parent and child. Conceivably, subsequent internal (i.e. thought) or external (i.e. 
discussions with others) reflection by the child in terms of event repetition or elaboration 
may follow and In turn, be responsible for subsequent source confusions. 
Elaboration of any kind has been previously demonstrated to increase the 
activation strength of the ideas and improve subsequent recall relative to when no such 
elaboration was performed (Experiment 4. 5, 6 & 7). G-E conducted immediately 
following generation has previously been found to have a powerful effect on increasing 
recall-own plagiarism rates. Whether, the same intrusion rate would be evident when this 
elaboration was conducted in a separate session, three days post generation is unclear. 
Elaboration on day 3. may serve to reduce UP relative to elaboration on day 1 as the 
elaborative session on day 3 may be more discriminable from generation (due to the 
delay) and thus may be more accessible at test (as they are less proximal to generation) 
and thus potential plagiarisms more likely to be detected as inaccurate. On the other 
hand, plagiarism may be increased, as research has demonstrated that misinformation 
manipulations given on a different day to initial target encoding may increase source 
memory errors relative to when manipulations occur at the same day as encoding 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1998). However, how factors interact to determine test performance 
may depend on the extent to which participants attend to the sources but of memories that 
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come to mind at test and performing the G-E on either day may be sufficient powerful to 
evoke a comparable effect on recall-own ability 
Fundamentally, it is anticipated that the repeated elaboration will lead to stronger 
memories which accordingly should result in improved recall and reduced plagiarised 
intrusions in the generate-new phase. However, the question of interest here was 
whether these stronger memories would; 
1) Serve to strengthen and improve source memory and thus attenuate the 
plagiarism levels in the recall-own task obtained in the previous studies or 
2) Serve to further weaken source memory and thus increase plagiarism levels in 
the recall-own phase in line with our previous findings following G-E. 
4.4.2 Method 
4.4.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-eight students participated in the generation phase. However. 1 participant 
failed to attend the second testing session and so only 27 participants completed the 
experiment. Participants were undergraduates from the University of Plymouth and 
received either partial fulfilment of a course requirement or £8 for their participation in this 
study. 
4.4.2.2 Design and Procedure 
A within-subjects design was implemented and the within subjects variable corresponded 
to the day on which generative-elaboration was performed (control, once on day 1, once 
on day 3, twice -on day 1 & 3). 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 7 the only difference was the type of 
elaboration that participants performed. The generation phase was the same, but when 
participants elaborated (on day 1 and day 3) they completed generative-elaboration (as 
opposed to imagery-elaboration in Experiment 7). During generative-e/abora//oa 
participants were requested to write down three ways to improve the given idea. On day 7 
the testing phases were conducted as previously. 
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4.4.3 Results 
Unconscious plagiarism was scored in the same way as in the previous experiments and 
the same two raters were used. 93% of participants exhibited an unconsciously 
plagiarised error in at least one of the phases (recall-own or generate-new). The overall 
numbers of ideas correctly recalled and unconsciously plagiarised in each of the tasks are 
summarised in Table 4.4.3.1. 
Elaboration Status 
Task Control Elaboration on Elaboration on Elaboration on 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Recall 1.0' 1.04 2.15" 1.40 2.22" 1.31 3.04' .90 
UP (RO) .19^ .93 .81" .41 .78" .56 2 .81 ' .59 
UP (GN) .70^ .82 . 56 ' .85 . 26 ' .60 .52^ .75 
Notes: Means within a row that share the same superscript letter do not significantly differ from one 
another (p<05 after Sidak adjustment). 
Table 4.4.3.1: Experiment 8: Mean rates of correct recall and plagiarism within the recall-
own (RO) & generate-new (GN) phases for control ideas, ideas that were elaborated once 
(on either day 1 or day 3) or twice (on both days). 
4.4.3.1 Correct Recall 
In total, 312 ideas were reported. Of these ideas 200 ideas (64.1%) were correctly 
recalled, where each participant on average correctly recalled (i.e. did not plagiarise) 7.4 
(SD =3.6 ) of their initial ideas. The top row of Table 4.4.3.1 shows the effects of 
elaboration on correct recall. A within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
elaboration status on participants' perfonnance, F(3,78)= 19.09; p<0.01. Multiple pair-wise 
comparisons between means were conducted, with a Sidak-adjusted alpha level of .05. 
These revealed that ideas that were elaborated twice (day 1 & 3) were significantly better 
recalled than any of the other ideas (including those that were elaborated on only one 
occasion). Recall of ideas that were elaborated on day 1 or 3 did not differ from each 
other, but both demonstrated improved recall relative to control. 
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4.4.3.2 Unconscious Plagiarism 
Recall-own task: In this task, participants were required to remember as many of their own 
initial ideas as possible. Unconscious plagiarism occurred when participants recalled 
someone else's idea as their own. As in the previous experiments a plagiarised idea was 
only counted once. Of the 312 ideas that were reported. 115 ideas (36.9%) were 
unconsciously plagiarised (SD=3.4). In the recall-own phase, 88.9% of participants (24 of 
27) unconsciously plagiarised at least one idea that another group member had originally 
generated in the encoding session. Additionally. 85.2% (23 of 27) of participants made 
two or more intrusions. These observed numbers are much higher than in the preceding 
studies, on average participant's plagiarised 4.3 ideas each. 
A within subject ANOVA revealed that the elaboration manipulation reliably 
affected rates of unconscious plagiarism F(3,78)=25.64, p<.001. The means are 
displayed in the second row of Table 4.4.3.1, and were compared by Sidak adjusted 
multiple comparisons as before. These revealed that generative-elaborated ideas that 
were elaborated twice were plagiarised more often than all the other ideas. Elaborating 
the idea once increased plagiarism rates relative to control, but whether this elaboration 
occurred on day 1 or 3 did not affect the plagiarism levels. Therefore, conducting 
generative-elaboration during idea encoding significantly increased the later plagiarism of 
those ideas, but performing this elaboration twice more than trebled the probability that 
those ideas would incorrectly be self-attributed. The remaining means did not differ 
significantly. 
4.4.3.3 Generate-new task: Participants' were required to generate four new ideas per 
category cue, but often participants unconsciously plagiarised another persons' ideas or 
inadvertently duplicated one of their own previous ideas (self plagiarism). In total. 389 
ideas were generated and of these. 332 (82.7%) were new ideas. 55 (14.1%) had 
previously been generated by someone else, and 12 (3.1%) were participants own ideas 
that they had inadvertently re-presented as new. The small remainder were duplicated 
ideas at test that were excluded from the analysis. 
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Self-plagiarism; There was a very small number of these types of intrusions and 
there was no significant main effect of elaboration status on self-plagiarism rates, F<1. 
Unconscious plagiarism: In the generate-new phase, 77.8% of participants (21 of 
27) plagiarised by reproducing an old idea that had been previously generated by another 
group member and 51.9% (14 of 27) made two or more of these intrusions. The effects of 
elaboration on rates of these en-ors can be seen in Table 4.4.3.1. A within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of elaboration status on the rate of 
unconscious plagiarism for others' ideas F(3,78)=1.74; p=0.17. 
4.4.4 Experiment 7 & 8 combined Analysis 
The results from Experiment 7 and Experiments 8 were compared using a between (l-E 
vs. G-E) - within (control, elaborate day 1, elaborate day 3 or elaborate day 1 & 3) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA to evaluate the difference between the two types of 
elaboration. 
The repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was no interaction between 
elaboration type (l-E or G-E) and elaboration times (once or twice) for ideas that were 
correctly recalled F(3,162)=1.70, p=.17 or incorrectly given as new ideas F(3.162)=2.19. 
p=.09. Together, these findings suggest that both imagery and generative-elaboration 
affected the strength of the ideas comparably (see Figure 4.4.4.1). 
However crucially, there was a significant interaction between elaboration type and 
times for the Ideas plagiarised in the recall-own phase F(3,162)=16.30, p<.001. Follow up 
test, with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons revealed that repeated G-E (in 
Experiment 8) resulted in significantly more plagiarism than repeated l-E (in Experiment 7) 
t(54)=4.92, p<.001. Therefore, participants only claimed another participants' idea as their 
own after they had performed the G-E. twice. 
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Figure 4.4.4.1: Experiment 7&8 combiried analysis: A graph indicating the number of 
ideas that were correctly recalled and plagiarised following l-E and G-E. 
4.4.5 Discussion 
The pattern of results obtained in this study was largely consistent with the 
previous findings. Performing the G-E during one experimental session improved correct 
recall and also increased plagiarism in the recall-own phase relative to control. This 
pattern followed whether the elaboration was conducted on day 1 during the generation 
session, or day 3 when elaboration was conducted three days after generation. The 
manipulation of interest here was the repeated elaboration where the G-E was performed 
twice. Following this, idea strength was increased and consequently the level of correct 
recall was Inflated. The most striking finding however, was the extraordinarily high rates 
of 70% plagiarism following this repeated elaboration in the recall-own phase (See 
general discussion for a discussion of input and output bound measures of plagiarism). In 
this phase, participants were just as likely to recall someone else's idea that they had 
elaborated twice (mean 2.81) as their own ideas, as they were to actually recall one of 
their own Ideas (mean 3.0). This is an extremely high rate of plagiarism that far exceeded 
levels of plagiarism obtained in previous studies, Including both our own studies and other 
similar studies (Macrae et al. 1999). 
In the condition where G-E was conducted twice, participants correctly recalled 3.0 
ideas and plagiarised a further 2.8 ideas. Therefore, as participants may only report 4 
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ideas per category it would seem that there were more responses than spaces. However, 
for each object, participants should recall 1 idea each that came from control, G-E on day 
I , G-E on day 3 and G-E on day 1 and 3, but participants misattributed additional others' 
ideas from G-E1 and 3 as their own and this suppressed the possibility of other 
plagiarism. For example, an observation here was that the ideas that were elaborated 
only once (day 1 = 26% and day 3 = 27%) were actually plagiarised at a lower rate than In 
our previous studies (Experiment 4 = 4 1 % and Experiment 6 = 39%). Ultimately in each 
of our studies total participant output was restricted as only 16 spaces were provided for 
the participant's initial idea generations. Here on average participants reported a total of 
I I . 6 ideas each that included both correctly recalled and plagiarised ideas. Importantly, 
this number was comparable to the number of items reported in the previous experiments. 
However, in this study, repeating generative-elaboration not only resulted in an extremely 
high level of plagiarism but also resulted in a very high level of correct recall. In fact, 
these correctly reported and plagiarised ideas constituted 45% of the total reported output 
in the recall-own phase. Therefore, the remaining 55% of ideas (correct and plagiarised) 
were distributed between the control ideas and the ideas that were elaborated once on 
day 1 and once on day 3. In addition, the ideas that were elaborated once were also 
correctly recalled to a high level (also reducing the opportunity for plagiarism). 
Consequently, the plagiarism levels obtained following one elaborative session were 
invariably lower than in previous studies when two such elaborative sessions were not 
employed. 
In this study, in the recall-own phase participants reported a mean of 11.6 ideas of 
a possible 16 ideas. For each object participants were recalling a mean of nearly 3 out of 
the 4 ideas, the maximum ideas may not have been reported as a result of an implicit (or 
explicit) participant metacognitive bias that their memory is not good and that they would 
not be able or expected to recall all of their initial ideas. Hence, although participant were 
not reporting as many ideas as they potentially could, if recall was free and not restricted 
to 4 spaces per object absolute recall levels (including plagiarised errors) may have risen 
to be more in line with those rates obtained in prior studies. Nonetheless, in this study, 
despite the lower levels of plagiarism, the pattern that we had previously obtained 
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following G-E in the recall-own phase prevailed. Furthermore, a rate of 26% plagiarism 
was obtained. This was higher than rates found in previous findings for semantic 
intrusions (e.g. Brown & Halliday,1989) or plagiarised ideas (e.g. Landau & Marsh 1997) 
and was in line with the levels obtained in Experiment 5 (26% also) when participants 
were encouraged to use a stricter decision criteria to monitor their responses. However, 
elaborating ideas once or twice did not significantly affect the plagiarism in the generate-
new phase (see chapter 6). The trends suggested that generate-new plagiarism was 
reduced following elaboration compared to control, but that two sessions did not change 
this pattern. This may have been due to the increased familiarity of the G-E ideas (in the 
absence of source cues) being incorrectly attributed incorrectly to a spontaneous 
generation rather than the elaboration phase, however, speculating Is problematic as the 
differences were small. 
The findings from this study lend further support to our source monitoring theory of 
unconscious plagiarism where participants are suggested to make attributions about the 
qualitative aspects of ideas that come to mind in the recall task (see Johnson et al. 1993). 
The ideas that were originally generated by someone else, but were added to by the 
participant were qualitatively rich and more likely to be plagiarised than control. This 
follows as the processes employed during G-E are comparable to those used during initial 
idea elaboration. Elaborating these ideas for a second time on day 3 served to enhance 
this information and further confuse the initial information sources. As a result, this 
repeated elaboration more than doubled the chance of these ideas being plagiarised. 
Indeed, this increase can not be explained as a function of simply performing the 
elaboration on day 3 (in separate session that was temporally closer to the testing phase) 
as when elaboration was performed on this day alone (day 3) there was no difference in 
plagiarism relative to the conventional G-E (on day 1). Consequently, performing G-E has 
a powerful effect on later rates of self-appropriated ideas. This follows, whether G-E was 
conducted at encoding or separately after encoding and repeating this G-E only served to 
further intensify this robust effect. Therefore, these findings have potentially worrying real 
world applications. 
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4.5 General Discussion 
The findings from chapter 4 serve to replicate and support those we found in chapter 3. 
Performing G-E by improving ideas once increased the likelihood that participants would 
later assume those ideas as their own. However, performing l-E by rating idea 
imaginability and effectiveness did not increase these observable intrusions. This pattern 
prevailed when this l-E was strengthened by means of matching it in temris of content to 
G-E (Experiment 6) or when it was repeated on a second occasion (Experiment 7). 
However, here the dramatic finding was observed when G-E was repeated. While 
completing one session of G-E increased errors relative to control, completing two 
sessions of G-E doubled the likelihood that a participant would unconsciously plagiarise 
someone else's idea as their own (Experiment 8) relative to elaborating once. In fact, 
following repeated G-E, when participants were recalling their own ideas they were just as 
likely to 'recall' a plagiarised idea as they were one of their own correct ideas. 
Consequently, in this study while repeating G-E had a striking effect on the data, 
repeating l-E did not. 
However, in Experiment 6 although G-E ideas were clearly plagiarised the most, l-E 
ideas were plagiarised more than control. This observation was numerically but not 
significantly the case in Experiment 8. Cumulatively, this pattern is not consistent with the 
findings from our previous studies as rates of l-E and control plagiarism were equivalent. 
One explanation for the difference here, resides in the lower baseline measures of 
plagiarism that were obtained in Experiment 6 (.19) and Experiment 8 (.21) relative to 
prior studies (Experiment 4 =.53). However, while this baseline reduction may account for 
the increase in plagiarism observed in Experiment 8, it can only partially account for the 
difference in Experiment 6. This follows as in Experiment 6, there was also an increase in 
plagiarism following l-E and this increase was double the rate observed in Experiment 8. 
Reasons for this difference in l-E plagiarism in Experiment 6 may arise as a product of 
completing the Rl-E. In this study, a slightly higher level of plagiarism was found following 
Rl-E than l-E. This was previously explained (in Experiment 6) in terms of spontaneous 
elaborations on the part of the imaginer that may have been performed in response to 
ideas that were not improved in a specific enough way to warrant imagination. Thus, if an 
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idea was to imagine 'a brick as a sculpture* and the improvement was *to carve it', the 
Imagining participant would need to decide how the carving was intended to improve the 
sculpture (or the resulting shape) before the Idea was imagined. Hence, some element of 
generation may have been involved prior to Imagination and as such, this may have been 
responsible for the increase in intrusions. 
Consequently, a similar explanation may be given for the slight increase in plagiarism 
following l-E In Experiment 6 (relative to prior studies). This possibility was determined by 
analysing the order that the tasks (l-E, G-E & Rl-E) were performed and calculating the 
corresponding mean number of l-E ideas that were plagiarised. When l-E was conducted 
as a primary task before any G-E or Rl-E. a mean rate of .55 ideas were plagiarised. This 
number was slightly increased to .69 when l-E followed G-E. However, when l-E followed 
Rl-E (when participants had been required to l-E other participants' ideas and their 
corresponding idea improvements) the mean number of plagiarised l-E ideas tripled to 
1.57. A one-way ANOVA indicated that the affect that task order had on rates of l-E 
plagiarism approached significance F(2.31)=3.01, p=.06. Therefore, it appeared that l-E 
may have only resulted in an increase in unconscious plagiarism when it followed Rl-E, as 
l-E after Rl-E may have evoked some spontaneous G-E. Importantly, the rate of 
plagiarism obtained from l-E ideas, when l-E was the initial elaborative task, was 
comparable to levels of plagiarism obtained in previous studies (Experiment 4 .55/ 
Experiment 5 .40). Consequently, this carryover from Rl-E to l-E, twinned with the low 
levels of baseline plagiarism, may be responsible for the increased intrusions here. 
Therefore, the findings here also adhere to our previous conclusion that participants only 
appropriate someone else's ideas after elaborate generative idea improvement but not 
after elaborate idea Imagery. 
As in Experiment 4 and 5, the results here indicated that l-E and G-E resulted in 
ideas of equivalent strength. This was demonstrated by high levels of correct recall after 
l-E and G-E following 2 elaborative sessions (Experiments 7 and 8). In fact, repeated l-E 
(Experiment 7) actually resulted in the highest level of absolute recall, thus indicating that 
these ideas were as strong if not stronger than the G-E ideas (Experiment 8). IVIoreover, 
ideas that were imagined once (Experiment 7) were recalled numerically more than those 
142 
G-E once (in Experiment 8). This pattern may be partly explained in terms of participants' 
output restrictions, as in the recall-own phase participants could only present a total of 16 
ideas with a fixed total of 4 for each category. In Experiment 8. following two sessions of 
G-E recall and plagiarism was increased, with the number of ideas reported in this 
condition constituting 45% of the total number of recalled ideas (as opposed to 25% 
absolute correct recall and no plagiarism). This in turn suppressed the baseline and 
potential for other plagiarism, relative to Experiment 7, where the ideas that were l-E twice 
(correct and plagiarised) accounted for a lesser proportion of the total ideas (30%). But 
overall, importantly, a repeated measures ANOVA that was conducted across the two 
experiments (Experiment 7 and Experiment 8) indicated that there was no significant 
interaction for the number of correct ideas that were recalled in either study, across the 
different conditions (F(3,162)=1.70. p=.17). Therefore, in this between subjects analysis 
there was no ultimate difference in the activation strength of l-E and G-E ideas. This 
interpretation was supported by the plagiarism observed in the Generate-New phase; 
although elaboration did not significantly reduce plagiarism relative to control, there were 
no further differences between the intrusion level observed over the four conditions 
between the two experiments F(3,162)=2.19, p=.09). 
Hence, these analyses both directly (correct recall) and indirectly (generate-new 
plagiarism) support the idea that l-E and G-E result in memories of equivalent strength 
and familiarity. However, crucially, in the two studies (7 & 8), there was a significant 
interaction between elaboration type and times for the ideas plagiarised in the recall-own 
phase F(3.162)=16.30, p<.001. Participants only claimed another participants' idea as 
their own after they had performed the G-E and improved someone else's idea (As in 
Experiments 4 and 5). Due to the lack of unconscious plagiarism following l-E of any kind 
explanations for these findings that are made in terms of activation strength (see Marsh & 
Bower. 1993) or idea familiarity (see Jacoby et al. 1989) are not possible. 
These data suggest that while processing fluency that results from raised idea 
familiarity can account for how imagined events are believed to be real (Garry et al. 1996: 
Loftus & Bernstein, 2005; Sharman et al. 2004) or previously performed (Goff & Roediger. 
1998; Thomas & Loftus, 2002; Thomas et al. 2003) it cannot account for how others' ideas 
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are believed to be one's own. However, there are fundamental differences between the 
two domains that may account for why processing fluency may have differential affects on 
these source memory errors. The source monitoring framework can explain this pattern. 
In the Imagination inflation literature, details of imagining events and real events are both 
perceptual in nature so may be confusable. Conversely, the presence of rich imagery 
perceptual information could be used to prevent confusion and reach the reverse 
conclusion in an unconscious plagiarism paradigm, as one's own generated ideas would 
not be highly perceptual (unless imagery to a large extent is involved in generation). This 
explanation reflects the pattern of data that we have observed in this experimental 
programme so far. While increasing the familiarity of the l-E ideas by increasing the 
Imagery detail (Experiment 6) or increasing the number of times elaboration was 
performed (Experiment 8) did not increase the number of plagiarised intrusions, 
increasing the number of times G-E was performed did increase the prevalence of such 
intrusions to startling degree. 
Consistently in this research programme we have only observed an increase in 
recall-own plagiarism following idea improvement through G-E. In contrast to the 
aforementioned l-E, the memory characteristics obtained thorough the process of G-E 
would more closely resemble and be comparable to those obtained throughout the 
process of initial idea generation. Hence at recall, this generation information (cognitive 
operations) may mislead participants and result in source confusion. Repeating this G-E 
for a second time would have increased idea familiarity but also enriched these generative 
cognitive operations associated with others' ideas. In turn, this increase in cognitive 
operation twinned with the heightened familiarity would strengthen this powerful effect 
whereby participants confuse other's ideas as their own. These cognitive operations may 
additionally hold some personal relevance to the participant and may serve to intensify 
this effect. For example, if a participant was improving another person's idea to 'use a 
paperclip to decorate a picture frame' an improvement could be to bend the paperclips 
into flower shapes. At subsequent recall If the participant remembers the picture frame 
with the associated flowers that they specifically designed, they may incorrectly believe 
that the idea was initially their own. 
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Therefore, it the nature of processing that participants engage in that has a critical 
impact on later source memory ability, rather than the repetition (or strength) of that 
processing per se. However, repeating processing that detrimentally affects one's 
propensity to source monitor can further inhibit ones source memory performance to a 
profound degree. When people devise something novel (i.e. Ideas, songs, stories etc) 
from an initial starting point provided by someone else they undoubtedly devote a great 
deal of time and cognitive effort in re-working and improving their idea. It is also possible, 
that the twins, who plagiarised their sibling's memories, (Ikier et al. 2003; Kuntay et al. 
2004; Sheen et al. 2001) repeatedly thought about or vocalised the event during their 
lives. Thus, real-world creative artists or writers (or scientists) may be engaged in a 
prolonged version of the generative-elaboration condition used here. 
Experiment 6 and Experiment 8 resulted in extremely high levels of plagiarism in a 
recall task. We previously found in Experiment 5 that when a manipulation was 
incorporated into the design that encouraged participants to use a stricter decision criteria 
to monitor their responses, although, the pattern of findings was preserved the ultimate 
levels of plagiarism were reduced. It has previously been suggested that plagiarism 
occurs in these generative paradigms as participants are exclusively focused on 
completing the task goal and hence fail to consider original idea origins (Marsh et al. 
1997). In light of the high levels of plagiarism obtained in this research programme so far, 
it would be interesting to explore the effects of idea elaboration when a source monitoring 
is the primary task objective. To do this, a source monitoring test will be implemented 
during the testing phases in place of the recall-own and generate-new tasks that have 
been used so far. 
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Chapter 5 - Applying Elaboration to Source Monitoring 
5.1. Introduction 
Within this research programme consistently very high levels of plagiarism have been 
obtained. Specifically, levels as high as 4 1 % were observed in the recall-own phase, 
following one session of participant idea improvement (G-E -Experiment 4) which rose to 
higher levels of 70% when this process was repeated (Experiment 7). However, following 
any degree of l-E, the rates obtained did not significantly differ from baseline (l-E -
Experiment 4 and 8). In contrast, both types of elaboration affected the levels of 
plagiarism in the generate-new task to the same degree, but instead of increasing the 
observed intrusions here the elaboration manipulations served to reduce (Experiment 4), 
or not affect these levels relative to baseline (Experiment 7 and 8). This dissociation 
across the two tasks (with respect to G-E) is believed to be a function of the different 
decision processes that participants need to employ to successfully complete each task 
(see chapter 3. Macrae et al. 1999; Landau & Marsh, 1997) 
In the generate-new task participants need to make a decision that is similar to an 
old/new item recognition judgement (Marsh & Bower, 1993), in so far as they needed to 
remember whether an item was previously given in the initial generation phase to prevent 
themselves from presenting the idea as new. Consequently, manipulations that increase 
item strength/familiarity (such as idea elaboration see chapter 3) not only increase level of 
correct recall but also accordingly increase the ability to avoid intrusions of such ideas as 
new (Macrae et al. 1999; Landau & Marsh, 1997). As previously stated, participant 
performance in this task could conceivably be guided by idea familiarity. For example, if 
an idea came to mind accompanied by a feeling of familiarity, this feeling may be 
attributed (either correctly or incorrectly) to the Ideas presence in the generation phase 
(old idea) and so prevent the idea from being presented as new. On the other hand, in 
the recall-own phase, idea familiarity alone is not a sufficient heuristic to guide successful 
performance as the participants' objective in this task is to remember their initial ideas 
without recalling anyone else's. While familiarity here may drive a judgement that the idea 
was given in the generation phase (old idea) it would not provide origin information. 
Therefore, here an additional judgement based on source is required to determine 
146 
whether the idea was initially presented by themselves or another participant. Hence, to 
do this a decision more similar to a source recognition judgement is required (Johnson et 
al. 1993; Marsh & Bower. 1993). 
The source monitoring framework (Johnson et al. 1993) suggests that when 
'information' is experienced (i.e. generated/heard) memory characteristic features (that 
include source information) may be bound to the memories. These features (such as 
sensory/perceptual detail, affective detail, spatiotemporal detail, semantic detail or records 
of cognitive operations) and the associated memorial representations may differ as a 
result of the different encoding processes that led to the memory. For example, 
perceived information (originating externally) may be perceptually rich as a result of 
actually seeing the information first hand, whereas dreamt information (originating 
internally) may be more cognitively rich as a result of the processes engaged throughout 
the dream construction. Thus, the quality and quantity of these varied characteristics may 
be used by an individual to infer the original source of their memories (Johnson et al. 
1993). 
There are two types of decision processes that may be employed by individuals to 
address and evaluate their memories and assign source (see Johnson eta l . 1993). First 
are heuristic processes that inspect the 'amount' of qualitative aspects of activated 
information (cognitive operations, perceptual detail) rapidly and without deliberation 
(Johnson & Raye. 2000). If the activated information from the memory being evaluated 
has qualities that may be expected to be from a certain source, then the information may 
be attributed to that source. For example, if a memory contains rich perceptual 
information the person may conclude that the 'event' was seen. However, these decisions 
are not comprehensive and can be made without conscious knowledge of the process 
(Chaiken et al. 1989). As a result, errors may arise when there is reduced variability over 
memories from different sources and the distributions of the given features may overiap. 
This may occur for dreams that appear more vivid or plausible than other waking events 
(Johnson et al. 1993). Moreover, this type of process may have ensued in our studies, as 
a result of the improvement process serving to enhance the cognitive operations 
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associated with 'others' ideas. This may Impact the extent In which these ideas resemble 
and are subsequently confused with their own genuine ideas (see chapter 3). 
The second decision process Is a more systematic process that Is slower and 
more deliberate than the heuristic processes. Systematic processes are more thorough 
and believed to carefully scrutinise the available information (Johnson & Hirst, 1993). 
While performing these judgements participants may retrieve additional Information (e.g. 
temporal or situational) or engage in more extended reasoning judgements that may help 
to question the veracity of their source and accordingly be used to discredit the 
information; i.e. although a dream may be vivid and appear real a person on reflection 
may reason that it could not have been real. Or in the aforementioned studies, an idea 
that may have felt like one's own may be revealed after careful scrutiny as someone 
else's, perhaps as a result of an associated memory of the generating participant's 
expression when they initially presented the Idea. Performing these more accurate 
systematic processes is more likely to give rise to a sense of effort (Hasher & Zacks, 
1993) or control (Chaiken et al.1989; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shallice, 1988) than the 
more heuristic processes. However, typically, these process tend to be engaged in less 
often (Johnson et al. 1993) 
Heuristic and systematic processes can be utilised to guide and monitor one 
another, but the extent to which each may be utilised Is contingent upon the demands of 
the task and the person's goals (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Marsh et al. 1997). One will tend 
to engage in relatively automatic heuristic processes for everyday remembering, but 
engage in more systematic source monitoring processes only where the cost of making a 
mistake is high (Dodson & Johnson, 1993) or source ascription is a primary objective 
(Johnson et al. 1993). Source monitoring is a primary objective in modified recognition 
tasks. Source monitoring tests in general are conducted in two parts. In the initial task 
information is provided by different sources (i.e. participant or computer). This is followed 
by the modified recognition test where all the previously generated information is re-
presented, together with new information. Participants are instructed to indicate in which 
of the sources (i.e. computer, themselves or new) the information initially originated from 
(see Johnson et al. 1993 for a review). Hence, such tests directly measure source 
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memory when participants' full attention is assigned to completing this task goal. As such, 
in these modified recognition tests systematic decision processes are more consciously 
and more exclusively utilised (Marsh et al. 1997). 
The nature of the criterion used during a source monitoring test also has important 
ramifications for subsequent participant source memory performance. Research has 
demonstrated that increasing the number of possible source options (e.g. self, other, new) 
given on a source monitoring test from 2-options to 3 (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) or 4-
optlons (Dodson & Johnson. 1993) significantly improves source monitoring and reduces 
the number of errors emitted. This increased accuracy follows for older adults in source 
tests, when the number of potential options increases (Jacoby et al. 1989) and for 
eyewitnesses who are forced to consider all possible perpetrator alternatives (Lindsay & 
Johnson. 1989). Therefore, encouraging participant consideration of all sources during a 
comprehensive source monitoring test appears to improve accuracy by changing the 
cognitive processing strategies used to make source attributions. Specifically, strict 
source monitoring tasks, with 3 or more choice options appears to induce more stringent 
systematic decision criteria. 
In contrast, in the plagiarism studies (e.g. Brown & Murphy. 1989) source memory 
in the recall-own and generate-new tasks is investigated more indirectly. In the generate-
new task, while participants primarily need to generate-new Ideas only a cursory old/new 
source judgement is needed to prevent an old idea's reproduction. In the recall-own task, 
while participants primarily need to recall their own idea, a larger source component is 
required to prevent another's idea being recalled as their own. However, fundamentally, 
in neither of these tasks is source monitoring (that requires systematic decision 
processes) the foremost goal. Jacoby et al. (1989) suggested that when task demands 
place secondary rather than primary emphasis on source, people may not spontaneously 
recollect source but either largely ignore or neglect it altogether and hence may fall to use 
available information that may have helped error prevention. Moreover, Johnson et al. 
(1993) previously accounted for unconsciously plagiarised errors within these laboratory 
tasks (during both phases) as a consequence of participants being exclusively engaged in 
the cognitively taxing recall-own/generate-new phase such that they neglect the source 
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(see also Marsh et al. 1997) or simply do not adequately monitor the source of each piece 
of information (e.g. Allen & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby & Kelley, 1987). 
Therefore, it is possible that during plagiarism studies if participants make source 
decisions they may tend to engage in more heuristic source judgements (that are more 
open to error) rather than the more thorough extended processing that is evoked in source 
monitoring tests. Hence, the plagiarism errors obtained within this research programme 
may have possibly been reduced (or eliminated) by participants more exclusively 
engaging in systematic processes. This is a point we will return to later. If this is the case, 
then the increase in plagiarism observed so far in this research programme may be a 
consequence of participants not monitoring their information sources to a sufficient 
degree. To address a similar question, Marsh et al. (1997) assessed the degree that 
systematic source-monitoring processes were spontaneously evoked when memory for 
source was required in service of another task. They postulated that if unconscious 
plagiarism (in the generate-new task) arose as a direct result of insufficient source 
monitoring decision criteria during test then equally heuristic or systematic processing 
may be responsible for the errors. Their studies specifically focused on manipulating 
conscious systematic criteria to investigate the involvement of systematic decision 
processes on unconsciously plagiarised errors^. Hence, they investigated whether 
plagiarism would prevail if a 3 option source monitoring test replaced the conventional 
generate-new task. 
Previous unconscious plagiarism studies have investigated source memory by 
means of a modified recognition test (that encouraged careful source monitoring) and 
results have generally demonstrated lower rates of plagiarism (e.g. Brown & Halliday, 
1981; Marsh & Bower, 1993). However, findings from these studies are difficult to 
extrapolate for two reasons. First, these studies have not been conducted using creative 
stimuli (see chapter 1) but second and more importantly they have been confounded by 
the modified recognition test being completed after the recall-own and generate-new tasks 
(e.g. Brown & Halliday, 1981; Marsh & Bower, 1993). This is problematic for task 
^ Marsh et al (1997) initially implicitly equated conscious processing with the systematic processing and 
unconscious processing with heuristic processing (see also Johnson et al 1993). 
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interpretations due to the interference between these two tasks (Lindsay 1990). However, 
both issues were alleviated by Marsh et al. (1997) who conducted a variation on Brown 
and Murphy's initial 3-stage paradigm. During generation participants were required to 
connplete a creative brainstorming task (i.e. by generating ways to improve their 
university). Then, at test, participants either generated new ideas (generate-new task) or 
completed a modified source recognition test where they were encouraged to monitor 
their sources more carefully. The findings demonstrated that despite an equivalent 
correct performance in both conditions, interestingly, more unconscious plagiarism was 
observed in the generation group (21%) than the source group (.8%). Moreover, this 
accurate source memory prevailed over a one week delay. Participants here were 20 
times more likely to claim another's idea as a new idea when they were generating and 
completing a secondary source task than when they were primarily focused on the idea's 
source in a modified recognition task. Thus, participants accurate performance in the 
source monitoring test indicated that ideas were not 'plagiarised' on the basis that they 
had been forgotten or that source had been forgotten but rather, because during the 
generate-new task they failed to engage in systematic decision processes detailed by the 
source monitoring framework (Marsh et al. 1997). This may conceivably happen in real 
worid cases, where individuals are engaged in creative pursuits (e.g. writing a story, a 
song, an article). As a result of cognitive effort that they are investing to complete their 
goal and the pressures to which they may face, source monitoring may not be exhibited at 
an appropriate level to avoid such intrusions. Therefore, when addressing the question of 
which task is appropriate as a 'model' for real worid plagiarism the answer is arguably 
both. 
Together the above results indicate that differences in source monitoring may 
depend on the contextual demands of the task and also on the methods of assessment 
that are utilised (Marsh & Hicks. 1999; Marsh et al. 1997). Moreover, these findings 
suggest that although people in source monitoring tests are engaged in conscious 
systematic recollective processes, in generation tasks and potentially in the real worid 
decision criteria may be very different as people may not spontaneously monitor source to 
a sufficient degree. Marsh et al. (1997) further reasoned that if consciously controlled 
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systematic criteria were not sufficiently engaged when completing the generate-new task 
then unconscious plagiarism should be amenable to manipulations that served to increase 
this control. They first, investigated this possibility by focusing participants on the source 
and leading them to believe that their responses would be carefully scrutinised at test. 
Second, they implicitly encouraged control at test by individually and stringently testing 
participants during the generate-new test (relative to a more anonymous group testing). 
Participant plagiarism here was reduced in both studies, indicating that although effective 
systematic source monitoring was not induced spontaneously (in the generate-new task) it 
could be encouraged (and perfonnance improved) explicitly by task Instruction. Task 
instruction (by mean of a financial reward for effective source monitoring) also reduced 
plagiarism in Experiment 5. Moreover, Marsh et al. (1997) found that when participants 
were tested individually and received additional instructions to avoid errors, plagiarism 
was reduced to a very low level that mimicked 'modified recognition test' performance. 
Hence, it appeared that utilising 2 measures that encouraged stricter source monitoring 
(one on one interaction, along with strict task Instructions) changed participants' decision 
criteria and caused them to apply more controlled systematic decision criteria to avoid 
unconsciously plagiarised errors. 
The importance of control in successful source monitoring has also been 
demonstrated within the conceptually related conformity literature. This data has shown 
that when participants are required to design novel space creatures they tend to conform 
to ('plagiarise') features inherent in the examples that they were previously shown. 
Manipulations that have served to encourage controlled (systematic) decision processing 
include participant warnings that their examples would be analysed by a plagiarism expert 
(Landau, Thomas, Thelen & Chang, 2002; see also Marsh. Ward & Landau, 1999) and 
instructions to change their strategy in completing the task (e.g. by incorporating a 
designated shape into their space creatures Landau & Leynes, 2004) have resulted in 
attenuated participant conformity. Landau et al. (2002) suggested that when participants' 
ultimate goal is creativity, they may 'bypass many of the prototypical features and rely on 
activated features (or heuristic processes) unless there is some compelling reason to 
avoid them' (Landau, et al, 2002 p i 96) (i.e. via instruction or task goal). Cumulatively, 
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these studies demonstrate that more systematic, conscious decision processes can be 
either invoked spontaneously when the situation demands them by a source monitoring 
test (Marsh et al. 1997) or invoked explicitly by a task warning instruction (Landau et al, 
2002; Marsh et al. 1997; Marsh et al. 1999). 
Marsh et al. (1997) were also interested in the subsequent effects on plagiarised 
intrusions when participants' available conscious control was reduced. To do this, a strict 
time pressure was imposed on participants during test. This manipulation intended to 
reflect a more real worid environment (speeded condition) that creative individuals in a 
deadline oriented industry may face. In this scenario plagiarism was Increased. 
Therefore, it appeared that source monitoring (to a certain degree) was spontaneously 
induced in the generate-new task and moreover, monitoring did in part depend on the 
conscious processing that this speeded manipulation presumably reduced. If no 
conscious processing was utilised in this phase (spontaneously) then no increase in 
plagiarism should have been observed relative to control. Consequently, source 
monitoring in a generate-new task must either Involve a conscious and systematic 
decision component or the heuristic processes must incorporate a conscious element 
(Marsh et al. 1997). Nevertheless, their study demonstrated fundamentally that when 
participants were engaged In a secondary source monitoring task they did not 
spontaneously source monitor to an appropriate degree. 
In sum, the number of attribution en-ors on a generate-new task has been 
demonstrated to vary as a direct function of the degree to which participants were 
required to consider origin of new ideas, the amount of conscious processing available to 
generate-new ideas and how stringently decision criteria were emphasised by the 
experimenter and amplified by the participant. However, in contrast, performance on a 
source monitoring test was very good and unaffected by these measures (see Marsh et al. 
1997). Hence, certain manipulations may have consequences for one task but not 
another (Marsh e ta l . 1997). 
The dissociation between the recall-own task and generate-new task were 
highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. When compared to the generate-new task, 
the recall-own task relies more heavily on source information and so is likely to 
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accordingly involve a greater degree of conscious processing. In Chapter 3. we 
discussed studies that have demonstrated impaired source monitoring ability and reliable 
increases in recall-own plagiarism, where participants attribute someone else's idea to 
themselves. These include Macrae et al. (1999 through cognitive distraction at encoding 
and testing), Landau and Marsh (1997 through perceptual similarity see chapter 3) and 
our previous findings within this research programme. We have found that additional 
processing (by idea improvement) implemented between encoding and testing can result 
in levels of recall-own plagiarism at a rate of approximately 40%. Moreover, increasing 
the prevalence of this processing inflated these errors to an extent where subjects were 
Just as likely to recall a correct idea as they were a plagiarised idea. However, to date, 
none of these manipulations that affect incorrect ownership self-attribution have been 
investigated using a more stringent source monitoring task as a primary task at testing. 
Hence, this chapter intends to explore whether people plagiarise in a source monitoring 
task following idea elaboration. This is a key point that has not been previously 
discussed. In none of the studies above was source monitoring conducted following 
elaboration. Prior research has shown that following a single encounter, source 
monitoring is possible but it is not clear whether source monitoring is possible after 
multiple, different encounters. 
In this chapter modified source monitoring tests will be Implemented that are not 
confounded with prior recall/generation. Previously, Experiment 5 (Chapter 3) indicated 
that when stricter source monitoring was encouraged via a financial incentive, significant 
levels of recall-own plagiarism prevailed in a direction consistent with our prior findings but 
that the absolute levels were reduced. Using our paradigm with a source monitoring test 
at retrieval, we were interested in two issues: 
1) The overall level of unconscious plagiarism (compared to prior recall studies) 
2) The differential effect of G-E verses l-E. 
Essentially, were participants plagiarising in the prior recall-own tasks as a result of 
failings to evaluate whether the accessible information was relevant or applicable to the 
given task (as past research would suggest e.g. Landau et al. 1997) or were they 
plagiarising as they were unable to effectively evaluate their source information. 
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5.2 Experiment 9 
5.2.1 Introduction 
A consistent finding throughout this research programme was that improving someone 
else's idea through generative-elaboration resulted in participants believing that those 
ideas were originally their own. Following imagery-elaboration, this was not the case as 
elevated levels of recall-own plagiarism were not observed. The intention of Experiment 9 
was to ascertain whether this pattern of participant intrusion would prevail when 
participants were given a stringent source monitoring task at test that first and foremost 
assessed their source memory ability. 
This study constituted an exact replication of Experiment 4 until the final test 
phase. The generation phase was identical, and the four item elaboration conditions were 
investigated; G-E, l-E, repetition and control. The only difference here was that during 
test, the conventional recall-own and generate-new phases were substituted with a 64 
item source monitoring test. Included on this test were a selection of a participant's own 
ideas, other participant ideas and new ideas to which they had not been previously 
exposed. Participants were required to read the ideas and indicate where the ideas 
initially originated (i.e. mine, other & new idea). All the 'other' participants' ideas were 
included on this test. This removed the problem associated with experimenter selected 
items in terms of the potential ideas chosen by the experimenter not representing those 
that may have been plagiarised by the participant when given the free choice (see Marsh 
& Bower 1993 p687). Hence, only presenting some of the other participants ideas may 
have led to a type 2 error. 
Only half the participants own ideas were featured on the source monitoring test. 
Therefore, participants could not recognise all their own ideas (as they were not 
presented) so the number they attributed to themselves could not be used as a heuristic 
to guide performance. For example, if they had seen all their four prior uses for a brick 
they would know by process of elimination the remaining ideas were not their own. 
Consequently, providing a sub-set of a participant's own responses was deemed 
desirable. Finally, the remaining ideas were new ideas and the number of these was 
matched to the number of participants own ideas that were included. 
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On this test, we anticipated an overall high level of performance. This prediction 
was made on the basis of 1) our prior recall-own findings where level of recall was high 
and 2) the trends observed in the literature where con-ect Identification across the different 
class of items has been between approximately 82-90% (see Marsh et al.1997). In a 
similar vein, we expect to observe the well documented 'it had to be you' effect as detailed 
by Hoffman (1997). This effect has been reliably observed in modified recognition tests 
and ensues when false alarm identifications are made, by attributing an idea to which the 
source is unclear to another person rather than oneself (i.e. new idea scored as an other 
person's idea) (see also Johnson et al. 1981; Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 
1995; Marsh et al. 1997). This effect can be conceived as a result of the greater memorial 
strength (Hoffman. 1997) or greater memorial Information (BInk et al. 1999) that Is 
associated with self-generated information. As this information would not follow for ideas 
originating elsewhere, the ideas may be dismissed as their own and attributed to others. 
It is anticipated that performing either type of elaboration, relative to control will 
prevent participants from wrongly identifying another participant's Idea as a new Idea. 
This runs parallel with the findings from the generate-new plagiarism in the previous 
studies (see Experiment 4). However, the critical finding here will regard those others' 
ideas that are incorrectly claimed as the participants' own ideas. Administering a source 
monitoring test as a primary goal should encourage participants to utilise more controlled 
extended reasoning processes than in the more conventional recall-own and generate-
new tasks (Marsh et al. 1997). Given predictions from eariier work only G-E should 
produce feature overiap with own ideas while l-E should not. This study Intends to 
determine whether these extended reasoning source monitoring processes will be 
sufficient to reduce the plagiarism levels previously observed following G-E in the recall-
own phase. This would follow if in the previous studies participants were not engaging in 
sufficient source monitoring. An alternative possibility is that these errors would still ensue 
when extended reasoning processes were employed because these processes cannot 
prevent the G-E intrusions. This may follow if the memory characteristics of the G-E ideas 
contain similar cognitive operations to the self-generated ideas as a result of the 
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Improvement process. So at recall although the stringent decision processes are utilised 
they may not permit accurate source attributions to be made 
Therefore here, in a strict SM task we were interested in whether the dissociation 
affect between G-E and l-E that we have consistently observed throughout this research 
programme remains. In essence, are participants plagiarising in the recall-own phase as 
a result of not effectively source monitoring or because they are unable to effectively 
source monitor? 
5.2.2 Method 
5.2.2.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students participated in the generation phase. However, 5 
participants failed to attend the second testing session and so only 35 participants 
completed the experiment. Participants were undergraduates from the University of 
Plymouth and received partial fulfilment of a course requirement for their participation in 
this study. 
5.2.2.2 Design and Procedure 
Methodology in the generation phase and elaboration phase was identical to Experiment 
4. Hence, a within-subjects design was implemented that explored participant idea 
elaboration (control, re-presentation, imagery-elaboration, generative elaboration). 
In the generation pliase there were 4 object names in total to which each 
participant generated 4 novel uses. Immediately after, participants were required to 
complete the elaboration pliase, where one quarter of the Ideas (one idea from each 
participant per object) were subject to each of the following elaboration conditions; 
1) Generative-elaboration (G-E) where 3 idea improvements were given. 
2) Imagery-elaboration (l-E) where ideas were rated on 2 five point rating scales in 
terms of how easy they were to imagine (1 = difficult to imagine, 5 = easy to imagine) and 
how effective the ideas would be (1 = not effective, 5 = very effective)) 
3) Re-presentation where ideas were heard for a second time but not elaborated. 
4) Control where ideas were not presented at this stage. 
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The order that participants performed these tasks was fully counterbalanced across the 
groups. The experimenter read these ideas aloud In a pre-determined random-order. 
Instructing the participants to elaborate, rate or listen to the idea, as appropriate. This task 
completed the first session, which lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
One week later, participants returned to complete the 64 item source monitoring 
test in their initial groups of 4. Each participant received a uniquely tailored booklet that 
contained previously generated ideas and new ideas. Each test contained all of the other 
participants' (48) initial ideas from the generation phase (others ideas). It also contained 
half of the participants own ideas that they produced in the initial generation phase (own 
ideas). Eight of these ideas were included, with an equal number of ideas from each 
elaboration status and each object. Only 8 (rather than 16) of these ideas were displayed 
to increase the response difficulty. The remaining 8 ideas were new ideas that had 
previously not been given in the generation phase (New ideas). All of these ideas were 
randomised but the positions that each type of idea appeared was pre-determined and 
remained constant for each participant (i.e. own ideas appeared In positions 1, 6, 14 etc). 
Participants were required to read each idea and indicate the onginal source by circling 
the corresponding letter (I.e. 'M' for my original idea, 'O' for originally one of the other 
participants idea and 'N' for a new idea). This phase completed the study and lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. 
5.2.3 Results and Discussion 
5.2.3.1 Recognition 
5.2.3.1.1 Correct recognition 
Following the one week retention interval, participants' exhibited an overall mean 
recognition accuracy of 79.5% (own, other's and new). Specifically, with an accuracy of 
77 .1% for identifying ideas that were previously their own, 77.6% for identifying other 
participants' ideas and 92.9% for identifying a new idea. 
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The source monitoring test results regarding the 4 four types of elaboration status are 
shown below In Table 5.2.3.1. The results depict the percentage^° identification of item 
origins in terms of those correctly reported (i.e. correctly identified another participants 
idea as an 'other' idea) or those where the sources were confused (i.e. reporting another 
participants idea as a 'new' idea or as their 'own' Idea). 
Overall, identification perfonmance for recognising participant's own and other 
participants' ideas (own and other) was 62.2% for control ideas. This accuracy was 
improved following a representation of the ideas to 73.9% and further improved following 
ideas elaboration, to 88.9% for l-E ideas and 85.3% for G-E idea. 
My ideas: Numerically it appeared that elaborating own ideas improved 
subsequent source memory of those ideas relative to the baselines however a within 
subjects ANOVA revealed that this recognition benefit was not significant F(3,102) =1.58, 
p=.20. Hence, recognition of participants own ideas were good and elaboration did not 
enhance their recognition ability. 
Others idea: A within subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
elaboration status on correct source recognition of these ideas F(3,102) = 43.95. p<.001. 
Multiple pairwise comparisons were conducted with a Sidak-adjusted alpha level of .05. 
These revealed that experiencing additional exposure to the ideas through re-presentation 
or elaboration provided a recognition advantage (74.0% SD=1.9 relative to control ideas. 
60.7% SD=2.2). Moreover, elaborating the ideas by either l-E (90.5%, SD=1.2) or G-E 
(85.2%, SD=1.7) improved source recognition relative to those ideas that were simply re-
presented (74.0%. SD=1.9), but there was no difference between either type of 
elaboration. Consequently, it appeared that imagery and generative-elaboration produced 
memories of equivalent strength. 
Mean values have not been reported here due to the differential numbers of items included within each 
category class. 
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5.2.3.2 Source memory errors 
5.2.3.2.1 Unconsciously Plagiarised errors 
The interesting difference here was the proportion of others' ideas that were in correctly 
claimed to be ones own and hence plagiarised. This occun*ed when another participants 
idea was incorrectly labelled 'my idea* in the source monitoring task. In this study, 80% of 
the participants exhibited at least 1 unconsciously plagiarised en-or, and over all 
conditions 5% of other participant ideas were plagiarised. A within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed that in a source monitoring task the elaborafion manipulation reliably affected the 
observable levels of plagiarism F(3,102) = 6.38, p<.001. Multiple pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the generative-elaborated ideas were plagiarised more than any of the other 
ideas (8.8%, SD= 1.3). Imagery-elaborated ideas (3.3%, SD= .7) were not plagiarised 
any more that re-presented ideas (3 .1%, SD=0.7 or control ideas (2.9% SD=.6). The 
remaining means did not differ. Consequently, performing generative-elaboration 
significantly increased the likelihood that the participant would subsequently believe other 
people's ideas were originally their own, in line with previous research. 
5.2.3.2.2 Other's idea errors 
There was a small proportion old ideas that were not recognised as ideas from the 
generation phase but incorrectly labelled as new ideas (18% misses). A within subjects 
ANOVA revealed that elaboration status significantly affected the rate of these en-ors 
F(3,102)= 60.07, p<001. While the highest rate was seen with the control Ideas (mean 
4.4, SD =2.2), Sidak adjustments (as before) indicated that re-presentation of the ideas 
reduced these errors from occurring (22.9% SD=2.0) and performing elaboration further 
reduced the likelihood of these errors. However, as with correct source recognition, there 
was no difference between imagery-elaborated ideas (6.2%, SD=1.0) and generatively-
elaborated ideas (5.7%, SD=.9). The remaining means did not differ. Hence, this finding 
further supports the idea that imagery and generative-elaboration produced memories of 
equivalent strength. 
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5.2.3.2.3 'My idea errors' 
There was no significant main effect of elaboration on participants' own ideas that 
were incorrectly reported as someone else's idea F(3,102)=.757, p=.53 or a main effect of 
those Ideas being reported as a new F(3.102)=1.00. p=.40. This indicated that 
elaborating ideas did not affect error rate relative to baseline. 
5.2.3.2.4 False positives ('it had to be you' Vs 'it had to be me') 
When participants incon-ectly missed a new Idea, there were more errors in which a new 
idea was attributed to another group member (7 .1%, SD= .17) than oneself (0.4% 
SD=.17) t(34) = 3.93, p<.001. This finding is in accordance with Hoffman's (1993) *lt had 
to be you effect' (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995). 
This effect explains paradoxically why the most shallowly encoded items may have some 
discriminative source advantage at test as such ideas may be recognised on the basis of 
familiarity rather than recollection. When a participant felt an idea was familiar (a false 
positive) they displayed a greater willingness to attribute it to an external source than to 
themselves, as they would have been conceivably more likely to remember the idea if it 
was originally their own (due to the memory characteristics involved in such an ideas' 
generation). 
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Item origin 
New idea Other's idea My idea 
Response % SD SD % SD 
Control Ideas 
'New idea' 92.9 0.9 36.4 2.2 10.0 0.5 
'Other's idea" 7.1 0.8 60.7 2.2 18.6 0.5 
'My idea' 0.4 0.2 2.9 0.6 71.4 0.7 
Re-presented ideas 
'New idea' 22.9 2.0 11.4 0.3 
'Other's idea" 74.0 1.9 15.7 0.6 
'My idea' 3.1 0.7 72.9 0.7 
Imagery- Elaborated Ideas 
'New idea' 6.2 1.0 7.1 0.4 
'Other's idea' 90.5 1.2 14.3 0.5 
*My idea' 3.3 0.7 78.6 0.6 
Generatively-Elaborated Ideas 
'New idea* 5.7 0.9 4.4 0.3 
•Other's idea 85.2 1.7 10.0 0.4 
'My idea' 8.8 1.3 85.7 0.5 
Table 5.2.3.1: Experiment 9: Percentage of correct identifications and source confusions 
in source memory for control ideas. 
Consequently, elaboration (of both types) improves recognition performance for 'others' 
and 'own' ideas. The only differential rate of elaboration status (G-E and l-E), was on 
rates of unconscious plagiansm; with only G-E increasing the observable intrusion rate. 
This finding supports our prior finding that generative-elaboration, resulted in participants 
significantly plagiarising others ideas not only in a recall test (Exp 4, 5 & 6), but also in a 
source monitoring test when participants' primary goal was to consult their memory 
sources. Therefore, it appears that participants are engaging in source monitoring at an 
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appropriate level but, that they are unable to effectively monitor the information sources 
following Idea improvement. 
5.3 Experiment 10 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Participants were more likely to incorrectly believe that someone else's idea was originally 
their own after they had improved that idea themselves than after they had simply 
imagined the idea. Experiment 9 demonstrated that this finding prevailed when 
participants were primarily focused on judging the ideas original origin as a primary task. 
Hence, we observed plagiarism in a source monitoring test and at a high rate of 
approximately 9%. This rate not only exceeds the 0.8% obtained by Marsh et al. (1997) in 
a source monitoring task but also rates of 7% in recall-own tests that have been employed 
(Brown & Murphy, 1989). Thus, even when participants were engaged in a task that 
induced stringent systematic decision processes, plagiarism ensued. Therefore, it 
appears that the intrusions are a result of inefficient monitoring not failure of such 
applications. However the rates are nonetheless lower than those seen in the previous 
recall-own tasks (38-41%) 
The next step was to replicate and further investigate the potential magnitude of 
this effect. In Chapter 4, when repeated G-E was investigated extraordinarily high rates of 
unconscious plagiarism were obtained. In this study, we were interested in whether this 
repeated manipulation that largely increased plagiarised errors in recall-own tasks would 
accordingly raise the frequency of such errors in a source monitoring task. 
To this end, an exact replication of Experiment 8 was employed with a source 
monitoring test implemented at testing (constructed in the same way as in Experiment 9). 
Therefore, following initial idea generation, participants would either perform the G-E once 
or twice prior to test completion. In line with our previous findings, any G-E is anticipated 
to Increase the self-intrusion rate relative to control but ultimately the highest rates of 
plagiarism are expected following two G-E sessions relative to only one. 
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5.3.2 Method 
5.3.2.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students participated in the generation phase. However, 7 
participants failed to attend the second testing session and so only 33 participants 
completed the experiment. Participants were undergraduates from the University of 
Plymouth and received £10 for their participation in this study. 
5.3.2.2 Design and Procedure 
The methodology in the generation phase and elaboration phases was identical to 
Experiment 8. A within-subjects design was implemented that explored the day on which 
elaboration was performed (control, generative-elaboration on day 1, generative 
elaboration on day 3, generative- elaboration on day 1 & 3). 
Hence, in this study, following the conventional generation phase, participants completed 
the generative-elaboration (provided 3 idea improvements) either once (immediately after 
generation or 3 days after generation), or twice (at generation then again 3 days after 
generation). 
Then, 7 days after the initial generation phase participants returned to complete 
the source monitoring test. The source monitoring test was the same as in Experiment 9. 
Each participant received a uniquely tailored booklet that contained 64 ideas. This 
included 8 new ideas that had previously not been given in the generation phase (New 
ideas). The 48 of/7er participants' initial ideas from the generation phase (others' ideas) 
and 8 of the participants own ideas that had been given in the generation phase (with an 
equal number of ideas from each elaboration status and each object). As in Experiment 9 
all of these ideas were randomised but the positions that each type of idea appeared was 
pre-determined and remained constant for each participant. As before, participants were 
required to read each idea and indicate the original source by circling the corresponding 
letter (I.e. 'M' for my original idea, 'O* for originally one of the other participants idea and N 
for a new idea). 
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5.3.3 Results and Discussion 
5.3.3.7 Recognition 
5.3.3.1.1 Correct recognition 
Following the one week retention interval, participants' exhibited an overall mean 
recognition accuracy of 79.6% (own, other's and new), with an accuracy of 75.4% for 
identifying ideas that were previously their own, 78.0% for identifying another participants 
and 94.0% for identifying a new idea. The source monitoring test results regarding 
elaboration condition are shown below in Table 5.3.3.1. The results are displayed as 
percentages of correct and incorrect source identifications of ideas true origins. 
Overall, identification performance (for own and others) was weakest for control 
ideas (54.8%). and highest following repeated elaboration (88.7%). Elaborating the ideas 
once improved performance relative to control but whether the day of elaboration was 
either day 1 or 3 did not affect performance (84.8% and 82.0%) respectively. 
My ideas: A/umerically it appeared that elaborating own ideas improved 
subsequent source memory of those ideas relative to the baselines however a within 
subjects ANOVA revealed that this recognition benefit was not significant F(3,96) =2.42, 
p=.07. Hence, recognition of participants own ideas were good and elaboration did not 
enhance their recognition ability. 
Others idea: A within subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
elaboration status on correct source recognition of these ideas F(3.96) = 61.19, p<.001. 
Multiple pairwise comparisons were conducted with a Sidak-adjusted alpha level of .05. 
These revealed that any elaboration (once or twice) improved recognition performance 
relative to the baseline (53.3% SD=2.0). Although, elaborating the ideas twice resulted in 
the highest recognition accuracy (89.9%, SD=1.2) this performance did not statistically 
exceed recognition obtained following one elaboration session on either day 1 (86.4% 
SD=1.3) or day 3 (82.3%. SD=1.5). The remaining means did not differ. Consequently, 
generatively-elaborating the ideas improved identification, but the day or times that this 
elaboration took place did not further impact the results. 
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5.3.3.2 Source memory errors 
5.3.3.2.1 Unconsciously Plagiarised errors 
The interesting difference here was the proportion of others' ideas that were 
plagiarised and incon-ectly claimed to be ones own. In this study 85% of the participants 
exhibited at least 1 unconsciously plagiarised en-or and 79% made 2 or more errors. 
Overall 6% of the other participant ideas were plagiarised. A within subjects ANOVA 
revealed that in a source monitoring task, repeating the G-E reliably affected the 
observable levels of plagiarism F(3,96) = 5.09, p<.05. Mulfiple pairwise comparisons 
were conducted as before and revealed that ideas that were elaborated twice (9 .1%, 
SD= 1.1) were plagiarised more than control (3.0%, SD=.60). Ideas that were elaborated 
once, on day 1 (5.8%. SD=.81) or day 3 (6 .1%, SD=.88) were plagiarised more than 
control numerically however, these differences did not reach statistical significance. The 
remaining differences were not significant. Consequently, repeating the generative-
elaboration significantly increased the likelihood that the participant would subsequently 
believe that the ideas were originally their own, again mirroring the data in the recall-own 
task. 
5.3.3.2.2 Other's idea errors 
There was a small proportion of old ideas that were not recognised as ideas from 
the generation phase but that were incorrectly labelled as new ideas (16% false misses). 
A within subjects ANOVA revealed that elaboration times significantly affected the rate of 
these errors F(3.96)= 119.06, p<001. While the highest error rate was seen with the 
control ideas (43.7%, SD =2.0). Sidak adjustments (as before) indicated that elaborating 
these ideas once or twice reduced these errors. Day of elaboration was not important as 
there was no difference between those ideas that were elaborated on day 1 (7.8%, 
SD=1.1) or day 3 (11.6%. SD=1.5) but relatively, elaborating the ideas on both days led to 
a significant error reduction (1.0%, SD=.12, SD=.33). 
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5.3.3.2.3 My idea errors 
There was no significant main effect of elaboration times on participants' own 
ideas that were incorectly reported as someone else's' idea F(3,96)=.75, p=.52. 
However, there was a main effect of those ideas being reported as a new F(3.96)=11.39, 
p<.001. Multiple pairwise comparisons were conducted with a Sidak-adjusted alpha level 
of .05. These indicated that elaborating these ideas once (day 1; 1.5%, SD=.2 or day 3; 
3.0%, SD=.2) or twice (1.5%, SD=.2) reduced the prevalence of these en-ors when 
compared to baseline (22.7%, SD=.6). There were no further differences. 
5.3.3.2.4 False positives 
When participants incorrectly called a new idea old, there were more errors in which a 
new idea was attributed to another group member (4.9% SD=.9) than oneself (1 .1%. 
SD=.5) t(33) = 3.40, p<.05. This finding is in accordance with Hoffman's (1993) 'it had to 
be you effect* (Johnson & Raye. 1981; Marsh & Bower. 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995). 
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Item origin 
New idea Other's idea My idea 
Response % SE % S E % S E 
Control Ideas 
'New idea' 93.9 0.9 43.7 2.0 22.7 0.6 
'Other's idea" 4.9 0.7 53.3 2.0 13.6 0.5 
'My idea' 1.1 0.5 3.0 0.6 63.6 0.7 
Ideas Elaborated once (day 1) 
'New idea' 7.8 1.1 1.5 0.2 
'Other's idea' 86.4 1.3 22.7 0.6 
'My idea' 5.8 0.8 75.8 0.6 
Ideas Elaborated once (day 3) 
'New idea' 11.6 1.5 3.0 0.2 
'Other's idea' 82.3 1.5 16.7 0.5 
'My idea' 6.1 0.9 80.3 0.6 
Ideas Elaborated twice (day 1 & 3) 
'New idea' 1.0 0.3 1.5 0.2 
'Other's idea' 89.9 1.2 16.7 0.5 
'My idea' 9.1 1.1 81.8 0.5 
Table 5.3.3.1: Experiment 10: Percentage of correct identifications and source confusions 
in source memory for each of the conditions. 
In this source monitoring study we essentially obtained the same general pattern as in the 
recall-own data in Experiment 8. Participants exhibited the highest levels of 
unconsciously plagiarised en-ors following the G-E. Relative to control, there was 
numerically more plagiarism observed following one session of G-E (on either day 1 or 
day 3) and significantly more plagiarism following two sessions of G-E. Therefore, as 
anticipated, in a source monitoring test the highest error rate was observed following two 
elaboration sessions. However, surprisingly, the magnitude of this plagiarism following 
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these sessions was not inflated when compared to Experiment 9 where only one session 
of G-E was administered. 
Possible explanations for this difference in plagiarism levels will be considered and 
thoroughly discussed in the general discussion. In the meantime, however it was deemed 
important to conduct a final study that investigated the effects of repeating the l-E 
(examined previously with recall-own and generate-new tasks). This was important for 
control purposes and as a means of obtaining a baseline measure of unconscious 
plagiarism in such a task. 
5.4 Experiment 11 
5.4.1 Introduction 
This study was essentially conducted as a control for Experiment 10. Thus, Experiment 
11 was identical except that here, participants performed l-E rather than G-E. l-E was 
conducted either once on either day 1 or day 3, or twice, on both days (1 and 3) 
proceeding test. 
While Experiment 9 demonstrated that G-E significantly affected the number of 
plagiarised intrusions it also demonstrated that performing l-E on other peoples ideas did 
not detrimentally affect subsequent source monitoring performance. Rather, performing I-
E by imagining and rating others idea, improved item identification relative to baseline but 
did not affect the prevalence of source memory errors. The same pattern was observed 
when intrusions were measured using recall tests and this followed for l-E that was 
conducted once or twice (in Experiment 7). Hence, in sum, imagery-elaborating ideas did 
not increase the likelihood that someone else's ideas would be claimed to be one's own. 
Therefore, repeating l-E is not anticipated to result in any increase in source monitoring 
errors here. 
5.4.2 Method 
5.4.2,1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students participated in the generation phase. However, 10 
participants failed to attend the second testing session and so only 30 participants 
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cx)mpleted the experiment. Participants were undergraduates from the University of 
Plymouth and received partial fulfilment of a course requirement for their participation in 
this study. 
5.4.2.2 Design and Procedure 
This study was the same as Experiment 10 except imagery-elaboration (l-E) was 
performed instead of generative-elaboration (G-E) (see also Experiment 7 for stage 1 and 
2). Thus, a within-subjects design was implemented that explored day of elaboration 
(control, imagery-elaboration on day 1, imagery-elaboration on day 3, imagery-elaboration 
on day 1 & 3). 
In this study, following the conventional generation phase, participants completed 
the imagery-elaboration by rating the ideas on 2 Likert scales. The first, how easy the 
ideas was to imagine (1=difricult to imagine, 5= easy to imagine) and second, how 
effective they thought the ideas would be (1=not effective, 5= very effective). Participants 
completed this elaboration either once (immediately after generation or 3 days after 
generation), or twice (at generation then again 3 days after generation). 
Then, 7 days after the initial generation phase participants returned to complete 
the source monitoring test. The source monitoring test was constructed and completed in 
the same as in Experiment 10. 
5.4.3 Results and Discussion 
Following the one week retention interval, participants' exhibited an overall mean source 
identification accuracy of 79.2% (own, others' and new ideas), with an accuracy of 71.0% 
for identifying ideas that were previously their own, 78.5% for identifying another 
participants and 91.5% for identifying a new idea. The source monitoring test results 
regarding elaboration times are shown below in Table 5.4.3.1. As before, the results are 
displayed as percentages of correct and incorrect source identifications of ideas true 
origins. 
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5.4.3.1 Recognition 
5.4.3.1.1 Correct recognition 
Overall, Identification performance (for own and others) was weakest for control 
ideas (84.6%) but better following elaboration once that was performed on day 1 (82.9%) 
or day 3 (81.8%) or twice; on day 1 and 3 (84.6%). 
My ideas: A within subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
elaboration times on correct recognition of own ideas F(3.90)=6.63, p<.001. Sidak 
adjustments for multiple pairwise comparisons revealed that while elaboration performed 
on day 1 (80.6%. SD=.7) and elaboration on day 1 and 3 (83.9%. SD=.5) improved 
identification relative to baseline (54.8%, SD=.8), elaboration conducted only on day 3 
(64.5, SD=.6) did not. 
Others idea: A within-subjects ANOVA was conduced and revealed a significant 
main effect of elaboration times on con-ect recognition F(3,90)=62.67. p<.001. Multiple 
pairwise comparisons revealed (as in Experiment 10) that any elaboration improved 
participant recognition of others ideas relative to control (53.8%, SD=2.4). This followed 
for ideas elaborated on day 1 (83.3%, SD=1.8). day 3 (84.7%, SD=1.5) or twice, on both 
days (92.2%, SD=.9). Moreover, elaborating twice improved recognition relative to 
elaborating once (on either day 1 or day 3). The remaining means did not differ. 
5.4.3.2 Source memory errors 
5.4.3.2.1 Unconsciously Plagiarised errors 
Regarding the proportion of others' ideas that were incorrectly claimed to be ones 
own, in this study 6 1 % of the participants exhibited at least 1 unconsciously plagiarised 
error and 32% made 2 or more errors. Across all conditions only 3% of other participant 
ideas were plagiarised. A within subjects ANOVA revealed that in a source monitoring 
task, repeating the l-E did not affect the observable levels of plagiarism F(3,90) = 1.00, 
p=.40. Consequently, as expected, performing l-E or repeating this l-E did not increase 
the likelihood that the participant would subsequently believe that others' ideas were 
originally their own. 
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5.4.3.2.2 Others'ideas source errors 
There was a small proportion of old ideas that were not recognised from the 
generation phase, but incorrectly labelled as new (19%). A within subjects ANOVA 
revealed that elaboration times significantly affected the rate of these errors F(3,90)= 
72.58, p<.001. The highest rate was seen with the control ideas (44.4%. SD =2.4), and 
Sidak adjustments (as before) indicated a significant reduction in these errors following 
elaboration. While elaborating the ideas twice (4.8%, SD=.8) resulted in fewer errors than 
elaborating once, there was no difference between initial day of elaboration (day 1, 13.2%, 
SD=1.5orday 3. 12.1%. SD=1.3). 
5.4.3.2.3 My idea source errors 
There was no significant main effect of elaboration times on participants' ideas that 
were incorrectly reported as someone else's F(3,90)=2.12, p=.10 but there was a main 
effect of their ideas being incorrectly reported as new F(3,90)=4.88, p=.05. Elaborating 
the ideas twice resulted in no intrusions. Sidak adjustments revealed that although 
elaborating these ideas twice reduced intrusions relative to baseline (19.4%, SD=.7). 
elaborating the ideas only once, (on day 1, 6.5%, SD=.3 or day 3, 8 .1%, SD=.5) did not. 
5.4.3.2.4 False positives 
When participants incorrectly clamed a new idea as old, there were more errors in 
which a new idea was attributed to another group member (7.7%, SD= .9) than oneself 
(1.2%. SD=.3) t(31) = 3.23. p<.05. This finding is in accordance with Hoffman's (1993) 'it 
had to be you effect' (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 
1995). 
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Item origin 
New idea Other's idea My Idea 
Response % S E % S E % S E 
Control Ideas 
'New idea' 91.5 1.0 44.4 2.4 19.4 0.7 
'Other's idea" 7.7 0.9 53.8 2.4 25.8 0.7 
'My idea' 1.2 0.3 1.9 0.6 54.8 0.8 
Ideas Elaborated once (day 1) 
'New idea' 13.2 1.5 6.5 0.3 
'Other's idea' 83.3 1.8 12.9 0.5 
'My Idea' 3.5 0.8 80.6 0.7 
Ideas Elaborated once (day 3) 
'New Idea' 12.1 1.3 8.1 0.5 
'Other's idea' 84.7 1.5 27.4 0.6 
'My idea' 3.2 0.6 64.5 0.6 
Ideas Elaborated twice (day 1 & 3) 
*New idea' 4.8 0.8 0.0 0 
'Other's idea' 92.2 0.9 16.1 0.5 
'My idea' 3.0 0.8 83.9 0.5 
Table 5.4.3.1: Experiment 11: Percentage of correct identifications and source confusions 
in source memory for each condition. 
As expected, performing l-E either once or twice did not affect the rates of later plagiarism 
as measured by a source monitoring test. While, control ideas were plagiarised 2% of the 
time, ideas that were l-E on day 1. day 3 or on both days were each plagiarised 3% of the 
time. There was no difference in ultimate plagiarism between the different levels of l-E. 
Consequently, these plagiarism figures that do not differ from chance support our previous 
findings that l-E does not affect levels of self appropriation. 
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5.4.4 Experiment 10 and 11 combined Analysis 
The results from Experiment 10 and Experiments 11 were compared using a between (G-
E vs. l-E) - within (control, elaborate day 1. elaborate day 3 or elaborate day 1 & 3) 
repeated measures ANOVA. 
My ideas: There were no significant interactions between the participants own 
ideas that were con-ectly reported F(3,186)= 1.64, p=.18, incon-ectly reported as either 
others' ideas F(3.186)=2.48. p=.62. or new ideas F(3,186)=.84. p=.47 in either 
experiment. Cumulatively, these findings indicated that the different types of elaboration 
were affecting the strength and thus participants' ability to correctly identify the source of 
ideas equivalently, over the different elaboration times. 
Others ideas: For the mean number of other participants' ideas that were correctly 
identified as a new idea, or incorrectly identified as their own idea or a new idea. A 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was no interaction between elaboration 
type (G-E or l-E) and elaboration times (once or twice) for others' ideas that were correctly 
recognised F(3.186)=.70,p=.52 (see figure 5.4.4.1) or that were incorrectly reported as 
new ideas F(3,186)=.80, p=.50 (see figure 5.4.4.2). 
Others ideas correctly recognised 
12.0 
S 8.0 
6.0 
4.0 
2.0 
0.0 
control Elab Elab Elab 
day1 Day 3 day 1 & 
3 
Correctly recognised ideas 
• G-E (Exp 10) 
• l-E (Exp 11) 
Figure 5.4.4.1: A graph indicating the participants' origin attributions for the ideas 
correctly identified as 'other' participants' ideas in both G-E (Experiment 10) and l-E 
(Experiment 11). 
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others ideas recognised as new 
6.0 
« 5.0 
S 4.0 
g 2.0 
E 1.0 
0.0 
control Elab Etab Elab 
day l Day 3 day 1 & 
3 
Ideas incorrectly recognised as 
new 
• G-E (Exp 10) 
• l-E (Exp 11) 
Figure 5.4.4.2; A graph indicating the participants' origin attributions for the ideas that 
should have been correctly identified as 'other' participants' ideas in both G-E (Experiment 
10) and l-E (Experiment 11) but were incorrectly identified as new. 
Unconscious Plagiarism 
However crucially, there was a significant interaction between elaboration type and 
times for other participants ideas that were reported as their own ideas and hence, 
plagiarised F(3,186)=2.60, ps.05. Follow up test, with Bonferroni con-ections for multiple 
comparisons revealed that repeated G-E (in Experiment 10) resulted in significantly more 
plagiarism than repeated l-E (in Experiment 11) t(62)=3.28, p<.05. Therefore, in 
accordance with our prior findings, participants only claimed another participants' idea as 
their own after they had performed the G-E, twice (see figure 5.4.4.3). 
175 
others ideas recognised as own 
1.2 
« 1.0 
S 0.8 
S 0.4 
E 0.2 
0.0 
• G-E (Exp 10) 
• l-E (Exp 11) 
control Elab Elab Elab 
day l Day 3 day 1 & 
3 
Ideas incon-ectly recognised as 
own (UP) 
Figure 5.4.4.3: A graph indicating the participants' origin attributions for the ideas that 
should have been correctly identified as 'other' participants' ideas in both G-E (Experiment 
10) and l-E (Experiment 11) but were incorrectly identified as their own. 
False positives: Across both studies there were more errors in which a new idea was 
attributed to another group member than oneself t(64) = 3.53. p<.001. This finding is in 
accordance with Hoffman's (1993) 'it had to be you effect' (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Marsh 
& Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995). There was no significant interaction on this 
effect with l-E or G-E F(1.62)=.85. p=.36. 
Consequently, in accordance with the findings from the equivalent recall studies 
(Experiment 7 & 8), the results obtained here (in both Experiment 10 & 11) adhere to our 
source monitoring account of unconscious plagiarism. 
5.5 General Discussion 
The studies in this chapter have demonstrated two things; first and most importantly that 
unconscious plagiarism was observed in a source monitoring test and second that the 
pattern of results obtained was consistent with those obtained in the previous recall tasks. 
Levels of 9% unconscious plagiarism were obtained following one (in Experiment 9) or 
two sessions (in Experiment 10) of generative-elaboration. However, the rates of 
unconscious plagiarism following one (Experiment 9) or two sessions of Imagery-
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elaboration (Experiment 11) did not differ from control (3% in each). Hence, in a scenario 
where a three option source monitoring test was administered and the participant's 
primary objective was to judge the initial information sources, unconscious plagiarism still 
ensued and was uniquely influenced by G-E. In essence, it appeared that although 
participants were engaging in source monitoring at an appropriate extended level they 
were following idea improvement and were unable to effectively monitor all their memory 
sources. 
These findings appear to differ from Marsh et al. (1997) who found that when 
participants are primarily engaged in a source monitoring test they exhibit few plagiarised 
errors. They found rates of 2 1 % plagiarism in a conventional generate-new task but the 
reduced rates of approximately 0.8% in a source monitoring task (Experiment 1). This 
reduction in errors was claimed to be a primary function of the source processing that the 
participants were engaged in. When source monitoring was made a primary objective (via 
implicit or explicit instructions), participants engaged in stringent systematic processes 
and specifically focused on sources to avoid confusions. However, when source 
monitoring was a secondary task in service of some other primary (i.e. generate-new) 
task, systematic source monitoring was not utilised to an appropriate degree but rather, 
superseded by rapid, heuristic based judgements that were less comprehensive and more 
open to appropriation error (Jacoby et al. 1989). Previously in our recall-own, secondary 
source monitoring tasks we also obtained high levels of plagiarism but although these 
ultimate levels of plagiarism were reduced when a stringent source monitoring task was 
used at test (in Experiment 9 and 10) (a point we will return to), significant levels of 
unconscious plagiarism prevailed. While the extended processing did help suppress 
plagiarism levels in the control group at a comparable level to the 0.8% obtained by Marsh 
et al. (1997), it did not for ideas that had been subject to generative-elaboration. This 
finding suggests that source errors for creative ideas (following idea improvement), may 
be more difficult to avoid than previously believed (e.g. Marsh et al. 1997). 
There is an interesting pattern in these three experiments; that the most common 
source monitoring error is the 'it had to be you effect' (Hoffman, 1997). This follows not 
just in terms of new items but also in old items. Even participant's own ideas are quite 
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often attributed to others, presumably this refiects the proportions of own and others 
ideas, but G-E reliably reduces this error. Although, this error does not reflect plagiarised 
intrusions per se, it rather demonstrates changes in ownership that are due to factors 
unrelated to the original generation. It may be possible that if participants were tested in 
dyads, that the rate of unconscious plagiarism would be higher. Thus, G-E has the 
tendency to increase ownership of ideas both correctly, by overcoming the 'it had to be 
you effect" and incorrectly by inducing unconscious plagiarism. 
Landau et al. (1997) clamed that participants plagiarised in the generate-new 
phase as a result of the plagiarised ideas having a higher activation strength than the 
other non plagiarised ideas (see also Marsh & Bower. 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995 & 
chapter 3). Therefore, when participants generate-new ideas, the activated ideas may 
come more readily to mind and so in the absence of a stringent source monitoring 
decision these ideas may be incorrectly attributed to a spontaneous generation (i.e. 
plagiarised). This would not follow in the primary source monitoring task. Activation 
strength cannot account for the difference between the recall and source tasks findings 
here. This follows as both l-E and G-E resulted in memories of equivalent strength as 
determined by corect recall, con-ect recognition and generate-new unconscious 
plagiarism (in a recall study i.e. Experiment 4 and a source monitoring study i.e. 
Experiment 9) but differentially affected rates of recall-own unconscious plagiarism. An 
increase in intrusions was on/y observed following the G-E. If strength could account for 
these findings then both elaboration manipulations should also afl'ect intrusion rates at a 
comparable level. 
These findings are more explainable in terms of the source monitoring framework. 
The source monitoring framework indicates that memories of different types can vary, 
both in terms of their accuracy and their experiential content (Johnson et al. 1993). 
Moreover, Bredart et al. (2003) demonstrated that within a traditional plagiarism domain, 
actual experienced information included significantly more information about qualitative 
features at study than plagiarised information (or new information). Specifically, on a 
memory characteristics questionnaire (Johnson et al. 1988) correctly recalled ideas, when 
compared to plagiarised ideas, were reported to possess more auditory and contextual 
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detail, more associations with a mental image, feeling or specific thought about the idea 
and more associations with information that related to a particular retrieval strategy. 
Hence, Bredart et al. (2003) essentially demonstrated that plagiarised ideas and 
participants* own ideas on average differed but there was an overlap in the distributions. 
It appears from the current findings that when systematic decision processes are induced 
at test, participants were able to effectively distinguish between their own ideas (with rich 
experiential detail) and others* control ideas (that lack this experiential detail) but not for 
G-E ideas. This followed as the process involved in G-E resembles initial self generation 
and serves to build upon the ideas' associated experiential details. Hence, the ideas' 
qualitative characteristics may be more equated with their own ideas and accordingly at 
test may become more difficult to distinguish. Although, this would be particularly 
pertinent in inflating errors when source was determined using heuristic based 
judgements (as in Chapter 4), it was also the case in Experiments 9 and 10 when more 
conscious, extended decision processes were engaged. In sum, representation similarity 
may underlie source confusion and subsequent plagiarised errors and consequently, 
these findings may be used to support our source monitoring account of unconscious 
plagiarism. 
However, there are important issues here that need to be addressed that relate to 
the ultimate reduction in plagiarism from the prior recall chapters (mean 48% -Experiment 
4 & 8) to those obtained in this source monitoring chapter (mean 9% - Experiment 9 & 10). 
First, Experiment 9 (and 10) specifically produced levels of plagiarism that were 
considerably lower than in the recall studies that they replicated (Experiment 4 and 8 
respectively). Although the more stringent decision processes exhibited in the source 
monitoring test can account for the reduction in intrusion levels, the strategies participants 
use in each task may also influence the results. In a recall test, participants record only 
those ideas that they can remember (which are likely to be mainly elaborated ideas). 
Potentially a total of four ideas per object (16 in total) may be recalled but most often 
(across studies) participants only report a mean of 2 ideas. Participants in the source 
monitoring test were presented with half of their initial ideas. 8 ideas in total. However, 
here these ideas were experimenter-selected and although they intended to represent 
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participants' own ideas, the specific ideas that were chosen were arbitrary (with equal 
numbers were selected from each elaboration status). So it is possible, that the 
presented ideas may not have otherwise been recalled by the participant (this is also true 
for the new ideas that were incon-ectly attributed to another participant in terms of the 'it 
had to be you affect'). Hence, these ideas could cue idea memory and potentially serve 
to increase correct recognition or simultaneously reduce the likelihood of plagiarising 
'other' ideas. For example, if participants were expecting certain ideas (that they could 
recall) to appear on the test that were not presented, this may help participants reason 
that the remaining others' ideas were not their own. Moreover, in a similar way the 
presence of other participants' ideas may also provide cues that help link information 
together to aid memory. For example, if the ideas that were given by one participant 
converged to a theme i.e. jewellery and a second participant incorrectly believed that they 
had initially generated an idea i.e. 'paperclip as a ring' when they saw other jewellery 
items they may conclude that the idea was not in fact their own. Although these 
explanations are speculative, it is possible that the re-presentation of prior, creative ideas 
would provide memory aids that were absent in the recall tasks. 
Second, in this research programme, one of the most striking findings was that 
when G-E was conducted once (Experiment 4) high levels of 4 1 % plagiarism were 
obtained, but when it was conducted twice (Experiment 8), the rates of plagiarism were 
further increased to the extremely high level of 70%. However, when source monitoring 
studies were conducted, no such increase was observed but the same rate of 9% 
plagiarism was observed following one (Experiment 9) or two (Experiment 10) sessions of 
G-E. This difference may also be ultimately accountable in terms of the difference in 
decision processes utilised in the two testing phases but yet influenced by the extent of 
elaboration performed. In Experiment 9 (and 4) only 16 ideas were G-E while in 
Experiment 10 (and 8) a total of 32 ideas were G-E (during one session but a total of 48 
ideas, at some point during the study i.e. 16 on day 1, 16 on day 3 and 16 twice on day 1 
and 3). This sheer increase in the number of ideas elaborated (from Experiment 9 to 10) 
may have affected the participants in two ways. First, this would have increased the task 
difficulty as they invariably needed to invest more cognitive effort into completing the task 
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(as the number of improvements required was more than doubled). Second, the extended 
length and more repetitive nature of the task may have changed participants' approach to 
the task. For example, they may have potentially diluted the creativity or distinctiveness of 
some of the assigned improvements, in so far as proposing improvements that were more 
general and re-useable across objects (i.e. to paint a brick)". Therefore, the experiential 
information associated with improved ideas may not so closely resemble self-generated 
ideas. This may not have affected the ultimate plagiarised levels in the recall-own task 
(Experiment 8) as the secondary source judgements exhibited may not have been 
sensitive enough to con-ectly detect the differences between these classes of ideas and 
avoid plagiarised errors. Rather, these ideas may still have 'felt' like their own ideas and 
following a heuristic based judgement may be reported as such. However, when 
participants were required to complete the more stringent source monitoring task 
(Experiment 10), the primary decision criteria exhibited would have been more sensitive 
towards the memory characteristics and conceivably more able to reduce the number of 
plagiarised intrusions. Therefore, relative to Experiment 9, improving more ideas in 
Experiment 10 may have suppressed potential intrusions here. 
However, although there was no absolute increase in plagiarism following two 
session of G-E (in Experiment 10) when compared to only one session of G-E (in 
Experiment 9); the overall number of ideas that were ultimately plagiarised in Experiment 
10 was higher than in Experiment 9. This supports the findings from the recall studies 
that ideas subject to G-E are more likely to be self appropriated later. Moreover, this 
finding is perhaps even more striking when levels of correct performance are taken into 
account. Performing G-E not only increases unconscious plagiarism but it also increases 
idea strength and improves idea memory (see chapter 3). Following one session of G-E 
(Experiment 9), correct recognition was 85% but following two such sessions (Experiment 
10) correct recognition was at a higher rate 90%. Although, comparing across studies in 
this manner is problematic it serves to illustrate the very small remaining margin for error. 
" Similarly, in Experiment 3, there were concerns that when participants were required to list positive or 
negative things about the ideas, (32 ideas) they tended to focus on the attributes of the object as opposed to 
the specified uses and hence may not have completed the task in the anticipated manner. 
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particulariy in Experiment 10. Moreover, when compared to Experiment 11 where l-E was 
conducted twice, con-ect recall did not significantly differ (from recall following G-E in 
Experiment 10) but the number of plagiarised intrusions did. It was only after repeated G-
E that participants attributed others' ideas to themselves. 
These findings demonstrate importantly that following G-E, participants did 
plagiarise ideas and to a significant extent in both Experiment 9 and 10. In each study, 
similarly low levels of plagiarism were obtained for control ideas and these rates were not 
increased following l-E. either once or twice (in studies 9 or 11 respectively). However, 
following G-E (in Experiment 9) or repeated G-E (in Experiment 10) the plagiarism rates 
were trebled. Hence, the unconscious plagiarism obtained here was proportionally 
equivalent to the plagiarism obtained in the recall tasks (Experiment 8). Furthermore, 
completing a stringent source monitoring test here was not sufficient to help the 
participant avoid plagiarising and believing that someone else's ideas was their own. This 
indicates that even when participants do engage in careful, conscious source ascription 
they are not always able to disfinguish between personally improved ideas and their own 
ideas. 
Therefore, these studies support the source monitoring framewori< and also have 
important implications for the real worid. After an individual has been exposed to a basic 
idea, following close working, development and re-drafting of the idea, the experiential 
information that accompanies the idea may mimic a truly unique idea. Hence, identifying 
potentially unconsciously plagiarised information in everyday life may be harder to 
determine than previously believed. This may follow even when an individual is making a 
conscious effort to do so. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
Levels of unconscious plagiarism obtained in this thesis were consistent and robust. Of 
the participants tested across 11 studies 89.2% exhibited at least one unconsciously 
plagiarised error in one of the three different memory tests. Participants plagiarised by 
Incorrectly recalling or recognising someone else's idea as their own original idea (recall-
own plagiarism or source monitoring error respectively) or by reporting someone else's 
idea as their own new idea (generate-new error). Experiments were designed to extend 
the ecological validity of the current literature by examining participants' tendency to 
plagiarise creative materials, following a retention interval and following various types of 
Idea elaboration. The results from each experiment followed largely the same pattern^^; 
while types of elaboration influenced correct recall, and generate-new plagiarisms 
equivalently, the different types of elaboration differentially affected rates of recall-own 
plagiarism and recognised plagiarism. Taken together, these results are inconsistent with 
a strength-based account of unconscious plagiarism, and are more supportive of a 
source-monitoring account of unconscious plagiarism errors. 
6.2 Summary of Experimental Findings 
6.2.1 Recall-Own Phase 
Experiment 2 essentially replicated Brown and Murphy's (1989) initial experiment. Using 
the three stage paradigm with a category generation task or the creative Alternate Uses 
Test (e.g. generate novel uses for a brick; Christensen et al. 1960) at generation, 
equivalent intrusion rates were obtained. Following a one week retention interval, the 
highest rates of plagiarism were obtained in the category generation task but, in the 
creative task, rates of plagiarism increased by a factor of 2.5 following the delay. Hence, 
Throughout this thesis the results from each independent experiment have been compared and hence 
absolute inferences from such comparisons should be viewed with caution. However, broad descriptive 
experimental comparisons were not perceived to be problematic given the methodological consistency in this 
research programme. That is, across studies participants were drawn from the same population and were 
tested in the same experimental environment (same experimenter, testing laboratory and equipment). 
Moreover, the instructions and materials that participants received were identical and differed only in terms 
of the individual manipulation under investigation in each suidy. 
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participants plagiarised other participants' creative ideas as their own (c.f. Tenpenny et al. 
1998). 
The main constnjct examined within this thesis related to idea elaboration, 
specifically regarding the types of mental activity that participants engage In during the 
retention interval between generation and testing. Using a four-stage paradigm, three 
types of elaboration were investigated. The first encouraged participants to rate the 
previously given ideas (including their own and others' ideas) in either a positive or 
negative way, the second encouraged participants to form a mental image of the ideas by 
rating the imaginability and effectiveness of the ideas (l-E) and the third encouraged 
participants to develop the Ideas by providing three possible ways in which the ideas 
could be improved (G-E). Such elaboration techniques were investigated as they were 
believed to somewhat reflect processes that real world plagiarists may employ. The 
results following these distinct types of elaboration were clear and consistent. Across 
experiments, a single type of elaboration improved participant recall relative to control 
(range of correct recall 25-45%). Specifically, positive and negative rating increased 
plagiarism rates to 66.7% and 62.0% respectively and the l-E & G-E similarly increased 
plagiarism rates to 60.1%-70.5% and 54.7%-68.8% respectively. Hence, each different 
type of elaboration comparably improved recall performance. However, the levels of 
plagiarism following these elaboration types were not comparable (see Table 6.2.1.1 for 
the rates of plagiarism observed across recall studies and Table 6.2.1.2 across source 
monitoring studies). In the recall-own phase, following the G-E manipulation, a high rate 
of 42% was obtained (Experiment 4 and 40% in Expenment 6) whereas rating Ideas in 
any way (positively, negatively or l-E) did not affect the plagiarism level (11.8-13.8% in 
Experiments 3 & 4) relative to control (10.7-13.2% Experiment 3 & 4). Only performing G-
E increased the self appropriation of such G-E ideas as one's own. Moreover, these rates 
of plagiarism for creative materials exceeded those previously reported in prior studies 
(e.g. Landau & Marsh, 1997; Macrae et al. 1999). 
l-E did not increase intrusions relative to control and strengthening the l-E in either 
of two ways did not affect this stable pattern. First, when the imagery-elaboration was 
replicated on two occasions, despite an improvement in participant recall, the associated 
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rate of plagiarised intrusions in the recall-own phase was not significantly increased 
(19.6% Experiment 8). Second, when the detail of the imagery-elaboration was intensified 
and the processing was matched to the G-E in terms of content (in Experiment 6). 
plagiarism in the recall-own phase still did not equal the levels obtained following G-E. 
However, the rates observed in this study following l-E were at a somewhat raised level of 
25%. This increase was attributed to a task crossover effect with the Rl-E (and 
accordingly G-E), as participants may have needed to engage in a certain level of idea 
development before the task could be effectively performed. For example, in order to 
successfully imagine a 'decorated' paperclip picture frame, additional detail such as how 
the frame was to be decorated would be required (see chapter 4). Moreover, it is very 
difficult to know precisely what mental processes individuals are engaging in during 
imagination. Individuals may be 'high' or low' imagers and thus the according level of 
detail and vividness that individuals construct are likely to be variable (e.g. Dobson & 
Markham, 1993). These factors may also impact upon the plagiarism frequencies 
obtained here. Nonetheless, the rate obtained for the rich imagery-elaboration (Rl-E) was 
still significantly lower than the rate obtained following G-E in this study (40.6%). 
Therefore, consistently it was only the G-E that resulted in the confusion that someone 
else's creation was their own when it was not. 
Plagiarism rates however, may be calculated in terms of an input bound or output 
bound measure. The rates of plagiarism that have been cited thus far have been reported 
in terms of an input bound measure of plagiarism; that is, the numbers of ideas that were 
reported for each condition, relative to the number of ideas that should have been 
reported in each case and for each elaboration status (e.g. 4 ideas). For example, for 
ideas from a given elaboration status (i.e. control ideas) a participant may correctly recall 
2 (out of 4) ideas and plagiarise someone else's idea to make a total of 3 reported ideas. 
Hence, correct recall here was calculated out of the possible 4 ideas that should have 
been reported (e.g. 2/4= 50%). Calculating equivalent plagiarism measures is more 
difficult as there was a maximum of 4 opportunities for participants to plagiarise (assuming 
none of the 4 ideas were correctly recalled) but there was a pool of 48 other participants' 
ideas that may possibly be plagiarised. In this thesis, the input bound plagiarism measure 
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was based on 4 ideas (as with recall), as this was the maximum number of ideas that may 
be plagiarised for each given object. Hence, plagiarism here was also calculated out of 
the possible 4 ideas that should have been reported (e.g. 1/4= 25%). 
Experiment Number: Recall Based Test 
Manipulations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MEAN 
Control 6.0 10.7 13.2 6.3 4.7 4.5 4.6 7.1 
Re-presentation 15.8 7.6 . 11.7 
Positive 16.7 16.7 
Negative 13.1 . 13.1 
l-E 13.8 11.8 20.3 12.5 14.6 
l-E day 3 17.9 17.9 
l-E twice . 19.6 19.6 
Rl-E 25.0 25.0 
G-E 42.1 22.9 40.6 20.4 31.5 
G-E day 3 . 19.4 19.4 
G-E twice . 70.4 70.4 
Mean % 6.0 13.5 21.2 12.2 22.7 13.6 28.7 
(across conditions) 
Notes: Control = Ideas only experienced at generation 
Re-presentation = Ideas heard for a second time In the elaboration phase 
Positive = Ideas positively rated in the elaboration phase 
Negative = Ideas negatively rated in the elaboration phase 
l-E = Ideas imagery-elaborated in the elaboration phase (i.e. on day 1) 
l-E day 3 = Ideas imagery-elaborated for the first time 3 days after the elaboration phase 
l-E twice = Ideas imagery-elaborated twice (once in the elaboration phase and again 3 days later) 
Rl-E = Rich imagery-elaborated ideas 
G-E = Ideas generattvely-elaborated In the elaboration phase (i.e. on day 1) 
l-E day 3 = Ideas generatively-elaborated for the first time 3 days after the elaboration phase 
G-E twice = Ideas generatively-elaborated twice (once In the elaboration phase and again 3 days 
later) 
7"a6/e 6.2.1.1: Percentage Rates of Recall-Own Unconscious Plagiarism 
Experiment Number - Source monitoring test 
Manipulations 9 10 11 MEAN 
Control 2.9 3.0 1.9 2.6 
Re-presentation 3.1 . 3.1 
l-E 3.3 3.5 3.4 
l-E day 3 . 3.2 3.2 
l-E twice 3.0 3.0 
G-E 8.8 5.8 7.3 
G-E day 3 6.1 6.1 
G-E twice 9.1 9.1 
Mean % 4.5 6.0 2.9 
(across conditions) 
Notes: as above 
Table 6.2.1.2: Percentage Rates of Source Monitoring Unconscious Plagiarism 
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An output bound measure of plagiarism is rather based on the percentage of ideas 
plagiarised as a proportion of the actual number of ideas that were reported, accordingly 
excluding the number of ideas that were forgotten'/not reported (see Table 6.2.1.3 for 
recall-own rates). Reporting such output bound measures of plagiarism provides a clearer 
indication of the plagiarism rates obtained as recall is the factor that explains variations 
(e.g. using the above example: 1 plagiarism of 3 reported ideas = 33%). Nevertheless, in 
the recall-own phase across studies, the rates of plagiarism for both the input bound and 
output bound measures were largely the same. The proportional differences within and 
between the measures were similar and the absolute percentages of plagiarised ideas 
were in fact mainly increased when calculated in this manner. 
One difference however between these two measures was the plagiarism of 
control ideas appearing higher when reported as an output bound measure than an input 
bound measure. This difference may have occurred as a result of the lower response 
output for the control ideas (plagiarism & correct recall) relative to other elaborated (or 
rated) ideas. While the input bound measure takes account of the number of ideas that 
should have been reported (across conditions), the output bound only accounts for those 
reported ideas in that condition. Thus for control ideas, the proportion of plagiarised ideas 
(low number of ideas) was high relative to correctly reported ideas in that same condition 
(also low number of ideas) but was not so high relative to the rates obtained across other 
conditions (higher number of ideas (recalled and or intrusions depending on condition)). 
Hence, as the conditions were calculated independently from one another lower recall 
combined with lower plagiarism served to inflate the plagiarism measure here. (The 
difference in Experiment 8 will be discussed in section 6.2.1.1.2 below) 
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Experiment Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MEAN 
Control 10.0 16.1 27.0 12.5 10.7 8.9 15.6 14.4 
Re-presentation 22.0 9.7 15.9 
Positive 20.0 20.0 
Negative 17.5 , 17,5 
l-E 17.4 16.0 25.0 15.1 18.4 
l-E day 3 20.2 20.2 
l-E twice 20.4 20.4 
Rl-E 31.1 31.1 
G-E 41.0 26.2 37.1 25.9 32.6 
l-E day 3 27.2 27.2 
G-E twice . 48.1 48.1 
Average 
(across conditions) 10 17.8 26.9 16.1 26.0 16.1 29.2 
Table 6.2.1.3: Percentage Rates of Recall-Own Unconscious Plagiarism as an output 
bound measure 
6.2.1.1 Nature and stability of this pattern 
6.2.1.1.1 Manipulations that encouraged accurate performance 
This pattern, where G-E (only) resulted In inflated recall-own plagiarism was stable 
and did not dissipate when participants were encouraged to utilise a stricter decision 
criteria to monitor their responses during testing. This was encouraged in two ways by an 
explicit task instruction or more implicitly by task goals. First, in the four stage paradigm, 
participants were specifically warned about plagiarised intrusions and were additionally 
motivated to avoid such errors through the promise of a sizeable financial incentive for 
accurate performance. In this study, following the elaboration phase, despite task 
instructions and self-reports of their motivation to avoid such errors, participants still 
unconsciously plagiarised others' G-E ideas as their own. Unconscious plagiarism was 
observed at a rate of 2 1 % (input bound and 26% output bound) and although this was 
lower than the rates obtained in other studies (e.g. Experiment 4 and 6) it statistically 
exceeded the (also lowered) rates obtained here following l-E 11.8% (input bound and 
16.0% output bound) or control 6.25% (input bound and 12.5% output bound). Second, 
the same paradigm was used but the recall-own and generate-new tasks were replaced 
with a source monitoring test. This test encouraged participants to assess their memory 
sources as a primary objective and therefore changed participants' task goals. In this 
study, rates of plagiarism for incorrectly recognising another's ideas as one's own were 
188 
also reduced relative to the comparable recall studies (Experiment 4, 5 & 6) but, as in 
Experiment 5, the main pattern of findings with respect to G-E was preserved. In this 
source monitoring test, participants plagiarised at a rate of 9% following G-E but the lower 
rate of 3% following l-E and control. Hence, the difference in the proportions of ideas that 
were plagiarised across the elaboration conditions was incrementally the same as in the 
prior recall-own tasks; where the performance of G-E inflated self appropriation of other 
ideas by a factor of 3. 
6.2.1.1.2 Following manipulations that strengthened the elaboration performed 
Moreover, repeating this G-E (by elaborating both immediately after generation and then 
again for a second time 3 days after elaboration) nearly doubled the total rate of 
plagiarism obtained in the recall-own task (Experiment 7). However, measures of input 
bound and output bound plagiarism markedly differed here between 70% and 48% 
respectively. This follows as the input bound measure reflected proportions of maximum 
possible plagiarism as the most participants could plagiarise was 4, therefore, 2.81 
plagiarism /4= 70%, whereas, the output bound measure reflected the proportions of 
answers that were plagiarised, hence. 2.81 plagiarism/ 2.81 plagiarism + 3.0 recall = 48%. 
This difference between measures may be accounted for in terms of response output (in a 
similar way to the difference between input and output bound control plagiarism). In 
Experiment 8, following one session of G-E, levels of correct recall was high (2.2) as were 
the number of plagiarised intrusions (.8). However, following repeated G-E, plagiarism 
was increased at a higher rate than correct recall and in fact, participants were just as 
likely to report a con^ectly recalled idea (3.0) as their own as they were to incorrectly report 
someone else's idea as their own (2.8). Consequently, this equalised response frequency 
for plagiarised/recalled ideas resulted in a plagiarism rate of 48%, using such an 
independent (output) measure. Nevertheless, G-E plagiarism in this condition far 
exceeded the rates observed in the other conditions. 
In Experiment 8, when an input measure was used - that is sensitive to differences 
In output responses across conditions- a higher rate of 70% was reported. The rate of 
plagiarism for the repeatedly elaborated ideas was high and on average while participants 
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were supposed to be reporting a total of 4 ideas (from each elaboration status), they were 
In fact reporting a total of 6 repeatedly elaborated ideas (including both correctly recalled 
Ideas and plagiarised ideas). As a result of this increased response output of such ideas, 
participants were likely to be suppressing recall and perhaps plagiarism of other ideas 
(e.g. ideas G-E once on day 1 or 2 and control ideas). To explore this possibility explicitly, 
it would be interesting to evaluate plagiarism levels when participants were provided with 
an unstructured free recall test in place of the recall-own task at testing. On such a test, 
performance would not be guided by the object heading or restricted or cued by the 
maximum response output for each (i.e. 4 ideas per object) and the number of ideas 
reported may potentially rise. 
Nonetheless, here, In Experiment 8, 48% (output bound) or 70% (input bound) 
plagiarism is a striking amount and constitutes the highest rate of plagiarised ideas 
observed within this research programme and In prior research studies. Moreover, the 
overall equivalence in rates of input bound and output bound plagiarism reflects the robust 
nature of these plagiarised errors and highlights the power of the G-E on inducing 
consistently high error rates. 
Moreover, in a replication study, where memory was assessed using a stringent 
source monitoring test, the same pattem emerged but the plagiarism rate following 
repeated G-E was noticeably reduced to 9% (Experiment 10). However, the ratio of G-E 
ideas that were plagiarised, relative to control was consistent with those found in the 
recall-own data and the overall rate of plagiarism exhibited was higher than the rate 
observed in a source monitoring test where participants had only been subjected to one 
session of G-E (Experiment 9). 
6.2.1.1.3 Following a three month retention Interval 
A follow up study was conducted on participants who had performed the 1-E and G-E 
during elaboration and had had their memory initially assessed by a source monitoring 
test (Experiment 9). Three months after completing this test, participants were 
unexpectedly asked to return to complete an 'experimental extension study"; twelve 
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participants agreed. In this follow up session, participants were asked to try to remember 
the ideas that they offered in the initial generation phase and hence complete the recall-
own task. The results from this study indicated that following this extended retention 
interval, the main pattern of results was maintained. Participants correctly recalled 33.9% 
of their initial ideas and plagiarised 34.4% of others' ideas as their own (the remaining 
ideas were not reported). Consequently, participants were just as likely to remember a 
plagiarised idea as they were to recall one of their own genuine ideas. A within subjects 
ANOVA indicated that there was a significant main effect of elaboration status 
(F3.33)=11.803; p<.001. Moreover, Sidak adjustments for multiple comparisons revealed 
that participants plagiarised ideas that had been previously subject to G-E more than any 
of the other ideas (none of the remaining means differed). Following G-E, participants 
plagiarised others' ideas at a rate of 70% while they plagiarised l-E ideas at a rate of 
31.3%. re-presented ideas at a rate of 20.8% and control ideas at a rate of 14.6%. 
Hence, the rates obtained for G-E across this retention interval (70%) were comparable to 
the extremely high levels obtained following strengthened G-E (70%). This finding 
demonstrates the robust nature of these errors and their prevalence over time. 
6.2.2 Generate-New Phase 
In the generate-new phase, an input bound measure of generate-new plagiarism was 
calculated in the same way as the recall-own data, that is; the number of plagiarisms out 
of the 4 possible ideas per object (see Table 6.2.2.1). Plagiarism rates for the output 
bound measure were calculated slightly differently as participants in the generate-new 
phase were required to report a total of 4 ideas for each object (see Table 6.2.2.2) but 
unlike in the recall-own phase, new ideas had no prior assigned elaboration status (as 
they were not from the generation phase). Thus, the ideas plagiarised across each 
condition were calculated as a percentage of the total number of ideas given in the 
experiment (plagiarised, self-plagiarised and new ideas). However, the plagiarism rates 
for each respective condition were then adjusted (multiplied by number of conditions) to 
permit relative comparisons with the input bound measure of plagiarism. Importantly, the 
total (or mean) rates of plagiarism (before or after adjustment respectively) were 
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equivalent in both cases. These similar rates additionally demonstrate the pervasiveness 
of these errors. 
Rates of plagiarism obtained in the generate-new task did not differ when the 
creative novel uses task was employed and this followed for immediate testing and testing 
after a one week retention interval. However, experiencing the one-week delay increased 
the number of plagiarised intrusions (as in the recall-own phase) by a factor of 1.8 
(Experiment 2). In Experiment 1. participants who had actively participated in the 
generation phase were no more likely to plagiarise other participants' ideas as new ideas 
(16.1%) than when they had simply observed or rated the generation phase (20.1% Vs 
19.5%). This finding differs from Raye and Johnson (1980) who indicated that observers 
had poorer source memory and Brown and Halliday (1991) who in their pilot study 
demonstrated that non-participant observers plagiarised more in the generate-new phase 
than generators. In Experiment 1, the improved observer performance may be a function 
of the testing context being reinstated at recall (Brown & Halliday, 1991; Jacoby et al. 
1989). This follows, as reinstating context invariably increases the presence and 
availability of environmental and social cues from the generating participants that may aid 
recall. Thus, it may be speculated that if participants In Experiment 1 were tested alone 
and not exposed to such cues, the data may have been more likely to mimic the pattern 
observed by Brown and Halliday (1991). 
Overall, the mean rate of generate-new plagiarism obtained across the 8 studies 
ranged between 6.3% and 23.7% (input bound see table 6.2.2.1) and 6.0% and 25.9% 
output bound (see table 6.2.2.2). However, across the 8 generate-new phases, there 
was only an effect of elaboration status observed in Experiment 4, whereby elaborated 
Ideas were plagiarised at a lower rate than control. This pattern was broadly evident 
across latter studies but the differences failed to reach statistical significance. However. 
importantly here, the effect of elaboration type did not affect plagiarism rates in the same 
way as in the recall-own phase as there was no difference between the G-E (15.1% input 
bound or 15.3% output bound) and the l-E (9.9% input bound or 10.0% output bound). 
This occurred, despite the levels of produced plagiarism for l-E and G-E across studies 
being largely comparable, even when the elaboration was strengthened (Experiments 7 & 
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8) and when participants were encouraged not to plagiarise (Experiment 5). Hence, the 
attained intrusions appear to be robust and the significant difference observed In 
Experiment 4 appears to be a result of the high baseline rate of plagiarism observed in 
this study (23.7% input bound or 23.9% output bound) but why this higher rate was 
obtained is unclear. Consequently, in the generate-new task each type of elaboration 
affected rates of plagiarism in a comparable manner and hence, G-E had a dissociation 
effect upon the recall-own and generate-new measures of unconscious plagiarism. 
Experiment Number: Generate-New Plagiarism 
Manipulations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MEAN 
Control 16.1 17.2 16.7 23.7 14.3 20.3 10.3 17.6 17.03 
Re-presentation 20.1 25.7 13.4 . 19.73 
Positive 10.7 10.70 
Negative , 10.7 10.70 
l-E 19.5 9.9 6.3 14.1 17.2 13.40 
l-E day 3 . 12.9 12.90 
l-E twice 6.9 6.90 
Rl-E 12.5 12.50 
G-E 15.1 15.2 15.6 13.9 14.95 
Day 3 6.5 6.50 
G-E twice . 13.0 13.00 
MEAN % 18.6 17.2 12.7 18.6 12.3 15.6 11.9 12.7 
(across conditions) 
Notes: Control = Ideas only experienced at generation 
Re-presentation = Ideas heard for a second time in the elaboration phase 
Positive = Ideas positively rated in the elaboration phase 
Negative = Weas negatively rated in the elaboration phase 
l-E = Ideas imagery-elaborated in the elaboration phase 
l-E day 3 = Ideas imagery-elaborated for the first time 3 days after the elaboration phase 
I'E twice = Weas imagery-elaborated twice (once in the elaboration phase and again 3 days later) 
Rl-E = Rich-imagery-elaborated Ideas 
G-E = Weas generatively-elaborated in the elaboration phase 
l-E day 3 = Ideas generatively-elaborated for the first time 3 days after the elaboration phase 
G-E twice = Ideas generatively-elaborated twice (once in the elaboration phase and again 3 days 
later) 
Table 6.2.2.1: Percentage Rates of Generate-New Unconscious Plagiarism as an input 
bound measure 
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Experiment Number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MEAN 
Control 17.8 16.3 12.8 23.9 14.5 20.8 9.0 18.1 16.7 
Re-presentation 19.8 25.9 13.6 19.7 
Positive 8.3 . 8.3 
Negative 8.3 . . 8.3 
l-E 20.3 10.0 6.3 14.4 15.1 11.5 
l-E day 3 . 11.3 11.3 
l-E twice . 6.0 6.0 
Rl-E 12.8 12.8 
G-E 15.3 15.4 16.0 14.3 15.2 
l-E day 3 . 6.7 6.7 
G-E twice . 13.3 13.3 
MEAN % 17.8 18.8 9.8 18.8 12.4 16.0 10.4 13.1 
Notes: Control = Weas only experienced at generation 
Re-presentation = Weas heard for a second time in the elaboration phase 
Positive = Weas positively rated in the elaboration phase 
Negative = Ideas negatively rated in the elaboration phase 
l-E = Ideas imagery-elaborated in the elaboration phase 
l-E day 3 = Weas imagery-elaborated for the first time 3 days after the elaboration phase 
l-E twice = Weas imagery-elaborated twice (once in the elaboration phase and again 3 days later) 
Rl-E = Rich-imagery-elaborated Ideas 
G-E = Ideas generatively-elaborated in the elaboration phase 
l-E day 3 = Ideas generatively-elaborated for the first time 3 days after the elaboration phase 
G-E twice = Ideas generatively-elaborated twice (once in the elaboration phase and again 3 days 
later) 
Table 6.2.2.2: Percentage rates of Generate-New Unconscious Plagiarism as an output 
bound measure 
6.3 Theoretical implications 
Reconciliating activation strength and source monitoring 
6.3.1 Activation Strength 
Items produced in the generation phase of the 4 stage paradigm would invariably 
differ in their levels of associated activation strength from ideas that were not produced 
(Marsh & Bower, 1993). Theoretically, items that participants generated themselves 
would be the strongest ideas (as a result of the effort that they exerted during the self 
generation; generation effect; Slamecka 8L Graf. 1978) and new or distracter items would 
be the weakest ideas (as participants had had no prior exposure to such ideas). Items 
from an external source, prior to any elaboration (e.g. another participant), would vary in 
strength but reside in between the two (due to the lack of self-engagement with the idea 
but exposure to the idea during the generation phase). Marsh and Bower (1993) claimed 
that participants utilise a decision criteria to establish the source of the information based 
on a given benchmari< level of strength. Hence, If an item is below this level then an item 
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will be regarded as a new idea, if it falls above this level it may be regarded as self-
generated and if it is in between the two it would be regarded as an extemally generated 
idea (see figure 6.3.1.1 for a pictorial demonstration). 
The effects of participant performance (correct recall and generate-new 
plagiarism) following a one week delay in Experiment 2 (and 3) can be accounted for 
using Marsh and Bower's (1993) model (see also Brown & Halliday, 1991; Bredart et al. 
2003; Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995; Marsh et al. 1996.1997; Marsh, Ward 
et al. 1999). Specifically, during delayed testing, the number of ideas that were correctly 
recalled markedly decreased compared to the rates obtained during immediate testing. 
This is indicative of a weakening in item trace strength over time (both for self and other 
generated information) to a level more comparable with non-presented or genuinely new 
items (shift below p see figure 1.3.1.1). Moreover, this depleting activation strength (in the 
absence of rehearsal or elaboration) may simultaneously explain the (numerical) 
increased likelihood of such ideas being incorrectly presented and plagiarised as new in 
this study. In addition, this idea of weakening trace strength over time is also consistent 
with the increasing rates of plagiarism obtained across tasks (i.e. recall-own to generate-
new) in Experiment 2 (see also Marsh & Bower, 1993). 
However, strength would suggest that weakening traces of other's ideas over time 
would also decrease the risk that such ideas would be confused with self-generate ideas 
and thus plagiarised in the recall-own phase. However, more plagiarism was observed 
following the delay in the recall-own task than following immediate testing (Experiment 2). 
Hence, participants here may have shifted and therefore liberalised their response criteria. 
Moreover, a strength account would accordingly predict that the 'it had to be you effect' 
whereby ideas to which participants are unsure of the source (e.g. own ideas) are 
attributed to an external source rather than an internal one (Johnson & Raye. 1981) would 
become more prevalent over time. This follows as when the strength of one's own ideas 
weakens over time it may drop to a level more comparable to others ideas and be 
attributed as such (see figure 6.3.1.1). However, in this research programme the data do 
not appear to support this prediction as following a one week retention interval participants 
were no more likely to incorrectly attribute one of their prior control ideas to an external 
195 
source (e.g. another participant's idea) than a new source. This was the case in each of 
the source monitoring experiments (Experiment 91(32)=1.647, p=.109. Experiment 10 
t(32)=1.292, p=.204 and Experiment 11 1(30)=.661: p=.514). Yet this assertion may be 
Interpreted with caution as no immediate testing was conducted, but as there was no 
evidence for the 'it had to be you' effect more indirect evidence is provided to support the 
idea that participants may shift their response criteria following a one week delay. 
Immediate Testing 
Recall-own UP 
n= new idea c=others s=self-generated 
\ Weakening of item traces 
over time 
Delayed testing 
'it had to be 
n= new idea c=other's 
idea 
s=self-generated 
hypothetical distribution for new ideas 
hypothetical distribution for others' ideas 
hypothetical distribution for self-generated words 
P=- generate-new criterion - any item failing below will be considered as a new candidate. 
0 = recall-own- item whose strength exceeds would be considered self-generate, 
n = will be labelled new idea 
c = will be labelled computer (externally) generated idea 
s = will be labelled self-generated ideas 
Figure 6,3.1.1: Hypothetical pictorial representation of Marsh and Bower's (1993) 
Activation Strength Model following a retention interval. 
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Marsh and Bower (1993) demonstrated that strengthening ideas (others and own) by 
performing a deeper semantic encoding has the reverse effect on performance by 
increasing item trace strength. This manipulation was claimed to not only Improve 
participant recall but also to aid ability to discriminate between old and new ideas and 
hence reduce generate-new plagiarism (Marsh & Bower, 1993). This pattern was 
numerically demonstrated In Experiments 3. 4, 5. 6, 7 and 8. Moreover, it was predicted 
according to the strength model, that Increasing the strength of others' items towards the 
status of self generated items should also increase confusion between others' and self-
generated ideas (as the distributions should overiap) and accordingly increase recall-own 
plagiarism (Marsh & Bower, 1993) (see figure 6.3.1.2). However, in this research 
programme, rates of plagiarism appear not to be exclusively influenced by demonstrations 
of item strength. This follows as consistently, the different elaboration manipulations (l-E 
and G-E, Experiment 4, 5, 6, and 7 & 8) resulted in comparable performance on the two 
aforementioned tasks that provide direct (i.e. correct recall) and indirect (generate-new 
plagiarism) measures of Item strength (Experiment 4, 5, 6 as hypothetically depicted on 
figure 6.3.1.2). However, only G-E and not l-E hindered performance and increased 
plagiarism in the recall-own phase relative to control. Given that there were no significant 
differences between the two forms of elaboration across studies, a strength model fails to 
account for this data because recall did not differ between the two elaboration methods 
but plagiarism In the recall-own tasks did. Therefore, while the overall results for connect 
recall and generate-new plagiarism do not necessarily contravene the predictions made 
according to strength, results in the recall-own task (and source monitoring task 
Experiments 9 and 10 &11) do given that the difference between G-E and l-E cannot be 
accounted for in tenns of strength. 
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Control Items 
recall-own UP 
^ n= new Idea 
c=others 
Elaborated Items Strengthening of item traces 
following elaboration 
ncreased GN 
plagiarism as predicted 
but not found for l-E 
plagiarism 
n= new idea s=self-generated 
^ hypothetical distribution for new ideas 
hypothetical distribution for others' ideas 
hypothetical distribution for self-generated words 
/3= generate-new criterion - any item falling below will be considered as a new candidate. 
G = recall-own- item whose strength exceeds would be considered self-generate, 
n = will be labelled new idea 
c = will be labelled computer (externally) generated idea 
s = will be labelled self-generated ideas 
Figure 6.3.1.2: Pictorial representation of Marsh and Bower's (1993) Activation Strength 
Model following idea strengthening due to elaboration. 
This difference between the two different types of elaboration has previously been 
explained as a function of the different decision processes that guide participant 
performance in the two testing phases. Where idea familiarity or activation strength 
(Marsh & Bower, 1993; Landau & Marsh. 1997) is sufficient to drive successful 
performance in the generate-new phase (i.e. if a participant can remember the idea they 
can deduce that the idea is not new), it may not be sufficient to drive performance in the 
recall-own phase as remembering an item as 'old' is not sufficient enough to prevent 
plagiarising that 'old' idea - that may have been generated by someone else - as one's 
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own. Hence, in the recali-own phase, an additional judgement that evaluates source 
(whether the idea was really their own idea or another participant's idea) would be 
required. Consequently, performance in the recall-own phase is more vulnerable to 
factors or processes (such as the elaboration performed) that may affect memory 
representations. 
6.3.2 Source monitoring 
The source monitoring framework maintains that it is this characteristic detail of 
memory traces (e.g. semantic detail, special and temporal detail, affective information and 
cognitive operations) from the conditions under which a memory was acquired, that 
guides successful source attributions. Internally and externally generated ideas differ. 
While, self-generated memories may be schematic (i.e. formed by expectations of 
familiarity with the source) and reflect the cognitive operations that were attained during 
creation, externally generated memories tend to be more contextual and perceptual (see 
Johnson et al. 1993; Raye & Johnson, 1981). During generative-elaboration, participants 
may have carried out processes similar to those involved in the generation of ideas in the 
first instance as participants would have likely stored a record of the associated cognitive 
operations (Johnson et al. 1993; Johnson & Raye. 1981) that went into generating those 
improvements. Therefore, the memory representations of such G-E ideas may somewhat 
resemble the representations of their own internally generated ideas. In contrast, since 
imagining an event requires mental effort, plus evidence (including details) of sensory. 
perceptual (i.e. colours, perceptual clarity and vividness) and contextual information, 
(Finke et al. 1988; Johnson. Foley. & Leach, 1988; Johnson et al. 1988; Johnson & Raye, 
1981; Johnson, Raye, Foley. & Foley, 1981; Johnson et al. 1982; Suengas & Johnson. 
1988). I-E ideas may not resemble those of their own ideas as such processes used to 
construct images and rate ideas (I-E) will not reflect those utilised in idea generation 
(unless imagery is utilised by the participant during generation). Therefore, at test, when 
participants recall their own ideas and infer the original source of their memories, if the 
quality and quantity of the memory characteristics of the G-E ideas do resemble their own 
ideas, they may be confused as such and plagiarised (Johnson et al. 1993). Moreover. 
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this research programme has demonstrated that the degree of these intrusions increases 
when the intensity of the G-E performed increases (Experiment 8 & 10). 
The cognitive operations that are produced in response to such G-E may also 
involve some personal element that may serve to influence one's source judgements. For 
example, while participants were devising improvements for another participant's idea, 
that idea may have cued memories of times when they had seen or used the item in that 
way (e.g. using a brick to build a bike ramp in the garden). As a result of the effort 
involved through considering, re-working and improving the idea, it may feel more 
personally relevant to them by means of personal semantics (e.g. remembering building a 
bike ramp in the back garden) or personal style (e.g. they are the kind of person who 
would build a bike ramp in the garden). Thus, when that idea is later recalled, it may be 
accompanied by the personally relevant information or be recalled in their own natural or 
familiar style. This idiosyncratic information may then serve as a misleading 
discriminative cue that results in participants incorrectly assuming that the idea was 
initially their own. Such effects were not observed with ideas that were rated or imagined 
because those ideas would not be as cognitively rich, or closely tied to self, or self-style, 
irrespective of the imagery intensity. Therefore, it may not be the strength or effort per se 
invested that is responsible for the increased recalled intrusions but rather the nature and 
kind of elaboration and the according impact that that elaboration has upon one's memory 
characteristics and ability to effectively source monitor. 
The idea that source monitoring ability influences plagiarism levels in the recall-
own phase is not new but consistent with past research. Landau and Marsh, (1997) used 
the three stage paradigm while promoting source confusion at generation. Participants 
were encouraged to guess their computer partner's responses in addition to providing 
their own contributions. Thus, as similar search processes were required at encoding to 
derive each type of idea, their idea representations for both types of ideas were similar. 
Hence, the information from both the sources proved difficult to differentiate and the rates 
of unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own phase were increased (Landau and Marsh, 
1997). Similarly, Macrae et al. (1999) found that when the participant's generating partner 
was perceptually similar to themselves (i.e. same gender) or when initial information 
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encoding was obstructed (by a radio playing topical news reports during generation) 
source confusion was also promoted, which accordingly increased the likelihood that 
participants erroneously believed that another participant's ideas were their own. 
However, none of the above manipulations, including those in this research paradigm 
affected the rate at which such ideas were plagiarised as new (this is a point that we will 
return to). 
Cumulatively, this research demonstrated that rates of unconscious plagiarism 
may not only be affected by manipulations that affect encoding and testing (Landau & 
Marsh, 1997; Macrae et al. 1999; Marsh & Landau, 1995) but by manipulations that are 
enforced post encoding and during the interval between encoding and testing. That is, 
improving someone else's idea can have a substantial impact on one's subsequent 
source monitoring ability and propensity to plagiarise that idea as their own, even when 
the idea was initially encoded without disruption. Moreover, such e ro rs are robust and 
not eliminated when participants were made aware of such errors (Experiments 5) or were 
given strict instructions to monitor their sources (Experiments 9 and 10). This has worrying 
implications for potential cases of real worid plagiarism (see section below). 
There are however caveats to the source monitoring account. Although these data 
appear to follow nicely with this account of unconscious plagiarism there is no identifying 
evidence. It is very difficult to know what cognitive processes participants are engaging in 
during generation and while perfonning different types of elaboration. The process used 
by participants may be explored using a series of experiments outlined in the future 
research* section below that aims to break down the phenomenology of the G-E (e.g. 
generation, idea credibility, personal relevance). Additionally, potential evidence of what 
participants are doing during such tasks may be obtained from various self-report 
measures such as asking participants to vocalise what they are actually doing when they 
are improving the ideas, in terms of the level of detail that they provide and also the 
information about mechanisms that they may be using to complete the task (e.g. mental 
imagery). Alternatively, providing participants with the memory characteristics 
questionnaire at test (or a tailored derivative oO (Johnson et al. 1988). could offer insight 
into the different memory characteristics that are associated with each idea. This would 
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permit comparison of the memory characteristics associated with ideas that participants 
generated themselves against those ideas that they G-E/improved (and those others 
ideas that experienced no elaboration). Previously, data from an altered MCQ test 
indicated that plagiarised Ideas may differ from non plagiarised ideas (Bredart et al. 2003 
see introduction) and thus, it would be interesting here to ascertain whether these 
differences would remain following the G-E. 
6.3.2.1 Reasons for the difference in source monitoring and recall studies 
The source monitoring framework maintains that effective source monitoring also 
depends on the quality of the decision processes employed to evaluate those sources 
(Johnson et al. 1993). IVIonitoring decisions may be based upon discriminating the 
qualitative differences between memory characteristics either relatively automatically and 
heuristically (Johnson & Raye, 2000) or more laboured and systematically (Hasher & 
Zacks, 1993). In the recall-own tasks, a source monitoring component is invariably 
evoked by participants in response to the task instruction but in such a task, source 
monitoring is not the participant's primary objective. Hence, participants may be subject 
to a situation that is akin to a divided attention manipulation as their cognitive resources 
are split between completing the task goal (e.g. reporting ideas) and monitoring sources 
effectively. However, as participants are primarily focused upon recalling solutions (or 
devising new solutions) cognitive resources may be deflected away from the source 
(IVIarsh et al. 1997). Therefore, it Is likely that within this phase, participants were mainly 
engaging in more rapid, heuristic source decisions that were likely made with little 
knowledge of the processes being engaged (Johnson & Raye, 2000). 
In contrast, the source monitoring tasks, participants were shown the previously 
generated ideas and were asked to indicate source as a primary task focus (in 
Experiments 9, 10 and 11). Therefore, more controlled (Chaiken, Lieberman & Eagly. 
1989; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shallice, 1988) systematic processes were likely to be 
induced and utilised (Johnson et al. 1993; Landau & Marsh, 1997) to evaluate source. As 
these decision processes are more stringent than those heuristic processes (that likely 
guide performance in the recall-own/ generate-new tasks) there was a reduced 
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opportunity in such source monitoring tasks for source error (Marsh et al. 1997). This was 
previously highlighted by Marsh et al. (1997) who demonstrated levels of 2 1 % plagiarism 
in the generate-new phase, being reduced to marginal levels of 0.8% in a source 
monitoring test. 
The data in this thesis largely supports this source monitoring explanation based 
on decision processes at test, as overall (combining conditions) average plagiarism levels 
(input bound) dropped from 21.2% in the recall-own phase (Experiment 4) and 18.6% 
(Experiment 4) in the generate-new phase to 4.5% in replication study with a source 
monitoring test. However, evoking such systematic processing in this study was not 
sufficient to prevent plagiarised intnjsions as the aforementioned G-E effect was 
observed. Performing G-E statistically increased one's propensity to recognise someone 
else's idea as their own, relative to any other manipulation (i.e. 9% G-E Vs 3% l-E, 
representation & control Experiment 9) and this followed despite extremely high levels of 
correct source recognition (approximately 90%). Additionally, strengthening this G-E only 
served to increase the overall rate of these intrusions in a source monitoring test. That is, 
when G-E was conducted once, an average of 4.5% plagiarism was observed across the 
experiment, with 9% following G-E. However, when G-E was strengthened and 
conducted twice, the overall rate of plagiarism increased to 6% across the experiment, 
with a rate of 6% following one session of G-E (on either day 1 or 3) and 9% following two 
sessions (G-E on both days) (Experiment 10). The global reduction in plagiarism here 
relative to the recall studies could be attributable to the systematic processes that were 
additionally engaged in the source monitoring test. Nonetheless, the pattern evident in 
the recall-own data was prevalent here and therefore, under certain conditions (i.e. 
following G-E) participants may not always be able to effectively source monitor to avoid 
plagiarised errors even when such systematic processes that draw upon a person's prior 
knowledge, metamemory assumptions and plausibility (Cohen, 1981) are induced. This 
finding lends further support to the notion that perfomriing G-E may result in ideas 
indistinguishable from one's own. 
The extent to which each type of processing may be utilised is contingent upon the 
demands of the task (Marsh et al. 1997; see also Marsh & Hicks, 1998) but may also be 
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contingent upon a person's goals. In studies where strict instructions warned participants 
to avoid plagiarism or indicated that their responses would be carefully scnjtinised at test, 
the average number of intrusions decreased relative to conditions where no such 
warnings were given (Landau et al. 2002; see also Marsh, Ward et al. 1999). Similariy, in 
Experiment 5 alerting participants to the purpose of the study and offering them a reward 
incentive to avoid errors also reduced the levels of plagiarism (input bound from 4 1 % / to 
2 1 % or output bound from 4 1 % to 26%) relative to when no such warnings were given. 
This improved performance may be indicative of the stricter decision processes 
participants used here in their approach to the task, compared to such performance in the 
recall-own and generate-new tasks when no such manipulations were imposed. 
However, this instructional manipulation did not reduce the number of errors to the same 
degree as seen in Experiment 9 where a more stringent source monitoring test assessed 
participants' memory (9%). This is an interesting pattern and highlights the possible 
interaction of heuristic and systematic decision processes that may together determine the 
type and stringency of the adopted source monitoring (Marsh et al. 1997). Support for 
this interaction of processes may also be taken from demonstrations where participants 
have been required to complete the recall-own and generate-new phases under time 
pressure and plagiarism rates have increased. The processing engaged by participants in 
completing these tasks may not be exclusively heuristic or automatic as a degree of 
conscious processing must be evoked during such tasks for the time pressure to have 
affected plagiarism frequency (or if only heuristic processing was engaged then such 
heuristic processes must involve some degree of conscious processing) (Marsh, et al. 
1997; see also Marsh & Hicks, 1998). 
Interestingly, in a similar domain Hicks and Marsh (1999) investigated whether 
false recognition (reporting that something had been seen when it had not) could be 
reduced by incorporating more stringent source-monitoring criteria into decision 
processes. As observed in this research, making stringent source judgements appears to 
require careful scrutiny of memories and accordingly reduces plagiarised errors. Hence, 
performing source judgements should also result in reduced false recognition relative to 
more cursory old-new recognition judgements. This follows as false memories 
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presumably lack memory characteristics relative to memories of perceived information 
and result in their more frequent rejection in source monitoring tests. Hicks and Marsh. 
(1999) using a word learning DRM paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995), presented 
participants with lists of words (e.g. bed, rest, nap..) that were associated with non-
presented critical lures (e.g. sleep). False memories were later scored if a critical lure was 
reported as an old word at test (on any type of test). However, across 3 experiments with 
varied combinations of sources, false recognition was increased rather than reduced by 
applying source-monitoring processes. One of the suggestions put forth to explain this 
counterintuitive result was that source monitoring instructions require subjects to look 
vigorously for source specifying information and may cause subjects to accept even weak 
source information as a source guide. This may lead to an overall lowering of the 
response criterion. It is possible, that in the plagiarism paradigm while participants 
completed the source monitoring test, if they had lowered their overall response criteria, 
they would also be more susceptible to plagiarism errors following G-E. This would follow 
as such memory characteristics would be more readily abundant and be more likely to 
resemble their own ideas. Hicks and Marsh (1999) argued that source judgments 
involved a more liberal response criterion than the old/new judgments and that the 
underiying cognitive mechanisms that are used to determine if an item is old or new are 
not the same in source memory paradigms as in old/new recognition paradigms. If these 
assertions are con-ect, these findings oppose multinomial modelling approaches to 
analysing source monitoring data (e.g. Batchelder & Reifer, 1990) as such models 
assume that source judgments happen after old/new judgments have been made, 
whereas in their studies this appears to not be the case. Moreover, it may be deduced 
that the psychological parameters that govern old/new detection may not always influence 
the psychological parameters governing source discrimination. This appears to be 
consistent with the findings from the generate-new task (that is more comparable with an 
old/new recognition task) and the finding in the source monitoring task in this thesis as 
while G-E did not significantly increase the likelihood that participants would plagiarise 
another participant's ideas as new, it did increase the likelihood that the ideas would be 
incorrectly recognised as their own on a source monitoring test (relative to l-E and 
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control). This may be indicative of a more liberal decision criterion in the source 
monitoring task affecting plagiarism rales following G-E. However, rates of plagiarism in 
the generate-new task were high and were not eliminated by decisions more akin to an 
old/new judgement (although this measure was confounded by generation here) and the 
rates obtained following G-E were numerically highest. Clearly the false memory 
paradigm used here is different to the one used in the plagiarism study so the 
explanations may differ and not be pertinent to the plagiarism literature. For example, the 
effect in the false memory studies may be due to content borrowing (Lampinen, 
Neuschatz & Payne, 1999), where a new but related word is seen on the source test and 
it reminds the participant of an old target word and hence the source of that target may be 
falsely attributed to the word (Hicks & Marsh, 1999). Nevertheless, Hicks and Marsh 
(1999) expressed concern that their findings did not follow their initial predictions or recall 
results and fundamentally highlighted the important difference in memory errors that may 
ensue following different types of testing. 
Consequently, exploring different tests in the unconscious plagiarism paradigm 
may provide additional insight into the cognitive mechanisms utilised and the way in which 
such source decisions are made. First, providing participants with a task at testing that 
better resembles an old/new recognition test that includes all participants* previous ideas 
with newly integrated ideas would prove interesting in terms of establishing correct 
recognition rates that may be compared to those attained in source monitoring tests. If 
source memory was improved it is possible that participants were employing a more 
stringent decision criterion. In addition, as the largest plagiarism effect sizes within this 
research paradigm were observed following generative-elaboration within the recall-own 
task, establishing such recognition rates in the absence of any recall -that may be 
interpreted as a 'generative' task itself- would be interesting. However, when such 
comparable source decisions are made in the real world, individuals are likely engaged in 
a generative task and are highly unlikely to be subjected to all prior ideas at one time. 
Second, in this 4-stage unconscious paradigm, participants who completed the 
source monitoring test may hold an implicit or explicit belief about the proportion of test 
items that belong to certain classes that may have in turn influenced performance. In the 
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source monitoring studies in this thesis, only half of the participants' prior ideas were re-
presented. Dodson and Johnson (1996) systematically manipulated such proportions of 
different classes of items and found that participants may adjust their performance 
accordingly at test as 'recollection is not all or none* (p. 181). Moreover, implicit beliefs 
that may be held by participants have been demonstrated to be altered by the 
characteristics of test (Healy & Kubovy, 1978). Hence, altering and specifically increasing 
the number of ideas presented on a source monitoring test and exploring whether 
participant performance would improve may also help to demonstrate the robustness of 
the obtained plagiarised errors that were observed following G-E. 
Third, source decisions can be based upon subjective feelings of remembering 
that may be incorrectly brought about by the absence of memory characteristics or the 
presence of qualitative characteristics that lack clarity and sufficient amounts of detail 
(Hicks, Marsh & Ritschel. 2002). Thus, evaluating participants' remember/know 
judgements and contrasting them with source monitoring judgements would also add an 
interesting dimension to these plagiarism findings by evaluating participants' perceptions 
of the plagiarised ideas. During the recall-own session it is difficult to know what mental 
processes are exhibited by participants, as is the level of decision criteria that they are 
utilising. If participants exhibit a lenient decision criterion and have partial memory 
information for an idea being their own without explicitly remembering its generation, a 
'know' response to such a plagiarised idea may be more likely than a 'remember' 
response. However, it would be interesting to ascertain whether the likelihood of 
providing a 'remember' response would be increased after participants had engaged in 
the process of generatively-elaborating someone else's idea and hence whether this 
generative process sufficiently increased one's propensity to incorrectly 'remember' an 
externally generated idea being 'generated' 
6.3.2.2 Generate-new plagiarism 
Participants in this phase were more likely to plagiarise other participants' ideas than one 
of their own prior ideas. This finding is in accordance with the generation effect that 
declares that self-generated stimuli are recalled and recognised better than perceived 
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stimuli (Slamecka & Graf. 1978). As previously discussed, self-generated information is 
more cognitively rich than perceived information as participants have a record of the idea 
and the operations that were experienced while generating such an idea. This information 
is intensified in cases where an idea was particulariy difficult to generate (see Marsh & 
Hicks, 1998). Therefore, self-generated ideas were more likely to be remembered and 
were less likely to be plagiarised as new during testing (Johnson et al. 1993). Very low 
rates of such intrusions were observed across studies and these rates were unaffected by 
the different elaboration manipulations. 
Moreover, these findings adhere to those that would be predicted by models of 
strength as self-generated ideas would assume a higher activation strength than other 
perceived ideas (Marsh & Bower. 1993; see section 6.4.1). Plagiarised ideas in the 
generate-new phase have been reported to be those ideas with a post-generational 
activity (Marsh & Landau, 1995). Unconsciously plagiarised errors arise if this heightened 
availability of such ideas is not linked to the prior experience and rejected, but is rather 
incorrectly attributed .to the spontaneity of having generated something novel (Johnson et 
al. 1993). Thus, in this generate-new task, when participants are primarily and cognitively 
engaged in generating new creative ideas, they may only apply a cursory heuristic source 
decision (Allen & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby & Kelley. 1987) which may lead to intrusion. 
Assuming performance in the generate-new phase can be completed without systematic 
reference to source it will conceivably be less affected by manipulations that affect 
memory characteristic detail. Hence, the rate at which others' ideas were plagiarised as 
new may have been relatively immune to the different elaborative manipulations as they 
lead to memories of equivalent strength. Numerically the highest rates of plagiarised 
ideas were seen for the control ideas that had received no elaboration but only in 
Experiment 4 were these control ideas plagiarised statistically more than elaborated 
ideas. However, across this research program although ultimately the highest rates of 
plagiarism were obtained in the recall-own phase, interestingly a higher number of 
participants were likely to exhibit at least one plagiarised error in the generate-new phase 
(86.8%) than in the recall-own phase (76.1%) phase. This difference may be due to 
different baseline probabilities, but the generate-new errors were robust and performing 
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elaboration of either kind did not prevent individuals from plagiarising someone else's idea 
as new. 
It is possible that the experimental manipulations may also disrupt generate-new 
performance. Bink et al. (1999) demonstrated that a consequence of considering more 
credible infomriation is that people may spontaneously think about the implications of such 
ideas (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). When participants were explicitly asked to generate 
implications of ideas from a less credible source, plagiarism levels were equated with 
those of the more credible source. Through providing the implications, participants may 
store extra cognitive operations during encoding (Johnson et al. 1993). As cognitive 
operations have been demonstrated to revive more quickly than perceptual details in a 
response deadline procedure (Johnson, Kounios & Reeder, 1994), credible ideas may 
have revived slightly more quickly. Therefore, the greater availability for this class of item 
may be mistaken in the editing process of a generative task, not for feelings of oldness but 
rather for feeling of spontaneity for truly having generated something new. Consequently, 
performance may not reflect levels of 'activation per se' but rather be operationalised as a 
quicker revival rate upon re-encountering an idea or item. 
Interestingly, however, the authors claim that the storing of these extra cognitive 
operations did not affect explicit memory measures such as free recall or source 
monitoring as such measures may depend upon how long a memory takes to fully revive. 
The process of idea development (G-E) utilised in this research programme may 
be a comparable process to the implication generation here. However, in this research 
paradigm the G-E manipulation did affect the two explicit measures of correct recall and 
recall-own plagiarism. Consequently, it may be possible that the memory characteristics 
may also influence generate-new plagiarism. For example, a similar explanation in terms 
of cognitive operation revival rate and misclassification may help account for why only the 
G-E ideas (in Experiment 4) were not reduced following the reward incentive manipulation 
in Experiment 5 where participants were exhibiting more stringent source monitoring 
(where control ideas and re-presented ideas were). In addition, this explanation may in 
part account for why ideas that were G-E twice were numerically plagiarised more than 
those l-E twice, l-E twice reduced plagiarised intrusions relative to l-E once whereas G-E 
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did not follow this pattern. Hence it is possible that if the experimental manipulations were 
further strengthened, generate-new performance may also be disrupted by G-E. 
However, these speculations must be interpreted with caution as statistically across 
studies there was no difference between l-E and G-E on the generate-new tasks. 
6.3.2.3 Relationship between Item and source memory 
The independence of item memory (where prior infomriation is not remembered) and 
source memory (where prior information is remembered but the source of that information 
is not) has been implied in various ways across studies (e.g. Shimamura & Squire, 1987). 
For example, Schacter, Harbluk and McLachlan (1984) found that the ability to 
discriminate among multiple information decays more rapidly over a one week delay 
relative to remembering that the prior event occurred and Voss et al. (1987) found that 
individuals were better at later recognising (as old) items they had initially produced, than 
words generated by their partner but that source memory ability for the items was 
equivalent. Differing findings may be a function of the different decision processes utilised 
at test rather than the independence of the two measures per se. However, the 
relationship between item forgetting and source forgetting was initially explored in an 
unconscious plagiarism domain by Brown and Halliday (1991). At testing, a source 
monitoring test followed the recall-own and generate-new tests and specifically from this 
test, measures of source forgetting (i.e. 'own' responses labelled 'others' and 'other's' 
responses labelled 'own') and item forgetting (the actual 'misses' i.e. 'own' responses 
labelled 'new' and 'others' responses labelled 'new') were calculated. At immediate 
testing, participants made half the errors that recall participants made but the two types of 
errors that they made did not initially differ. However, following a one-week retention 
interval, source forgetting increased at a higher rate than item forgetting and moreover no 
significant correlation was observed between the two measures for the source monitoring 
participants (hits-false alarms). Hence, the authors concluded that there was little 
relationship between unconscious plagiarism and source memory difficulties (see also 
Johnson & Raye, 1981; Schacter et al. 1984; Shimamura & Squire, 1987; Voss et al. 
1987). 
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However, Marsh and Bower (1993) claimed that factors that affect item memory also 
affect source memory. They disputed Brown and Halliday's (1991) finding that source and 
item memory were independent on the basis of the two indices that they used to reach 
their conclusion that the measures were uncorrected. Marsh and Bower (1993), using a 
similar procedure, observed higher levels of plagiarism (up to nine times) than Brown and 
Halliday (1991), but still did not observe a positive relationship between the measures. 
However, they believed this was because source and item forgetting possessed a 
negative relationship. That is, in this task, as the probability increases for participants to 
label their own ideas as others' ideas, the probability that the remaining ideas will be 
simultaneously labelled new decreases. Consequently, Marsh and Bower (1993) 
maintained that the non significant relationship that was reported by Brown and Halliday 
(1991) was a function of balancing a true positive relationship between item forgetting and 
source forgetting with the negative relationship inherent in the two measures. Thus they 
advocated that the two measures are not independent. 
However, crucially here the relationship between item memory and unconscious 
plagiarism shows a dissociation between recall-own unconscious plagiarism (and source 
monitoring unconscious plagiarism) and generate-new unconscious plagiarism. 
Therefore, the different types of unconscious plagiarism cannot both have the same 
relationship with source monitoring. Also, the source monitoring theory itself could lead to 
alternate patterns because source monitoring is a function of heuristic (strength) and 
analytic processes. These two may be separable and so different patterns may be found 
across different studies if these studies differ in terms of how much they use 
heuristic/analytic judgements. 
6.4 Practical implications 
In real plagiarism cases, individuals who are engaged in product generation (i.e. song 
writing, or academic writing) are conceivably highly motivated to make correct source 
judgements to prevent themselves from blatantly copying. Where unconscious plagiarism 
has been implicated, a pervasive theme through many cases has been that the artists 
(e.g. George Harrison) are so convinced that their composition is original that they are 
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detemiined to profess their innocence and the originality of their wori^ in court. It is 
possible that these artists presented their product following a lengthy process of idea 
development that is somewhat similar to the G-E discussed in this research program. 
When participants were engaged in a process of improving someone else's idea, rates as 
high as 70% of those other peoples' ideas were incorrectly reported as their own creative 
idea and this was observed after only two such generative sessions. 
Landau and Marsh (1997) previously claimed that source monitoring in eariy 
stages of idea development may obstruct progress because it might inhibit generation of 
ideas that are similar (but sufficiently different) to older ideas. They therefore suggested 
that a creative artist (e.g. a writer) might better benefit from source scrutiny once the novel 
product is finished. In this way the creative process could proceed unimpeded and the 
writer could later apply the more stringent type of decision processes that are used by 
participants to avoid plagiarised errors. However, following the idea improvement process 
(G-E), when participants were highly motivated to be accurate at test to avoid plagiarism 
errors, high rates of 2 1 % and 9% were nonetheless reported (or incorrectly identified) as 
one's own (Experiment 5, 9 & 10). Thus, in light of the research presented here, creative 
artists who do not source monitor until the novel product is finished but who have engaged 
in an elaborative developmental process, may be particulariy susceptible to plagiarised 
errors. 
Moreover, the pressures that face creative artists in industry were not accurately 
encapsulated in these studies. For example, subjecting participants to factors such as 
internal 'stress' or external 'time pressure' has been observed to disrupt the source 
monitoring process by which possible ideas are assessed and to diminish processing 
capacity that results in an increased probability of source misattribution (Landau et al. 
2000; see also Johnson et al. 1993). Additionally, the pilot data conducted in this 
research programme indicated that a more ecologically valid retention interval of three 
months further impaired source monitoring ability and served to increase the likelihood of 
appropriating someone else's idea as one's own. Hence, from these results and those 
demonstrating intensified effects of repeating such idea development (Experiment 8), it 
may be speculated that individuals who have engaged in this idea improvement process 
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over extended time frames and who are faced with real deadlines may be even more 
likely to produce appropriated ideas. 
However, one critical question that may be asked in response to these findings, 
particularty following the idea improvement (G-E), refers to the point at which a 
'developed' idea may be considered as a *new idea". Answering this question is 
paramount for the purposes of this research (see future research below) and regarding 
real worid plagiarism cases. In legal terms, there appears to be no universal agreement 
about what constitutes 'substantial similarity' of two works. In some cases anything 
recognisable classifies as plagiarism even if the overall similarity is questionable (Challis, 
2003). However it is difficult to ultimately assess as many ideas that are generated evolve 
through a natural process that is likely to be akin to this idea improvement. It is very rare 
for an idea to be entirely and exclusively original, as one's inspiration is usually obtained 
from a prior vestige (see Ward, 1994). On occasions individuals are happy to contribute 
their basic ideas for others to pursue if they are not intending to develop that idea 
themselves. In cases such as these, this development would not be seen as plagiarism. 
However, where permission has not been sought to reproduce prior works, an individual's 
perceptions of plagiarism may vary along with the way that the plagiarism may be dealt 
with. Cases may be taken to court (e.g. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, 
Ltd, 1976)^^ but if a 'borrowed' tune had not been financially lucrative, then taking 
expensive action may be seen as pointless and in some artist may even regard 
unconscious plagiarism positively and view the intrusion as a compliment. Hence, cases 
may be dismissed without legal action (e.g. the song "make 'em laugh" from Singing in 
the Rain that was very similar to Cole Porter's song "Be a Clown" as cited by Collins, 
2002) or be resolved through out-of-court settlements (e.g. Vanilla Ice; Copyright website. 
2005) at the discretion of the 'plagiarised' and other artists involved. Therefore, providing 
an answer to the question 'where should one draw the line?' is beyond the scope of this 
thesis as each accused plagiarism case is multifaceted, unique and to some degree 
subjective. 
Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music. 420 F. Supp. 177 ( S O N Y 1976) 
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One main problem with cases of 'unconscious' plagiarism that result in legal action 
is the lack of consistency of the penalties that are assessed, as on occasions, individuals 
deemed 'unconscious' plagiarists may receive harsher penalties than those whose intent 
was not regarded as unconscious (Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, 2000). 
Determining whether copyright law should extend to the unconscious is controversial but 
in legal terms it does. Cases are evaluated on an individual basis but given that 
governing rules are elusive, standardising penalties is difficult even once the severity of a 
case is determined. Standardising penalties consistently within academia is also 
problematic as evaluating one's liability when information is created independently of 
one's consciousness is difficult. Identical treatment of those plagiarising with and without 
intent may not be fair as unconscious plagiarists may not be able to prevent such errors. 
However, in practice this is a contentious question due to the absence of any available 
measures that may be used to distinguish those deliberate errors from truly unconscious 
ones. Moreover, institutions that practise leniency towards unconscious plagiarism may 
actually promote plagiarism by indirectly encouraging deliberate plagiarists to claim 
'unconscious' plagiarism as a legitimate 'excuse'. However, creating consistent policies 
that deal with treatment of plagiarism would be desirable. Regardless of one's intent, 
plagiarism is still morally wrong and so measures are needed to protect those individuals 
who create and develop the initial idea from exploitation (although perceptions of such 
exploitation or consequences of exploitation may vary) and to help prevent individuals 
from making unconsciously plagiarised en-ors. 
This research has demonstrated that after improving basic information, individuals 
may inadvertently plagiarise said information as their own even when they are motivated 
to be accurate (Experiment 5, 9 & 10). Developing basic information is a natural process 
that people in various positions engage in on a frequent basis. For example, information 
from elsewhere may be used by students who cut and paste when writing an essay; 
academics who amalgamate information for lecture notes; politicians proposing a 
campaign; advertising executives launching a product or researchers designing 
experiments for a research proposal or devising theoretical models. In all such varied 
cases, a great deal of time and effort is involved in developing, improving and coherently 
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expressing such 'information*. It is thus feasible that during this generative nurturing 
process those individuals may experience a degree of source confusion and incorrectly 
attribute externally derived information/ideas to themselves. The research from this thesis 
has implied that repeating this generative process intensifies such plagiarism and that 
over time the possibility of plagiarising may grow. Thus, it may be those individuals who 
work hard improving information that may be the worst affected. Most importantly 
however, even when individuals are aware of plagiarism with a desire to avoid 
reproducing other's ideas, they may nevertheless re-produce such information as their 
own. 
It is very difficult to predict the number of these types of errors that occur in the 
real worid, but it Is likely to be substantial. However, the prevalence of unconscious 
plagiarism and source monitoring errors is only anticipated to increase in the future. This 
claim is made on the basis of the vast (and growing) array of information that is posted on 
the internet and the number of individuals globally who have easy access to that 
information. People are likely to be exposed to an abundance of information (ideas, 
literature, music) from a host of different sites. Some of these sites may not display valid 
copyright infonnation (or may not have one) or may contain information that is simply *cut 
and pasted' from elsewhere without appropriate referencing (Austin & Brown, 1999). 
Hence, over time, not only will this increase the difficulty in identifying the true origin of 
'plagiarised' material but it will create environments in which it will become increasingly 
easy for individuals to develop/improve basic information (within a host of domains) and 
thus be potentially subjected to situations that may be conducive to unconscious 
plagiarism . 
6.5 Future areas of research 
In this thesis, it may be constnjed that following G-E an original idea may not be 
considered as a plagiarised Idea but as a 'new' improved idea. However, this is not 
anticipated to have influenced the main results seen in this research program for two 
reasons. First, although participants developed the basic ideas, the function of such uses 
did not often alter as the ideas given were very diverse and so were not easily confusable 
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with one another. Scoring throughout this research programme was strict and if there was 
any ambiguity over an ideas' originality then that idea was not scored as an instance of 
plagiarism. An idea was only scored as an instance of plagiarism when the use was 
identical to an idea from the generation phase. In the recall-own phase, only in a couple 
of cases was a non identical idea scored as an intrusion and this only occurred when the 
functional use was the same, but the wording differed (e.g. a brick as a door stop or a 
brick as a door wedge). Ideas that had a similar but not identical use (e.g. buttons as a 
snowman's eyes or buttons as eyes on a teddy) were not scored as an intmsion as clearly 
determining when such similar uses are true instances of plagiarism is problematic. In 
general, across the 11 studies, the nature of the uses given for each of the 4 objects were 
clear and as the given ideas were not often similar the cases of plagiarism were easy to 
isolate. In addition, scoring ambiguity was reduced by the presence and agreement 
between two independent raters. Second, the striking finding in this research program 
with respect to G-E was observed in the recall-own phase. In this phase, the ideas that 
should have been reported were the participants' own ideas that they initially gave in the 
generation phase (irrespective of any elaboration that was subsequently carried out). If 
another's idea was elaborated into a 'newly' developed Idea, this should not have had a 
significant impact upon these recalled results, as such newly-created ideas should not 
have been reported in the recall-own phase (a marginal number of new ideas were 
intruded in the recall-own phase but these were excluded from analyses). This would 
have been a more pertinent problem in the generate-new phase as the scoring regarding 
developed ideas resembling old ideas would be more subjective. As previously stated, 
scoring was also stringent in this phase and those questionable ideas were not scored as 
intrusions. Hence, GN plagiarism rates potentially may have only increased in this phase 
if a more lenient scoring procedure was utilised. However, differentiating between an 
initial idea and a newly developed idea in this task is still elusive and implementing a 
lenient scoring system may have resulted in a type 1 error. Yet, in the real worid this is a 
difficult point to address and returns to the issue outlined above concerning where the line 
should be draw between a plagiarised and a developed idea, as this process reflects the 
natural process by which many great ideas are based. 
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An issue that may have influenced participant performance within this paradigm is 
the possibility of participants adhering to a response 'bias to self. In these studies, self 
generation was a common task and one from which (across the study) the largest 
proportion of ideas were exposed (among generation and generative-elaboration). 
Therefore, it is possible that at testing If an idea came to mind and the participant was 
unsure about source, that rather than attributing the idea to self on the basis of the altered 
memory characteristics it was attributed to self as generating was the most common task 
(c.f. Hoffman, 1997; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). This is similar to Kahan's (1996) finding 
where participants imagined or perceived infomiation at encoding, then at test they were 
more likely to incorrectly attribute previously imagined ideas to having been perceived 
when they were unsure about source, and this was reversed when cognitive involvement 
was increased. Kahan termed this affect 'bias towards the real'. In order to rule out this 
similar possibility within this 4 stage paradigm, the number of ideas that participants 
generated (at generation and generated to at elaboration) would need to be matched with 
ideas from a different, external source, so that such task frequency may not influence 
source attributions. 
In this research paradigm the impact that G-E has on rates of recall-own 
plagiarism did not deviate across studies and was apparent to a considerable degree in 
each. Consequently, a next important step in this unconscious plagiarism research is to 
uncover the phenomenology of the effect by specifically investigating the aucial aspects 
of the generative-elaboration that are responsible for the extremely high rates of self 
appropriation rates of others' ideas as one's own. 
One possible explanation for this effect following G-E may reside in the perceived 
credibility of the idea. For example, such 'improved' ideas may be regarded as better 
ideas and so, more appropriate to plagiarise (as compared to non-improved' imagined or 
rated ideas). Therefore, rather than the process of improving the idea per se driving these 
intrusions (as previously suggested) the ideas resulting from the improvement process 
may be responsible for the intrusion. Such a view would fit with data from Bink et al (1999) 
who had people read potential solutions to a problem (How can the number of traffic 
accidents be reduced?). The presented ideas were randomly sampled from a single pool, 
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but participants were told that half had been generated by students, and the other half 
generated by town planners. Later, when attempting to generate their own solutions to the 
traffic problem, participants were more likely to plagiarise the more credible ideas that had 
been presented as coming from the town-planners. Whilst this methodology differs from 
the paradigm used within this research program, it is simitar enough to suggest an 
alternate account of the generative-elaboration effect. It is possible that people plagiarise 
the ideas they improve because they become more credible, rather than because the 
elaboration is generative, as previously argued. This possibility could be investigated by 
encouraging participants to consider generated ideas in a more, or less, credible way by 
suggesting either why novel uses may fail in their role or why they may be a success. 
A second possible explanation for the increased plagiarism rate following G-E may 
concern the content of the actual elaborations that individuals offer in response to the 
presented ideas. Specifically, such elaborations may involve personally relevant 
information. For instance, during generation person A might generate the idea of using a 
brick as a door-stop. However, at elaboration, person B devised improvements for this 
idea, that may think of decorating the brick with striped wallpaper or may have even 
imagined the brick being used in their own home. Hence, at testing, person B might 
remember the idea of a striped brick door-stop and have to judge whose idea it was. If 
they particularly like stripes, or they remember the image of the decorated brick in their 
own home, they may mistakenly believe that this indicates that the idea was originally 
theirs. That is, they may use personal-relevance as a (mistaken) cue for idea-ownership. 
This possibility may be tested by encouraging participants to generate idea improvements 
for either their own use or for use by an older adult. 
To date, the studies in this research program are the only ones to use a 4 stage 
paradigm to investigate the effects of elaboration on unconscious plagiarism. The 
additional elaboration phase was selected to mimic the effects of idea-development that is 
likely to happen in real-world situations, since real-world plagiarists are likely to have 
thought about and cultivated their ideas over an extended period of time. However, all the 
work conducted that has used the 4-stage paradigm has used the Alternate Uses Test at 
generation. Although other tasks showing plagiarism have been reported in the literature 
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(e.g. category member generation, Brown & Murphy. 1989; creative drawing tasks. Marsh 
et al. 1996; brainstorming solutions to a real-world problems. Bink et al. 1999), these have 
only been studied in the context of the 3-stage paradigm. Consequently, investigating 
whether the effects of elaboration seen with the Alternate Uses Test will generalise to 
other problem solving type tasks would be important to explore. Utilising a creative 
brainstorming task at generation that uses Issues that hold relevance to the participants' 
life (e.g. improving different aspects of university life such as their students' union or their 
halls of residence) would be interesting. 
The pilot data here indicated that a 3 month delay between generation and testing 
increased and in fact nearly doubled plagiarism relative to testing following a one-week 
retention interval. Although a small sample size was utilised here, the finding was 
nonetheless significant. This pattern is perhaps explainable in terms of a more lenient 
decision criterion that is employed over time as memory traces inevitably weaken. 
However, there is bound to be a point at which these memory traces fade and it is 
possible that at such a point that these plagiarism rates may be seen to dissipate. 
Therefore, examining rates of plagiarism following varied retention intervals would be 
interesting with reference to the generalisability of such studies to real world cases that 
arise over extended time frames. Along a similar vein, while examining delays the notion 
of context reinstatement at testing could also be investigated. Previously, when 
participants have been tested in the same context that they were in during generation 
(with their initial generating partner), the available memory cues have reduced levels of 
plagiansm relative to when this context differed at test (without their initial generating 
partner) (Macrae et al. 1999). In the studies cited in this research paradigm participant 
have been exposed to the same contextual conditions (generating participants and 
environment) at generation and testing and thus have also been exposed to various 
retrieval cues (see Macrae et al. 1999). Removing this context at testing would raise the 
external validity of the study, as it is unlikely that when individuals are creating/plagiarising 
external information that they will be immersed in the environment in which they were 
introduced to the information in the first instance. Therefore, it may be speculated that 
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following G-E, when participants are tested in a different context that plagiarism levels 
may be raised. 
Lastly, an important point that plagues the laboratory based literature is whether 
participants really believe that the plagiarised ideas were their own, as without a doubt, 
self-belief is a major component of real worid cases of plagiarism. Thus far, degree of 
belief has not been systematically Investigated in laboratory studies. Those studies 
employing confidence judgments taken following the testing phase have generally 
revealed lower average confidence ratings for plagiarised ideas than participants' own 
ideas (e.g. Landau et al. 1997). However, there is a degree of overiap in ratings given to 
plagiarised- and own-ideas. For example, studies have shown that a substantial 
proportion of plagiarised ideas (12-32%) are given the highest possible confidence rating 
(e.g. Bredart et al. 2003; Marsh et al. 1997). To date, whether the generative-elaboration 
effect has an impact on degree of belief in the plagiarised ideas has not been directly 
explored. Confidence in the originality of one's recalled ideas may be indirectly sought 
from the findings that financial inducement to avoid plagiarised errors (Experiment 5) did 
not remove the G-E effect. Hence, confidence in those ideas is likely to be higher 
following generative-elaboration (as participants plagiarised so often in this condition), but 
clear empirical evidence is required to support this claim. Interestingly, research in the 
imagination inflation domain has demonstrated that repeatedly Imagining a fictional event 
(e.g. Garry et al. 1996), or merely re-exposure to the fictional idea (Sharman et al. 2004) 
can increase confidence that the imagined event actually occurred. Thus, in this 
literature, generative-elaboration is not required to produce an effect. There are two 
potential corollaries of this pattern: either belief in the reality of fictional events and 
plagiarism of others' ideas are influenced by different factors, or the production of an error 
and the degree of confidence in that error are influenced by different factors. Obtaining 
confidence ratings as an additional independent measure in the aforementioned 4 stage 
paradigm would provide a means to examine whether error rate and belief in those errors 
are affected by the same variables. 
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6.6 Summary 
This research was motivated by trying to understand real world plagiarism. Across 11 
studies, consistently high levels of unconsciously plagiarised errors were obtained. More 
pertinently, high levels of plagiarism were obtained following idea improvement (G-E), 
across 4 recall-own studies (20.4%-70.4%) and two source monitoring studies (9%). 
Hence, this idea improvement process had a powerful effect on plagiarism rates when 
people later try to recall their own ideas and this was the case when participants were 
motivated to avoid these errors via written warning, financial incentive and task demands. 
Hence, this data suggests that real-world conditions that require people to take ideas and 
work on them are likely to result in those people coming to believe that the original idea 
was their own. This may therefore constitute a possible mechanism by which creative 
artists, who may have worked on and invested considerable time and effort into a basic 
idea, may come to appropriate that idea as their own. Moreover, these mechanisms may 
not only help to explain unconscious plagiarism but may also offer insight into 
conceptually related issues concerning how Individuals may come to hold certain beliefs, 
succumb to advertising or political movements and may aid progress in psychotherapy 
(Binketal. 1999). 
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Appendix A 
A random list of novel uses that constitute a representation of the ideas generated 
across experiments. 
Brick: A C D Player casing 
Brick; A Cushion 
Brick: A Mouse mat 
Brick: A piece of paper 
Brick: As a bowl (some bricks have grooves in the middle) 
Brick: a s a foot stall 
Brick: As a large crayon (as it crumbles and marks) 
Brick: As a ruler to draw straight lines 
Brick: As a weapon 
Brick: As an exfoliate 
Brick: As posts for a rounder game 
Brick: as the feet of a table 
Brick: ashtray 
Brick: attach to bottom of shoes to make you look taller 
Brick: Balance one upon your head to improve posture 
Brick: break up and use to write with 
Brick: Build a stand for the T V 
Brick: Carve a little house into it for mice 
Brick: chair 
Brick: computer stand 
Brick: cooking pot 
Brick: could use to make a maze for an animal 
Brick: could u s e to make a road for toy cars 
Brick: cnjmble it up and make a decoration 
Brick: designer table 
Brick: Door stop 
Brick: drill hole in and use to keep pencils in 
Brick: drinks mat 
Brick: drop from a cliff to s e e how far down the water is 
Brick: engrave to keep score in games using tally system 
Brick: file your nails with 
Brick: fish tank 
Brick: fishing weight 
Brick: hammer 
Brick: hold them in each hand for a s long as possible to stretch arms 
Brick: hollow out and use as shoes 
Brick: hot stands for pots after cooking 
Brick: in a goldfish bowl, a s decoration 
Brick: keep a s a pet 
Brick: kitchen utensil holder 
Brick: line them up along the door to stop a draught blowing in 
Brick: make stepping stones 
Brick: make stilts 
Brick: Paint individual faces and suchlike on them and have a brick family 
Brick: paint it yellow and use it a mariner 
Brick: paperweight 
Brick: place small candles on top of it for a table decoration 
Brick: play jenga with them (tower of blocks, take turns in removing a brick each) 
Brick: pretend it is a microphone and sing into it 
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Brick: Put a small fire out with 
Brick: put in a pattern to write a m e s s a g e 
Brick: scratch finger nails along the side of it as though its a nail file 
Brick: Sculpture 
Brick: stack up as a jump in a horse competition 
Brick: stand on to reach into a cuptxiard 
Brick: Throw at someone you hate 
Brick: Throw them into the s e a in a brick throwing contest 
Brick: to create a new game 
Brick: to cut something on 
Brick: to draw, with the dust that c o m e s off it (like chalk) 
Brick; to get an apple or something down from a tree, by throwing it up at it 
Brick: to keep a door shut 
Brick: to play table tennis on 
Brick: to prop a window open 
Brick: to sit on 
Brick: to smash a window with 
Brick: to stop a mouse coming out of its hole 
Brick: toilet roll holder 
Brick: use as a cooking weight 
Brick: use as a foot rest 
Brick: use as a paperweight 
Brick: use as a step 
Brick: use as a training weight 
Brick: use as plane wheel chocks (to keep plane from moving fonward) 
Brick: use as prop in a play 
Brick: use for a printing picture 
Brick: use for vandalism 
Brick: use it as a plate stand 
Brick: Use it to play the drums with 
Brick: use it to stir a large pot of paint 
Brick: use lots of bricks to balance on top of each other as a game 
Brick: use to break a n entry 
Brick: use to crush food 
Brick: use to weigh things down, i.e. in water 
Brick: weight (for exercising) 
Brick: you can build a house 
Brick: you can place it on a bike to make it go faster 
Brick: you can use it as a desk 
Button: you could use them as money tokens 
Button: As a hat 
Button: a s a nail head (stick it onto a piece of wire) 
Button: As a necklace, if you add string 
Button: As a patch for a hole in a jumper 
Button: As a strainer, using the holes 
Button: As a sweetie 
Button: As a toy for a cat 
Button: As an object to skim over water 
Button: as false nails that you don't have to re-paint 
Button: attach to a dogs collar 
Button: bottle top 
Button: C a n string a lot together to make an abacus 
Button: Christmas tree decorations 
Button: computer button 
Button: could make button up shoes 
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Button: could play a smaller version of bowls with discs 
Button: could stick along walls of buildings to give infomnation in brail 
Button: could stick on your bag a s decoration 
Button: cut the middle out and make a ring 
Button: decorate a birthday card 
Button: decorate around computer monitor 
Button: do a picture 
Button: door stop 
Button: Drop from a high building to dent someone you don't like car 
Button: earplug 
Button: earrings 
Button: Eat soup with 
Button: false nails 
Button: fishing bate 
Button; Fool people into thinking they are flying saucers 
Button: Glue it to the TV to make the on/off button more obvious 
Button: glue them to the bottom of shoes so you can slide on concrete 
Button: have a red self destnjct button in a car 
Button: hold it vertically on its side on a flat surface and spin it round 
Button: insert glass and use as a manacle 
Button: light switch 
Button: lots sewn onto a jacket for that just off the catwalk look 
Button: magnifying glass 
Button: make a curtain of buttons 
Button: make a necklace out of lots of them, or some sort of jewellery 
Button: make abstract art with them 
Button: make an ornament 
Button: make g lasses from them 
Button: make into cot mobile 
Button: mosaic 
Button: necklace 
Button: Paint and use a s a replacement eye ala a glass eye 
Button: Paint loads a make a mosaic 
Button: put in someone's shoe to annoy them 
Button: put into shoes to get taller 
Button: put lots in a plastic container to make a musical shaker 
Button: put many in a box to make it rattle (kids toy) 
Button: put one that doesn't wori< on a keyboard 
Button: Sell them as souvenirs 
Button: s e w them to a bag to make it look more interesting 
Button: shell 
Button: Small Fr isbees 
Button: stick in belly button 
Button: stick lots together and dribble paint through holes to make artists tool 
Button: Stick them all over your body and pretend that your a button magnet 
Button: Stick to the bottom of shoes and create ice skates 
Button; stick to your feet for permanent s h o e s 
Button: stone 
Button: sunglasses 
Button: tablet 
Button: throw into the air like confetti 
Button: Throw them like ninja stars 
Button: tie 2 together by a length of string to make a throwing weapon 
Button: tie lots together to make a belt 
Button: to throw at someone 
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Button: to use a plate 
Button: to use as a shaker 
Button: to use as a stencil 
Button: to use as a toboggan 
Button: to use as a tray 
Button: use a big one a s a plug 
Button: use a s a rennainder, i.e. put notice underneath 
Button: use a s counters in a card game 
Button: use a s fins in making a model of a shark 
Button: use a s guitar plectaim 
Button: use instead of Christmas decorations 
Button: use it to flip into the air like you use a coin for heads or tails 
Button: use them a s mini Frisbees 
Button: use them a s play money 
Button: use them for animal toys 
Button: use them for tokens in poker 
Button: Write words with them by arranging them 
Button: you could put them on a candle for a design 
Button: you could use them as pretend headphones 
Button: you could use them on the bottom of table legs 
Paper-clip: A Pen 
Paper-clip: A Screw 
Paper-clip: A weight 
Paper-clip: As a boomerang 
Paper-clip: a s a hairgrip 
Paper-clip: As a stencil for a possible tattoo 
Paper-clip: As one of those sword things that go through club sandwiches 
Paper-clip: Bend into a needle and sow with 
Paper-clip: bend it into letters or words 
Paper-clip: Build a replica terminator; out of loads of them 
Paper-clip: button 
Paper-clip: Chandelier 
Paper-clip: clip to ears as decoration 
Paper-clip: could use in stead of pegs to hang out washing 
Paper-clip: could use instead of false nails 
Paper-clip: could use to make a scarf 
Paper-clip: curtain hook 
Paper-clip: curtains 
Paper-clip: decorate photo frame 
Paper-clip: door hinge 
Paper-clip: ear phones 
Paper-clip: fishing hook 
Paper-clip: get something out that has fallen down small gap 
Paper-clip: hair tie 
Paper-clip: hairclip 
Paper-clip: heat it up and use it to burn messages into wood 
Paper-clip: javelin 
Paper-clip: make a 32 of them into various shapes and play chess with them 
Paper-clip: make a bridge for mice 
Paper-clip: make an anklet 
Paper-clip: Make braces to straighten teeth 
Paper-clip: make into stick to grow plants up 
Paper-clip: make into tongs to pick up rubbish 
Paper-clip: make jewellery with 
Paper-clip: make to a moving doll/figure for a child 
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Paper-clip: make wire sculptures 
Paper-clip: metal basket 
Paper-clip: mobile 
Paper-clip: needle (threader) 
Paper-clip: open out and use as a switch if the button on your lap top has broke off 
Paper-clip: pen top 
Paper-clip: put them on a bike wheel s o the rattle 
Paper-clip: Put through a bulls nose and drag by 
Paper-clip: Scratch a tattoo into your arm with one 
Paper-clip: Scratch your name into a picnic table with it 
Paper-clip: sell them a s lucky charms 
Paper-clip: Shape them into balls 
Paper-clip: shoe laces 
Paper-clip: straighten and use a s a tooth pick 
Paper-clip: tie all your stationary together 
Paper-clip: to clean your nails 
Paper-clip: to get an object that's stuck in a hole out with 
Paper-clip: to get out the rest of a tube e.g.: lipstick 
Paper-clip; to hang washing on a line 
Paper-clip: to hold nose shut to keep from breathing 
Paper-clip: to open a safe 
Paper-clip: To open packets etc, when you need a sharp object and you have no 
scissors 
Paper-clip: To pick a lock 
Paper-clip: To pick the label of bottles 
Paper-clip: to pick up peas with 
Paper-clip: to pierce your ear with 
Paper-clip: to pinch a balloon 
Paper-clip: to reset things like calculators and watches 
Paper-clip: to scratch hard to reach places 
Paper-clip: to scratch paint off something 
Paper-clip: To spell out words by bending it 
Paper-clip: to stir paint 
Paper-clip: to test a magnet 
Paper-clip: to thread a lace through a garment of clothing 
Paper-clip: To use a s a tool, to get into small s p a c e s 
Paper-clip: to use on a corset top to keep it together 
Paper-clip: to wear in your hair as hair grips 
Paper-clip: tool 
Paper-clip: toothpick 
Paper-clip: toy 
Paper-clip: TV. Aerial 
Paper-clip: unbend them to make a hair tie 
Paper-clip: unblock the sink with it 
Paper-clip: Use as improvised surgical needle 
Paper-clip: use as shoe lace 
Paper-clip: use end of it to scratch graffiti into a table 
Paper-clip: use it a s a needle to push string through the place on a camera for a strap 
Paper-clip: use it to scratch a cd 
Paper-clip: use the end of it to clean a small gap on a piece of jewellery 
Paper-clip: use the end of it to clean underneath fingernails 
Paper-clip: use them to hang up wet pieces of paper 
Paper-clip: use them to poke people 
Paper-clip: use them to scratch off nail polish 
Paper-clip: use to make guitar frets 
Paper-clip: use to replace broken fuses 
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Paper-clip: use to store paper, i.e. put paperclip through important notices, s o don't 
lose 
Paper-clip: use to tie cable together 
Paper-clip: use to write in paint 
Paper-clip: wnnd chime 
Paper-clip: you could make a lead for a dog 
Paper-clip: you could use one a s a key 
Paper-clip: you could use them a s a brush 
Paper-clip: you could use them to hang up utensils 
Shoe: A bed for a doll 
Shoe: A Pet 
Shoe: A Plate 
Shoe: A Wine glass 
Shoe: Adapt it s o an animal could wear it 
Shoe: aquarium 
Shoe: As a bad smell deten-ent for rodents 
Shoe: as a ball in a game 
Shoe: a s a desk tidy 
Shoe: as a fish tank 
Shoe: as a gift wrapping for something small e.g.: ring 
Shoe: As a paper weight 
Shoe: as a place to hide something in it 
Shoe: As a toy in a gold fish bowl 
Shoe: As a water ski 
Shoe: As an instrument to stoke a fire with 
Shoe: bath plug 
Shoe: Bird feeder 
Shoe: Burn it to keep warm 
Shoe: can holder in a car 
Shoe: clothes peg holder 
Shoe: computer mouse 
Shoe: container 
Shoe: could break up and use the soles to make a Frisbee 
Shoe: could use instead of a hammer 
Shoe: could use the leather to make headband or scarf 
Shoe: could use the padding on inside of trainers to stuff teddy of pillow 
Shoe: cut off sole and use as rubber wire insulator 
Shoe: decorate and use a s a toy 
Shoe: Decorate it and use it as a plant pot 
Shoe: door stop 
Shoe: Drink coffee out of it 
Shoe: drop it if a high building 
Shoe: flask 
Shoe: football 
Shoe: garden ornaments 
Shoe: give it to a one legged person 
Shoe: glass 
Shoe: hanging of ceiling a s a wind chime 
Shoe: hide and seek for children 
Shoe: hold it by laces and twiri around head 
Shoe: hold open a door with one 
Shoe: holdall 
Shoe: keep pens and pencils there 
Shoe; Lamp shade 
Shoe: make into a lamp 
Shoe: make up box 
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Shoe; Modem art 
Shoe: money box 
Shoe: prop up to use a s pins for bowling 
Shoe: put it in the shower to hold your shampoo 
Shoe: put them on your hands to keep hands warm 
Shoe: Scoop something out of a deep fat fryer with it 
Shoe: S e w the leather upper onto a t-shirt to make an interesting fashion item 
Shoe: shoe bag 
Shoe: sling for broken arm 
Shoe: speaker phone 
Shoe: spin it by the laces and get people to jump over 
Shoe: store sweets in one 
Shoe: strap to knees a s knee pads 
Shoe: Sun dial 
Shoe: iUrovj it up at a window to get someone's attention 
Shoe; Tie laces together trip someone up 
Shoe: tie shoes around waist with the laces a s a belt 
Shoe: tie the shoe laces of two shoes together to make a mobile 
Shoe: tie them to your head and use them a s rabbit ears 
Shoe: to hold rice 
Shoe: to keep spaghetti in 
Shoe: to keep spare change in 
Shoe: to throw at someone 
Shoe: to trip someone up with 
Shoe: to use as a door stop 
Shoe: toilet bnjsh holder 
Shoe: toy for a pet 
Shoe: use 3 a s juggling balls 
Shoe: use as feet for another object, i.e. a table 
Shoe: use as model foe still life painting 
Shoe: use as pot for bits &&; bobs 
Shoe: use a s washing up gloves 
Shoe: use in a game - throw as far as can 
Shoe: use it as a glove 
Shoe: U s e it a s a mould for a clay shoe statue 
Shoe: use it a s a piggy bank 
Shoe: use it a s a weight to balance sca les 
Shoe: use it instead of a stocking at Christmas 
Shoe: use it to break a window 
Shoe: use it to carry objects in 
Shoe: U s e it to hide your valuables 
Shoe: use laces a s hangman noose 
Shoe: use laces of lots of shoes to make jump n3pe 
Shoe; use leather to make bookmarit 
Shoe: use the shoe laces to make a friendship band 
Shoe: use them as stockings if you don't have any and put presents in them 
Shoe: use to hit a ball, like a racket 
Shoe: use to make shoe shaped cement moulds 
Shoe: v a s e 
Shoe: wear it as a hat 
Shoe: you can unpick the shoe and use it as a shin pad 
Shoe: you can use the laces for a corset 
Shoe: you could make a coat for an animal 
Shoe: you could use them as a goal post 
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Appendix B 
A randomly selected list of Idea improvements that were given by participants 
during generative-elaboration. 
BUTTON Improvements 
Button as a Frisbee Frill the edges 
Take the centre out 
Luminous colours 
Button as a wall decoration Make it into a clock 
make it oblong 
colour co-ordinate it 
Button as a shaker Put buttons in an attractive container 
Use different sized buttons 
Many colours of buttons 
Button as pretend money Melt and re-mould 
Paint pictures of coins on the money 
Used different sizes 
Buttons as catapults make a dent in the button to sit on the catapult 
Create catapult that could fire more than one button at a time 
sharpen buttons 
Button as counters Use different colours 
Use different shapes 
bit of rubber on the end to stop sliding 
Button to make a photo 
Frame 
Carve them into shapes 
add glitter 
use different sizes 
Buttons to write messages 
on the wall 
magneticA/elcro so you can change the message 
different colours for different people messages 
different sizes for different priorities 
Button to scratch a stone sharpen edges 
cut them into different thicknesses (lines) 
reinforce with metal to make more effective 
Button as teddy eyes 
Button as a bag decoration 
paint to look like eyes 
sew around them - embroidery 
cut them to shape 
use different coloured thread to attach 
different designs with varying size buttons 
enhance the decoration with embroidery 
Button to fill a whole use several to make it look like a feature not a repair 
colour the button to match the other material 
re-shape for perfect fit 
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Buttons as tidily winks fill button holes 
appropriate colours/ teams 
make storage pot 
Button as screen saver superimpose other images onto the button 
Different photos of sizes and shapes 
animate the button 
Button as an abacus different colours 
different textures 
carve the buttons into different shapes 
Buttons to make a trail use large bright coloured buttons 
tie them together 
attach something to make a noise 
Button to decorate a cake make into a smiley face 
create a layering effect 
stick them on vertically and horizontally 
Button as dials write numbers on them 
make holes big enough for fingers 
use shiny buttons 
Buttons as confetti lots of coloured buttons 
cut them in half to reduce size/weight 
include button shavings 
Button as wheels Put an axel through the centre 
use black buttons 
use 4 buttons the same 
Button as dolls plates fill in the holes 
Use different sizes 
use different colours 
Button as a puck in ice 
Hockey 
Build a button tower 
bright colour so can be easily seen 
Use a large heavy button 
carve out the centre and fill with heavy substance 
different sizes 
make then interlink-able 
build a base 
Buttons as fish tank 
Decorations 
Buttons to make bunting 
Button as a Christmas tree 
Decoration 
use coloured and shiny buttons 
build a button arch 
used varied shapes and sizes 
buttons on siring hanging down from the main bunting 
many sizes and colours 
thread on string in-between material 
spay with festive colours 
attach to stockings 
thread on to a paperclip and make a hanging decoration 
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BRICK 
Brick as a weight Rubber stops at the bottom 
Make it smooth 
Round the edges 
Brick sculpture Carve and make abstract 
combination of different coloured bricks 
Put it on a stand 
Brick as a weapon 
Brick as art 
Spikes out of the end 
put a laser on it 
hide a gun in it 
smash up and build as a different 
shape 
Put in a different context 
Frame it 
Brick as a BBQ Put it on legs 
Put a grill on top 
Paint the outside 
Brick as an ashtray 
Carve grooves for the 
cigarettes 
create a dip in the middle 
coat it in glass 
Brick to prop up a car 
Put padding around brick to prevent 
scratching 
layer bricks for height 
make a wide base 
Brick to smash windows cover with a sheet - makes less noise 
Sharpen edges 
Use a heavy brick 
Brick to play catch cover with foam 
Round off the edges 
Hollow out the centre 
Brick to stand on put wheels on for easy manoeuvre 
large bricks for stability 
stack bricks for extra height 
Brick as modern art Put it in a glass tank 
Stand against white background 
use with broken bits to look effective 
Brick as a table Paint bricks 
Add a table cloth 
use glass as a table top 
Brick as book ends Reduce in size 
decorate to look like a book 
file so smooth 
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Brick as an iron heat up the brick 
smooth the ends 
add a handle 
Brick as a hammer reduce the size 
make it harder 
attach a handle 
Brick as a candle holder carve space for the candle 
create a grove for the wax 
make wholes for more than one 
candle 
Smash a brick to make gravel use different types of brick 
spray with weed killer 
add sand 
Brick as a paperweight attach pictures of friends 
Carve it 
add a design to it 
Brick as a shot put make it circular 
make it smooth 
colour it 
Brick as a ruler ensure side is straight 
add measurements along the side 
stick two together to make it 
longer 
PAPERCLIP 
Door wedge Make it heavier 
Paint it 
Varnish it 
In to a shape Crimp it 
Soldier it 
Right angles 
Paperclip as a tie Rubberise it 
cover it in cloth 
make them different sizes 
Paperclip to repair a zip Decorate it 
Colour it to co-ordinate with clothing 
rust proof it 
Paperclip as rope Bend all the ends over so there are no sharp ends 
Spray paint it 
glue lots together to make it thicker 
Paperclip to mend watch strap cover with leather 
file the ends to prevent sharp edges 
put beads through the remainder of the paperclip 
Paperclip as radio ariel bend it into shape 
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use many for a longer ariel 
stick a bead on the end 
Paperclip as a hook twist paperclips together - stronger 
coat to reinforce hook shape 
tie it to string 
Paperclip to punch holes for 
brail 
sharpen the end to make it easier 
add a handle 
make it work electronically 
Paperclip as a spring coil it tightly 
add mbber centre to make it more springy 
paint or add tinsel 
Paperclip as a bracelet twist it to look more attractive 
add beads 
wrap it with cotton thread 
Paperclip as a mini bow and 
arrow 
bend the paperclip into bow shape 
add elastic band 
blunten end so it's not dangerous 
Paperclip as toothpick thin the end of the paperclip 
sterilise 
point end 
Paperclip as a hairgrip attach feathers 
Bend into interesting shapes 
use coloured paperclips 
Paperclip to pick lock make larger by attaching 2 together 
easy use handle 
strengthen the metal 
Paperclip as a stirrer elongate 
attach rubber to prevent burning hands 
clean it 
Paperclip as a shoelace use flexible metal 
remove sharp edges 
use coloured paperclips 
Paperclip curtain attach paperclips to wool 
use similar sized paperclips 
used coloured paperclips to create patterns 
Paperclip as picture stands bend into floral shapes 
attach pretty stones 
attach to a sturdy base 
Paperclip earrings hang objects from them 
bend into symbols 
connect them to make a chain 
Paperclip as a guitar pick bend into shape 
Fill the hollow centre 
write your name on it 
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Paperclip as drum beaters put a rubber ball on the end 
use many for increased strength 
wrap material around the beater 
Paperclip as chain mail clothing similar sized paperclips 
bend the paperclips to make clasps 
blunten the ends of the paperclips to prevent scratching 
Paperclip to eat with bend into a fork shape 
Lengthen 
attach handle 
Paperclip as a pointer Make it long and thin 
paint black to make it less obvious 
put a rubber tip on the end 
Paperclip as cufflinks attach a button to paperclip 
attach other small items to the paperclip 
colour them to match tie 
SHOE 
Food container Sterilise it 
Line it 
Put a lid on it 
Shoe to scare birds Fit it with an explosive 
Camouflage it 
Put it in a field 
Shoe as earrings Make shoe out of platinum 
Embedded with stones 
small shoe 
Shoe as pet toy line it with fur 
put bells in it 
make out of rubber 
Shoe as gloves Line with fur 
Make finger slots 
Sew on beads 
Shoe as a belt weave fabric around the laces 
Use the leather to cut out shapes 
Hand laces to it for 
decoration 
Shoe to smell out a room put smelly cheese inside 
attach the shoe to pulley system so don't have to go near it 
attach a siren to the shoe 
Shoe as a hamster home Make a lid 
Put hay inside 
Make a flap for the door 
Shoe as a hat use laces as a neck tie 
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Add accessories 
Split the sides to fit on head 
Shoe as a trophy spray gold and engrave 
use football shoes for football prizes etc. 
use different sizes for different prizes 
Shoe as a flower pot Water proof it 
fill with soil and stones for drainage 
decorate with floral 
design 
Use a shoe as a reminder paint the shoe yellow 
attach a note pad 
put it in an obvious place 
Shoe as a desk tidy Use boots 
colour them 
cut the toe out and place rubbers there 
Shoe as a mini boat make water tight 
make it buoyant 
add a sail 
Shoe as a fan cut the leather and re-shape 
attach to the sole 
paint a design on the leather 
Shoes as dumbbells put different things inside to vary weight 
remove the 
heels 
cover the foot entrance 
Shoe as a dog toy use a hard shoe so they can chew it 
remove sharp pieces - i.e. heels 
put treats inside 
Shoes for making picture Use shoe prints 
use various sizes and sole prints 
use different textured paint 
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When elaboration leads to appropriation: Unconscious 
plagiarism in a creative task 
Louisa-Jayne Stark. Timothy J . Perfect, and Stephen E. Newstead 
University of Plymouth, UK 
B r o w n and Murphy ' s (1989) three-slage paradigm (general ion, recal l -own, generate-new) was used to 
assess the effecLs of participant e laboration on rates of unconscious plagiarism in two experiments using a 
creative task. Fo l lowing the generation phase, participants imagined and rated a quarter of the ideas 
( imagery e laborat ion) , generated improvements to another quarter (generative e laborat ion) , and listened 
to a quarter of the ideas again without e laboration, with the remaining ideas acting as control . A week 
later, participants attempted to recall their own ideas, and generate new solutions to the same cues. In 
E x p e r i m e n t 1 both forms of e laboration equal ly increased correct recal l , and decreased plagiarism in the 
generate-new task. H o w e v e r , generative e laboration led to significantly greater plagiarism in the recall-
own task, but imager)' e laboration did not. Participants in E x p e r i m e n t 2 were encouraged not to plagiarise 
by means of a f inancial incentive. H o w e v e r , they showed the same pattern as seen in E x p e r i m e n t 1. 
T h e r e f o r e , contrary to a s imple strength account, the probability of a person plagiarising another's ideas is 
l inked to the part icular nature of the e laboration carr ied out on that idea, rather than its familiarity. 
The need to correctly allribute a memoiy, a 
thought, or an idea to its origin is imporianl for 
normal human inieracrion and is inherent in most 
facets of everyday life (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993). Inevitably, mistakes in this attri-
bution process may occur in life where two 
information sources become confused. This occurs 
in unconscious plagiarism, where an individual 
may unknowingly plagiarise another by claiming a 
previously experienced idea as their own novel 
idea. There have been many documented cases of 
unconscious plagiarism over the years including 
high-profile cases where public claims have been 
made about the originality of the work, for 
example, Freud's theory of biscxuality (1960), 
George Harrison's song My Sweet Lord (Dannay, 
1980), and the makers of the 1997 film The Full 
Monty (as cited by Macrae, Bodenhausen, & 
Calvini, 1999). 
Recent research investigating unconscious 
plagiarism has been based on Brown and Mur-
phy's (1989) experimental paradigm. Their 
experimental paradigm involved three distinct 
stages. Tn an initial generalion phase, groups of 
four participants took turns to generate category 
exemplars (see also Brown & Halliday, 1991; 
Macrae et al., 1999). Following this encoding ses-
sion, participants were instructed to recall their 
initial responses (recall-own task) and to generate 
an equal number of new responses (generate-new 
task). Plagiarism was scored slightly differently in 
the two tasks. In the recall-own task, plagiarism 
was counted whenever a participant recalled an 
idea that had originally been generated by some-
one else. In the generate-new task, plagiarism was 
counted whenever a previously generated idea 
was re-generated, whether originally by someone 
else, or by the participant. Thus, in the generate-
new task participants can plagiarise themselves. 
More recently, this paradigm has been extended 
to more creative tasks such as puzzle tasks (Marsh 
& Bower, 1993), brainstorming sessions (Marsh, 
Landau, & Hicks, 1997), and drawing novel space 
creatures (Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996). Here 
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we use the Allemate Uses Test (Chrisiensen, 
Guilford. Merryfield, & Wilson. 1960). 
Brown and Murphy (1989) found that uncon-
scious plagiarism occurred in each of the three 
phases. The frequency of plagiarism was higher 
when participants were generating new exemplars 
(9%) than when they were directly recalling iheir 
own exemplars (7%). These repetitions were sig-
nificantly more frequent than would be expected 
by chance. Further, plagiarising from others 
occurred more frequently than inadvertent self-
duplication, thus suggesting that people monitor 
self-generated and other-generated information in 
different ways (Slamecka & Graf. 1978; Vos, 
Vesonder. Post. & Ney. 1987). 
Using variations in the Brown and Murphy 
(1989) paradigm, research has shown that delays 
between initial idea generation and later genera-
tion of novel responses significantly increase rates 
of unconscious plagiarism (Brown & Halliday, 
1991; Macrae et al., 1999; Marsh ct al.. 1996). 
Additionally, studies have demonstrated that 
participants are more likely to plagiarise a person 
of the same sex (Macrae et al., 1999). the person 
who spoke directly before them (Brown & Mur-
phy, 1989; Linna & Gulgoz. 1994) and ideas from a 
more credible source (Bink, Marsh. Hicks, & 
Howard, 1999). Cumulatively, however, in pre-
vious studies, unconscious plagiarism tends to be 
higher when participants generate new ideas than 
when they recall their own ideas. 
One issue of central interest in this work is the 
difference in the rates of unconscious plagiarism 
across the recall-own and the generate-new tasks. 
This is believed to be due to different decision 
processes being utilised in the two phases (Marsh 
& Bower, 1993). In the recall-own phase, when 
participants recall their initial ideas, source-mon-
itoring judgements are required. Participants need 
to first determine whether an idea is an old idea 
and second to establish who initially generated it. 
However, when generating new ideas, less differ-
entiated information is required as participants 
can rely on judgements of item familiarity (Dod-
son & Johnson, 1996; Johnson et al., 1993). 
Therefore, due to the extended use of source 
monitoring during the recall-own phase, levels of 
unconscious plagiarism are sensitive to factors 
related to the attributes of the memory repre-
sentations. Landau and Marsh (1997) demon-
strated this by manipulating the representations of 
self-generated and computer-generated informa-
tion. Initially, memory representations were made 
highly confusable by requiring participants to 
guess the computer's responses in addition to 
generating their own ideas. Similar search pro-
cesses and cognitive operations were utilised to 
derive each of the ideas and so information from 
both the sources was more difficult to differ-
entiate. Consequently, rates of unconscious pla-
giarism in the recall-own phase increased. 
However, rates of plagiarism in the generate-new 
phase remained unchanged. This was because the 
ideas were familiar and could easily be rejected as 
new ideas. Conversely, when perceptual differ-
entiation was manipulated and the two sources 
were made easy to distinguish, unconscious 
plagiarism in the recall-own phase was reduced. 
This finding has subsequently been replicated 
by Macrae et al. (1999) who found that source 
confusion manipulations at encoding and 
retrieval increased unconscious plagiarism in the 
recall-own phase but did not increase generative 
errors. 
A neglected area of research that is likely to 
impact on source judgement is the effect of par-
ticipant elaboration following exposure to an idea. 
Elaboration might involve thinking about, evalu-
ating, or developing the idea after the initial 
generation phase, but before test. Real-life plagi-
arists inevitably think about appropriated ideas 
and accordingly invest considerable lime and 
effort into these ideas. The aim of the present 
work is to explore the possibility that it is this 
process that is responsible for a plagiarist main-
taining their belief in the originality of their work. 
A number of findings suggest that elaboration 
should have an impact on rates of unconscious 
plagiarism. For example, imagination inflation 
research (e.g., Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sher-
man, 1996) demonstrates that a false belief that a 
fictional event has occurred is created by repeated 
imagination experiences concerning event infor-
mation and detail. During this process, and over 
time, participants come to believe that the ima-
gined event actually occurred. There have been 
similar results documented within the domain of 
eyewitness memory. Repeatedly interviewing a 
witness increases their confidence in their testi-
mony, even for erroneous details (Shaw. 1996). 
Elaboration processes are anticipated to be an 
important component of unconscious plagiarism 
and provide the focus for this paper. Two specific 
forms of elaboration were examined. TTie first was 
elaboration based on the idea itself. In this con-
dition, participants were required to rate how 
easily the idea could be visualised and how 
effective an idea it was. In depth of processing 
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terms (Craik & Lockharl, 1972), this would be 
regarded as deep processing since it requires both 
the formation of an image and the consideration 
of the meaning of the idea. However, crucially, it 
does not involve the participant developing the 
idea in any way. The second form of elaboration 
did just that. In this condition, participants were 
required lo think of three ways of improving the 
idea. Because this second form of elaboration 
involves a degree of generation, it will be referred 
to as generative elaboration, to contrast with the 
previously described imagery-elaboration condi-
tion. Given that these forms of elaboration also 
involve being repeatedly exposed to the ideas that 
were previously generated, two control conditions 
were used. In addition to the standard baseline 
condition of single exposure to the generated 
ideas, there was a condition in which ideas were 
re-presented, without any accompanying instruc-
tions to elaborate. This enabled us to rule out 
simple repetition as the basis of any effects 
obser\'ed in these conditions. Also, this permitted 
a comparison to be made between ideas heard 
once and twice. 
The goal was to determine whether these dif-
ferent types of elaboration had differential 
impacts on plagiarism rates. Both fornis of ela-
boration require deeper processing of the original 
ideas and so would be expected to increase the 
idea's strength in memory. Activation strength is 
currently the dominant model used lo explain 
unconscious plagiarism (Bink, Marsh, & Hicks, 
1999; Marsh & Landau, 1995). In this view, higher 
rates of plagiarism are anticipated in the recall-
own task, as items with greater strength arc more 
likely to be plagiarised (Marsh & Landau, 1995). 
Marsh and Bower (1993) suggested that as the 
activation strength of externally generated ideas is 
increased, their activation level becomes closer lo 
that of self-generated ideas and so intrusions of 
plagiarised ideas occur. This view also predicts 
that both forms of elaboration should reduce 
plagiarism, relative to baseline, in the generate-
new tasks. This follows because any increase in 
strength would lead to greater discrimination 
between new and old items, and thus reduce 
intrusions from previously elaborated ideas. Thus 
the simple strength account of unconscious plagi-
arism predicts that elaboration should show a 
dissociation across the two measures of plagiar-
ism, but makes no predictions regarding the two 
forms of elaboration beyond that predicted by 
strength. That is, if one form of elaboration leads 
to stronger memorj- traces, as indexed by higher 
recall, one might consequentially expect to see 
higher rales of plagiarism in the recall-own task, 
and lower rates of plagiarism in the generaie-new 
task in thai condition. 
An alternative viewpoint leads to a different set 
of expectations, however. In line with the source-
monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993), one 
might expect participants to make an attribution 
about an idea that is currently in mind on the basis 
of the qualitative aspects of that idea. That is, a 
person might conclude that a particular idea is new 
because of the cognitive operations that led to it, or 
they may conclude the idea is a memory because of 
its perceptual qualities, or because they also can 
access other ideas associated with the event at 
encoding. In this view, the different forms of ela-
boration might have differential effects on 
unconscious plagiarism because they lead to dif-
ferent kinds of traces being laid down, and so 
different attributions. This difference is likely to 
emerge in the recall-own task. This follows 
because both forms of elaboration would lead to 
greater discrimination from new ideas than control 
items, and so show less unconscious plagiarism in 
the generate-new task. However, in the recall-own 
task, there is likely to be greater overlap between 
the processes of originally generating an idea and 
thinking of ways of improving that idea, than there 
is between originally generating that idea and 
imagining it and rating its quality. This follows 
because generating an idea and thinking of ways of 
improving an idea both involve generative pro-
cesses, and participants may erroneously attribute 
the generation of the ways of improving the idea lo 
the generation of the original idea. 
There may also be scope in such a view for an 
effect due to personal style or personal semantics 
to emerge. That is, participants may think of ways 
of improving an idea that makes it "their kind of 
idea". For example, Person A might generate the 
idea of using a brick as a doorstop. However, 
Person B might think of improving this by dec-
orating the brick using floral-design wallpaper. 
Later, Person B might recall the elaborated idea 
and, focusing on the floral attribute, believe that 
the idea must have been their own, since they 
particulaHy like flowers. This would be a use of 
personal style. An example of personal semantics 
would be if a participant had thought of decorat-
ing the brick so as to match their wallpaper al 
home. Recalling the brick as being decorated in 
the style of one's own home-decor might later be 
taken, erroneously, as evidence that the idea must 
have been one's own. 
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Thus, this view anticipates that elaborative 
encoding instructions that allow participants to 
generate ways of improving an idea will lead to 
substantially more plagiarism in the recall-own 
task than instructions that merely require partici-
pants to imagine an idea and judge it. Even though 
both may lead to memories of the same strength, 
as indexed by correct recall, it is the qualitative 
nature of the traces that will lead to these differ-
ential levels of unconscious plagiarism in the 
recall-own task. 
The present work utilised the original Brown 
and Murphy (1989) paradigm of group generation 
followed by a later test session involving recall of 
old ideas and generation of new ideas. In addition 
to the standard methodology there was also an 
elaboration phase where participants were 
required to think about a subset of the ideas that 
had previously been generated. However, rather 
than using category generation as the original 
group task, the Alternate Uses Test (Christensen 
et al., 1960) was used. This task was selected as it 
has parallels with the category generation task 
but also requires a degree of participant creativ-
ity, within constraints that enable scoring proce-
dures to be employed. This task also has the 
benefit of creating ideas that can be improved 
upon, unlike simple category membership. The 
testing session followed 1 week after the initial 
generation and elaboration stages. The expecta-
tion was that any form of elaboration would lead 
to a reduction of unconscious plagiarism in the 
generate-new task. However, the issue of parti-
cular interest was the rate of plagiarism in the 
recall-own task. Here, the strength account would 
predict that both forms of elaboration would lead 
to increases in unconscious plagiarism, while the 
source-monitoring account would predict that 
unconscious plagiarism would be particularly 
inflated by elaboration that involves thinking of 
idea improvements. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 40 undergraduate students partici-
pated in the generation phase. However, 2 parti-
cipants failed to attend the second testing session 
and so only 38 participants completed the 
experiment. Participants were undergraduates 
from the University of Plymouth and received 
partial fulfilment of a course requirement for their 
participation in this study. 
Procedure 
Four participants were randomly assigned to a 
group and given a seat around a central table. The 
participants were informed that they would hear a 
list of category names (e.g., a newspaper) and they 
would have to think of novel, non-conventional 
uses for the items (e.g., to make a paper hat). After 
the experimenter read aloud the first category 
(either brick, shoe, paper-clip, or button) partici-
pants were instructed one at a time to share their 
idea with the group. The order that participants 
were asked their ideas was denoted by a Latin 
square design. This decreased the likelihood that 
the participant would plagiarise the pereon who 
spoke directly before them, as they could not 
anticipate when they were going to speak (Marsh & 
Bower, 1993). Moreover, explicit instructions sta-
ted that they must listen to all the others' exemplars 
to prevent themselves from generating the same 
ideas as another person. The experimenter recor-
ded all the generated ideas. For each of the four 
categories, each participant generated four novel 
uses. Accordingly, for each category there were 16 
generated exemplars. Examples, of generated ideas 
included "to use buttons to play tiddly winks", "to 
use a shoe as a flower pot", and "to use a paperclip 
to decorate a picture frame". 
The elaboration phase immediately followed 
the generation phase. Of the previously generated 
ideas, a quarter (one idea from each participant, 
from each category) was then subject to the fol-
lowing condition treatments. For the imagery-
elaboration ideas participants rated the ideas on 5-
point rating scales for how easy they were to 
imagine (/ = difficuii to imagine, 5 = easy to ima-
gine) and how effective they thought the ideas 
would be (/ = not effective, 5 = very effective). For 
the generative-elaboration ideas participants 
wrote down three ways to improve the given idea. 
For the re-presented items participants heard the 
ideas a second time but were not instructed to 
elaborate them in any way. Control ideas were not 
re-presented at this stage. 
The order in which participants performed 
these tasks was counterbalanced across the 
groups. The experimenter read these ideas aloud 
in a predetermined random order, instructing the 
participants to rate, elaborate, or listen to the idea, 
as appropriate. This task completed the first ses-
sion, which lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
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One week later, participants returned to com-
plete the recall-own and generate-new phases 
individually on computer. In the recall-own phase, 
participants were shown the four category head-
ings (e.g., brick) that they had previously gener-
ated to in the first session, with four blank spaces 
under each. The categories were displayed one by 
one in a random order for each participant. Par-
ticipants were instructed to type in all of their own 
ideas from the first session (16 ideas). Recall was 
not timed or forced. If participants could not 
remember all of their ideas, then they were per-
mitted to leave blank spaces. Once this had been 
completed, the same category headings were 
repeated in a random order. However, partici-
pants were asked to generate four completely new 
uses for each category that had not been pre-
viously generated (in any of the categories). If 
participants failed to enter four ideas, a message 
was displayed alerting them that they had not 
provided four ideas and could not proceed until all 
the ideas had been typed in. This session lasted 
approximately 20 minutes. 
Results 
Unconscious plagiarism was scored if an idea was 
identical or very similar to an idea previously 
generated by another participant (e.g., use brick as 
a doorstop or use a brick to wedge a door open). 
Furthermore, if a recalled/generated idea was 
identical or very similar to a previous idea from a 
different category, the idea was scored as an 
instance of unconscious plagiarism. Inclusion of 
these ideas did not alter the pattern or significance 
of the results. Responses were categorised inde-
pendently by two raters. In the recall-own phase 
the raters indicated whether the ideas were cor-
rectly recalled, plagiarised, or new ideas (that 
were not generated in the initial phase). In the 
generate-new phase, raters determined whether 
the ideas were new. plagiarised, or duplicated 
ideas (i.e., ideas that appeared in the generate new 
phase more then once). The inter-rater agreement 
across all the ideas was 98.7%. Discrepancies 
occurred when ideas from the generation phase 
were similar to ideas produced as new ideas, for 
example "to use button as eyes on a teddy bear" 
and "to use buttons as eyes on a snowman". In 
instances such as these, the idea was not classified 
as being plagiarised. However, there were very 
few examples like these and all were resolved by 
discussion. 
All of the participants exhibited an uncon-
sciously plagiarised error in al least one of the 
phases (recall-own or generate-new). The overall 
numbers of ideas correctly recalled and uncon-
sciously plagiarised in each of the tasks are sum-
marised in Table I . 
Correct recall 
In total, 460 ideas were reported. Of these ideas 
331 ideas (72%) were correctly recalled, where 
each participant on average correctly recalled 
(i.e., did not plagiarise) 8.7 {SD = 2.5) of their 
initial ideas. The top row of Table 1 shows the 
effects of elaboration on correct recall. A within-
subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of ela-
boration status on participants' performance, F(3, 
111) = 10.26,;? < .01. Multiple pairwise compar-
T A B L E 1 
Experiment 1 
Elaboration status 
Control Re-presented Imagery elaboration Generative elaboration 
Task Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Recall 1.42" 1.13 2.24" 1.24 2.63" 0.97 2.42" 0.9S 
U P ( R O ) 0.53' 0.73 0.63* 1.05 0.55' 0.76 1.7*" 1.8 
U P ( G N ) 0.95" 1.01 1.03' 0.8S 0.39" 0.72 0.61'" 0.89 
Expcrimcnl 1; Mean rates of correct recall and plagiarism within the recall-own ( R O ) & generate-new ( O N ) phases for control 
ideas, ideas that were repeated and Ideas the were subject to imagery elaboration and generative elaboration. 
Means within a row that share the same superscript letter do not significantly differ from one another (p < .05 after Sidak 
adjustment). 
Recall = Correctly recalled ideas in the recall-own task. 
U P ( R O ) = Unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own task. 
U P ( G N ) = Unconscious plagiarism in the generate-new task. 
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isons between means were conducted, with a 
Sidak-adjusted alpha level of .05. These revealed 
that the baseline condition was significantly lower 
than all the remaining conditions, which did not 
differ. This lack of difference suggests that ima-
gery elaboration and generative elaboration pro-
duced memories of equivalent strength. 
Unconscious plagiarism 
Recall-own lask. In this task, participants 
were required to remember as many of their own 
initial ideas as possible. Unconscious plagiarism 
occurred when participants recalled someone 
else's idea as their own. A plagiarised idea was 
only counted once. Of the 460 ideas that were 
reported. 129 ideas (28%) were unconsciously 
plagiarised. In the recall-own phase. 79% of par-
ticipants (30 of 38) unconsciously plagiarised al 
least one idea that another group member had 
originally generated in the encoding session. 
Additionally, 57.9% (22 of 38) of participants 
made two or more intrusions. 
A within-subject ANOVA revealed that the 
elaboration manipulation reliably affected rates of 
unconscious plagiarism. F(3.111) = 11.01, p < .001. 
The means are displayed in the second row of 
Table 1. and were compared by Sidak-adjusted 
multiple comparisons as before. These revealed 
that generative-elaborated ideas were plagiarised 
more often than any of the other ideas. Tlierefore, 
conducting generative elaboration during idea 
encoding significantly increased the later plagiar-
ism of those ideas. The remaining means did not 
differ significantly. 
Generate-new task. Participants were 
required to generate four new ideas per category 
cue, but often participants unconsciously plagi-
arised another persons' ideas or inadvertently 
duplicated one of their own previous ideas (self 
plagiarism). In total, 602 ideas were generated and 
of these. 474 (78.7%) were new ideas, 113 (18.8%) 
had previously been generated by someone else, 
and 15 (2.5%) were participants* own ideas that 
they had inadvertently re-presented as new. The 
small remainder were duplicated ideas at test that 
were excluded from the analysis. 
Self-plagiarism. There was a very small number 
of these types of intrusions and there was no sig-
nificant main effect of elaboration status on self-
plagiarism rates, f < 1. 
Unconscious plagiarism. In the generate-new 
phase, 97.4% of participants (37 of 38) plagiarised 
by reprcxlucing an old idea that had been pre-
viously generated by another group member. 
Moreover, 68.4% (26 of 38) made two or more of 
these intrusions. The effects of elaboration on 
rates of these errors can be seen in Table 1. A 
within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of elaboration status on the rate of 
unconscious plagiarism for others' ideas, f"(3. 111) 
- 4.51; p < .05. Follow-up tests were conducted as 
before, and revealed that the mean for the ima-
gery-elaborated ideas was significantly lower than 
both control and re-presented ideas, but that no 
other comparison was significant. 
Discussion 
There were three measures of interest in this 
study. On two of them, recall and plagiarism in the 
generate-new task, there were equivalent levels of 
performance in the two elaboration conditions 
relative to the two control conditions. The only 
difference observed between the two forms of 
elaboration occurred in the rate of unconscious 
plagiarism seen in the recall-own task. In this task, 
generative elaboration led to considerably higher 
rates of plagiarism than imagery elaboration, 
which did not differ from the two control condi-
tions. 
This pattern is interesting for a number of 
reasons. First, the results strongly refute a simple 
strength account. There are two measures of 
memory strength available. The most direct is 
correct recall and on this measure neither form of 
elaboration exceeds the re-presented control. 
More p)ertinently. the two forms of elaboration did 
not differ, with in fact numerically higher recall for 
imagery elaboration. Thus, this measure refutes 
the idea that generative elaboration produces the 
strongest memories. Exactly the same conclusion 
can be drawn from the indirect measure of 
strength, the ability to avoid generate-new plagi-
arisms. Here again the two forms of elaboration 
are not statistically different, although they do 
reduce plagiarism on the generate-new task rela-
tive to either control or re-presented ideas. Fur-
ther, it is the imagery condition that is numerically 
the lowest, suggesting stronger memories than 
generative elaboration. Thus both measures are 
consistent with imagery elaboration producing 
memories that are strong, if not stronger than the 
generative elaboration. Additionally, the gen-
erate-new plagiarism data, although not the recall 
data, suggest that both forms of elaboration pro-
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duce stronger memories lhan re-presentation. 
Finally, both recall and generate-new plagiarism 
data indicate that re-presentation creates stronger 
memories than single prcsenialion. 
Using these measures of strength to predict 
plagiarism in the recall-own data produces a series 
of predictions that are not met. Strength would 
predict more recall-own plagiarism of re-presented 
ideas than control data; this was not found. Nor was 
there the expected increase in plagiarism following 
imagery compared to either re-presented or con-
trol. Conversely, in recall-own plagiarism, whilst 
strength would predict no difference in recall-own 
plagiarism (or perhaps a difference favouring 
imagery elaboration), a large difference favouring 
generative elaboration was found. Thus, a strength 
account is wrong on almost all accounts. 
Whereas a memory strength account cannot 
explain the elevated levels of unconscious plagi-
arism seen in the generative-elaboration condi-
tion, a source-monitoring account readily explains 
this pattern. These data are in tine with the idea 
that participants make attributions about the 
qualitative aspects of ideas that come to mind in 
the recall task. Ideas that were originally gener-
ated by someone else, but have been added to by 
the participant, were more than three limes as 
likely to be plagiarised lhan control ideas or 
imagined ideas, and more than twice as likely lo 
be plagiarised as repeatedly presented ideas. In 
fact, the magnitude of the effect was particularly 
surprising. On average, in the generative-ela-
boration condition, participants recalled an aver-
age of 2.4 items, and plagiarised a further 1.7 
items. Thus, plagiarised items constitute 41% of 
all responses in that condition. Prc\ious studies 
have shown much lower rates of plagiarism, more 
in line with the levels seen in the control condition 
here. The highest rales of plagiarism reported 
previously were those in ihe recall-own phase in 
Macrae et al. (1999). They reported plagiarism 
levels of between 14% and 24%, which are still 
well below the rate in this study. 
There are a number of potential factors that may 
contribule lo ihe high levels of plagiarism seen in 
the present study. This study is the first to use the 
Alternate Uses Task in this manner. Although it is 
not an overly demanding task, there may be certain 
task-specific factors operating that make it difficult 
for participants to complete. For example, the 
ideas may be less discriminabic from each other 
than on some of the previously used tasks. Simi-
larly, the use of an extended delay is not typical of 
the literature, but is consistent with previous work 
showing that delays increase rales of plagiarism 
(Br^dart, Lampinen, & Deleldre, 2003; Brown & 
Halliday, 1991; Macrae et al.. 1999; Marsh et al., 
1996). In addition, the fact that in three out of four 
conditions participants encountered the ideas 
twice may also contribute lo the higher rates of 
plagiarism. Nevertheless, while these factors might 
account for a general increase in plagiarism errors, 
they cannot account for the particular increase 
seen only in the generative-elaboration condition. 
However, because the general levels of plagiarism 
observed in this study were high, there was a 
concern lhat the levels were elevated as a result of 
participants not using a strict enough decision 
criterion to monitor their responses given in the 
recall-own and generate-new phases. Therefore, i l 
was decided to conduct a replication of the study 
with an additional manipulation that encouraged 
participants to think more carefully about their 
answers before making a response. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
This study replicated Experiment 1 except for one 
detail. Participants were offered a financial 
incentive for not plagiarising any previously gen-
erated ideas, in order to encourage them to 
monitor their decision processes more carefully. 
Participants were told that a prize of £50 would be 
shared between all participants who avoided pla-
giarised errors. TTiey were told thai in the previous 
study this would have resulted in two or three 
participants sharing the money. The expectation 
was that this manipulation would encourage par-
ticipants to monitor the source of their ideas 
carefully, and so reduce the overall plagiarism 
rales from Experiment 1. There was no strong 
expectation that this would affect the pattern of 
effects seen previously, although it did allow the 
testing of the possibility that the parliculariy high 
rates for the generative-elaboration items were 
due to this factor. As a manipulation check, par-
ticipants were also asked to rate how hard ihey 
tried to not plagiarise any of the previously given 
ideas at the end of the study. 
Method 
Parf/c/panrs 
A total of 40 undergraduate students partici-
pated in the idea-generation stage of the study. 
However. 4 participants did not attend the second 
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test session and so only 36 participants completed 
the experiment. Participants were undergraduates 
from the University of PI>'mouth and received 
partial fulfilment of a course requirement for their 
participation in this study. None had taken part in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the Experiment 
1, except for the incentive not to plagiarise. Before 
they began, participants were instructed that there 
was a reward available for all the participants who 
did not plagiarise any of the previously generated 
ideas. They were informed that a £50 cash prize 
would be equally split between the participants 
who did not re-produce any ideas from the initial 
session (previously given by themselves or any of 
the other participants). It was made clear that in 
previous studies only 5-10% of participants have 
been able to successfully do this. Consequently, 
their share in the money should be sizeable. At the 
end of the study, participants were asked to indi-
cate how hard they tried to not plagiarise any of 
the previously given ideas using a 5-point rating 
scale from 1 = not hard at all to 5 = very hard. 
Results and discussion 
Unconscious plagiarism was scored in the same 
way as in Experiment 1. The same two raters were 
used and the inter-rater agreement was 99.3%, 
again with discrepancies resolved through discus-
sion. When participants were asked how hard they 
tried to not plagiarise any of the previous ideas, 
86.7% of participants responded with a 4 or 
higher. The mean rating on the 5-poini rating scale 
was 4.4 {SD = 0.9).' Excluding those who had 
given a lower rating than 4 did not alter the results 
and so all the data were retained. The number of 
correctly recalled ideas and the number of plagi-
arised ideas in the generate-new and recall-own 
tasks are given in Table 2. 
Correct recall 
In total, 417 ideas were reported, 347 (83.2%) 
of which were correctly recalled (i.e., not plagi-
arised). Each participant on average correctly 
remembered 9.6 {SD = 2.9) ideas. A within-sub-
jects ANOVA revealed that there was a sig-
nificant main effect of elaboration status on rates 
of recall, F(3, 105) = 7.31, p < .05. Differences 
between the means were examined by Sidak 
multiple comparisons with an adjusted alpha 
level of .05. These revealed that the ideas that 
had received generative elaboration or imagery 
elaboration or had been re-presented were recal-
led more often than control ideas. As in Experi-
ment 1 there were no other significant 
differences, thus providing no evidence for dif-
ferential memory strength as a result of elabora-
tion type. 
TABLE 2 
Experimeni 2 
Elaboration status 
Task 
Control Re-presented Imagery elaboration Generative elaboration 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Recall US' 1.25 2.8" 1.16 2.47" 1.18 2.58" l.O 
U P ( R O ) .25' .50 .31' .82 .47' .81 .92" 1.0 
U P ( G N ) .58- .60 .47' .77 .28' .57 .58' .69 
Experimeni 2: Mean rates of correct recall and plagiarism within the recall-own ( R O ) & generate-new ( G N ) phases for control 
ideas, ideas lhal were repeated and ideas the were subject to imager>' elaboration and generative elaboration. 
Means within a row ihat share the same superscript letter do not significantly differ from one another (p < .05 after Sidalc 
adjustment). 
Recall = Correctly recalled ideas in the recall-own task. 
U P ( R O ) = Unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own task. 
U P ( G N ) = Unconscious plagiarism in the generate-new task. 
' Due lo an administration error, seven participants did not receive this rating scale to complete. 
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Unconscious plagiarism 
Recall-own task. Unconscious plagiarism was 
scored in the same way as in Experiment I . In the 
recall-own phase, of the 417 ideas that were pro-
duced, 70 (16.8%) were unconsciously plagiarised. 
During this task, 75% of participants (27 of 35) 
unconsciously plagiarised at least one idea that 
another group member had originally generated. 
Additionally, 44.7% of participants (17 of 35) 
made two or more intrusions. As shown in Table 
2, the elaboration manipulation reliably affected 
rates of unconscious plagiarism, F(3, 105) = 6.32, 
p < .05. Follow-up tests revealed that the gen-
erative-elaboration ideas were plagiarised at a 
higher rate than baseline ideas, re-presented 
ideas, and the imagery-elaborated ideas. The 
remaining comparisons between cell means were 
not significant. Therefore, as in Experiment 1, 
generative elaboration alone increased the later 
plagiarism of ideas. 
Generate-new task. In total, 563 ideas were 
generated and of these, 481 (85.4%) were new 
ideas, 69 (12.3%) were unconsciously plagiarised 
ideas, and 13 (2.3%) were participants' own ideas 
that they had inadvertently re-presented as new. 
Self-plagiarism. There were a very small num-
ber of these types of intrusions, only 27.8% (10 of 
36) of participants plagiarised one of their cariier 
ideas. Only two participants made more than one 
intrusion. Moreover, there was no significant main 
effect of elaboration status on self-plagiarism 
rates, F < 1. 
Unconscious plagiarism. In the generate-new 
phase, 91.7% of participants (33 of 36) plagiarised 
by reproducing an old idea that had been pre-
viously generated by another group member. 
Moreover, 55.6% (20 of 36) made two or more of 
these types of intrusions. A within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed that there was no significant 
main effect of elaboration status on the rale of 
unconscious plagiarism, F(3, 105) = \.65,p = .182. 
As in Experiment 1, the lowest level of uncon-
sciously plagiarised ideas was in the imagery 
condition. 
Experiment 2 therefore largely achieved its 
aims. Rales of plagiarism were reduced from the 
previous study, although the magnitude of the 
reduction was larger in the recall-own task. 
Overall, in the recall-own task, mean number of 
plagiarised ideas per person dropped from 3.4 
(Experiment 1) to 1.9 (Experiment 2). The 
equivalent figures for the generate-new task were 
3.0 and 1.9. Thus, i l appears that our incentive did 
result in participants making fewer intrusions on 
average. However, interestingly, this effect did not 
translate to the number of participants making 
any kind of plagiarised response. In Experiment 1, 
79% of participants made a plagiarised response 
on the recall-own task, and 97.4% of participants 
did so on the generate-new task. In Experiment 2, 
75% of participants made a plagiarised response 
in the recall-own task, compared lo 91.7% in the 
generate-new task. In fact, in Experiment 2, there 
was no one who met the criterion of totally 
avoiding plagiarised responses. 
Against the background of reduced rales of 
plagiarism, the basic pattern of findings seen in 
Experiment 1 was replicated. In the recall-own 
task, there was a significant effect of elaboration 
type, which was entirely due lo the generalive-
elaboralion condition. Although the mean num-
ber of plagiarised ideas per person dropped from 
1.7 in Experiment I , to 0.9 in Experiment 2, this 
remained at around double the rate seen in the 
other conditions. In contrast, ihe mean number of 
plagiarised responses in the imagery elaboration 
condition was only 0.4, which was in line with (he 
rates seen for re-presenled items (0.3) and control 
items (0.3). 
The effects seen in the generaie-new task were 
less clear-cut, although still in line with the pre-
vious results. In Experiment 1 the ideas that were 
subjected to both the baseline measures (control 
and repealed ideas) were plagiarised significantly 
more than the imager)'-elaborated ideas and 
numerically more than the generative-elaborated 
ideas. However, in the second experiment, there 
was a significant reduction in the plagiarism in the 
control and re-presenled condition compared lo 
Experiment 1, and consequently there was little 
difference between the plagiarism levels across 
the manipulation of elaboration. However, once 
again the lowest rate of plagiarism was seen in the 
imagery-elaboration condition, again suggesting 
thai imagery produces strong memories. 
As before, a strength account cannot account 
for these data. The recall data suggest that control 
items are weaker that the other three kinds of 
item, which do not differ. Numerically, the highest 
recall is seen for re-presented items. The plagiar-
ism data in the generate-new phase suggest no 
differences in strength but numerically i l is ima-
gery elaboration that minimises plagiarism lo the 
greatest degree. Thus, neither measure suggests 
that generative-elaboration produces "strong" 
memories, but it is this condition that shows 
570 S T A R K . P E R F E C T . N E W S T E A D 
double the rate of plagiarism in the recall-own 
task, compared lo the other conditions. 
One pattern that is hard to explain is why the 
incentive manipulation only reduces plagiarism in 
the control and re-prescnted conditions. Cleariy a 
simple threshold shift that might be utilised in a 
strength model such as a signal detection theory 
cannot explain this finding. However, since our 
main focus was on comparison of the two forms of 
elaboration, this pattern was not central to the 
current argument. What is pertinent is the repli-
cation of the pattern of reduced generate-new 
plagiarism for imagery compared to generative 
elaboration in Experiment 2. Although neither 
study showed a significanl difference, overall 
generate-new plagiarism following imagery was 
about half that seen for generative elaboration. As 
we argued above, if the ability lo reject ideas as 
being old rests on a measure of strength then this 
pattern would be consistent with imagery ela-
boration producing stronger memories. This pat-
tern therefore serves only lo strengthen the claim 
that the increased plagiarism for recall-own fol-
lowing generative elaboration could nol be due to 
strength. Of course it is also possible that plagi-
arism in the generate-new task does not stem from 
strength alone. There may also be a meiacognitive 
component such that participants apply a "mem-
ory criterion" (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002) lo gen-
erated ideas. Thus, when an idea comes to mind, 
any associated imagery thai is produced might 
lead to the conclusion thai the idea is old and 
should be rejected. On the assumption thai ihc 
imagery-elaboration condition creates more visual 
traces, this might explain why fewer generate new 
ideas arc plagiarised following imager)'. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Overall the financial incentive used in Experiment 
2 resulted in few systematic changes between the 
experiments. Both experiments produced sub-
stantial rales of unconscious plagiarism. Although 
the extent lo which participants plagiarised was 
reduced in Experiment 2, relative to Experiment 
1, the results from each experiment followed lar-
gely the same pattern. In both, elaboration status 
influenced correct recall, with poorest perfor-
mance in the control condition. For plagiarism in 
the recall-own task, both experiments showed that 
only generative elaboration caused elevated levels 
of plagiarism. For plagiarism in the generate-new 
task, the pattern was less consistent. In Experi-
ment 1 only imagery elaboration decreased pla-
giarism relative to the baselines, while in 
Experiment 2 plagiarism of the baseline ideas was 
reduced and there were no significanl differences 
between conditions. Taken together, these results 
are inconsistent with a strength-based account of 
unconscious plagiarism, and are more supportive 
of a source-monitoring account of unconscious 
plagiarism errors. 
Marsh and Bower (1993 see also Brown & 
Murphy, 1989; Marsh & Landau, 1995) originally 
suggested lhat in the recall-own task participants 
plagiarise ideas that have a high activation 
strength. They maintained that increasing the 
activation level of externally generated ideas 
makes these ideas more comparable to self-gen-
erated ideas. Therefore, the ''overlap" between 
the ideas increases, and accordingly so does the 
rate of unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own 
phase. Conversely, increasing activation strength 
allows ideas lo be rejected as old in a generalc-
new task, and so would be expected lo lower 
plagiarism when new responses are required. 
Our strategy in interpretation of our data to 
lest these ideas has been lo lake the recall per-
formance as an indicator of memory strength, and 
use this to make predictions about plagiarism 
rales in the two tasks. Clearly, given that there 
were no significant differences between the forms 
of elaboration in the two studies, a simple strength 
model fails lo account for our data because recall 
did nol differ between either of the elaboration 
methods but plagiarism in the recall-own tasks 
did. The same arguments apply lo comparisons 
involving the re-presented ideas. A strength 
hypothesis would also have predicted that re-
presentation, which improved recall, would also 
have increased plagiarism in the recall-own task 
relative to baseline, but it did not. 
If one adopts a similar strategy, and takes pla-
giarism in the generate-new condition as a proxy 
measure of strength, one runs into similar diffi-
culties. Assuming that stronger memories are 
easier to reject as old in the generate-new task, but 
harder to distinguish from old in the recall-own, 
leads to the prediction that the two forms of pla-
giarism should be negatively correlated across 
conditions. This is cleariy nol the case. For 
instance, in Experiment 2, generative elaboration 
leads to numerically ihe highest rales of plagiar-
ism in both tasks. Thus, however we oper-
ationalise memory strength, our data do nol seem 
to conform to the predictions from the strength 
hypothesis. 
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One surprising aspect of the data in these stu-
dies was performance in the re-presented ideas 
condition. Merely re-presenting ideas, without 
instructions to elaborate in any way, had a sub-
stantial impact on rates of correct recall. In fact, in 
both experiments recall rates for this condition did 
not differ from the elaboration conditions, and 
were significantly higher than control ideas. 
However, given the increased recall seen in this 
condition, it is important to note that this was not 
refiected in higher rates of unconscious plagiarism 
in the recall-own task. CIcariy our re-presentation 
control condition involves presenting participants 
with ideas to hear again, in the context of other 
ideas that they are being asked to imagine/elabo-
rate. It would be naive to assume that participants 
do not carry over some of the processing from the 
elaboration conditions to the re-presented ideas. 
What impact is this likely to have had? Foremost it 
can only serve to reduce differences in processing 
between the re-presented and the other condi-
tions. If we were able to demonstrate robust 
effects, this would suggest that perhaps the effects 
we obtained are underestimates of the true effects. 
We were able lo explore this issue by compar-
ing those ideas that were re-heard before any 
elaboration instructions were given, with those 
that followed either the imagery or generative 
elaboration. For correct recall and generate-new 
plagiarism there were no significant effects of 
presentation order in either experiment. How-
ever, for unconscious plagiarism in the recall-own 
phase, order was significant, f (2 , 35) = 4.73, p < 
.02, with re-hcard ideas presented first producing 
0.36 plagiarisms, ideas following imagery rating 
0.27, and those following generative elaboration 
1.33. Thus, these data mimic exactly the pattern 
seen in the full data set, suggesting that those who 
carry out generative elaboration first carry this 
over to listening, and hence produce more plagi-
arisms. Those who begin with imagery' elaboration 
show no such effect. The same broad pattern was 
observed in Experiment 2 (listen first 0.07, image 
first 0.25, generative elaboration first 0.70), but 
this did not reach statistical significance, F{\, 35) = 
1.83, p < .18. Thus together the data suggest that 
listening a second time does not increase plagiar-
ism, compared to baseline, except when preceded 
by the generative-elaboration instruction. 
There are a number of potential reasons why 
generative elaboration increased plagiarism in the 
recall-own task. One, in line with the source-
monitoring framework, is that the different forms 
of elaboration resulted in qualitatively different 
kinds of traces being laid down at encoding. When 
participants generated their ways of improving an 
original idea, they will have stored a record of the 
associated cognitive operations (Johnson & Raye, 
1981; Johnson et al., 1993) that went into gen-
erating those improvements. It is this additional 
information (including the quality and detail) at 
recall that assists the participant in distinguishing 
between internally and externally generated ideas 
and inferring their origin (Johnson & Raye, 1981). 
During generative elaboration, participants may 
have carried out processes similar to those 
involved in generation of ideas in the first 
instance. Consequently, the memory representa-
tions would resemble the representations of their 
own ideas. Thus, at recall when source-monitoring 
judgements are made, if the perceptual detail for 
an externally generated idea is lacking but there is 
an abundance of associated cognitive operations, 
then the sources of the two ty'pes of ideas may be 
confused (Landau & Marsh. 1997; Marsh & 
Bower, 1993). Such a process would result in the 
original sources of the idea being misplaced and 
others' ideas incorrectly claimed to have been self-
generated. Conversely, processes used in con-
structing images and rating the quality of ideas do 
not resemble those utilised in generation, and so 
the representations will not be confused al test. 
This idea is consistent with past research (Landau 
& Marsh, 1997; Macrae et al.. 1999; Marsh & 
Landau. 1995). 
These additional cognitive operations seen in 
the generative-elaboration condition may also 
involve some element of personal style or perso-
nal semantics that ser\'c as a semantic cue. In 
reality monitoring literature, it is well documented 
that internal and external events differ (see 
Johnson & Raye, 1981) and internal memories 
provide additional cues lhal allow the origins of 
the ideas to be distinguished. Johnson and Raye 
(2000) maintain that the source of information is 
not stored with a memory but is inferred through 
an automatic heuristic process thai is based on an 
evaluation of various information features. 
Therefore this additional personal information 
may incorrectly influence participants' source 
monitoring judgements. 
While participants were performing generative 
elaboration by devising novel uses for ideas, they 
may have associated personally relevant infor-
mation to the idea. Other participants' ideas may 
have cued memories of times when they have seen 
or used the item in that way (e.g., lo use a shoe to 
hide money in). As a result of thinking about and 
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improving the idea, the source may be confused 
and the idea may feel more personally relevant. 
What is personally relevant might consist of per-
sonal semantics (e.g., remembering using their 
shoe to hide money) or personal style (e.g.. thai 
they are the kind of person who hides money). 
This familiar style of the idea may be achieved 
through participants re-working the idea 
throughout the elaboration period. The effort 
exerted may serve to change the expression of that 
idea to fit the person's own style. Consequently, 
when the participant later recalls the idea, they 
may remember the personally relevant informa-
tion, or recall the idea in a way that is familiar, 
natural, and in their own style. This idiosyncratic 
information may then serve as a misleading dis-
criminative cue, and hence participants may 
erroneously decide that the idea was something 
that they had originally generated. Such effects 
would not occur with ideas that were merely rated 
or imagined because they are not so closely tied to 
self, or self-style. Therefore it is not the strength or 
effort perse that is responsible for the increase in 
recalled intrusions but rather the nature and kind 
of elaboration. 
This research was motivated by trying lo 
understand real-world plagiarism. Across two 
studies, the results indicated that generative ela-
boration has a powerful effect on plagiarism rates 
when people later tr>' to recall their own ideas. 
These data suggest that real-worid conditions that 
require people lo take ideas and work on them are 
likely to result in those people coming to believe 
that the original idea was their own. This may 
therefore constitute a possible mechanism by 
which creative artists, who may have worked on 
and invested considerable time and effort into a 
basic idea, may come lo believe someone else's 
idea is their own. Moreover, the results from 
Experiment 2 suggest that this process may occur 
even when people are warned about plagiarism 
and are consciously trying to avoid it. 
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Abstract 
Unconscious plagiarism occurs when individuals claim previously experienced ideas as 
their own. Using an adaptation of Brown and Murphy's (1989) 3-stage paradigm, 
participant elaboration was investigated using the Alternate Uses Test at generation. 
Following generation, ideas were imagined and rated (imagery-elaboration), improved in 3 
ways (generative-elaboration), improved by another participant and then imagined and 
rated (rich imagery-elaboration) or not re-presented. A week later, participants recalled 
their original ideas and generated-new ideas. Relative to control, elaborating or imagining 
an idea previously generated by someone else improved recall and reduced plagiarism in 
the generate-new task. However, in the recall-own task, generative-elaboration alone led 
to high levels of plagiarism in the recall-own task. Consequently, it is the generative 
nature of the elaboration performed on an idea that influences later idea appropriation. 
Elaboration Inflation: How Your Ideas Become Mine 
Memories are not objective snapshots of the past but rather subjective 
reconstructions of events that are vulnerable to post-event Infomnation (Loftus & Pickrell, 
1995). Misinformation provided after an event may be integrated into a person's memory, 
modifying his or her belief of what was personally experienced. While these modifications 
may be relatively minor (e.g. a stop sign becoming a yield sign: Loftus, Miller & Burns, 
1978) or more acute (e.g. Nourkova, Bernstein & Loftus, 2004), distinguishing the sources 
of these facts without corroboration can be extremely difficult (Loftus, 2002). Moreover, 
post-event suggestion can plant and create entirely false memories (see Loftus & 
Bernstein. 2005 for a summary) for traumatic events (Porter. Yuille & Lehman. 1999). 
unlikely events (Mazzoni. Loftus & Kirsch, 2001) and even impossible events (Braun. Ellis 
& Loftus, 2002). 
Similar false memories have been observed In twin studies, where one twin is 
involved in an event but where both claim ownership of the event memory (Sheen, Kemp 
& Rubin, 2001). The nature of the events in question may vary from mundane events 
(Kuntay. Gulgoz & Tekcan, 2004) to quite significant events such as running away from 
home (Sheen, Kemp & Rubin, 2001). However, with no experimental intervention, one 
twin may come to possess a false belief. What may have caused this error? A 
conceptually related type of source confusion occurs in unconscious plagiarism when 
individuals assume ownership of ideas that are not their own. Indeed one could argue that 
one of the twins has plagiarised the other's memories. In both real life and in the 
laboratory, people unconsciously plagiarise experienced information by reproducing it 
under the illusion that it Is new, or that they originally produced it. This phenomenon has 
particular implications for those who work in a creative discipline and strive to produce 
something high-quality and novel. Plagiarism cases have emerged that span time and 
disciplines, from Freud's theory of bisexuality (1960) to recent music copyright 
infringement cases (e.g. Three Boys Music V. Michael Bolton, 2000) \ 
Empirical studies based on Brown and Murphy's (1989) 3-stage paradigm have 
consistently demonstrated that participants can be induced to plagiarise in the lab. The 
Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d. 477 (9th Cir. 2000) 
procedure involves an initial generation-phase where participants complete a generative 
task, such as category generation (see Brown & Murphy. 1989; Brown & Halliday, 1991; 
Macrae. Bodenhausen & Calvini. 1999). puzzle tasks (Marsh & Bower. 1993) or a 
brainstorming session (Marsh, Landau & Hicks, 1997). Following generation, participants 
try to recall their previous contributions and then generate-new exemplars/solutions that 
were not previously given. Plagiarism occurs when participants unintentionally reproduce 
previous, externally generated ideas as either their own (recall-own phase) or new ideas 
(generate-new phase). Initially Brown and Murphy found levels of plagiarism in each task 
at around 7-10% and 9-14% respectively. However, these rates are inflated when 
creative tasks are implemented (Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh, et al. 1997) and when 
retention-intervals separate generation and testing (Brown & Halliday, 1991). 
Landau and Marsh (1997) have demonstrated that manipulations can affect 
plagiarism in the recall-own and generate-new task differently due to different memorial 
processes being utilised in each. In the generate-new phase, participants need to make a 
judgement that resembles an old new judgement as they must refrain from presenting an 
old idea as new. In this phase, activation strength may guide performance as an increase 
in strength would lead to greater discrimination between old and new ideas (Marsh & 
Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1997). However, in the recall-own task, an additional 
source evaluation is required to verify an idea's origin. The participants must determine 
whether an *old' idea was originally produced by themselves or another someone else. 
The source monitoring framework suggests that individuals assign source on the basis of 
the experiential details associated with their memories. These details differ in type and 
kind and may be contingent upon the initial encoding processes (Johnson, Hashtroudi & 
Lindsay, 1993). For example, while perceived information may be perceptually rich as a 
result of seeing the information first hand, dreamt information may be more cognitively rich 
as a result of the processes engaged throughout dream construction (Johnson. 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Fundamentally, factors that reduce the efficiency of 
source-monitoring such as source similarity (Landau & Marsh, 1997) and cognitive 
distraction at encoding or testing (Macrae, et al. 1999) only increase plagiarism in the 
recall-own phase. More recently. Stark, Perfect and Newstead (2005) have demonstrated 
that additional processing between encoding and testing also hampers later source-
monitoring. 
Stark. Perfect and Newstead's (2005) rationale for their approach stemmed from 
the fact that real-world plagiarism undoubtedly involves prolonged idea attention rather 
than a single exposure. In their study participants initially generated novel-uses for 
objects such as a button (e.g. use as counters) and then either devised ways to improve 
generated ideas (e.g. colour-code them), temied generative-elaboration, or rated idea 
imaginability. termed imagery-elaboration. An increase in recall-own plagiarism was only 
observed following generative-elaboration. That is, participants only claimed others' ideas 
as their own after devising idea-improvement and not after forming a mental image. Stark 
et al. argued that a strength-based account cannot explain this finding since imagery-
elaboration actually produced as strong memories as generative-elaboration, as 
measured by correct recall and reduction in generate-new plagiarism. Instead they 
favoured a source-monitoring account (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993) maintaining 
that processes employed in generative-elaboration may resemble those used In the 
original generation-phase and consequently representations of improved ideas may reflect 
those of internally generated ideas. 
Findings from the imagination inflation literature suggest that imagining a fictitious 
event can increase one's confidence that a simple (Garry, Manning, Loftus & Sherman, 
1996) or complex (Wright, Loftus & Hall, 2001) event occurred. Moreover, imagining 
common and bizarre actions increases confidence that those actions were performed 
(Thomas & Loftus, 2002). Although the precise mechanisms responsible for this effect 
are unclear, Garry and Polaschek (2000) suggested that the act of imagination evokes 
detailed mental images or increased familiarity that later results in source confusion and 
increased certainty in event reality. However, more recently simple exposure to an event 
by solving anagrams (Bernstein. Whittlesea & Loftus, 2002), paraphrasing (Sharman, 
Garry & Beuke, 2004) or even explaining event information without specific imagination 
has also been demonstrated to induce this 'imagination' inflation effect (Sharman, 
Manning & Gan7. 2005). Hence, these findings can be more effectively explained using a 
processing fluency account. If the familiarity induced by imagination or exposure is 
incorrectly attributed to a prior experience rather than the experimental manipulation, then 
a misattribution is made. Consequently, the lack of an imagery effect in Starts, Perfect and 
Newstead's (2005) study is surprising if familiarity per se can cause source-monitoring 
errors. One possibility is that their lack of an imagery effect on plagiarism rates in the 
recall-own phase was a consequence of the imagery-elaboration condition not constituting 
a strong enough Imagination* manipulation to drive processing fluency. The intensity of 
the imagination manipulation provides the focus of the current paper. 
In this study, the two types of elaboration used in Stari<, Perfect and Newstead 
(2005) were retained; imagery-elaboration (imaginability ratings) and generative-
elaboration (idea improvements) while a third elaboration condition was included that 
attained a more detailed mental image of the ideas which we termed rich imagery-
elaboration. Here participants imagined and rated the original ideas together with the 
improvements that were previously provided by another participant. Since the ideas that 
one participant generates are later imagined by another participant, any differences in 
plagiarism cannot be due to idea content. There was also a baseline condition where 
ideas received no elaboration. Our expectation was to replicate the findings of Stari<, 
Perfect and Newstead (2005) regarding inflated levels of plagiarism in the recall-own 
phase with the generative-elaboration but not imagery-elaboration alone. 
However, the imagination of ideas elaborated by others provides an interesting 
test case. On the one hand, these Ideas are elaborated in more depth and are likely to 
result in richer images than either imagery-elaboration or control. Consequently, this 
additional processing may sufficiently strengthen familiarity or processing fluency and 
induce source confusion. Accordingly, both generative-elaboration and rich imagery-
elaboration should show higher plagiarism than imagery-elaboration and control. On the 
other hand, forming images of others' elaborations or improvements involves no 
generation. Therefore, while the memory characteristics of improved ideas (generative-
elaborated ideas) may resemble the cognitive operations of self-generated ideas, the 
memory characteristics of rich imagery-elaboration ideas would instead contain enhanced 
perceptual information. Consequently, at recall, this difference in distinctive information 
may aid source identification and specifically reduce the likelihood of self-appropriation. In 
this source-monitoring view, only generative-elaboration should produce elevated 
plagiarism relative to rich imagery-elaboration, Imagery-elaboration and control. As In 
Stark, Peri'ect and Newstead (2005). elaboration of any kind Is expected to strengthen 
memories and so Increase correct recall (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and decrease 
plagiarisms in the generate-new phase, relative to control items. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth participated in 
return for partial fulfilment of a course requirement. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in pairs. The experimenter individually read aloud 
category names (e.g. brick, shoe, paper-clip and button) and participants generated 4 
novel, non-conventional uses for each item (e.g. brick as a door-stop). Additionally, the 
experimenter contributed 8 novel uses for each category that were randomly selected 
from a pool of ideas given in Starts, Perfect and Newstead (2005). Participants were 
explicitly instructed to listen to all the ideas to prevent them from re-production. Ideas 
were given in a pre-determined random order and the experimenter recorded all the ideas. 
Following this generation-phase, participants completed a 5 minute picture-puzzle 
distracter task while the experimenter wrote down the to-be-elaborated ideas (from the 
generation-phase) in each participant's booklet. A quarter of the ideas (one idea from 
each participant, per object) were subject to each of the following conditions. For the 
imagery-elaboration ideas, participants rated the ideas on five-point rating scales for 
imaginability (1-difficult to imagine, 5=easy to imagine) and effectiveness {1=not effective, 
5=very effective). For the generative-elaboration ideas, participants wrote down three 
ways to improve a different sub-set of ideas. For the rich imagery-elaboration ideas, 
participants imagined the ideas (in a pre-determined random order) that their partner had 
just improved (generative-elaborated). To ensure each idea and improvement was read 
participants rated the ideas subsequent imaginability and effectiveness. Baseline ideas 
were not re-presented. 
One week later, participants completed the recall-own phase. The four category 
headings (e.g. brick) from the first session were shown. In a random order with four blank 
spaces. Participants wrote down the ideas that /rtey generated in the first session (recall 
was not forced). Then, in the generate-new phase, the category names were randomly 
re-presented and participants generated 4 new uses for each. 
Results 
Recall-own task 
In the recall own phase, participants were asked to recall as many of the 16 ideas that 
they initially proposed in the generation phase (four ideas per object). These results are 
reported in terms of the number of ideas that were correctly recalled and unconsciously 
plagiarised. 
Correct Recall: In total. 403 ideas were reported of which 286 ideas (71.0%) were 
correctly recalled. Participants correctly recalled (i.e. did not plagiarise) a mean of 9.0 
(SD = 2.61) of their initial ideas (16 in total). A within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of elaboration status on recall performance. F(3,93)= 7.54; p<.001, as illustrated In 
Table 1. Multiple pair-wise comparisons were conducted, with a Sidak-adjusted alpha 
level of .05. These comparisons revealed significantly fewer baseline ideas were recalled 
compared to elaborated ideas. However, there were no differences in recall performance 
between the different kinds of elaboration. 
Table 1 about here. 
Unconscious Plagiarism: If participants incorrectly reported an idea that was the 
same or similar to one from the initial phase (partner/experimenter given) the idea was 
classed as a plagiarised intrusion (e.g. paperclip hair slide or paperclip hair grip). The 
inter-rater reliability between two independent-raters' judgements of what constituted 
plagiarism was 98.7% with the discrepancies resolved by discussion. Of the 403 reported 
ideas. 116 ideas (28.8%) were plagiarised. Additionally, 75.0% of participants (24 of 32) 
unconsciously plagiarised at least one idea from the generation-phase while 71.9% (23 of 
32) made two or more intrusions. 
A within-subject ANOVA revealed that the elaboration manipulation reliably 
affected rates of unconscious plagiarism F(3,93)=12.61, p<.001. The means are 
displayed in the second row of Table 1. and multiple comparisons conducted as before. 
The analysis revealed that all of the elaborated ideas (generative-elaborated, imagery-
elaborated and rich imagery-elaborated) were plagiarised more often than the control but 
generative-elaborated ideas were plagiarised significantly more than any of the other 
ideas. Crucially, there was no difference between the two forms of imagery-elaborated 
ideas. Therefore, conducting generative-elaboration during idea encoding significantly 
increased the later plagiarism of those ideas, but imagining already elaborated ideas did 
not. 
Generate-new task 
When participants generated new ideas, plagiarism was scored when a previously 
generated idea was mistakenly reproduced. In total, 495 ideas were given, 379 (76.6%) 
were new, 99 (20.0%) were previously generated by someone else and 17 (3.4%) were a 
participant's own inadvertent reproductions. The small remainder were duplicated ideas 
at test that were excluded from the analysis. 
Unconscious plagiarism; 90.6% of participants (29 of 32) re-presented an idea from the 
generation-phase and 84.4% (27 of 32) presented two or more of these old ideas. The 
effects of elaboration on rates of these errors can be seen in Table 1. The baseline ideas 
were plagiarised numerically more than any of the elaborated ideas but, a within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed that this difference was not significant F(3,93)=1.68, p=.177. 
Discussion 
Performing both imagery-elaboration and generative-elaboration during the 
retention interval increased the rate of correctly recalled ideas and simultaneously 
reduced the rate of generate-new plagiarisms. The only observed difference was in the 
plagiarism rates in the recall-own task, with generative-elaboration resulting in elevated 
levels of plagiarism, as in Stark, Perfect and Newstead (2005). 
The key measure of interest here was the rich imagery-elaboration, where 
participants rated and imagined already improved ideas. Crucially, these ideas were 
matched in content with the generative-elaboration condition, unlike in Stark, et al. (2005). 
As expected this rich imagery-elaboration resulted in a comparable increase in correct 
recall and decrease in generate-new plagiarism relative to the generative-elaboration and 
imagery-elaboration. However, in the recall-own task the observed level of plagiarism did 
not differ from the imagery-elaboration condition. So, although constructing a rich mental 
image may have increased activation-strength or familiarity of the rich imagery-elaboration 
ideas, it did not increase the likelihood of participants appropriating another's idea. 
Therefore, plagiarism was contingent upon participants' self-generation of idea 
improvements. Simply imagining another's idea improvements for those same ideas did 
not result in a comparable plagiarism. Consequently, while familiarity misattribution may 
explain how fictional events may be "personally experienced as real memories" (Loftus & 
Bernstein, 2005, p110), here, in a plagiarism domain, increased familiarity cannot explain 
how individuals incorrectly come to believe that ideas originating elsewhere were their 
own. In this study, despite all classes of elaborated ideas (Imagery, rich-imagery and 
generative elaborated) being equally familiar they were not equally plagiarised. 
These data can be explained in tenns of the source-monitoring framework 
(Johnson. Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993) and therefore adhere to Stark, Perfect and 
Newstead's (2005) source-monitoring account of unconscious plagiarism. Generating 
improvements to an idea shares cognitive operations with the process whereby 
participants originally generate an idea. Thus at recall, if participants use cognitive 
operations to decide source (Johnson, et al. 1993), then generative-elaboration will lead to 
error (as thought processes may resemble those utilised In own idea generation) and 
hence self-appropriation of another's idea. Such errors would not be observed with 
imagined ideas due to the lack of generative cognitive operations (associated with 
generative-elaborated ideas) but presence of rich perceptual information (lacked by 
generative-elaborated ideas). Consequently, at recall, these memory charactehstics may 
aid performance and simultaneously help prevent imagery-elaborated and rich imagery-
elaborated ideas from being incon-ectly presented as self generated ideas. 
The magnitude of the rates of plagiarism that we observed in the recall-own task, 
are worth emphasising. In the control condition, which used the basic 3-stage paradigm 
of Brown and Murphy (1989), we observed a plagiarism rate of 1 1 % which is in line with 
previous reports (e.g. Brown & Murphy (1989). 7-14% ; Brown & Halliday. (1991). 13%). 
However, following generative-elaboration, this figure rose to 38%, which is more in line 
with Stark, Perfect and Newstead (2005) who found 4 1 % . Hence, this Is a powerful effect 
with potential real world relevance. 
These findings add to the growing evidence that memories are not objective but 
vulnerable and fallible. There is a wealth of research that demonstrates that post event 
manipulations may modify a person's belief of what was personally experienced (see 
Ayres & Reder, 1998 for a review) or may create a false belief that something happened 
when it did not (see Loftus & Bernstein, 2005). However, this study demonstrated that 
post-event manipulations may also alter a person's belief that an idea was his or her own 
(self-generated) when it was not. 
When something novel is devised from information originating elsewhere, a great 
deal of time and cognitive effort is likely invested into idea re-working and improvement. 
Thus, real-wortd creative artists may be engaged in a prolonged version of this 
generative-elaboration. It is also possible, though speculative, that the twins who 
plagiarised their sibling's memories, repeatedly thought about or talked about the event 
during their lives. Consequently, investigating generative-elaboration could provide a 
mechanism that enhances understanding of how those striving to be creative may 
unknowingly appropriate others' ideas as their own. In making this claim we sincerely 
hope that we have avoided this error ourselves. 
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Table 1 
Mean rates of correct recall and unconscious plagiarism (UP) within the recall-own 
(RO) & generate-new (GN) phases following different kinds of elaboration in the 
retention interval. 
Outcome 
measure 
Elaboration carried out during the retention interval 
Control 
Imagery 
Elaboration 
Generative 
Elaboration 
Rich Imagery 
Elaboration 
Mean 
SD 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Recall 1.56" .98 2.44^^ 1.05 2.63^ 1.11 2-31" 1.02 
UP (RO) .19" .47 .84" .95 1.67" 1.61 .97' 1.17 
UP (GN) 1.03" 1.10 .59" .84 .84" .92 .63" .83 
Notes: Means within a row that share the same superscript letter do not 
significantly differ from one another (p<.05 after Sidak adjustment). 
